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ABSTRACT  
   
Growers and the USDA showed increasing favor for agricultural 
chemicals over cultural and biological forms of pest control through the first half 
of the twentieth century. With the introduction of DDT and other synthetic 
chemicals to commercial markets in the post-World War II era, pesticides became 
entrenched as the primary form of pest control in the industrial agriculture 
production system. Despite accumulating evidence that some pesticides posed a 
threat to human and environmental health, growers and government exercised 
path-dependent behavior in the development and implementation of pest control 
strategies. As pests developed resistance to regimens of agricultural chemicals, 
growers applied pesticides with greater toxicity in higher volumes to their fields 
with little consideration for the unintended consequences of using the economic 
poisons. Consequently, pressure from non-governmental organizations proved a 
necessary predicate for pesticide reform.  
This dissertation uses a series of case studies to examine the role of non-
governmental organizations, particularly environmental organizations and 
farmworker groups, in pesticide reform from 1962 to 2011. For nearly fifty years, 
these groups served as educators, communicating scientific and experiential 
information about the adverse effects of pesticides on human health and 
environment to the public, and built support for the amendment of pesticide 
policies and the alteration of pesticide use practices. Their efforts led to the 
passage of more stringent regulations to better protect farmworkers, the public, 
and the environment. Environmental organizations and farmworker groups also 
  ii 
acted as watchdogs, monitoring the activity of regulatory agencies and bringing 
suit when necessary to ensure that they fulfilled their responsibilities to the public.  
This dissertation will build on previous scholarly work to show increasing 
collaboration between farmworker groups and environmental organizations. It 
argues that the organizations shared a common concern about the effects of 
pesticides on human health, which enabled bridge-builders within the disparate 
organizations to foster cooperative relationships. Bridge-building proved a 
mutually beneficial exercise. Variance in organizational strategies and the timing 
of different reform efforts limited, but did not eliminate, opportunities for 
collaboration. Coalitions formed when groups came together temporarily, and 
then drifted apart when a reform effort reached its terminus, leaving future 
collaboration still possible. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: SOWING THE SEEDS OF INDUSTRIALIZED 
AGRICULTURE 
Thanksgiving passed without incident for the agricultural industry in 1961, 
which must have given American growers cause for thanks.  In the two years 
prior, in a somewhat bitter twist of irony, the holiday most centered on eating (and 
overeating) gave rise to separate episodes that temporarily heightened public 
scrutiny of the agricultural industry.  The incidents, undoubtedly frustrating to 
growers, blemished a period of years in which productivity and respect for the 
industry were growing.  During World War II, the US Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) asserted that “food will win the war and write the peace,” to which 
American growers responded with a 33 percent boost in yield over the average of 
the four years preceding the global conflict.1  Then with escalating fears that a 
hungry Europe could collapse into totalitarianism, United States’ agriculture took 
on even greater importance.  Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson called 
upon growers to expand production further to feed the masses in Europe, giving 
growers a role in Cold War politics.2
                                                 
1Allen J. Matusow, Farm Policies and Politics in the Truman Years (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 3.   
  The high yield system of agriculture was 
 
2 Edmund Russell, War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects from World 
War I to Silent Spring (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 175; John 
H. Perkins, Insects, Experts, and the Insecticide Crisis: The Quest for New Pest 
Management Strategies (New York: Plenum Press, 1982), 227. 
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exported to other countries as well under the banner of the Green Revolution.3  
With new chemical and technological developments, agriculture embodied the 
spirit of modern, efficient industrial production.4
The first episode began in the weeks preceding Thanksgiving in 1959.  
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) Arthur Fleming called a 
press conference in early November to urge stores to stop selling cranberries, a 
Thanksgiving staple, because the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had 
discovered pesticide contamination in stocks from Washington and Oregon.  Tests 
showed excessive levels of aminotriazole, a pesticide known to cause thyroid 
cancer in rats.  After Fleming’s announcement, bulldozers buried contaminated 
berries, restaurants removed dishes with a cranberry ingredient from the menu and 
the public, erring on the side of caution, shied away from consumption.
  Yet, two previous Thanksgiving 
incidents in 1959 and 1960, one related to pesticides and the other to the working 
and living conditions of farmworkers, exposed some darker problems related to 
two core components of the modern industrial agricultural production system. 
5
                                                 
3 Angus Wright, The Death of Ramón González: The Modern Agricultural 
Dilemma (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 6. 
  As a 
result, cranberry sales plummeted to one-third of the expectation for the holiday 
 
4 Wright, The Death of Ramón González, 5-7; Deborah Fitzgerald, Every Farm a 
Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003), 186-187. 
 
5 House Subcommittee on Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies 
Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Agriculture 
Appropriations for 1961: Part 5 Indemity Payments to Growers of Cranberries 
and Caponettes, 86th Congress, 2nd Sess., 1960, 45; Clarence Dean, “Cranberry 
Sales Curbed,” New York Times, November 11, 1959. 
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season.6  The USDA and the American Cranberry Growers’ Association 
immediately engaged in a successful damage control campaign, ensuring 
consumers that pesticides were safe to use in food production and that the United 
States had the safest food supply in the world.7  Optimistic for the coming year, 
cranberry growers once again exceeded record production levels in 1960.8
As families and friends finished their meals of turkey, stuffing, and 
cranberries on Thanksgiving in 1960, many tuned in to watch Edward R. Murrow 
on CBS Reports.  The evening’s segment, entitled “Harvest of Shame,” showed a 
side of agriculture unfamiliar to most Americans.  The program followed a 
migrant stream of seasonal workers who trailed the ripening of crops up the 
Eastern Seaboard to work the harvest in fields and orchards.  Murrow 
characterized the migrant families as the “forgotten people,” chronicling their 
abject poverty and deplorable living and working conditions.
 
9
                                                 
6House Subcommittee on Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies 
Appropriations, Department of Agriculture Appropriations for 1961, 10.  
  He reported that 
migrants worked for depressed wages that were too low to advance their condition 
and lived in unsanitary housing often lacking toilets and clean water.  Secretary of 
Labor James Mitchell referred to them as the “great mass...of excluded 
 
7 Ibid., 55. 
 
8 “’60 Cranberry Crop is Approved by U.S.,” New York Times, November 18, 
1960. 
 
9 CBS Reports, “Harvest of Shame,” episode 78 (originally aired November 26, 
1960), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7087479n&tag=related;photovideo 
(accessed March 24, 2011). 
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Americans…whose plight is a shame.”10  Murrow concluded the “migrants have 
no lobby” and suggested that “only an enlightened, aroused, and perhaps angered 
public opinion” could influence legislation to improve the migrants’ condition.11  
The television documentary shocked many Americans who watched the show 
with full bellies in comfortable settings and increased support for legislation to 
improve farmworkers’ quality of life.  Yet, in the five years following, no new 
federal labor laws significantly changed agricultural labor relations.12
Despite the occasional negative publicity, production in the industrial 
agricultural system continued apace in 1961, dependent upon the voluminous use 
of pesticides and a force of seasonal workers mired in poverty.  Chemical forms 
of pest control and increased mechanization did not supplant the need for 
farmworkers in the industrialized production of fruit and vegetables in the 
twentieth century.  A tractable and seasonal workforce, in fact, remained as vitally 
important to industrial agriculture as pesticides.  The desire for a cheap and 
compliant workforce increased as large-scale commercial agriculture grew and 
 
                                                 




12 CBS received approximately 2,700 communications after the broadcast, nearly 
all of which were positive.  Press reviews proved to be similarly good.  The 
YWCA, National Council of Churches, Bishops’ Committee for Migrant 
Workers, AFL-CIO, and National Child Labor Committee thought that the film 
was important enough to host a viewing before Congress in January 1961.  
Congress responded, passing three bill in August 1961 related to migrants.  None 
of the laws improved conditions in the field or gave farmworkers greater leverage 
with employers.  Richard J. Schaefer, “Reconsidering Harvest of Shame: The 
Limitations of a Broadcast Journalism Landmark,” Journalism History 19, No. 4 
(Winter 1994).  
  5 
the fixed costs of production rose.  Growers stymied organizing efforts among 
farmworkers as growers’ associations worked to deny agricultural labor the rights 
provided to their industrial counterparts.  Healthy yields of produce and profits, 
they believed, depended upon reliable forms of chemical pest control and a 
reliable force of cheap, seasonal workers. 
 
American Agriculture’s Chemical Dependency 
 
The end of World War II heralded an era of agriculture in which many 
growers unflaggingly put their faith in chemical control technologies as their 
primary means of pest control.  Synthetic agricultural chemicals offered growers a 
control over nature that had been previously unobtainable.  Pesticides had a long 
history of usage in the United States prior to the introduction of synthetic 
chemicals, but had never been relied on to the degree that they were after World 
War II.  The strong reliance on pesticides in the post-World War II era solidified a 
path dependency in agriculture, in which it became ever more difficult for 
growers and entomologists to switch from chemical control technology to other 
systems of pest management.13
Folk remedies and botanicals assisted farmers in pest control prior to the 
development of industrial chemical compounds.  The application of salt and ash 
   
                                                 
13 John H. Perkins, “The Quest for Innovation in Agricultural Entomology, 1945-
1975,” in Pest Control: Cultural and Environmental Aspects, edited by David 
Pimentel and John H. Perkins (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 30, 37.   
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to fig trees to prevent worm damage, for example, dates back two-thousand years 
in Rome.  Folk wisdom continued to inform farmers about botanical mixtures that 
could be used to control pests for centuries thereafter.14  Towards the end of the 
eighteenth century, botanical insecticides became available in the commercial 
market.  Pyrethrum, composed of a blend of dried and crushed petals of several 
varieties of chrysanthemum, sold in the United States as an “insect powder” 
before 1800, but the high cost of the import limited its usage in agriculture.15  The 
development and increasing availability of soap solutions in the 1840s offered a 
more affordable pest control option.  In years following, soaps acted as an 
important ingredient in a variety of emulsions and oils designed to control insect 
pests.16
Farmers’ increased usage of emulsions and oils in the control of insects 
roughly coincided with the expansion of agriculture in the West and the 
associated growth of monocultural crop production (the cultivation of large 
 
                                                 
14 Russell, War and Nature, 5. 
  
15 Ibid., 6;  William H. McGarrah, “The Insecticide Value of Commercial Insect 
Powder” in Proceedings of the Pennsylvania Pharmaceutical Association at Its 
Seventh Annual Meeting, Held in Wilkes-Barre, June 3 and 4, 1884, With The 
Constitution, By-Laws, Code of Ethics, and Roll of Members (Harrisburg, PA: 
Lane S. Hart, Printer and Binder, 1884), 154.  Farmers also used the extract from 
a species of herbaceous flower plants and the “nicotine dust” of ground tobacco in 
their efforts to control insect populations.  James E. McWilliams, American Pests:  
The Losing War on Insects from Colonial Times to DDT (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008), 47.  
 
16 Kerosene, crude carbolic acid, distillate, and crude oil emulsions all had soap as 
one of their primary ingredients, as did resin washes.  E.O. Essig, A History of 
Entomology (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1931), 403, 404.  
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expanses of single-crop fields instead of smaller mixed-crop fields), which turned 
complex ecosystems into much simpler ones.  The development of vast 
monocultural landscapes greatly increased the threat of insect damage in 
agriculture.  In California, for instance, growers who imported non-native nursery 
stocks for cultivation in the state’s burgeoning citrus industry also imported a host 
of serious pests, such as the San Jose Scale, that plagued their operations for years 
thereafter.17  The improvement of continental transportation networks not only 
increased the speed with which agricultural goods could be transported to market, 
but also inadvertently helped spread the range of pests across ecosystems. The 
insect populations often encountered a plentiful food supply in the new simplified 
environments and few native predators to keep their numbers in check.18
Paris Green, a complex compound of copper acetate and copper arsenite, 
became the first widely used chemical poison in farmers’ battles against pests.  Its 
usage can be traced back to the early 1860s when it was employed as a control 
  
Growers considered insecticides as an option when facing heightened threats from 
insects. 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 53.  James Lick likely introduced the San Jose Scale to the United States 
when he transported Chilean citrus trees to his orchards in California in 1870.  
L.O. Howard and C.L. Marlatt, The San Jose Scale:  It’s Occurrences in the 
United States With a Full Account of its Life History and the Remedies to be Used 
Against It (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896), 10. 
 
18 Thomas Dunlap, DDT:  Scientists, Citizens, & Public Policy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1981), 18, 19.  The accidentally imported Australian 
cottony-cushion scale wreaked havoc on the California citrus industry for two 
years, because it had no natural predators in the state.  It ceased to be a threat only 
after entomologists purposely imported its primary predator, the ladybug, from 
Australia.  McWilliams, American Pests, 91. 
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agent for the Colorado beetle.19  Apple growers on the East Coast employed Paris 
Green soon thereafter as a means to control the codling moth and canker worm.20  
Other arsenic-containing compounds bearing names like London Purple, Paris 
Purple, and Scheele’s Green appeared on the market between 1868 and 1892, but 
Paris Green remained the most popular arsenic-based form of pest control in the 
late-nineteenth century.21 Arsenic, of course, kills more than target insects and the 
hazards of Paris Green filtered periodically through the press.  Paris Green likely 
killed thousands of fish in the Connecticut River in 1878 after heavy rains washed 
the chemical from the fields and into the waterway.22  The pesticide also posed a 
threat to farmers who applied it carelessly to their crops and consumers who 
purchased fruit with excessive residues.23  The extreme toxicity of Paris Green 
actually made it a popular poison for individuals with suicidal intent and persons 
harboring malicious or murderous thoughts in the late nineteenth century.24
                                                 
19 Hubert Martin, The Scientific Principles of Plant Protection (New York: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1928), 6.  
  
 
20 Russell, War and Nature, 6.  
 
21 Martin, The Scientific Principles of Plant Protection, 109.  
 
22 “Millions of Fish and Fowl Dying: Results of the Use of Paris Green in 
Agriculture,” New York Times, August 9, 1878. 
 
23 “Killed By Paris Green,” New York Times, July 8, 1884; “Poisoned Grapes on 
Sale: Quantities of Them Destroyed by Health Officers,” New York Times, 
September 23, 1891. 
 
24 See, for example, “Disappointed in Love,” New York Times, October 22, 1887; 
“Driven to Suicide,” New York Times, February 2, 1887; “Attempted Suicide by 
Paris Green,” New York Times, November 22, 1878; “Love and Paris Green,” 
New York Times, July 15, 1888; “Paris Green in a Well,” New York Times, June 
  9 
Nevertheless, by 1896, farmers in the United States applied two-thousand tons of 
Paris Green to crops annually.25  Ten years later, usage of Paris Green had all but 
ceased as the development of lead arsenates and other arsenical compounds that 
promised a supposedly safer form of protection from pests grew in popularity.26
Farmers’ usage of pesticides increased with the development of a 
professional class of economic entomologists.  Most farmers lacked the financial 
resources necessary to pay entomologists for independent consultation, yet a 
series of devastating crop losses caused by locust outbreaks in the years between 
1873 and 1876 made clear the need for improved pest control.  Missouri state 
entomologist Charles Valentine Riley argued for an increased federal role in 
agriculture and helped convince Congress to allocate funds for the creation of a 
three-man Entomological Commission in 1876.
 
27   The passage of the Hatch Act 
in 1887 expanded professional employment opportunities for entomologists.28
                                                                                                                                     
24, 1898; “Work of A Scoundrel,” New York Times, March 1, 1892; “Paris Green 
in His Pie,” New York Times, February 14, 1884; “Poisoning Case in Hoboken,” 
New York Times, July 10, 1869. 
  In 
 
25 Russell, War and Nature, 6. 
 
26 Essig, A History of Entomology, 428; Martin, The Scientific Principles of Plant 
Protection, 109.   Lead arsenate was later found to be carcinogenic and 
mutagenic.  “Lead Arsenate,” EPA Pesticide Fact Sheet 112 (December 1986), 
http://pmep.cce.cornell.edu/profiles/insect-mite/fenitrothion-methylpara/lead-
arsenate/insect-prof-leadars.html (accessed January 1, 2011); Trish Hall, 
“Grapefruit Safety Questioned,” New York Times, September 21, 1988. 
 
27 Perkins, Insects, Experts, and the Insecticide Crisis, 242-244.  
 
28 Two years after the passage of the Hatch Act, entomologists formed the 
Association of Official Economic Entomologists to facilitate communication 
between members and promote the interests of the new class of scientific 
  10 
years following, the growing class of professional entomologists found 
employment opportunities in a host of government agencies and public 
institutions, including the USDA, land grant universities, state agricultural 
experiment stations, and extension services.29
Neither farmers nor economic entomologists, however, wholly put their 
faith in chemical control methods during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.  Farmers continued to employ cultural methods of control that worked 
for them in the past.  These methods included intercropping, hybridization of 
plant varieties, altering planting schedules, and growing lure plants to draw 
predacious insects away from harvest crops.
 
30
                                                                                                                                     
professionals.  The organization later dropped the word “Official” from their 
name to become the Association of Economic Entomologists.  Dunlap, DDT, 22, 
23. 
  The majority of chemicals in this 
period came out of the fledgling insecticide industry in the private sector and 
carried unproven, often fraudulent claims about the effectiveness of the product 
on the target pest and the safety of the product for use by the farmer. USDA 
reported that nineteen out of forty-five samples of Paris Green taken by the 
agency contained unallowable amounts of sodium sulfate.  It also found a number 
of pesticides to have levels of arsenic that would burn crop foliage.  Nineteen of 
the 105 samples of pyrethrum tested contained a “poisonous substance” that 
posed a threat to applicators.  The agency held that other insecticides had such 
 
29 Perkins, Insects, Experts, and the Insecticide Crisis, 243-244.  
 
30 McWilliams, American Pests, 49; Martin, The Scientific Principles of Plant 
Protection, 11.  
  11 
high levels of inert ingredients that they would have no effect on insect pests.31  
No regulatory laws existed, though, to prevent companies from making dubious 
claims about adulterated pesticides.  Consequently, many farmers remained wary 
about using agricultural chemicals.32  The difficulties of preparing chemical 
mixtures, the instability of some chemical compounds, and the necessity of 
considering external variables such as weather and climate also slowed the 
process by which chemical controls were incorporated into agricultural practices 
during the first decades of pesticide development.33
Economic entomologists did not solely focus on chemical solutions either, 
choosing instead to experiment with a variety of control techniques in their efforts 
to protect farmers’ crops.  They analyzed the effects of a variety of biological, 
cultural, and chemical controls on experimental farms in order to determine the 
best combination of strategies for farmers to employ in a localized context.
 
34
                                                 
31 House of Representatives, Adulterated or Misbranded Fungicides, Insecticides, 
Etc., 61st Cong., 2d sess., 1910, H. Rep. 990, 5. 
  The 
 
32 Perkins, Insects, Experts, and the Insecticide Crisis, 4; McWilliams, American 
Pests, 97; Essig, A History of Entomology, 419. 
 
33 Farmers generally had to wait until wind conditions were light or non-existent 
before they applied chemical dusts to crops or else the powder would blow away 
from its target.  The Bordeaux mixture, a gelatinous compound used to treat down 
mildew on vines, had to be used immediately after mixing or it would go through 
significant physical changes that rendered it an ineffective control agent.  Martin, 
The Scientific Principles of Plant Protection, 55, 79; McWilliams, American 
Pests, 104. 
 
34 Entomologists continued to favor a decentralized approach to pest management 
even as the establishment of the Division of Entomology raised the possibility that 
more universally applicable solutions would take precedence.  McWilliams, 
American Pests, 55, 81.  
  12 
United States Entomological Commission, for instance, recommended that 
farmers on the Great Plains extinguish prairie fires during the autumn months 
when conflagrations typically occurred, so that controlled burning in the spring 
could be employed as a means of reducing locust infestations.35  Respected 
entomologist Charles Riley recognized the utility of pesticides like Paris Green 
and London Purple in some circumstances, but was cited as an authority who 
thought it “unwise and unsafe to employ such poisons, or to recommend them” in 
other situations.36  After being appointed Chief of the USDA Bureau of 
Entomology in 1881, Riley continued to show favor for biological controls over 
other pest management strategies, holding that every insect pest had a predator to 
keep its population in check.37
                                                                                                                                     
 
  Biological controls received an additional boost in 
popularity in 1888 when Albert Koebele discovered that the ladybug was the 
natural predator of the cottony-cushion (fluted scale) and saved California’s citrus 
35 J.A. Lintner, “Entomology in America in 1879,” The American Entomologist 3, 
No. 2 (February 1880): 33. 
 
36 “The Use of Paris Green,” American Entomologist 3, No. 9 (September 1880): 
244. 
 
37 McWilliams, American Pests, 86, 87.  Charles Valentine Riley first served as 
the head of the Bureau of Entomology from 1877 to 1879 when he resigned.  John 
Henry Comstock replaced Riley, but only stayed in the position two years.  Riley 
was reappointed as head of the bureau in 1881 and remained until 1894.  J.S. 
Wade, “Leland Ossian Howard (Obituary),” Annals of the Entomological Society 
of America 43, No. 4 (December 1950): 610. 
 
  13 
industry from certain devastation by introducing the insect into the state to control 
the pest population.38
Separate campaigns against the gypsy moth and boll weevil that 
respectively employed biological and cultural controls proved embarrassing 
public failures for the Bureau of Entomology though.
 
39  Introduced accidentally 
into the United States by a French naturalist in 1869, the gypsy moth grew in 
number, ravaging trees in towns and forests across Massachusetts.40  Leland 
Howard, who replaced Riley as chief in 1894, found approximately fifty natural 
enemies of the gypsy moth in Europe and imported them to combat the pest 
explosion in the Northeast.  Positive results, however, failed to materialize as they 
had in California with the ladybug.  The variety of the imported insect predators 
did not thrive in Massachusetts and made no significant dent in the gypsy moth 
population.41
                                                 
38 McWilliams, American Pests, 90-91. 
  The boll weevil entered the United States by crossing the Rio 
Grande into the Brownville region of Texas in 1893, its range rapidly spreading 
across the Cotton Belt in years following.  Entomologists initially urged that 
cotton planting in the Brownville region cease in hopes that the action would stop 
the advance of the boll weevil into more productive cotton growing areas of the 
American South.  When Brownville cotton growers did not heed the advice, the 
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Bureau of Entomology advised growers across the South to alter their cropping 
practices by planting an early-maturing seed and burning cotton stalks in October 
to eliminate habitat that the weevil used for hibernation in the cold winter 
months.42  Cotton states refused to pass laws mandating the growers to alter their 
cropping practices and growers failed to act in concert voluntarily, so the 
suggested cultural controls proved ineffective.43
The results of the gypsy moth and boll weevil campaign increased Leland 
Howard’s favor for pesticides and contributed to the Bureau of Entomology’s 
shift in emphasis towards chemical solutions in agriculture.  Howard had always 
harbored more of an interest in agricultural chemicals than his predecessor 
Charles Riley.  He gained his entomological knowledge in the classrooms and 
laboratories of Cornell University, differing from earlier generations of 
entomologists, who typically received their training on the farm and in the fields.  
The time spent at Cornell undoubtedly exposed Howard to the discourse of 
scientific colleagues who still characterized entomologists as amateurish bug-
catchers, despite their clear attempts to define themselves as a professional class.  
The development of universal chemical solutions to solve agricultural pest 
problems held the possibility of granting entomologists access to the more 
prestigious ranks of scientists, because pesticides had the potential for universal 
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applicability, fast action, and predictable results.  These characteristics fit the 
mood of an era that valued standardization, efficiency, and progress.44  This 
background coupled with the negative experience with biological and chemical 
pest control programs helped convince Howard that pesticides were the best and 
most infallible form of pest control in agriculture.45
If farmers were to rely more heavily on chemical controls though, they 
had to trust more completely in the effectiveness of pesticides.  Howard and other 
entomologists lobbied Congress for the passage of legislation that would help 
protect farmers from financial losses by forcing pesticide manufactures to follow 
certain guidelines.
 
46  Farmers and growers similarly argued that regulation was 
necessary to protect their economic interests.47
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  National Grange, American Apple 
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horticultural societies urged Congress to pass a bill regulating agricultural 
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chemicals.  Major pesticide manufacturers supported the passage of the 
Insecticide Act of 1910 as well, recognizing that pesticide sales would increase if 
farmers better trusted commercial products.  Tomsen Chemical Company 
President H.F. Baker stated that pesticide manufacturers “want standards 
established, so that we may be protected against manufacturers who are desirous 
of selling substandard products.” 48
The component parts of the Insecticide Act centered on protecting farmers 
from pesticide manufacturers making dubious claims about the efficacy of their 
product.
   
49  It required manufacturers to accurately portray the effects of pesticides 
and list inert ingredients on product labels.  The act set purity and strength 
standards for the two most popular agricultural chemicals, Paris Green and lead 
arsenate.50  It also charged the newly created Insecticide and Fungicide Board 
with the responsibility of making sure that pesticide manufacturers followed the 
new regulations.51
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  In years following, the Insecticide and Fungicide Board 
undertook scientific investigations to determine the effects of various pesticides 
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on insects, fungi and commercial crops; conducted hearings on alleged violations 
of the law; and engaged in educational outreach efforts to help bring pesticide 
manufacturers into accordance with the law.52
The outbreak of war in Europe further stimulated the manufacture and use 
of chemicals in American agriculture.  Cotton growers, for instance, increased use 
of calcium arsenate to better protect their crop from the boll weevil and meet 
wartime demands.
  Concerns about human and 
environmental health did not factor into the passage of the law. 
53  The war also sparked the growth of domestic chemical 
production in the United States.  Germany manufactured the bulk of coal-tar 
intermediates used in the manufacture of synthetic chemicals prior to World War 
I, but the United States’ termination of trade with the belligerent nation in 1915 
spurred domestic production.  Federal entomologists experimented with the 
synthetic compound Paradichlorobenzene (PDB) and toxic chemical mixtures 
contemporaneous with the growth of the domestic chemical industry.54
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Entomologist E.B. Blakeslee soon discovered that PDB worked well against the 
peach tree borer, an insect pest which previously had to be removed from beneath 
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tree bark by hand.  Chemicals once again proved to be an efficient labor-saving 
device in campaigns against agricultural pests.55  As a result of these 
developments, the United States emerged from World War I with a much matured 
chemical industry and heightened interest among farmers in chemical control 
technologies.56
The combination of war, greater volume of commercial pesticides, and 
increased farmer interest in agricultural chemicals presented an opportunity for 
entomologists to bolster their professional status as well.  Howard believed that 
entomologists had the opportunity to gain a respect that was sometimes lacking 
for their profession by protecting critical foodstuffs from insect devastation and 
by addressing war-related pest issues.  The immediacies of war, though, 
demanded universally applicable solutions that were fast-acting and effective.  In 
1918 when boll worms infested fields full of castor beans, the product of which 
lubricated airplane cylinders, entomologists did not have the time necessary to 
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customers.  Entomologists not only had to find a form of control that worked in 
 
56 Ibid., 23; Russell, War and Nature, 37. 
 
57 McWilliams, American Pests, 129, 132, 142. 
 
  19 
the fields, but one that fit the needs and desires of the agricultural community.58  
Recommending pesticides had the added benefit of increasing entomologists’ 
prestige as they helped farmers navigate the complicated chemical marketplace.59  
While the Bureau of Entomology continued to consider biological and cultural 
controls, it turned increasingly to chemical solutions.60
After the cessation of conflict in Europe, the growing domestic chemical 
industry worked to maintain profit levels by promoting agricultural use of 
pesticides.  Hoping to find solutions to the agricultural pest problems within the 
United States, chemical companies invested as never before in scientific research.  
They also poured money into advertising to sway consumers who still harbored a 
degree of distrust about the ability of pesticides to conquer pests without harming 
commercial crops.  Pesticide manufacturers promised that their products would 
vanquish insect foes rather than simply control populations, casting chemicals as 
the method best suited to counter the insect hordes.
 
 61  This tone matched the 
character of messages from the Bureau of Entomology and Leland Howard, which 
warned “the great armies of insect pests…are our worst rivals and enemies.”62
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The rhetoric proved appealing to growers in an increasingly capital-
intensive industry.  Nearly all of the innovations in agriculture during the 
twentieth century—new machinery, pesticides, fertilizers, irrigation 
developments—raised the fixed cost of production. The technological 
developments promised increased yields with less labor, but required greater 
capital investments up front.  The most commercially successful farmers adopted 
the new technologies despite the added cost.  Those who chose not to adapt or 
could not afford to do so became less viable in the marketplace and gradually 
disappeared.  As a result, from the 1930s onward, farms became increasingly 
consolidated into the hands of persons with a higher level of education, wealth 
and power who valued managerial skills and technological efficiency over hard 
physical labor.63  Chemicals promising total control of pest populations appealed 
to these farmers because they saved labor and offered the best chance of 
protecting the investments made in the fixed costs of production.64
Chemical controls soon became entrenched in agricultural pest 
management strategies.  The volume of insecticides applied to fields increased 
significantly in the first three decades of the twentieth century.  For instance, 
usage of Paris Green in the United States equated to 2,000 tons annually before 
the turn of the twentieth century.  Similarly, manufacturers sold 2,500 tons of lead 
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arsenate between 1907 and 1908.65  In 1938, the volume of Paris Green remained 
constant, while annual usage of lead arsenate climbed to more than 4,000 tons.66  
The increase in pesticide usage signaled a greater reliance on pesticides as the 
primary means of pest control.  Chemical inputs became routine in agricultural 
production.  Environmental historian James E. McWilliams contends that:  “Path 
dependency—in this case, the idea that agribusiness, the federal government, and 
the insecticide industry had chosen to fight insect infestations exclusively with 
chemicals—limited the way in which scientists and farmers framed the pest 
situation and contemplated their options.”67
Despite the growing chemical dependency in agriculture, scientists still 
knew little about the health effects of exposure to some of the most popular 
chemicals.  A consumer scare over arsenic on apples in 1925 prompted FDA to 
begin monitoring residues of lead arsenate on apples.  The agency had the 
approval of growers’ associations anxious for a rebound in consumer purchasing, 
but some of the growers negatively affected by the FDA effort demanded 
justification for the new policy and proof that lead arsenate posed a health threat 
to consumers.
   
68
                                                 
65 Russell, War and Nature, 6.   
 Assessing public risk in a widely variant populace of young, old, 
 
66 McWilliams, American Pests, 169.   
 
67 Ibid., 170. 
 
68 Christopher C. Sellers, Hazards of the Job: From Industrial Disease to 
Environmental Health Science (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1997), 199; Dunlap, DDT, 45-47. 
 
  22 
healthy, and infirm individuals proved a difficult task for the agency, particularly 
when attempting to find the chronic effects of low exposure to lead arsenate.  
FDA opted to initiate animal-based experimentation, using rats to conduct 
lifetime feeding experiments with the chemical.  It planned to project the results 
from these tests onto the human population with which it was most concerned.69  
Growers’ associations opposed the animal-based studies though, fearing the 
results would lead to FDA setting low tolerance levels for lead arsenate residue on 
fruit.  They argued that human-based studies provided the only reliable results, 
voicing their concerns to congressional allies.70  Testing the chronic effects of a 
poison on humans, however, raised obvious moral problems and was not a 
feasible option.  Still Missouri Democratic Representative Clarence Cannon, who 
chaired the agricultural appropriations subcommittee, responded by inserting a 
clause into the 1937 budget bill that read:  “no part of the funds appropriated by 
this act shall be used for laboratory investigations to determine the possible 
harmful effects on human beings of spray insecticides on fruits and vegetables.”71
The US Public Health Service later undertook a study looking at the 
effects of lead arsenate exposure on orchard workers in Washington.  The study, 
though, examined data that would show the acute effects of a chemical, which 
was not the primary concern with lead arsenate exposure.  The difference in 
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design made Public Health Service less able to determine the associated risk of 
chronic health problems than the preceding FDA tests and yielded little useful 
information on the health effects of lead arsenate.  Since the test results suggested 
that lead arsenate did not have severe effects, the Federal Security Administration 
raised tolerance levels for residues on fruit without determining the chronic 
effects of exposure.  The action failed to generate a public response, since concern 
about pesticide residue had largely faded by the time that the Public Health 
Service completed its investigation.  Consequently, little impetus existed to 
conduct additional tests, particularly when a well-formed agricultural lobby 
opposed it.72
Attention soon shifted from lead arsenate to a new “miracle” chemical, 
DDT, during World War II.  The proven effectiveness of DDT as an insect control 
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  Some scientists tempered their optimism about DDT.  The 
uncertain effects of DDT on populations of beneficial insects concerned some 
entomologists, because eradication of some non-target insects had the possibility 
of increasing pest problems.  FDA pharmacologists also found that DDT 
accumulated in the fat cells of dogs that ingested the chemical in experiments.  
Prudence led some scientists to call for more testing before use of DDT became 
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widespread.74  Impressive evidence from the warfront of DDT’s ability to 
decimate populations of mosquitoes and lice, however, made the transition from 
military usage to civilian markets a near certainty, particularly because the lack of 
a regulatory framework for pesticides made it nearly impossible for the 
government to keep chemicals off the market.75
The manufacture and usage of DDT and other pesticides exploded after 
World War II.  The number of companies manufacturing pesticides grew from 83 
in 1938 to 273 in 1954.
   
76  DDT production in the United States rose from 10 
million pounds in 1945 to 100 million pounds in 1951.77  As the volume of use 
exploded, there were some indications that DDT’s reign as a chemical miracle 
worker would be limited.  By 1949, the common housefly and two strains of 
mosquitoes had developed resistance to the chemical, even when the application 
was ten times stronger than it had been in previous years.78
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powerful pesticides had to be developed.79  The number of agricultural chemicals 
produced proved staggering.  By early 1947, approximately 25,000 pesticide 
products had been registered for sale.  The count showed no sign of slowing 
either.  The tremendous growth in pesticide manufacturing made it extremely 
difficult for the government to keep track of pesticides as they were introduced 
for sale in commercial markets.80
Congress responded with the passage of the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) in 1947.  FIFRA required that pesticide 
manufacturers’ register their products with USDA before making them 
commercially available to the public.  The Insecticide Act of 1910 only required 
the listing of ingredients on product labels and prohibited dubious claims from 
being made in the marketing of insecticides.  The outdated act did not require 
pesticide manufacturers to register products with a government agency, which 
made it nearly impossible for USDA to track agricultural chemicals in the 
marketplace.  With the passage of FIFRA, manufacturers had to attest to the 
safety and effectiveness of a product and submit a description of the chemical’s 
composition, results of residue tests, safety reports, analytical methodology, and 
the proposed label for review to the USDA’s Pesticide Regulation Division.  
Companies had to include a warning on pesticide labels that cautioned of the 
potential harm that usage may cause to humans, vertebrate animals, and 
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vegetation (excepting weeds) under the new law as well.  In further attempt to 
prevent accidental injury, FIFRA necessitated that companies add a dye to 
agricultural chemicals sold in white powder form, in hopes that the discoloration 
would prevent individuals from mistaking the poisons for similar looking 
products (sugar, flour, salt, baking powder, etc) used in cooking.81
State-level legislation preceded and sparked the congressional action on 
pesticide regulation.  Nine states passed laws to address a spate of injuries and 
deaths resulting from the accidental use of white powdered pesticides in food 
preparation.  Fifty persons interred at a state hospital in Salem, Oregon died and 
467 others suffered from poisoning after eating food contaminated with the 
insecticide sodium fluoride.  Similar episodes with sodium fluoride occurred on a 
small scale in New York and Pennsylvania.  In Texas, a cook preparing food for 
farmworkers mistakenly used an arsenic-based insecticide in the preparation of 
pancakes, resulting in the immediate death of a large number of men in the field.
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Louisiana, Tennessee, and New Hampshire responded to the cases of poisonings 
with laws designed to minimize episodes in which people accidentally consumed 
toxic pesticides.  The state laws generally required that a dye additive be used in 
white powder insecticides, though the legislative provisions varied slightly from 
state to state.83  USDA, pesticide manufacturers, and distributors favored the 
passage of FIFRA, because it would bring uniformity to pesticide regulation, 
vesting enforcement responsibilities with the Department of Agriculture.84 The 
American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), National Grange, and National 
Council of Farmer Cooperatives supported it, because the registration 
requirements and provisions on labeling promised to better protect growers from 
ineffective or harmful products.85  No consumer, conservation, or labor 
organization testified at the congressional hearings on FIFRA prior to its passage 
into law.86
FIFRA proved to be a relatively loose regulatory law that did little to keep 
dangerous agricultural chemicals off the market.  If USDA concluded that a 
pesticide did not comply with the tenets of the law, the agency was to notify the 
company seeking the registration and give them the opportunity to make 
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modifications.  The company, however, could refuse to make the necessary 
adjustments and still register their product under protest.87  If USDA chose to 
force the removal of a pesticide from commercial markets, it had to prove the 
hazardousness of the pesticide in court. The length and difficulty of the procedure 
to remove a pesticide from the market helped assure that USDA would take a 
noninterventionist approach to pesticide registration.88  USDA’s Pesticide 
Registration Division consistently bowed to pesticide makers when the companies 
challenged a denied registration request.89
Additionally, while farmers supported the passage of FIFRA in 1947, their 
usage of pesticides and chemical dependency continued to increase through the 
1950s.  The powerful new synthetic chemicals of the postwar era brought 
problems as well as promise.  The powerful new chemicals decimated populations 
of insects indiscriminately, killing not only the target-species, but the beneficial 
predators of pests as well.  The killing of insect predators eliminated a natural 
control of minor agricultural pests, allowing their numbers to explode to the point 
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that they represented a serious secondary threat to farmers.  The problems of pest 
resistance, resurgence, and the growth of secondary pest problems did not cause 
farmers to turn back toward biological and cultural controls.  Rather they invested 
more heavily in chemical solutions. 90  Pesticide companies funded entomological 
research in universities, government dollars financed field tests, and farmers 
struggled to stay a step ahead of insect pests in order to meet the demand for 
agricultural products in Cold War America.91
 
  Pesticides, including those that 
posed a threat to human and environmental health, saturated the United States as 
it entered the 1960s.  
The Exceptional Nature of Farm Labor 
 
The modernization and professionalization of agriculture also reshaped 
many farm owners’ thinking about labor and production.  Prior to the growth of 
industrialized agriculture, farm families and local hired hands engaged in the 
work of agricultural production outside of the plantation South.  On large farms in 
the twentieth century, in contrast, multitudes of migrant farmworkers performed 
the work in the fields while farm owners assumed more of a managerial position.  
The labor relations in these situations bear comparison to the relations between 
manager and employee in industrial settings, yet distinct differences between the 
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field and the factory arguably made agricultural labor exceptional.  Agricultural 
labor demands peaked and fell in accordance with the growing seasons.  The fruit 
and vegetable products of farm labor had to be sold in a more timely fashion than 
the products of industrial labor. Still the labor involved in agricultural production 
increasingly followed an industrial logic.  Agricultural producers chose to stress 
the differences, arguing that farmworkers should be exempted from twentieth-
century labor legislation.  They regularly acted in concert with the government to 
deny agricultural workers political power in order to maintain a cheap and 
plentiful supply of labor. 
The industrial model of modern agriculture in the United States has roots 
in the Slave South; its development in free society, however, can be traced to 
California in the late 1800s. Ownership of cultivatable land in the state of 
California never rested in the hands of the multitudes.  Old Spanish land grants 
influenced agricultural settlement patterns after statehood, because many of the 
large tracts transferred virtually intact into American hands.92
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was in the fertile San Joaquin Valley.93  This pattern of property ownership in the 
California countryside did not facilitate the growth of small family-based farms; 
rather it was conducive to the development of expansive industrial-style 
agriculture dominated by a small elite group of land speculators.  Insurance 
companies, bankers, lawyers, and investors came together to form land syndicates 
intent on turning big profits in agriculture.  Versed in the corporate model of 
management, the urban-based land syndicates brought industrialized production 
to the fields.  The syndicates’ corporate mentality introduced new land use, 
cropping, and labor management trends to agriculture.94
California had distinct climatic advantages over other parts of the country, 
but its geographical distance from markets and reliance on irrigation water made 
agriculture a capital intensive venture.  It cost California growers much more to 
ship their products to market than it did Eastern farmers who resided closer to 
major urban centers.  Irrigation raised growers fixed costs as well.  The nation 
paid for the bulk of western water projects, but some of the irrigation systems’ 
costs passed on to growers.
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of large-scale commercial agriculture in the arid West.96  California growers, as a 
result, specialized in high-value crops such as fruits and vegetables, which fetched 
high prices in the East.  They planted thousands of acres with a single crop, 
recognizing that monoculture carried greater risk of pest infestation than a 
diversified production, but also knowing that it had higher profit-making 
potential.97  Chemicals promised quick and efficient crop protection that meshed 
with their industrial logic, but pesticide usage also added to the fixed cost of 
production.98
The most variable production cost proved to be labor.  Growers sought to 
hire the cheapest labor possible and employ them only for the duration of the 
season, arguing that a different wage system would threaten their profits.
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Race and ethnicity came to play an important role in the shape and character of 
farm labor. Growers recognized that field conditions in their large-scale 
agricultural operations would not be desirable to white workers with other 
employment opportunities so they sought other alternatives.100  Beginning in the 
late 1800s and continuing through the first half of the twentieth century, growers 
employed the logic of biological determinism.  They rationalized that some racial 
groups such as Asians and Mexicans possessed hereditary traits that better fitted 
them for stoop labor than others, contending that small physical stature made 
them naturally suited for field work.  Growers maintained that the Chinese and 
later Mexican and Filipino workers also had a high tolerance for hot weather, did 
not strive for the same goals as white Americans, and were content with poor 
working conditions and a migratory life.  They concluded that these 
characteristics made the ethnic groups most fit for seasonal field labor.101
California growers showed an early preference for Chinese workers 
because of their lack of political power and influence.  While they used a 
biological rationale in arguing Chinese fitness for fieldwork, it was public 
hostility towards the Chinese and legal discrimination against them that forged the 
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type of pliant laborer growers wanted.  Growers began employing them in large 
numbers during the 1870s, a time during which anti-Chinese sentiment reached a 
fever pitch in the state.  White Californians passed legislation and engaged in the 
politics of intimidation to keep Chinese workers out of certain employments.  
They also limited options for legal recourse.  An 1854 California Supreme Court 
decision, for instance, upheld a statute that prohibited testimony by Chinese 
persons from being heard in cases that involved white parties.  Growers, however, 
welcomed them into the fields, recognizing that such disenfranchisement worked 
to the growers’ advantage.102  The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the 
subsequent Geary Act of 1892, which provided for the deportation of Chinese 
persons residing illegally within the United States, cut into the growers’ supply of 
workers though.103  The exclusionary legislation forced growers to rely more 
heavily on a heterogeneous mix of workers in the early twentieth century.104
Labor activism among the heterogeneous group of farmworkers developed 
slowly and often met with violent tactics of suppression from growers and local 
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authorities.  Following the logic of industrialists, growers fostered artificial 
divisions in their workforce by segregating different ethnic groups and basing 
their pay on variant wage scales.105 The divide-and-conquer strategy combined 
with the migratory nature of farm work made labor organizing difficult.  The 
American Federation of Labor (AFL) made half-hearted attempts to organize the 
California fields between 1903 and 1916 that met with failure.106  Wobblies in the 
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) proved more adept at organizing 
agricultural workers between 1905 and 1915.  With an interest in advancing the 
condition of all workers, the union remained more committed to farmworkers than 
did the organizers in the AFL whose priority was protecting skilled craftsmen.  
The IWW also had a low dues requirement or none at all, which enabled 
farmworkers to participate with greater ease.  However, regular and violent 
conflicts with state authorities resulted in fleeting gains for the IWW and its 
members.107
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In the most explosive conflict between farmworkers and growers in the 
early twentieth century, the owners of a hops ranch attempted to use local 
authorities to break up a labor protest in Wheatland, California during the summer 
of 1913.  The Durst brothers saturated the local labor market to drive down wages 
by placing advertisements for many more workers than they needed on their 
ranch.  Workers accepted the reduced wages, but found themselves in abominable 
living conditions with an inadequate and unsanitary supply of water, as well as an 
absence of other amenities promised by the Dursts.  Rather than accept the 
conditions in the field, as had often been the case in the past, the fieldworkers 
organized a grievance committee with a contingency of Wobblies recruiting in the 
field.  Ralph Durst attempted to break the labor action by asking local authorities 
to arrest Richard “Blackie” Ford, the most prominent leader of the organizing 
effort.  The Yuba County sheriff, two deputies, and the district attorney arrived on 
the scene to make the arrest and attempted to disperse the peaceably assembled 
crowd of two-thousand men, women, and children by firing a shot into the air.  
The gunfire triggered fighting between fieldworkers and authorities, which 
ultimately left four persons dead - including the district attorney and a deputy 
sheriff.108
 The Wheatland Riot ended the workers’ agitation on the Durst Ranch, but 
it did not immediately end IWW organizing in the fields.  An extensive campaign 
of intimidation followed as Burns detectives in the employ of Yuba County 
undertook an extensive search for the individuals responsible for the death of the 
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district attorney and deputy.109  The riot and subsequent persecution of the IWW 
bolstered the union’s reputation as a defender of migrant workers, sparking a 
growth in membership.110  The violence, however, that pitted farmworkers against 
growers and local authorities also foreshadowed later attacks on the IWW.  
Employers, media, and all levels of government initiated a virulent verbal and 
physical campaign against the IWW with the onset of World War I.111
California growers had continued to lobby Congress throughout the early 
1900s for the reintroduction of Chinese labor in hope of returning to what they 
viewed as the halcyon days of agricultural labor, yet the prospects of such a 
change appeared increasingly slim in the 1910s.  Growers broadened their appeal 
in 1917, recognizing that the war in Europe would sap available labor supplies.  
The Fruit Growers’ Convention drafted a resolution asking Congress to 
  By 
decade’s end, farmworkers once again faced a future without a representative 
labor organization. 
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temporarily allow the introduction of foreign labor for the duration of World   
War I.  The Department of Labor responded positively, allowing Mexican 
nationals to enter the United States without a head tax and without passing a 
literacy test.  Upon crossing the border, Mexicans had to fill out an identification 
card and promise to remain employed in agriculture.  The Department of Labor 
stipulation that Mexican nationals remain gainfully employed in agriculture while 
in the United States made them as vulnerable a workforce as the Chinese.  With 
these rules in place, Mexicans could not vacate positions in the fields for better 
paying opportunity without risking arrest and deportation, which allowed growers 
to set the terms of employment with little fear of protest.  Growers could also use 
the threat of deportation to counter farmworkers’ demands for better field 
conditions and wages.  As with the Chinese, growers wielded extraordinary power 
over Mexican laborers. 112  The Department of Labor explicitly stated that the 
policy on Mexican workers was a temporary resolution intended to solve wartime 
labor shortages yet growers convincingly argued that they still faced labor 
shortages at war’s end, leading to the continued importation of foreign laborers 
who lacked the power to improve their work conditions.113
Growers used carefully crafted campaigns to erase memories of unrest in 
the 1910s from the public mind, while simultaneously working to increase 
production efficiency and control over labor.  Advertising masked the industrial 
style of production in the fields, characterizing agricultural goods as the creation 
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of sun, water, and soil.114  Human labor had no place in the marketing schema.  If 
an advertisement featured a person, it typically showed a delicate white woman 
offering fruit from the vine.  Environmental historian Douglas Sackman holds that 
these print illustrations positioned women as “mediators between nature and 
consumer” in apparent reference to “the woman-as-Mother-Earth icon.”115  The 
women in the advertisements bore little relation to workers in the field, which 
helped divert consumer attention away from mass labor exploitation in 
agricultural production.116  Behind the carefully cultivated bucolic images, 
growers established cooperative bureaus that developed a common wage structure 
to eliminate competition between employers and keep labor costs at a minimum.  
The collective organization of growers inhibited the growth of a collective 
organization of farmworkers, because workers had to confront a unified industry 
rather than a single farm or grower.117  As a result, farmworker wages declined 
even as advertising campaigns sparked production and growers’ profits in the late 
1920s.118
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 Migrants who worked for large growers often lived in seasonal labor 
camps, but the availability of this housing did little to improve workers living 
conditions or financial security.  Housing generally consisted of a one-room shack 
that would be shared by itinerant workers or a migrant family.  In the 1930s, 
California growers charged between three and fifteen dollars a month for a shack 
that typically lacked a bed, running water, and sanitary facilities.  Sometimes a pit 
toilet would sit at the end of row of houses for use by upwards of 100 people.  
John Steinbeck reported that that a camp of approximately 400 persons in Kern 
County, California had a single shower.119  While camp furnishings proved 
minimal, grower surveillance did not.  Growers sometimes hired armed private 
security forces to patrol camps and monitor activities.  Armed guards broke up 
workers who were congregating together and squashed attempts at organizing.  
Steinbeck characterized the growers’ attitude as one of “hatred and suspicion,” 
stating that they maintained order with “the threat of his deputies’ guns” and 
“herded [workers] about like animals,” using every means possible to “make them 
feel inferior and insecure.”120
Farmworker activism, nevertheless, increased during the 1930s, leading 
growers and local authorities to respond with a vigor reminiscent of Wheatland in 
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1913.  A decade of unrest began with two spontaneous strikes by Mexican and 
Filipino farmworkers in the fruit and vegetable fields of the Imperial Valley in 
1930.  The Trade Union Unity League and the Communist Party responded to the 
action by sending organizers into the fields to channel the workers’ dissent into an 
organizational structure of a new branch of the Agricultural Workers Industrial 
League.121  Growers, newspapers, and local politicians quickly played off the 
specter of a communist threat and arrested strikers and agitators.  Local 
authorities and federal immigration agents continued to harass activist Mexican 
farmworkers in the months and years following, arresting and deporting 
unionists.122  In addition, the police and deputized members of the American 
Legion used a show of arms, tear gas, and violence to help growers intimidate 
farmworkers; break up strike meetings and pickets; and evict unionists from labor 
camps.123
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decade progressed.  Farmworkers staged 37 strikes in 1933 alone and 143 more 
by the end of the 1930s.124
The California Farm Bureau Federation and California Chamber of 
Commerce in collaboration with representatives from other grower associations, 
Santa Fe and Pacific railroads, Standard Oil, California Packing Company, and 
Bank of America formed the Associated Farmers (AF) in 1934 to combat the 
growing threat of farm labor activism.
   
125  AF compiled records on known 
communists, primed the media with information to stoke red fears, and published 
and distributed thousands of pamphlets bearing titles like “The Red Network” and 
“California’s Embattled Farmers.”126  They worked with legislators to pass anti-
picketing ordinances, stop the flow of relief payments to striking farmworkers, 
and prosecute labor leaders under the Criminal Syndicalism Act which was 
supposed to fight organized crime.127
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The farmworkers’ lack of success in building a lasting union movement in 
the 1930s varied greatly from the experience of urban industrial workers in the 
Great Depression whose efforts resulted in the growth of unions and the 
enactment of protective labor legislation.  While the industrial union movement 
made significant gains during the World War I era, it entered the 1930s with little 
momentum.128  Nevertheless, labor leaders worked to rebuild a relationship with 
the federal government as Franklin Roosevelt set to the task of revitalizing the 
country’s economy and industry during the Great Depression.129  Roosevelt 
showed support for workers with the passage of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act, which in part recognized workers’ right to organize and bargain collectively 
with employers.  The legislation stimulated the growth of existent industrial 
unions, as well as the birth of new ones.  Union membership skyrocketed from 
under 3 million in 1932 to nearly 9 million in 1939.130
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New Deal labor legislation after the passage of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act set agricultural and industrial unionism on different trajectories by 
legitimizing claims that agricultural work was an exceptional form of labor.  
Roosevelt responded more positively to workers than did previous presidents, yet 
the response was not uniform.  Roosevelt’s policies benefitted workers in 
industries where unions had strength or were building it and reaffirmed the power 
of industry in areas where the labor movement was weak or nonexistent.  Labor 
historian Melvyn Dubofsky maintains that “power sometimes appeared to be the 
sole reality” for the president.131  The passage of the Wagner National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935 marked one of the most significant legislative 
gains for the labor movement, but it did not equally apply to all groups of 
workers. NLRA exempted domestics (household workers) and farmworkers from 
its provisions.  Southern Democrats intent on preserving the racial hierarchy and 
California agricultural interests both expressed opposition to a labor bill that 
included farmworkers in its protections.  Both Southern Democrats and California 
growers wielded considerable political power; whereas farmworkers had little 
political influence.  The monumental legislation that guaranteed workers the right 
to form a union and established a tripartite relationship between workers, 
employers, and the state to resolve labor grievances did not apply to 
farmworkers.132
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Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act.  These legislative exemptions, labor 
historian Cletus Daniel argues, “effectively codified the traditional powerlessness 
of farm laborers” and adversely affected farmworkers for decades thereafter.133
In arguing for the exemption of farmworkers from labor laws, growers 
stressed the exceptional nature of farm labor.  They maintained that their 
agricultural production differed from industrial production in a way that made it 
uniquely vulnerable to loss.  In a factory setting, employers could make up for lost 
production due to strikes after workers and employers reached an accord.  In 
contrast, work stoppages in agriculture had the potential to destroy an entire 
season’s crop because harvesting had to be completed within a certain timeframe 
for the produce to be marketable.  Industrial employers, hence, could gamble on 
waiting out a strike; whereas growers had no such luxury.  Growers concluded 
that the state must not extend labor protections to farmworkers, because they 
would wield too much power over their employers.
  
134
Instead of empowering farmworkers by including them in the provisions 
of protective labor legislation, the welfare of migrant farmworkers became the 
charge of the newly created Resettlement Administration, which later morphed 
into USDA’s Farm Security Administration (FSA).  FSA began the Migratory 
Camp Program, constructing housing for migratory farmworkers and offering 
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educational lessons on hygiene, thrift, parenting, and self-government.135  The 
program provided some relief, but no real reform.136  Growers, nevertheless, 
became concerned that the government-run camps would provide refuge for labor 
organizers, because growers could not evict troublesome workers from the 
camps.137  AFBF and their congressional allies argued that the FSA camp 
program needed to be abandoned.138  In response, Congress removed the 
Migratory Camp Program from FSA oversight in 1943 and implemented a 
measure that required farmworkers to get the approval of county authorities 
before leaving for work elsewhere.139  Three years later, Congress dismantled the 
FSA.140
Government policy continued to affect the experiences of farmworkers 
and industrial workers in very different ways during World War II.  When the 
United States entered the war, the supply of industrial labor tightened.  Faced with 
the prospect of labor shortages, employers proved willing to negotiate with 
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unions.141  Labor unions emerged from the war with five million more members 
than they had when the United States entered the conflict.142  Industrial workers 
entered the postwar era believing that they were equal participants with 
management in an industrial democracy and aggressively pursued initiatives that 
empowered workers and improved their conditions.143  Farmworkers, conversely, 
remained unorganized during World War II.  Agriculture, like industry, faced a 
potential labor shortage during the war.  The Farm Bureau Federation and 
growers pled their case to Congress, USDA, and the president, arguing that a 
short supply of labor threatened food production.  The Roosevelt administration 
subsequently negotiated with Mexico for the importation of farmworkers, referred 
to as braceros, in 1942.  Between 1942 and 1945, at least 168,000 braceros 
arrived from Mexico, which combined with growers’ recruitment of 
undocumented Mexican workers prevented a labor shortage.144
                                                 
141 Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern America, 171. 
  Growers 
 
142 Lichtenstein, State of the Union, 101. 
 
143 The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 curbed the scope of union initiatives and 
constrained the type of activities in which unions could lawfully engage.  David 
Brody, Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle, 
2nd Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 160-165.  Union 
membership numbers continued to grow through the 1960s, though the percentage 
of the population that they represented slowly declined.  Lichtenstein, State of the 
Union, 186. 
 
144 Ernesto Galarza, Strangers in Our Fields (Washington D.C.: Joint United 
States-Mexico Trade Union Committee, 1956), 5-7; Massey, Durand, and 
Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors, 35, 36, 37;  Pincetl, Transforming 
California, 174;  Eric V. Meeks, Border Citizens: The Making of Indians, 
Mexicans, and Anglos in Arizona (Austin: University of Texas Press), 163. 
 
  48 
convinced Congress to extend the program after the war, importing well over 
700,000 braceros between 1952 and 1954.  The selective enforcement of 
immigration laws by INS helped ensure that farm labor remained available, 
cheap, and compliant.145
While industrial unionists made great gains in their standards of living, 
agricultural workers’ financial and living conditions remained largely unchanged 
during and after World War II.  Some braceros lived in converted cow barns that 
still bore the smell of manure, some shared bunkhouses with other farmworkers, 
some resided in shacks and tents set up in the middle of orchards, and others lived 
in more orderly labor camps.  The Department of Labor had agreements with 
states to provide adequate sanitary housing to braceros, but a lack of inspections 
convinced some growers that housing violations would go unpunished.
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counterparts.  The agreement stipulated that braceros subject to unfair treatment 
could lodge a complaint with the Department of Labor, but most foreign workers 
did not know the name or address of the area representative.147  Braceros also had 
the right to elect representatives to speak to growers about the maintenance of the 
work contract, although neither worker nor grower could alter work contracts 
without first receiving permission from the United States and Mexico.  Growers 
still perceived the election of field representatives with hostility and countered 
with threats of deportation.148
Agricultural employment practices on the East Coast mirrored those in 
California and the West by the mid-twentieth century.  Responding to Eastern 
growers’ fears of labor shortages during war, the United States reached agreement 
with the British West Indies and Bahamas in 1943 to import agricultural workers 
on a non-permanent basis.  Similar to Western growers, Eastern employers of 
foreign labor failed to furnish the living and working conditions promised in the 
intergovernmental agreement.  Workers imported from the Caribbean, like those 
in the bracero program, could be sent back to their home countries at any time if 
the employer deemed the foreign worker’s demeanor inappropriate.
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Western counterparts, Eastern growers pitted ethnic groups against one another to 
forestall organizing and prevent farmworkers from leveraging gains from their 
employers.150
By mid-century, then, growers and their representative organizations 
successfully argued that agricultural labor was exceptional and should not receive 
the same protections and rights granted industrial labor.  They stressed a mutual 
interest between growers and government to maintain an affordable and reliable 
food production system and used their political clout to ensure that agricultural 
laborers remained tractable and cheap.  Government cooperation with growers on 
agricultural labor policy made it more difficult for farmworkers to organize to 
improve living and working conditions.  When agricultural labor organizations 
posed a threat in the 1910s and 1930s, growers used extralegal means with the 
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the provisions of the agreement were met by growers.  Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., 
“Non-Immigrant Labor Policy in the United States,” Journal of Economic Issues 
17, No. 3 (September 1983): 614, 617; Hahamovitch, The Fruits of Their Labor, 
200-201. 
 century farming 
increasingly transformed into a corporate capitalist endeavor with an industrial 
 
150 Hahamovitch, The Fruits of Their Labor, 200-201. 
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logic at its core.  While the family farm remained, large-scale industrialized 
agriculture set the trends in production and accounted for an increasingly large 
percentage of the agricultural yield in the United States.  As farming 
industrialized, the rising fixed cost of production drove less financially secure 
farm owners off the land as machines and migratory workers replaced resident 
labor.151  The shift marked a transition from farming as an occupation relatively 
accessible to families of moderate means into a capitalist enterprise dominated by 
more financially-secure growers, investors, and corporations commanding greater 
levels of wealth and power than the typical farmer of the 19th century.152
Government-funded research into pest control focused heavily on 
chemical solutions from 1894 onwards, contributing to the rise of high yield 
monoculture production.  The promise of total control over pest populations 
proved intoxicating in the decades that followed, leading growers and USDA to 
rely almost wholly on chemical pest control.  DDT and other synthetic chemicals 
developed after World War II deepened the chemical dependency in agriculture.  
The new generation of potent chemicals indiscriminately killed beneficial insects, 
 
                                                 
151 Jim Hightower, Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times: The Original Hightower Report-
-and other Recent Reports--on Problems and Prospects of American Agriculture 
(Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1973, 1978), 35.  In 
California, for instance, forty-five corporations owned four million acres of the 
state’s farmland in 1973.  Ingolf Vogeler, The Myth of the Family Farm: 
Agribusiness Dominance of U.S. Agriculture (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1981), 69, 71.  Average farm size increased from approximately 151 acres in 1930 
to 400 acres in 1978.  The transition is also shown in the division of agricultural 
products.  In 1974, only nine percent of farms grossed over $100,000 annually, 
yet the sales of these farms accounted for 54.2% of agricultural products sold in 
the United States. Perkins, Insects, Experts, and the Insecticide Crisis, 211. 
 
152 Perkins, Insects, Experts, and the Insecticide Crisis, 212. 
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eliminating a natural pest control mechanism.  This increased problems of 
resistance, resurgence, and outbreaks of secondary pests (insects that previously 
posed little threat to crops but developed into a problem after agricultural 
chemicals wiped out their natural predators).  These developments did not lead to 
a significant reflection on pest control options.  Rather, as is typical with addictive 
behavior, growers used a greater volume of chemicals with more potent toxicities 
as they struggled to win their war on pests.  Ineffective regulatory mechanisms in 
early pesticide law allowed the usage of pesticides to grow relatively unchecked, 
even as some scientists questioned the safety of some agricultural chemicals. 
Evidence of the adverse effects of some pesticides on human and 
environmental health accumulated in the 1950s and 1960s.  USDA did little to 
address the problem, privileging its role as a service organization for growers over 
its regulatory responsibility to the public. This potential conflict of interest 
reduced the likelihood that the agency would advocate for a more stringent 
regulatory policy on its own accord.  Pressure for pesticide reform, then, had to 
come from the people who were adversely affected by the pesticides that saturated 
fields in increasingly greater volumes.  Farmworkers had the most direct regular 
exposure to pesticides, but they had been systematically disempowered by 
growers and government.  Farmworkers lacked political power and the protection 
of national labor laws.  Consequently, they needed allies.  To effect change in the 
fields, farmworkers had to build bridges to other segments of the public.  The 
struggles for pesticide reform in the years following would be fought by 
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farmworkers, environmentalists, and consumers using an array of creative tactics 
on a variety of fronts. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DEVELOPING A VOICE: GROWING AWARENESS AND RESPONSE TO 
PESTICIDE PROBLEMS, 1962-1972 
Rachel Carson introduced the public to the adverse effects of pesticides 
with the publication of Silent Spring in 1962.  She began her book with a “Fable 
for Tomorrow,” calling on the reader to envision a place in which “a shadow of 
death” hung heavy.  She described the blighted place as one in which mysterious 
sicknesses and death plagued livestock, adults and children alike, confounding 
doctors who attempted to identify the cause of the maladies.  Carson stated:  “No 
witchcraft, no enemy action had silenced the rebirth of new life in this stricken 
world.  The people had done it to themselves.”153
 Carson synthesized available scientific data and converted it into language 
understandable to the lay public.  She chronicled how the spraying of powerful 
pesticides, particularly chlorinated hydrocarbons like DDT, indiscriminately 
killed both target and non-target species.  Detailed accounts of declining bird 
  The depiction of this fictional 
town in Silent Spring laid the foundation for the argument that Carson would 
make in the following chapters.  She criticized the common belief that humans’ 
should control nature to serve human desires and warned that wanton use of 
agricultural chemicals to control insect populations posed severe risks to human 
and environmental health. 
                                                 
153 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (1962; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1994), 3. 
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populations and fish stocks within spray zones served to back up her claims.154  
Chlorinated hydrocarbons, she told, break down slowly and, hence, accumulate 
over time in the bodies of animals and humans.  Because these chemicals were so 
persistent, they passed up the food chain from plants to herbivores to carnivores, 
including humans, as well as from mother to child in breastfeeding mammals. 
Therefore, Carson warned that the danger of chlorinated hydrocarbons extended 
beyond the animal kingdom and raised the threat of chronic disease in humans.155  
Evidence of the adverse effects of persistent pesticides so alarmed Carson that she 
expanded her discussion of the topic from one chapter, as originally planned, to 
four chapters.156
                                                 
154 For a discussion of the relationship between the increased use of pesticides and 
the decline in number of several different bird populations, see the chapter 
entitled “And No Birds Sing.” Ibid., 103-128.  See the chapter “Rivers of Death” 
for a discussion on how fish are adversely affected by the spraying of some 
pesticides.  Carson, Silent Spring, 129-153. 
  She predicted in 1962 that one in four persons may ultimately be 
 
155 Ibid., 22, 23, 222.   
 
156 Mark Hamilton Lytle, The Gentle Subversive: Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, 
and the Rise of the Environmental Movement (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 8.  Though Carson extensively discussed the effects of pesticides on 
human health, anthropologist Devon Peña criticized Silent Spring for what he 
characterized as “curious silences” in the text.  He asserts that Carson showed a 
callous disregard for the welfare of farmworkers, stating that she “overlooked the 
plight of the largely Mexican-origin agricultural workforce” by failing to 
“recognize or acknowledge the emergent struggles against pesticide exposure and 
associated health problems.”  Peña concludes that the “oversight perhaps reflected 
Carson’s white and privileged middle-class background.”  Devon G. Peña, 
Mexican Americans and the Environment: Tierra y Vida (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 2005), 122.  Such criticism of Carson is problematic though.  
Carson published Silent Spring in 1962 and died in 1964, years before any of the 
“emergent struggles against pesticide exposure” to which Peña makes reference.  
Secondly, in writing Silent Spring, Carson synthesized available scientific data, of 
which there was little detailing the effects of pesticides on the agricultural 
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afflicted with some form of cancer if the use of chlorinated hydrocarbons and 
other chemical carcinogens continued at current rates.157
 Carson intended Silent Spring to be a clarion call for citizen involvement 
in pesticide regulation.  She believed that because their world was so deeply 
affected by the application of chlorinated hydrocarbons that citizens had a right to 
help decide how and to what extent chemicals should be applied to farms, 
suburban neighborhoods, and public lands.  Making reference to a Robert Frost 
poem, Carson told readers that they had approached a branch in the road; one side 
of which was a deceptively easy road that promised progress but ended in 
disaster, the other was a less traveled route that if followed would reach a 
 
                                                                                                                                     
workforce.  Historian Linda Nash states that farmworkers’ migratory lifestyle and 
multiple work environments confounded public health officials who attempted to 
study occupational illnesses in agriculture in the 1950s and 1960s.  Industrial 
workers presented a more stable study group who worked for extended periods in 
the bounded environment of the factory.  Nash also asserts that “the ability, or 
perhaps inability, of occupational health to produce dependable knowledge about 
pesticide poisoning was conditioned by political and intellectual factors” that 
made investigators reluctant to challenge the power of agricultural interests. Linda 
Nash, “The Fruits of Ill-Health: Pesticides and Workers’ Bodies in Post-World 
War II California,” Osiris 19 (2004): 209, 211.  Quote is on page 211.  Carson did 
not ignore farmworkers, despite the scarcity of available scientific information.  
She noted that stores of DDT in agricultural workers’ bodies were two to three 
times the amount accumulated in the bodies of average persons.  She also 
discussed the effects of less persistent, but more acutely toxic organophosphate 
chemicals on farmworkers.  For example, she detailed how eleven farmworkers in 
a crew of thirty had to be hospitalized after being exposed to parathion in a 
California citrus grove.  She warned that organophosphate chemicals were so 
toxic that physicians treating cases of pesticide poisoning or women who washed 
the clothing of exposed farmworkers may be in some danger.  Carson, Silent 
Spring, 22, 30. 
 
157 Carson, Silent Spring, 242. 
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sustainable future.  She charged the reader with the task of deciding how to 
proceed as a society.158
 Carson numbered among a group of scientists in the post-World War II era 
that harbored growing concern about some of the unintended consequences of 
scientific innovation.  Some of these scientists believed that the public had a right 
to know the costs and benefits of these developments and participate in the 
decision-making processes relating to their use.
 
159  One of Carson’s 
contemporaries, Barry Commoner, held that scientists had an “involuntary 
responsibility” to convey relevant scientific information to the public in an 
understandable and non-partisan manner, so that they could make informed 
decisions on issues that affected their lives.160
                                                 
158 Carson, Silent Spring, 277.  
  The communication of this 
scientific information to the public fostered debate about a number of political 
decisions made without citizen input that carried potentially serious consequences 
for humans and the environment alike.  This information equipped the public with 
knowledge that could be used to change public policy and catalyzed campaigns to 
 
159 Sarah L. Thomas, “A Call to Action:  Silent Spring, Public Discourse, and the 
Rise of Modern Environmentalism,” in Natural Protest: Essays on the History of 
American Environmentalism, ed. Michael Egan and Jeff Crane (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 185, 186; Michael Egan, Barry Commoner and the Science of 
Survival: The Remaking of American Environmentalism (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 2007), 2-3, 6-7. 
 
160 Egan, Barry Commoner and the Science of Survival, 57.   
 
  58 
end the use of DDT.161
 
  Beginning in the mid-1960s, both farmworker groups and 
environmental organizations initiated efforts for pesticide reform that fused the 
information made available by concerned scientists with personal observations 
and experiences.  Farmworkers and environmentalists shared a common concern 
about the effects of DDT on human health, but their approach to the problem 
varied.  The groups found the best opportunities for collaboration in legal 
challenges to ban the use of DDT. 
The National Farm Workers Association and Farmworker Health 
 
 Fred Ross walked the unpaved roads of San Jose’s barrio Sal Si Puede in 
June 1952 in hopes of recruiting locals into the Community Service 
Organization’s (CSO) voter registration drive.  Three weeks of effort yielded little 
reward for Ross.  A public health nurse and local priest then suggested that Ross 
contact a young man by the name of Cesar Chavez.  Chavez initially dodged 
Ross’ attempt at contact, but Ross’ determinism finally won out.  Once inside the 
Chavez home, Ross quickly impressed Cesar with his knowledge of local issues 
ranging from police problems to illnesses caused by environmental 
                                                 
161 Michael Egan uses the term “science information movement” to collectively 
describe the efforts of scientists like Barry Commoner and Rachel Carson.  An 
activist concern for humanity and the world often fueled the science information 
movement, though as Egan states, “that activism was obscured by the mantle of 
objectivity, which produced a far more subtle and convincing line of rhetoric.” 
Ibid., 58, 63.  Egan positions Barry Commoner at the forefront of this movement.  
He provides an excellent discussion of Barry Commoner, the science information 
movement, and the effect of the movement on modern environmentalism in his 
book. 
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contamination.  The two discussed how sores would develop on the legs and feet 
of neighbor children when a nearby creek over ran its banks, because it was so 
polluted by waste from a nearby packing shed.162  After meeting with Ross, 
Chavez began working for CSO, registering voters in Sal Si Puede before 
venturing out to other Northern California towns and cities to organize 
community members.163
 Cesar Chavez stayed with CSO for the next ten years, quitting in March 
1962 with the goal of organizing California farmworkers.  He recruited fellow 
CSO organizers Gil Padilla and Dolores Huerta to assist him in his efforts and 
launched the Farm Workers Association (FWA) in April.
 
164
                                                 
162Jacques E. Levy, Cesar Chavez: Autobiography of La Causa (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1975), 97-98.  Susan Ferriss and Ricardo 
Sandoval, The Fight in the Fields: Cesar Chavez and the Farmworkers 
Movement, ed. Diana Hembree (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1997), 
37-39.  Prior to heading north to San Jose, Ross organized Latinos in Los Angeles 
to elect Mexican American Edward Roybal to city council  in 1949.   F. Arturo 
Rosales, Chicano! The History of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement 
(Houston: Arte Público Press, 1997), 106, 131.“Sal Si Puedes” translates to 
“escape if you can.”  The “Sí Se Puede,” which would be popularized by Cesar 
Chavez in the years following translates to “Yes We Can.” 
  Together they 
employed the same strategies used by CSO, spending countless hours going door 
to door and town to town from their base of operations in Delano to talk to 
 
163 Levy, Cesar Chavez, 101-102; Ferriss and Sandoval, The Fight in the Fields, 
51-53. 
 
164 Rosales, Chicano!, 132-133; Marshall Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins: 
Leadership, Organization, and Strategy in the California Farm Worker Movement 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 82.  Chavez’s wife Helen and their 
eight children also contributed to organizing efforts, as did his brother Richard, 
cousin Manuel, and Fred Ross.  Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 85. 
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farmworkers and enlist their support in the organization.165  Elected officers 
drafted a constitution and established objectives in collaboration with FWA 
members in the months following.166
 Organizers continued efforts to expand the organization through the 
recruitment of new members in 1963 and 1964.  FWA established a Farm 
Workers Credit Union and introduced a group insurance plan in short time.
  
167  
Publication of a farmworker newspaper called El Malcriado began in 1964 to 
publicize the positive developments.  The newspaper, whose title translated to 
“problem child,” used a humorous cast of caricatures that included greedy 
growers, corrupt politicians, shady labor contractors, and simple but hard-working 
farmworkers to promote FSA’s message.168  FSA next changed its name to 
National Farm Worker Association (NFWA) in January 1965 to broaden its 
appeal to migrant farmworkers from Texas.  By summer 1965, El Malcriado had 
3,000 subscribers and NFWA claimed 1,200 members.169
                                                 
165 Randy Shaw, Beyond the Fields: Cesar Chavez, the UFW, and the Struggle for 
Justice in the 21st Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 17. 
  Despite the growing 
popularity of the paper and the gains of the organization, Chavez felt the group 
 
166 Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 87-89. 
 
167 Ibid., 100-101. 
 
168 Ferriss and Sandoval, The Fight in the Fields, 80. 
 
169 Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 104-105. 
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still lacked the strength necessary to confront growers.170
 Filipino workers associated with the AFL-affiliated Agricultural Workers 
Organizing Committee (AWOC) in California decided that the time was ripe to 
strike in September 1965.  Workers from nine Delano labor camps staged a sit-
down strike demanding that growers increase their wages from $1.00 to $1.40 an 
hour, plus 25 cents a box and twelve dollars for each grape gondola filled.  The 
action by Filipino workers put Chavez in the uncomfortable position of deciding 
whether or not to join the strike before he felt that NFWA was ready.  NFWA 
lacked a strike fund to support a prolonged action, but Chavez knew that many 
NFWA members were anxious to join the effort.  He also recognized that the 
AWOC strike had a greater potential for failing if NFWA did not participate.
  Events beyond 
Chavez’s control would soon draw NFWA into a labor dispute though.  
171
                                                 
170 Shaw, Beyond the Fields, 17. 
  
Chavez and the NFWA officers stood at a critical juncture and decided that they 
would take the risk of going on strike, if members supported the action.  They 
called a strike vote on September 16, Mexican Independence Day, and the 
overwhelming majority of farmworkers supported the decision to strike.  NFWA 
adopted AWOC demands and added one.  They went on strike not just for wages, 
 
171 Levy, Cesar Chavez, 182-183, 185. Ferriss and Sandoval, The Fight in the 
Fields, 86. 
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but for recognition as a union as well; recognition that farmworkers’ 
organizations had long been denied.172
 Though AWOC and NFWA went on strike together, the organizations 
employed different philosophies in conducting the strike.  AWOC possessed 
sufficient resources for prosecuting a strike because of their connections to the 
AFL and carried out a traditional labor protest of stationary pickets.
   
173  NFWA 
proved to be much more innovative, in part because their scarce resources 
demanded it.  Chavez and NFWA organizers worked to build bridges between 
farmworkers and the larger public, enlisting public support to bolster the 
farmworker cause.174
                                                 
172 Marshall Ganz states that the decision to strike for recognition, rather than 
simply a wage increase was a strategically wise choice.  It reminded potential 
supporters that farmworkers had to strike for even the most basic of labor 
protections because they had been excluded from the National Labor Relations 
Act and nearly every other major piece of labor legislation up to that time.  It 
helped build sympathy for the strike and cast it in a different light than other labor 
conflicts.  Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 125-126. 
  NFWA appealed to religious, student, and civil rights 
groups by casting their story in the moral terms of an oppressed group seeking 
rights long denied.  Organizers invited delegations to come to Delano to view the 
 
173 Ibid., 127. 
 
174 Fred Ross, Sr. “History of the Farm Worker Movement” (lecture, Dayton, OH, 
October 1974), 7, UFW Information and Research Department Collection, Box 
26, Folder 26-26, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, 
Detroit, MI; Levy, 183. 
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plight of farmworkers firsthand.  These delegates carried the stories home, 
building public support for la causa.175
 Volunteers with NFWA greatly assisted in developing tactics, infusing the 
movement with new ideas and broadening the scope of its appeal.  Because of 
Chavez’s insistence on nonviolence, the tactical input of civil rights veterans from 
the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) proved particularly valuable as they versed 
strikers in how to deal with the police, stay disciplined, and resist provocation.
   
176  
These volunteers brought with them their own networks of communication and 
influenced the decision to engage in a consumer boycott of growers’ products, 
both of which proved invaluable to NFWA efforts.177
                                                 
175 The NFWA benefitted from the strike’s place in time.  Vatican II recommitted 
the Catholic Church to principles of social justice and civil rights organizations 
had recently seen their efforts bear fruit with the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 
130-131.  NFWA and its supporters used “La Causa,” to characterize the 
farmworkers’ movement.  It brought forth ideas of righteous struggle and justice.  
An early editorial in El Malcriado made direct comparisons to Rosa Parks and the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott and the birth of the Civil Rights Movement when 
discussing the farmworkers’ movement, implying that the strike in Delano would 
be the same catalyst in the Mexican American movement for justice and equality.  
The editorial said: “This is how a movement begins.  This is why the farm 
workers association is a ‘movement’ more than a ‘union.’  Once a movement 
begins it is impossible to stop.  It will sweep through California and it will not be 
over until the farm worker has the equality of a living wage and decent 
treatment.” “Editorial: Enough People With One Idea,” El Malcriado, No. 19 
(1965): 2.   
  In conversation with 
reporter Jacques Levy, Chavez stated: “If we were nothing but farm workers in 
 
176 Levy, Cesar Chavez, 196; Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 134. 
 
177 Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 141. 142. 
 
  64 
the Union now, just Mexican farm workers, we’d only have about 30 percent of 
all the ideas that we have.  There would be no cross-fertilization, no growing.  It’s 
beautiful to work with other groups, other ideas, and other customs.”178 
Sociologist and former United Farm Workers (UFW) organizer Marshall Ganz 
argues that this diversity proved key to the success of NFWA (and later UFW), 
because “the links of the UFW leaders to the worlds of the farm workers, 
churches, students, unions and others gave them far more--and far quicker--access 
to salient knowledge” than any of the previous or contemporaneous organizing 
effort in the fields.179
As the number and diversity of NFWA organizers grew, so did the issues 
that the organization addressed.  NFWA deemed issues related to health and 
welfare important before the Delano strike and continued to emphasize their 
importance during the strike, even though their initial demands addressed only 
wages and recognition. During the first year of the Delano strike, Chavez 
delegated the task of setting up a part-time medical clinic to volunteer nurse 
Peggy McGivern, so that farmworkers who could not afford local doctors’ fees 
would have access to free medical care.
  
180
                                                 
178 Levy, Cesar Chavez, 197.   
  Also, just as Chavez had expressed 
concern about contaminated water affecting the health of children in Sal Si 
Puedes, NFWA raised concern about risks associated with poor sanitation in labor 
 
179 Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 10, 13.  Quote on p. 13.  
 
180 “Delano Needs Doctors,” El Malcriado No. 26 (1965): 12; “What is the 
NFWA?,” El Malcriado, No. 31 (March 17, 1966): 20. 
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camps and in the fields.181  The 1966 Plan of Delano listed suffering from 
“sickness” and “subhuman living conditions” in the same context as “starvation 
wages.”182  Chavez asserted that “disease-ridden camps, filthy housing, dangerous 
and inadequate transportation, inadequate or no medical facilities…and a host of 
other evils” were the products of a unjust farm labor system and public policy that 
had denied farmworkers the same rights and protections of workers in other 
sectors of the economy, implying that they were all legitimate issues to be 
addressed by the farmworkers’ movement.183  Despite the emphasis on health in 
NFWA’s first years of existence, issues relating to pesticides did not enter the 
discourse.184
                                                 
181 “Association Strike Continues Successful,” El Malcriado , No. 17 (1965): 7; 
“You Can Help: ‘A Crime Against All the Farm Workers of California’,” El 
Malcriado, No. 17 (1965): 8. 
  This, however, would change in years following, as the adverse 
effects of pesticides on farmworker health became a central concern of NFWA. 
 
182 “The Plan of Delano” El Malcriado (1966). 
 
183 The speech from which this quote is drawn lacks identifying information.  
However, references within the speech, as well as its cataloguing in the archives 
allow it to be placed fairly accurately in time.  Chavez states that “it is now almost 
18 months since the strike…started,” which means the speech was likely 
delivered in February 1967.  Cesar Chavez, [no title] (speech, no place 
information, [n.d]), United Farm Workers Organizing Committee Collection, Box 
2, Folder 2-5, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, 
Detroit, MI. 
 
184 The only time that pesticides were discussed in El Malcriado prior to 1967 
occurred in a report of a confrontation between a grower and farmworkers on the 
picket line.  It reported that the eighteen-year-old son of Delano grower Jack 
Radovich, Jr. drove along a picket with a spray rig, dousing workers with a 
“deadly sulfur spray” that caused temporary blindness in sixteen of the victims.   
The story, however, focused less on the potential health threat of exposure to the 
chemical and more on the insensible hostility of the act and the reluctance of local 
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 Farmworkers long associated some illnesses with exposure to pesticides in 
the fields; however, the extension of health concerns addressed by NFWA from 
issues of sanitation (i.e. toilet facilities and availability of clean water) to risks 
posed by agricultural chemicals did not happen immediately.  Farmworkers in the 
1950s connected eye irritation, swollenness around the mouth, and other health 
problems to the application of chemical sprays in the fields.185  Nonetheless, the 
first mention of agricultural chemicals adversely affecting the health of 
farmworker families in El Malcriado appeared January 1967, more than two years 
after the start of the newspaper.  The article came in response to a letter from the 
City of Delano warning its residents that the chemicals in fertilizers made city 
water unsafe for consumption by babies.  It ended with the complaint that not 
only would farmworker families have to continue to pay seven dollars a month for 
tainted city water, but they would have to shoulder the additional cost of bottled 
drinking water if they wanted to keep their young ones safe.186
                                                                                                                                     
police to arrest and prosecute the grower’s son.  “Radovich Sprays 16 Strikers 
with Blinding Sulfur,” El Malcriado, No. 21 (1965): 11.  In a subsequent article, 
the incident received mention again, but it was used as an example of the 
picketers’ stalwartness and commitment to the cause, rather than an opportunity to 
discuss the risk of pesticide poisoning.  The line read, “In defiance of sulfur 
poisoning, physical violence and threats, the brave strikers continued their rounds, 
and workers would stop work at the first cry of ‘Huelga!’.” “The Good and the 
Bad,” El Malcriado, No. 22 (1965): 3. 
  No suggestion 
about reducing the use of agricultural chemicals appeared in the text.   
 
185 Nash, “The Fruits of Ill-Health: Pesticides and Workers’ Bodies in Post-World 
War II California,” 212-213. 
 
186 “Delano Water Bad for Babies,” El Malcriado,  No. 54 (January 13, 1967): 10.  
A subsequent article in El Malcriado carried a much angrier tone, complaining 
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 Several notable developments occurred within the farmworker movement 
prior to the incorporation of pesticides into the campaign.  Pressure from an 
economic boycott of Schenley Industries’ products Cutty Sark and Roma wine, 
coupled with the media buzz generated by a 240-mile mass march up the Central 
Valley to the state capitol in Sacramento brought the first of the Delano growers 
to the bargaining table in 1966.187  The gains of NFWA convinced the AFL that it 
would be wise to merge AWOC with Chavez’s organization, which then became 
the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC).  The merger also 
brought with it an infusion of funds from AFL.188  By the end of the year, 
UFWOC held another contract with DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation and was in 
process of leveraging Perelli-Minetti for a third.  A less newsworthy but 
nonetheless significant event happened amidst these other important 
achievements.  Nurse practitioner Marion Moses began working full-time for 
UFWOC.189
                                                                                                                                     
that growers continued to receive government subsidies to “grow profits…while 
the people have to drink poison.”  “Power, Profit and Poison,” El Malcriado II, 
No. 6 (May 15, 1968): 12.  
  
 
187 Schenley Industries negotiated a contract recognizing the union on April 6, 
1966, midway through the mass march that lasted from March 17 to April 10, 
1966.  Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 141, 154-159. 
 
188 Ibid., 157, 195, 205. 
 
189 Marion Moses first heard of the farmworkers’ movement when she was a 
student at Berkeley in 1964.  She began volunteering her time with Citizens for 
Farm Labor before revitalizing a campus organization called Student Committee 
for Agricultural Labor.  She made her first visit to Delano in January 1966 and 
spent the next several months deciding whether to quit her job and commit all of 
her energies to the farmworker cause.  She participated in the march from Delano 
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Though she was just one of the many people who dedicated themselves to 
the farmworker cause, Moses’ burgeoning interest in the effects of pesticides on 
farmworker health and research on the subject would help move pesticides to the 
forefront of issues with which the farmworkers’ movement was concerned.  She 
began working in the UFWOC health clinic in 1966 and stayed there until the 
following summer.  Her encounters with patients in the clinic and home visits 
made Moses acutely aware of the multitude of health problems that farmworker 
families encountered.190  This experience stayed with her as she transitioned into 
another important role.  She became a boycott organizer in 1967, leaving the 
small clinic in Delano for major metropolitan areas in the East: Toronto, 
Montreal, Philadelphia, and New York City.  While coordinating the boycott 
effort in New York, Moses grew deeply interested in the issue of pesticides and 
health and conducted research on the subject when time allowed.  In the summer 
of 1968, she communicated her developing interest to Chavez and explained that 
gathering information was very time intensive.191  Chavez told her to go ahead 
with her research plan.192
                                                                                                                                     
to Sacramento, which convinced her to work a month for the union in July.  She 
stayed on five years.  Marion Moses, “‘Viva la Causa!’” American Journal of 
Nursing 73, No. 5 (May 1973): 842-843. 
  
 
190 Ibid., 844. 
 
191 Marion Moses to LeRoy [Chatfield], July 14, 1968, Marion Moses, MD 
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Moses quickly developed a network of contacts that helped her 
accumulate scientific information on the adverse effects of pesticides on 
farmworkers and other humans.  She found a particularly valuable resource in 
scientists who harbored concerns about the potential threats of scientific 
innovation to environmental and social welfare.  Moses contacted the Scientific 
Institute for Public Information, cofounded and presided over by Dr. Barry 
Commoner.  She discovered that several scientists with the organization, 
including Commoner, had already taken interest in the effects of nitrates on infant 
health.193  They connected Moses with Kevin Shea at the University of 
California-Berkeley who tested Delano’s water supply for contamination.194
                                                 
193 Marion Moses to LeRoy [Chatfield], July 14, 1968.  Moses could not contact 
Rachel Carson for information, because Carson succumbed to cancer four years 
prior in the spring of 1964.  The UFWOC did consult Silent Spring for 
information on pesticides.  The organization also referenced Since Silent Spring, 
authored by the Audubon Society’s field editor Frank Graham Jr. “Pesticide 
Notes,” UFW Central Administration Files Collection, Box 10, Folder 10-29, 
Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.   
  The 
 
194 Marion Moses to LeRoy [Chatfield], July 14, 1968.  The Scientists’ Institute 
for Public Information’s magazine Environment publicized the contamination of 
Delano’s wells by nitrates in a lengthy staff report that criticized California’s 
Department of Health’s response to the problem, concluding that “much of 
California’s population, and particularly its poorest members, will be exposed to a 
threat whose magnitude we do not yet know.” “Poisoning the Wells,” 
Environment 11, No. 1(January-February 1969): 45.  The UFWOC cited the 
Environment article in petitioning the city of Delano to better address the issue.  
The organization also cited Samuel Epstein, Chief of the Laboratories of 
Environmental Pathology and Toxicology at the Children’s Cancer Research 
Foundation.  Paul Driscoll to the Delano City Council, September 2, 1969, UFW 
Central Administration Files Collection, Box 9, Folder 9-19, Archives of Labor 
and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.  Epstein, who strongly 
believed that citizens’ political action was necessary to protect the health of 
workers and consumers, made himself available to the UFWOC if they needed 
any further help in the matter.  Samuel S. Epstein to Paul Driscoll, August 8, 
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Scientific Institute also referred Moses to Charles Wurster, a marine biologist at 
Stony Brook University and co-founder of the Environmental Defense Fund 
(EDF).195  Wurster researched the effects of DDT on Long Island’s bird 
populations during his post-doctoral research and concluded that the costs of DDT 
far outstripped its benefits.  The developing frustration over the continued usage 
of the chemical turned the concerned scientist into an environmental activist 
engaged in the fight against DDT.196
While Moses developed a network of contacts and collected pesticide 
information, UFWOC attorney Jerry Cohen tried to ascertain what chemicals 
were sprayed in what amounts on the fields in Delano.  Former farmworker and 
UFWOC worker Jessica Govea developed a concern about pesticides after 
working in the Farm Worker Service Center and encountering three female 
farmworkers whom she suspected of suffering from pesticide poisoning.  Govea 
pressed the UFWOC’s new attorney Jerry Cohen to devote some of the legal 
department’s energies to finding out the risks that agricultural chemicals posed to 
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farmworker health.197  Cohen submitted a request to the Kern County Agricultural 
Commissioner for records relating to pesticide application within the county, but 
the office denied his request.  According to Cohen, the commissioner then 
contacted the company that aerially applied the pesticides, Atwood Aviation, 
suggesting that it obtain an injunction from the Superior Court to prevent the 
release of records.198  The Court issued an injunction two days later that 
prohibited Cohen from accessing pesticide permits, applicator reports, and county 
officials’ pest control reports.199
UFWOC attorney David Averbuck then attempted a slightly different 
approach.  He entered the Riverside County Agricultural Commissioner’s office 
with Amalia Uribe, a nineteen-year-old grape worker who suffered blurred vision, 
itchy eyes, and nausea when working in the vineyards.  When first stricken with 
the maladies, Uribe talked to other workers who suffered from the same problems.  
The farmworkers suspected that a chemical powder used by the grower caused 
their health problems.  Uribe claimed that the grower failed to address their 
complaints and provided no medical attention to the afflicted workers.  Uribe and 
Averbuck sought to obtain pesticide information from the agricultural 
   
                                                 
197Jerry Cohen, interview by Leroy Chatfield, May 19, 2009, Farmworker 
Movement Documentation Project, “Audio Interview: Jerry Cohen/ David 
Averbuck/ Chuck Farnsworth Discuss Legal Cases 1960 (1 Hour)” 
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199 “Growers Hide Facts on Poisons,” El MalcriadoII, No. 13 (September 1, 
1968): 6; “UFWOC Demands Poisons Records,” El Malcriado II, No. 17 
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commissioner so they could identify the chemicals used and the possible effects 
of exposure.  The Riverside County Agricultural Commissioner Robert Howie 
summarily denied Uribe’s request just as the Kern County Agricultural 
Commissioner had denied Cohen.200  The response of the agricultural 
commissioners and courts heightened curiosity about the information contained in 
the closed records.201
UFWOC brought both cases to court in an attempt to overturn the 
injunctions.  The agricultural commissioners and commercial pesticide applicators 
argued that the records were not public, because they contained trade secrets 
which the applicators had provided to the agricultural commissioners in 
confidence that they would not be shared.  To counter the argument, the UFWOC 
called forth concerned scientists, including University of California Berkeley 
scientist Kyle Van Den Bosch, to testify on their behalf.  Van Den Bosch, who 
   
                                                 
200 When she requested the records, Uribe told Howie that she needed the records 
for her physician who was going to perform a cholinesterase base line test on her 
to determine if her health had been adversely affected by pesticide exposure.  
Chuck Farnsworth, interview by Leroy Chatfield, May 19, 2009, Farmworker 
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investigated the effects of pesticides on people and the environment, maintained 
that access to the information was essential to the study of integrated pest 
management and should be made public.202  Both cases lost in Superior Court.  In 
the Kern County case, Judge George A. Brown held that “requiring the disclosure 
of this information would seriously hamper the essential cooperation existing 
between all segments of the pesticide industry and the farmers on the one hand 
and with the commissioners on the other.”203  David Averbuck let the Kern 
County verdict go unchallenged, but appealed the Uribe decision to the California 
Appellate Court.  The appellate decision went in UFWOC’s favor but the judge 
did not render it until 1971.204
 
  Until that time, the records in the agricultural 
commissioners’ offices remained sealed from the public, making the cooperation 
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Growth and Change in the Green Movement 
 
Reflecting back on the cases, David Averbuck remembered the importance 
of help from other organizations concerned about the effects of pesticides.  He 
stated that help “was very common at the time if we had a certain kind of 
problem” and that “there were [sic] at that time a great deal of sharing going on 
by people who were involved in different cases.”  He specifically mentioned 
attorney Victor Yannacone, Jr. and the organization he co-founded in 1967, the 
Environmental Defense Fund.205
NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund provided inspiration for the Environmental 
Defense Fund in both name and strategy.
  EDF made an easy ally for UFWOC in its 
pesticide-related lawsuits.  Whereas more established and older conservation 
organizations, like the Sierra Club and Audubon Society, favored efforts to 
influence the executive and legislative branches of government; EDF pursued an 
aggressive strategy for environmental defense in the courts.   
206  Before co-founding EDF, an 
organization whose unofficial motto was “Sue the Bastards,” Yannacone 
represented the NAACP for nine years.207
                                                 
205 David Averbuck, interview by Leroy Chatfield, May 19, 2009. 
  The civil rights movement had utilized 
the courts to great effect in cases like Brown v. Board of Education.  EDF 
envisioned using the courts in similar fashion to pursue an environmental 
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protection agenda.  Charles Wurster stated that the “one asset” they had in the 
early days was an idea: “EDF would marry science and law to defend the 
environment in the courts…To influence the legislative or executive branches of 
government often requires large numbers of votes or dollars, and we had neither.  
The judiciary seemed less influenced by those traditional pressures.  Perhaps the 
judges would more readily listen to a handful of scientists if their plea was 
valid.”208
Yannacone made the transition to environmental issues when he initiated a 
class action lawsuit against the Suffolk County Mosquito Control Commission 
(SCMCC) to stop the spraying of DDT on Long Island in 1966.  He contacted 
Brookhaven Town Natural Resources Committee (BTNRC), a grassroots 
organization that formed in 1965 to address the despoliation of the local 
environment, for help in the case.  Scientists from SUNY Stony Brook and the 
nearby Brookhaven National Laboratory numbered among the attendees at the 
monthly meetings.  Yannacone hoped to draw on their expertise for the trial.
  From its beginning, EDF embodied a concern for both environmental 
and human health in its pursuits. 
209
                                                 
208 Wurster, “The Power of an Idea,” 45. 
  
The scientists within BTNRC set to the task of compiling scientific evidence, 
writing affidavits, and preparing charts, graphs, and photos to illustrate their 
argument.  Yannacone presented a compelling argument for halting DDT use in 
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  76 
Suffolk County because of the environmental damage it caused.  The judge issued 
a temporary injunction that required SCMCC to stop spraying DDT.  In the 
months that followed, the Suffolk County Legislature ordered that the application 
of DDT be ceased.210
The decision in the Yannacone case marked the entrance of EDF onto the 
national scene.  Following the limited yet significant victory in Long Island, 
requests for assistance from other groups interested in environmental litigation 
poured into the small Brookhaven office.  Yannacone and four members of 
BTNRC made the pivotal decision to incorporate as the Environmental Defense 
Fund in 1967, committing themselves to a future of casework on national 
environmental issues.
  
211  As Charles Wurster worked to secure promises from 
notable scientists to testify in cases without a requisite consultation fee, EDF 
prepared to sue over the use of chlorinated hydrocarbons in other states. 212
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filed suit in Michigan in 1967 to block the Michigan Department of Agriculture 
from using DDT and dieldrin, a pesticide ten times more potent than DDT, in a 
Japanese beetle control program.213  It then filed a petition the following year to 
stop the spraying of DDT in Wisconsin.214
EDF predicated the arguments in both cases on the unnecessary harm the 
chemicals caused to the environment, but the diversity of scientific expertise in 
the EDF’s Scientists Advisory Committee made the organization equally capable 
of bringing a suit based on DDT’s adverse effect on human health.  Charles 
Wurster and EDF viewed environmental problems as “inherently 
interdisciplinary.”
     
215
                                                 
213 Wurster, “The Power of an Idea,” 46. 
  Consequently, the organizations arranged to have different 
scientists discuss DDT in the context of their specialization.  Wurster envisioned 
scientific testimony in a case “like building a wall, one brick at a time…[and] 
sought to characterize DDT proponents as limited, narrow specialists unable to 
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grasp the total environmental picture.”216
The mission, structure, and character of EDF aligned fairly well with 
UFWOC’s pesticide interests.  Some older conservation organizations, in contrast, 
had missions and histories that made it more difficult to address emerging 
pollution and social justice concerns.  Since EDF was a young organization, it had 
the luxury of defining its mission in the context of post-World War II 
environmental and social justice issues.  EDF founders expressed their intent to 
facilitate a “closer working tie between science, law, and government” to foster 
better decision making in public policy that affected human welfare.
  The flexibility that came with the 
Scientists’ Advisory Committee’s breadth of scope enabled EDF to bring suits or 
testify in cases on environmental grounds or on the basis that DDT posed a 
significant threat to human health.  EDF’s strength in science and its dedication to 
using the court system as a vehicle of reform made it a useful ally of UFWOC in 
certain legal situations.  
217
                                                 
216 Wurster, “The Last Word,” 184.  Yannecone employed this strategy in the 
Wisconsin DDT case, calling on sixteen respected scientists with Wurster at the 
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  This 
mission enabled EDF to address concerns that affected the natural or urban 
environment without deviating from their stated purpose.  Both the Sierra Club 
and National Audubon Society, in contrast, had a narrower scope of interests 
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centered on the preservation of flora and fauna in the natural environment.218
Older conservation organizations also suffered from an identity crisis in 
the late 1960s as the size and character of the organizations changed dramatically.  
The Sierra Club and National Audubon Society membership rolls grew 
exponentially between 1960 and 1970.  The Sierra Club grew from an 
organization of less than 7,000 members in 1950 to one that claimed 16,000 in 
1960 and over 114,000 in 1970.
  The 
concentrated focus on the preservation of nature in the past fostered an 
organizational inertia that inhibited these groups from taking on many urban, 
suburban, and agricultural issues that emerged in the post-World War II era. 
219
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  The National Audubon Society also 
experienced significant growth in the mid-1960s, increasing from 36,000 
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members in 1965 to 60,000 two years later.220  Most of the members in attendance 
at the 1967 Audubon Convention supported the creation of an “environmental 
defense fund”; however, the Board of Directors delayed the action, in part 
because some of them were affiliated with chemical companies.221  The Sierra 
Club similarly struggled through a contentious division in its leadership.  After 
Executive Director David Brower became increasingly active in environmental 
protection campaigns in the 1960s, a strong contingent on the Board of Directors 
wished to reverse the group’s growing prominence as a force in conservation 
politics and return to being an organization that focused more heavily on 
wilderness outings and mountaineering than politics.222
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  These struggles over the 
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character of the groups created an organizational inertia that made older 
conservation organizations slower to respond to modern environmental problems.  
Signs of organizational change did appear as the Sierra Club persevered 
through the period that Sierra Club President Edgar Wayburn characterized as 
“the most turbulent years in our history.”223  Rhetoric supporting an expanded 
environmental agenda preceded by several years substantive movement in that 
direction.  Wayburn touted the importance of involving the club in the “critical 
fight for man’s total environment” in 1968, although the organization’s major 
projects still centered on the protection and enlargement of national parks and 
other natural areas.224  Entering 1969, Conservation Director Michael McCloskey 
maintained that as “new technological assaults spread across America, we keep 
learning how many more things we must defend.”225
                                                                                                                                     
Sierra Club resulted in David Brower being ousted from his position in 1969.  
Robert A. Jones, “Fratricide in the Sierra Club,” The Nation 208, No. 18 (May 5, 
1969): 568. 
  The club adopted a policy 
regarding waste disposal in the months following and Sierra Club Bulletin 
incorporated short articles about pollution and industrial waste into the 
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magazine.226
Yet, in critiquing the environmental movement’s response to pesticide 
problems, geographer Laura Pulido intimates that the Sierra Club showed a 
disinterest in pesticides, stating that some members actively supported the 
continued use of DDT.  Her primary source in making this assertion is an article 
penned by chemical company engineer and one-time Sierra Club member Thomas 
Jukes.
  In taking these steps, the Sierra Club signaled a growing willingness 
to tackle new challenges.   
227  Jukes opposed a DDT ban, asserting that the chemical was the 
unfortunate victim of an unfounded public hysteria caused by “‘environmentalist 
propaganda.”228  Jukes previously founded the New York chapter of the Sierra 
Club and, at one time, carried a lifetime membership in the organization.  
However, his opinions on DDT and other pesticides cannot be interpreted as 
representative of the organization.  In fact, he quit the Sierra Club, giving up his 
lifetime membership, because he so vehemently disagreed with the club’s call for 
a DDT ban.229
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No. 6 (June 1969): 14.  More than half of the Sierra Club Bulletin  issues 
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  Jukes later brought a libel suit against the Audubon Society after 
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the organization suggested that he was a “paid liar” for the pesticide industry.230
The opposition of the Sierra Club and Audubon Society to DDT usage 
developed over a period of years.  Despite the lag in devoting resources to address 
modern environmental problems, both organizations voiced opposition to the 
indiscriminate use of DDT earlier in the decade.  The Sierra Club opposed the use 
of chlorinated hydrocarbons on private and public lands in 1965 because of the 
damage done to flora and fauna.
  
Juke’s estrangement from the Sierra Club and his suit against the Audubon 
Society demonstrate that his opinions were not representative of mainstream 
environmental organizations’ stance on DDT. 
231  The Audubon Society followed in expressing 
support for a ban on DDT usage two years later.232  Then as more scientific 
information about the environmental and human health effects of DDT became 
available, the Sierra Club joined the Audubon Society, West Michigan 
Environmental Action Council, and Environmental Defense Fund in bringing suit 
to ban usage of the chemical in the closing days of 1969.233
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Eliminating the Use of DDT 
 
 The Sierra Club, Audubon Society, and EDF all supported a DDT ban by 
the time UFWOC chose to address the issue, but it was EDF’s grounding in 
science and its aggressive plan for legal action that presented the best opportunity 
for collaboration with UFWOC.  However, since UFWOC did not put much faith 
in the courts or legislature as a vehicle for reform, cooperative work between the 
two groups remained relatively minimal.  The fleeting nature of cooperation 
between the two groups does not diminish its significance, however.  EDF’s 
relationship with local environmental groups often proved to be equally short.  
Their partnership with Citizens Natural Resources Association, for example, 
lasted only for the duration of the trial in Wisconsin.    
UFWOC’s distrust of local and state governments is reflected in an 
interview Chavez did shortly after UFWOC was denied access to the Delano 
County Agricultural Commissioner’s records on pesticide use.  He maintained: 
“[T]here isn’t a judge within a hundred miles of here who will rule in our favor.  
Then you have the police, the school boards, the water district, all the way up.  
They try to choke you off…The moment you raise your picket sign your rights as 
a citizen are no longer secure.”234
                                                 
234 Paul Cabbell, “A Free Press Interview with Cesar Chavez,” reprinted from Los 
Angeles Free Press (August 22, 1969),  UFW Information and Research 
Department Collection, Box5, Folder 5-30, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, 
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  UFWOC, instead, pursued a union contract 
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believing that it provided the best possible protection to farmworkers.  Dolores 
Huerta maintained the “only way that you can be sure that the so called laws are 
administered…is when you have somebody right there on the ranch…somebody 
that has the protection of a union contract to make sure these things are carried 
out.”235
When UFWOC decided to address pesticide-related issues, the focus had 
shifted from Delano growers like Shenley Industries and Perilli-Minetti, who 
produced wine grapes, to growers who produced table grapes.  UFWOC made its 
entrance into table grapes in August 1967 with a strike on Giumarra Vineyards.
  Hence, UFWOC sought to pressure more growers into signing collective 
bargaining agreements replete with health and safety provisions. 
236
                                                                                                                                     
reaffirmed the belief that government agencies at the local and state level colluded 
with growers.  In a 1974 speech, she recalled that UFWOC contacted an ally 
within the Los Angeles County Health Department - Industrial Health for 
information on organophosphates.   A grower who found out about the incident 
reportedly tried to get the individual fired.  Huerta asserted that these situations 
arise when “you try to get into those controversial areas where you have 
conflicts…of power.”  Dolores Huerta, “Keynote Address Before the Annual 
Convention of the American Public Health Association” (speech, New Orleans, 
LA, October 21, 1974), UFW Information and Research Department Collection, 
Box5, Folder 5-30, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State 
University, Detroit, MI.   
  
 
235 Huerta, “Keynote Address Before the Annual Convention of the American 
Public Health Association.”  Chavez believed that the “best way to protect the 
union is to boycott” and planned to spend three-fourths of his time on the boycott 
in 1969.  Meeting Minutes, [n.d.], UFW Work Department Collection, Box 5, 
Folder 5-1, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, 
Detroit, MI.   
 
236 “Strike!,” El Malcriado, No. 65 (August 16, 1967): 1. Table grape growers 
employed a much higher number of farmworker than did wineries.  After 
successfully getting contracts with wine companies, UFWOC chose to focus on 
the part of the grape industry that employed the bulk of farmworkers.  Ganz, Why 
David Sometimes Wins, 227. 
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Giumarra table grapes proved to be tougher to boycott than Shenley or Perilli-
Minetti products.  Customers could easily identify which wine not to buy in a 
boycott, but they had difficulty identifying the origin of table grapes.  Researchers 
within the organization tried to track Giumarra shipments, but other growers let 
Giumarra use their labels to confound the boycott organizers’ efforts.  Economic 
boycotts had played a central role in previous efforts and Chavez did not want to 
abandon the strategy, so UFWOC called a boycott on all California table grapes.  
This made it easier for consumers to participate.237
 A farmworker who joined UFWOC staffers at a strategizing session 
suggested addressing pesticides in the boycott campaign.
 
238  Farmworkers had a 
growing awareness about the health hazards of pesticide exposure, in part because 
UFW staffers communicated the information gathered from concerned scientists 
to workers in the fields.  Flyers printed in Spanish and English warned 
farmworkers about the toxicity of DDT, aldrin, dieldrin, parathion, sevin, TEPP, 
and thiodan and outlined symptoms of pesticide poisoning.  The flyers suggested 
that farmworkers find out how recently a field had been sprayed before entering it 
and instructed the reader to never permit a groundrig or cropduster to spray 
chemicals on them.239
                                                 
237 Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 228. 
  Cropdusters, however, regularly buzzed the vineyards and 
 
238 Jerry Cohen, interview by Leroy Chatfield, May 19, 2009. 
 
239 “Danger-Poison!/¡Peligro-Veneno!,” UFW Office of the President Cesar 
Chavez Collection Part II, Box 36, Folder 36-20, Archives of Labor and Urban 
Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.   
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dropped their chemicals loads with little regard for the farmworkers below.240  
Farmworkers wanted the issue addressed, so they were not made “guinea pigs” as 
growers used DDT “in reckless disregard of its effects on human life and the 
environment.”241
UFWOC incorporated the issue of pesticides into the table grape boycott 
at an opportune time when diverse groups of people shared an interest in the 
environment, even if environmental issues were not their primary concern.  
Historian Adam Rome argues that “no single constituency drove the 
environmental movement,” maintaining that many liberals, women, and students 
critical of the status quo developed environmental concerns during the decade and 
contributed to the rise of the movement.
 The farmworkers’ concern about pesticides also resonated with 
the public.  
242
                                                 
240 Jerry Cohen, interview by Leroy Chatfield, May 19, 2009.  Farmworker 
Vincente Ponce brought suit against a Coachella grower in April 1969 for 
recklessly spraying pesticides on him and other farmworkers laboring in the 
fields.  George Getze, “Suits Ask Ban on Use of DDT in State, Confiscation of 
Crops,”  Los Angeles Times, April 15, 1969. 
  UFWOC targeted the same 
demographics when recruiting supporters to the grape boycott.  The boycott, in 
particular, needed to appeal to women who made decisions about food and family 
consumption while shopping.  Rome asserts that many of the women activists in 
the 1960s described themselves as housewives and viewed their interest in 
environmental issues as a natural extension of their efforts to protect their children 
 
241 Quoting UFWOC attorney David Averbuck.  George Getze, “Suits Ask Ban on 
Use of DDT in State, Confiscation of Crops.” 
 
242 Rome, “Give Earth a Chance,” 527, 553. 
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and families.243
Organizers introduced pesticide issues, particularly relating to DDT, into 
the table grape boycott, using arguments of mutual risk as a means to build a 
bridge to consumers and encourage participation in the boycott.  UFWOC 
instructed boycott organizers around the nation to read circulated pesticide 
literature packets, look for relevant scientific information on their own, and 
seriously consider reading Silent Spring to give them a solid background on the 
subject.  Boycott volunteers then shared their newly acquired knowledge with 
consumers.
  UFWOC framed the pesticide issue in a way that appealed to the 
concerns of this type of woman. 
244  They informed consumers that DDT could not be washed from 
produce, scientists linked the chemical to cancer in test mice, and accumulations 
of DDT in the breast milk of nursing mothers were so elevated that the milk 
would be unlawful to sell had it come from a cow.245
                                                 
243 Rome, “Give Earth a Chance,” 538. 
  The imparting message held 
 
244 Juanita Brown to Boycotters, 1969, United Farmworkers Organizing 
Committee Collection, Box 9, Folder 9-29, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, 
Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.  
 
245Ibid.;  Jerry Cohen to Boycotters, August 5 1969, UFW Information and 
Research Department Collection, Box 24, Folder 24-1, Archives of Labor and 
Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.  Marion Moses also prepared 
a slide presentation (17 slides and text) for use by boycott organizers.  The 
presentation began with a summation of Silent Spring and definition of terms and 
concepts before moving on to more recent scientific findings and anecdotes of 
farmworkers’ pesticide poisoning.  After explaining the dangers of agricultural 
chemicals to the audience, it described how the USDA was responsible for 
pesticide regulation but relied primarily on data supplied by the pesticide industry, 
creating a system that was prone to abuse.  It concluded with a call for research 
into alternative pest control strategies and the use of the precautionary principle in 
pesticide registration processes. “Commentary to Go With Pesticide Slides,” 
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that government agencies responsible for protecting the public health had failed to 
do so, putting both farmworkers and the public at risk; but a union contract would 
enable UFWOC to act as watchdogs, protecting farmworkers and consumers 
alike.246
The issue of pesticides quickly moved to the fore of UFWOC campaign in 
1969.  Chavez wrote a letter to table grape growers and their representative 
organizations in January 1969 requesting that if the growers would not meet to 
   
                                                                                                                                     
prepared  April 21, 1970, UFW Central Administration Files, Box 10, Folder 10-
34, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI. 
 
246“Grape Workers Are Killed and Maimed Every Year by the Pesticides You Are 
Eating,” leaflet, UFWOC New York Boycott Collection, Box 11, Folder 11-13, 
Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI; “It’s a 
Matter of Good Health For You to Support the Grape Boycott,” leaflet, United 
Farmworkers Organizing Committee Collection, Box 9, Folder 9-29, Archives of 
Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.  The UFWOC 
drafted a “Consumer and Worker Protection Clause” to be incorporated into 
contracts when signed.  The Preamble began: “The Company and the Union 
recognize the need to supply consumers with healthy grapes picked and handled 
under the most clean, sanitary and healthful conditions possible.  Furthermore, the 
Company and the Union recognize the need to conserve our natural resources and 
protect all forms of life from the serious dangers and damages caused by the 
improvident use of economic poison.  In the hope of taking progressive steps to 
protect the health of the farm workers and consumers throughout the world and 
conserving for all of mankind the benefits of our natural resources and 
surroundings, the Company and the Union agree as follows.” “Consumer and 
Worker Protection Clause,” UFW Information and Research Department 
Collection, Box 24, Folder 24-1, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne 
State University, Detroit, MI.  The Health and Safety portions 1970 contracts had 
a preamble that read very similar to the UFWOC draft and contained nearly all the 
provisions designed to make the details of growers’ pesticide usage readily 
accessible, including the establishment of a Health and Safety Committee 
composed of worker representative that would “participate in the formulation of 
rules and practices relating to the health and safety of workers.” “Health and 
Safety Portions of the Freedman Contracts,” UFW Central Administration Files 
Collection, Box 10, Folder 10-34, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne 
State University, Detroit, MI. 
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discuss a collective bargaining agreement that they at least meet to discuss the use 
and control of pesticides, an issue that he stated had become UFWOC’s primary 
issue of concern.  He wrote: “We will not tolerate the systematic poisoning of our 
people.  Even if we cannot get together on other problems, we will be damned--
and we should be--if we will permit human beings to sustain permanent damage 
to their health from economic poisons.”247  Growers initially ignored Chavez’s 
request, but economic pressure from the boycott succeeded in bringing ten 
growers to the bargaining table in June.248  However, rather than meeting to 
discuss pesticides, the growers tried to offer a contract in exchange for a pledge of 
silence on any issues related to pesticides. 249  UFWOC, in contrast, sought to 
foster an industrial democracy in the fields that gave farmworkers some control 
over the chemicals to which they would be exposed.250
                                                 
247 “Growers Spurn Negotiations on Poisons,” 3. 
   Talks broke down and 
 
248The ten growers represented grew approximately fifteen percent of the table 
grapes produced in California, a fraction of the boycotted crop.  Nevertheless, it 
had the possibility of being a moment of great significance, since table grape 
growers had long stood united in opposing the union. “Historic Break Through!: 
Growers Offer Negotiations,” El Malcriado III, No. 6 (June 1-30, 1960): 3, 14. 
 
249They wanted a clause inserted into the contract that read: “The Union agrees 
that it will not embark on any program which will in any way harm the industry to 
which the employer is a member.” Had UFWOC signed, they would have been 
unable to engage in pesticide reform efforts, even as more information about 
adverse health effects became available.   “Talks stalled on Poison Use: Chavez 
Speaks Out on Negotiations,” El Malcriado III, No. 8 (July 15-31, 1969): 3, 13; 
“Blackmail!,” El Malcriado III, No. 8 (July 15-31, 1969): 3, 14. 
 
250 The UFWOC’s renegotiated contract with Perelli Minetti Company in 
September 1969 had a health and safety clause that provided workers greater 
control over the conditions in the fields in which they worked with the 
establishment of a Health and Safety Committee composed of an equal number of 
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UFWOC continued to warn consumers about pesticides, urging them to boycott 
grapes.  
Grocery stores, growers, and some members of government decried 
UFWOC’s emphasis on pesticides and health as unfounded scare tactics designed 
to prop up a failing union effort; so UFWOC called on its boycott organizers to 
run laboratory tests for pesticide residues on supermarket grapes.251
                                                                                                                                     
representatives from the company and field crews.  “UFWOC Signs Historic 
Pesticide Safety Clause,” El Malcriado III, No. 12 (September 15-October 1, 
1969): 3, 6. 
  Chavez had 
 
251 Safeway Stores, Inc. to Customers, June, 26 1969, UFWOC New York 
Boycott Collection, Box 11, Folder 11-4, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, 
Wayne State University, Detroit, MI; Cesar Chavez to Boycotters, September 19, 
1969, UFWOC New York Boycott Collection, Box 11, Folder 11-4, Archives of 
Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.  The UFWOC 
tested grapes for pesticide residues as early as April 1969 if not earlier.  Grapes 
that Peggy McGivern bought from a supermarket on April 8, 1969 had showed 
levels of DDT residue at .0003 and .004 PPM when tested. Jerry Cohen to Cesar 
Chavez and Marion Moses, May 30, 1969, UFW Office of the President: Cesar 
Chavez Collection Part II, Box 36, Folder 36-20, Archives of Labor and Urban 
Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.  The UFWOC’s testing of grapes 
caused a stir at Subcommittee on Migratory Labor hearings on August 1, 1969 
when Jerome Cohen introduced a lab report into his testimony that showed aldrin 
levels 180 times above the legally permissible levels. Thomas J. Foley, “Grape 
Pesticides Finding Challenged,” Los Angeles Times, September 30, 1969.  The 
grape grower pledged that they had not used aldrin on the crop and California 
Senator George Murphy accused the UFWOC of raising “the pesticide issue in an 
effort to harass the industry,” stating that the organization had engaged in a 
“vicious type of deceit” by tampering with the tested grapes.  As it turned out, the 
UFWOC did not tamper with the grapes.  Rather, the laboratory tests were not 
sophisticated enough to differentiate between aldrin and sulfur, raising questions 
about the adequacy and accuracy of government pesticide monitoring.  
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor, Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker 
Powerlessness: Pesticides and the Farmworker, 91st Congress, 1st and 2d sess., 
1969, Part 6B, 3366-3367, 3379; Jerry Cohen, interview by Leroy Chatfield, May 
19, 2009.  When the controversy was straightened out, Senator Murphy had to 
admit that the disparaging charges that he had made against the UFWOC were 
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the legal department draft a sample consumer lawsuit, so that when residues were 
found, it would be easy for consumers to file a lawsuit against the grocery store 
and grower on the grounds of selling an adulterated food “made defective by the 
presence of pesticide, insecticide, and herbicide residue.” UFWOC suggested that 
nursing mothers or mothers who wanted to breastfeed their babies but feared 
passing DDT on to their children would make the best plaintiffs in the citizen 
suits.252
The California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) organization followed the 
UFWOC lead, partnering with the EDF to petition the Food and Drug 
Administration of the Health Education and Welfare Department (HEW) to set a 
zero tolerance level for DDT on food in 1969.  The organizations represented five 
parents of minor children and one expectant mother.  All of the parents had low 
incomes and three of the mothers breastfed their children.  The parents did not 
know the amount of DDT used in agricultural production; however, they knew 
that growers used the chemical on table grapes because of the ongoing UFWOC 
boycott.  The petition stated the parents “have a deep concern for the welfare of 
their children, whose welfare appears to be seriously threatened by the 
omnipresent health hazard posed by the continued contamination of the American 
 
                                                                                                                                     
made in error. “Murphy’s Lies Exposed,” El Malcriado III, No. 12 (September 
15-October 1, 1969): 2, 13. 
 
252 Chuck Farnsworth to Boycotters, [n.d.], UFWOC New York Boycott 
Collection, Box 11, Folder 11-4, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne 
State University, Detroit, MI; Cesar Chavez to Boycotters, September 19, 1969. 
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food supply with DDT.”253  The petition noted that poor persons’ diet typically 
caused them to have greater accumulations of DDT within their bodies and that 
DDT concentrated in mother’s breast milk.  Consequently, the World Health 
Organization estimated that nursing babies’ daily intake of DDT was more than 
twice the maximum recommended amount.  Despite the probability that 
breastfeeding would likely cause their children to consume unhealthful levels of 
DDT, the mothers shared a “very natural, deep and intense desire to breast-feed 
their children so as to establish the strong emotional bond and to provide the, 
otherwise, most nutritious food available to their infants.”254
EDF and CRLA referenced the 1959 Delaney Clause to the Food and 
Drug Act in proposing a solution.  The Delaney Clause barred any food 
containing an additive found to be carcinogenic in animals from being sold.  The 
groups held that scientific findings showed clear evidence that DDT was 
carcinogenic in animals and was very likely to pose the same threat to humans. 
From the premise that DDT was a food additive, EDF and CRLA argued that the 
  The argument 
concluded that the pervasiveness and persistence of DDT made it impossible for 
mothers to protect their children from contaminated foodstuffs. 
                                                 
253 Environmental Defense Fund, Incorporated, Sierra Club, West Michigan 
Action Council, and National Audubon Society, “In re: Irene Lopez, Elvira 
Garduno, Kathy Rake, Marilyn Vittor, Leigh Roycroft, Juan Zamora, and the 
Environmental Defense Fund Incorporated, “Petition for Issuance of a Proposed 
Regulation Repealing a Tolerance For a Pesticide on Raw Agricultural 
Commodities” in “Petition Requesting the Suspension and Cancellation of 
Registration of Economic Poisons Containing DDT,” Appendix B, 6, Sierra Club 
Records, BANC 71/103 c, Carton 125, Folder 12, The Bancroft Library, 
University of California Berkeley.  
 
254 Ibid., 6.  
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Delaney Clause prohibited any food with DDT residues from being sold to 
consumers.  Since DDT could not easily be removed from raw or processed food, 
a zero tolerance would effectively ban use of the chemical in agriculture.255
EDF also joined the Sierra Club, Audubon Society, and West Michigan 
Environmental Action Council to petition the Secretary of Agriculture to cancel 
the registration of DDT as a pesticide, banning its use in agriculture.  UFWOC, 
United Auto Workers, and the Izaak Walton League of America filed statements 
in support.  A press conference announced the joint action with Charles Wurster 
fielding technical questions while flanked by representatives of the Sierra Club, 
Audubon Society, United Auto Workers, UFWOC, and Izaac Walton League.
   
256  
The groups presented evidence that DDT damaged the environment and caused 
cancer in test animals and reported that cancer victims had more than twice the 
accumulation of DDT in their bodies as victims of accidental death.257
                                                 
255 Michael D. Green, “The Politics of Pesticides,” The Nation 209, No. 18 
(November 24, 1969): 570. 
  By year’s 
 
256 Environmental Defense Fund Incorporated, “Leading Environmentalists 
Petition U.S.D.A. to Ban DDT,” Press Release, October 31, 1969, Environmental 
Defense Fund Collection, RG 1, SG 1.4 , S 7, SS 2, Box 7, Folder 22, Department 
of Special Collections, SUNY Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY; James W. 
Moorman to Michael McCloskey, November 3, 1969, Sierra Club Records, 
BANC 81/ 103c, Carton 125, Folder 14, The Bancroft Library, University of 
California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA.  Center for Law and Social Policy attorney 
James W. Moorman represented the Sierra Club in the effort. James W. Moorman 
to Michael McCloskey, October 21, 1969, Sierra Club Records, BANC 71/103 c, 
Carton 125, Folder 14, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 
Berkeley, CA.   
 
257 Environmental Defense Fund Incorporated, “Leading Environmentalists 
Petition U.S.D.A. to Ban DDT.”  Wurster explained the petition to ban DDT to 
West Michigan Environmental Action Council Chairman Willard Wolfe, 
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end, USDA pledged to end the use of DDT in residential areas, while HEW set a 
two year phase-out goal for use of the chemical on food crops.  The petitioners 
did not find either response satisfying and looked to the courts for a full ban.258
As the environmental groups pursued legal action, growers buckled to the 
pressure of the UFWOC boycott.  Twenty-six grape growers gathered at 
UFWOC’s Forty Acres headquarters near Delano to sign contracts containing 
health and safety provisions with the union on July 29, 1970.
 
259
                                                                                                                                     
asserting that DDT should be targeted first because it was most widely used and 
had the most scientific evidence that it was harmful.  He maintained that it would 
be difficult to use the evidence against DDT more broadly to ban other 
chlorinated hydrocarbons, but the precedent set by the banning of DDT could be 
used in the banning of other dangerous pesticides.  He also explained the 
emphasis on environmental damage over human harm, stating that the evidence of 
damage done to vertebrate and useful invertebrate animals was very strong, but 
that its adverse effect on humans was suggestive but weaker.  James W.  
Moorman to Willard E. Wolfe, October 22, 1969, Sierra Club Records, BANC 
71/103 c, Carton 125, Folder 14, The Bancroft Library, University of California, 
Berkeley, Berkeley, CA. 
  The contracts 
banned DDT from use by contracted growers.  It also prohibited the growers from 
using chlorinated hydrocarbons aldrin, dieldrin, and endrin and organophosphates 
parathion and TEPP.  Additionally, the agreements provided farmworkers a 
means to restrict the usage of other harmful pesticides in the future.  Each grower 
agreed to the establishment of a Health and Safety Committee that would have 
access to pesticide records and would help formulate rules and practices to 
 
258 Dunlap, DDT, 207- 208. 
 
259 “Huelga Ends: Delano Struggle Concludes With Dramatic Signing,” El 
Malcriado IV, No. 4 (August 1, 1970): 4. 
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minimize risk to workers.  The committees would also establish safe reentry times 
for workers after the spraying of pesticides.260
EDF, Sierra Club, Audubon Society, and West Michigan Environmental 
Action Council continued to pursue their legal strategy for a national ban on DDT 
after UFWOC successfully barred it and a handful of other harmful chemicals 
from contracted fields.  In October 1970, Congress created the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and entrusted the agency with the responsibility of 
registering and regulating pesticides, duties that were previously performed by 
USDA.  Despite the change, EPA initially proved nearly as reluctant to ban DDT 
as USDA.  EDF brought suit again.  The Consolidated DDT Hearing that 
followed had 125 expert witnesses and lasted eighty days.  Finally, in June 1972, 
EPA Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus issued an order to ban nearly all uses 







 Public perception of DDT changed markedly in the short span of ten years 
from 1962 to 1972.  The chemical which emerged from World War II as a 
celebrated miracle-worker entered the 1970s under attack from individuals and 
groups spanning the social and political spectrum.  Rachel Carson catalyzed the 
                                                 
260 “Health and Safety portions of Freedman Contracts.” 
 
261 Dunlap, DDT, 211.  For a detailed account of the EDF’s final push to ban 
DDT, see Dunlap, “Final Rounds,” in DDT, 197-230. 
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shift in public opinion with the publication of Silent Spring which consolidated 
diffuse and complex scientific information into a concise and understandable 
compendium that was accessible the public.  The book’s message resonated with 
diverse groups of people since the problems posed by persistent pesticides 
touched everyone’s lives: from birdwatchers to farmworkers to nursing mothers to 
everyday consumers.  Carson, like other concerned scientists of her day, feared 
the unintended consequences of technological development and wanted not just to 
democratize access to information, but to democratize decision-making by 
encouraging citizen involvement in issues that potentially threatened their health 
and welfare. 
Silent Spring appeared on shelves at the dawn of a decade defined by 
dynamic progressive social movements.  Rights-based struggles for equality, 
justice, access to information, free speech, consumer protection, and a healthful 
environment grew in size and influence over the course of the decade.  Though 
these movements had a range of varying interests, activists within one cause 
sometimes drew inspiration and resources from organizations in another.  
Concerns about conservation, human health, and social justice overlapped in 
1960s.  This presented an opportunity for farmworkers, consumers, and 
environmentalists to collaborate to solve interconnected problems posed by 
pesticides. 
The UFWOC and environmental organizations used the information 
garnered from concerned scientists to complement their own observations of the 
deleterious effects of pesticides, using scientific expertise to strengthen arguments 
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for a ban on DDT.  Entomologist Kyle Van Den Bosch described the satisfaction 
felt when citizens and non-governmental organizations answered Carson’s call for 
engagement in decision-making about pesticides, stating “in happy union, we 
crashed into each other’s arms…environmentalists needed an entomologist to 
help them in the pesticide controversy, and I, an entomologist, needed their 
resources, know-how, and political clout to support my entomo-radicalism.”262
The banning of DDT, first in UFWOC-contracted fields and then 
nationally, constituted a major achievement for the involved farmworker and 
environmental organizations, but it did not eliminate all of the pesticide threats.  
Dangerous persistent pesticides remained in use, as did a multitude of acutely 
toxic organophosphates.  Farmworker organizations and environmentalists 
continued to push for pesticide reform in the 1970s after the general use of DDT 
ceased.  As the groups met new challenges, some older conservation groups, like 
  
But some organizations were better positioned to act than others.  Traditional 
conservation groups transitioned somewhat slowly to the host of new 
environmental issues relating to human health and the urban, industrial, and 
agricultural environments.  New groups, like EDF, embraced pollution, human 
health, and social justice concerns in much quicker fashion.  EDF resultantly 
proved most fit to collaborate with disparate interests, developing strategic 
alliances with scientists, lawyers, community organizations and UFWOC in the 
late 1960s to prosecute the case against DDT in the courts.  
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the Sierra Club, overcame their organizational inertia and became more vocal 
proponents of pesticide reform.   
  100 
CHAPTER 3 
MOVEMENTS IN TRANSITION: ENVIRONMENTALISTS, 
FARMWORKERS, AND THE REGULATORY STATE, 1970-1976 
Americans in towns and cities across the nation took part in the first Earth 
Day on April 22, 1970.  They engaged in demonstrations, parades, teach-ins, 
clean-up activities, guerilla theater, and civil disobedience to alternately express 
their disapproval of practices that polluted the environment, call for a reduction in 
peoples’ ecological footprint, and address problems with corrective action.263  
Proposed by Wisconsin Democratic Senator Gaylord Nelson and coordinated by 
Denis Hayes and the new organization Environmental Action, Earth Day events 
aimed to increase awareness about a range of environmental problems and serve 
notice that concern for environmental issues ranked high in the minds of many 
Americans.264  Certainly, the millions of people who participated in the day’s 
activities demonstrated that the environmental movement was a growing force in 
American politics.265
                                                 
263 Events and the intended purpose of them varied widely, because of the high 
degree of local control and focus in planning.  For a description of various events 
see “And the Day After,” Science News 97, No. 18 (2 May, 1970): 432; Richard 
Harwood, “Earth Day Stirs Nation,” Washington Post, April 23, 1970; David 
Lowenthal, “Earth Day,” Area 2, No. 4 (1970): 1-10.   
 
 
264 Louise Durbin, “Earth Day May Not Save the World, but It’s a Beginning,” 
Washington Post, March 22, 1970; George C. Wilson, “Ecology: Protests to 
Mount,” Washington Post, March 15, 1970. 
 
265 Environmental Action reported that nearly 20 million people participated in 
Earth Day activities.  “And the Day After,” 432.  Some commentators criticized 
that many of the day’s events lacked a substantive approach to environmental 
problems and wondered if the enthusiasm for the environmental agenda would 
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Poor and minority communities responded to Earth Day with mixed 
emotions.  Certainly many people within these communities harbored concern 
about urban environmental issues.  The Chicago Freedom Movement maintained 
that African Americans were “tired of living in rat-infested slums” of the “cement 
reservation” and demanded that the city clean streets in the neighborhood and 
improve garbage collection services in 1966.266  The Young Lords, a Puerto Rican 
organization in New York City modeled after the Black Panthers, launched a 
Garbage Offensive in 1969 in effort to improve sanitation services in Harlem.267
                                                                                                                                     
continue.  David Lowenthal maintained that “many activities were less real than 
symbolic, less ground breaking than jamboree.” Lowenthal, “Earth Day,” 3.  
Another writer noted that “the days following religious revivals and old-fashioned 
Fourth of July celebrations saw many backsliders and much business as usual,” 
contemplating whether environmentalists would suffer from the same drawdown 
after Earth Day passed.  “After Earth Day,” Science 168, No. 3932 (8 May 1970), 
1. 
  
Chicano activist and Earth Day organizer Arturo Sandoval led activists and news 
crews on a march through the streets of Albuquerque on Earth Day, believing that 
 
266 Thomas F. Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, 
Jr., and the Struggle for Economic Justice (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 285,  412n. 
 
267 The campaign began with the Young Lords removing garbage from streets in 
the neighborhood.  They left trash-filled bags curbside for collection, but the 
infrequent and poor sanitation service took an unreasonable amount of time to 
remove the garbage.  The activists then constructed barriers of garbage in the 
streets to bring attention to Harlem’s problem with the city’s sanitation service.  
The Young Lords’ efforts generated sufficient media attention to make New York 
City Mayor John Lindsay address the problem.  Johanna Fernandez, “Between 
Social Service Reform and Revolutionary Politics: The Young Lords, Late Sixties 
Radicalism, and Community Organizing in New York City,” in Freedom North: 
Black Freedom Struggles Outside the South, 1940-1980, ed. by Jeanne F. 
Theoharis and Komozi Woodard (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 264-
269. 
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the day’s events had the power “to make people understand that the kind of things 
that cause air pollution and water pollution are the same kind of things that cause 
poverty, that cause hunger in this country.”268  Yet not everyone rallied to the 
cause like Sandoval.  A young Chicago black woman interviewed by NBC 
Evening News stated that “the main reason that there weren’t many blacks in the 
pollution marches today is the simple reason that we have too many problems.  
We got the problems with our homes.  We don’t have enough food.  We can’t get 
good jobs.  The air, that’s irrelevant to what we have to do.”269  Other people 
harbored fears that Earth Day was a conspiracy plotted by the “established order 
in this country to divert attention from the pressing problems of black people.”270  
El Malcriado failed to mention Earth Day, although the UFWOC continued to 
picket against pesticides as it had done in the preceding weeks and months.271
                                                 
268 Rocky Barker, “A Lawmaker’s Brainchild, Earth Day Turns 40, Having 
Spawned Environmental Movement,” 
 
http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2010/04/a_lawmakers_brainchild_eart
h_d.html (accessed September 24, 2010).  Other staffers who helped organize 
Earth Day events had roots in movements for civil rights and social justice as 
well.  Adam Rome notes that Sam Love was a civil rights organizer in 
Mississippi, Steve Cotton worked for a biracial Southern newspaper, Bryce 
Hamilton previously volunteered for the Peace Corps, and Andy Garling 
established a peace advocacy group in Boston.  Adam Rome, “The Genius of 
Earth Day,” Environmental History 15, No. 2 (April 2010): 197. 
 
269 NBC Evening News. “Earth Day/Daughters of the American 
Revolution/Blacks/South Dakota,” (originally aired April 23, 1970), Vanderbilt 
University Television News Archive, Nashville, TN.  
 
270 Quote is from Howard University student Michael Harris.  “Earth 
Day/Daughters of the American Revolution/Blacks/South Dakota.” 
 
271 Lowenthal, “Earth Day,” 3.   
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Despite the apprehension that some individuals within poor and minority 
groups showed towards Earth Day, Sandoval and other event organizers 
employed a rhetoric intended to build bridges to other special interests and make 
the movement appealing to diverse groups of people.  At a speaking engagement 
in Denver, Senator Nelson asserted that the environment movement’s concerns 
extended far beyond the traditional scope of conservationists.  He argued that the 
environment “is the rats in the ghetto.  It is a hungry child in a land of affluence.  
It is ‘public housing’ that isn’t worthy of the name.  It is a problem whose 
existence is perpetuated by the expenditure of $25 billion a year on the war in 
Vietnam, instead of on our decaying, crowded, congested, polluted urban 
areas.”272  Environmental Action coordinators urged people and organizations 
within the movement to establish links with other groups by identifying common 
concerns, stating that the “alliances possible by organizing around environmental 
concerns stagger the mind” because pollution posed a threat to individuals of all 
economic classes and racial backgrounds.273
The Sierra Club adopted a broader view of concerns as it capitalized on 
the wellspring of public interest that surrounded Earth Day.  Leaders within the 
organization felt the swell of enthusiasm for environmental causes in the months 
  Many environmentalists accepted 
these contentions and entered the 1970s thinking about a wide range of 
environmental concerns outside the traditional realm of conservation.  
                                                 
272 Harwood, “Earth Day Stirs Nation.” 
 
273 Environmental Action, Earth Tool Kit: A Field Manual for Citizen Activists, 
ed. Sam Love, Peter Hamik, Avery Taylor (New York: Pocket Books, 1971), 7. 
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preceding the planned events and took steps to participate.  Though the Sierra 
Club lacked experience with coordinating demonstrations, it did not want to be 
bypassed by an event its leaders suspected would be important.  The club’s 
national leaders authorized local chapters to coordinate events and compiled a 
collection of essays into a volume entitled Ecotactics.274  The club also published 
The Sierra Club Survival Songbook in 1971.  The Survival Songbook contained 
fifty-nine songs that the editors considered the “best environmental songs in 
America today.”   Many of the selections fell well outside the scope of traditional 
conservationism and addressed things like air and water pollution in urban areas, 
industrial pollution, and lead paint poisoning.  The book included Don McLean’s 
“Orphans of Wealth,” a song whose lyrics criticize the affluent society in the 
United States for turning a blind eye on the poor as they suffered from hunger and 
illness related to environmental pollutants.  The songbook also featured Malvina 
Reynolds’ “DDT on My Brain,” which included a line about farmworkers 
adversely suffering from the effects of the chemical.275
                                                 
274 McCloskey, In the Thick of It, 105-106.  Membership in the organization 
continued to climb throughout the year, increasing by more than 17,000 in 1970 
alone.  Nicholls, ed., Chapter and Group Leaders’ Handbook , 6. 
  The growth in the Sierra 
 
275 The Sierra Club did not necessarily address all of the included subjects 
equally.  Yet, the inclusion of the issues and songs in the Survival Songbook 
shows recognition of each subject as a problem that ought to be addressed.  Jim 
Morse and Nancy Matthews, eds., The Sierra Club Survival Songbook , (San 
Francisco: Sierra Club, 1971). 
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Club’s scope of interests paralleled the organization’s growing acceptance of its 
place at the fore of the environmental movement.276
The Sierra Club’s scope of political engagement expanded much more 
than did Chavez’s United Farm Workers (UFW) or EDF between 1970 and 1976.  
As it became a lobbying force, the Sierra Club exerted its influence on public 
policy relating to pesticides.  EDF maintained its focus on using the courts as a 
vehicle for environmental protection.  UFW continued to pursue more contracts 
with growers, believing that the union would provide the best protection to 
farmworkers.  With the greater engagement of the Sierra Club in pesticide 
politics, collaboration between environmentalists and UFW increased between 
1970 and 1976; though the cooperation between the groups remained less visible 




From DDT to Dieldrin and Beyond 
 
Environmental Defense Fund undertook efforts to ban two other 
chlorinated hydrocarbons, aldrin and dieldrin, while still working to ban DDT.  
Rachel Carson warned about the dangers of both chemicals in Silent Spring, 
noting dieldrin tested five times as toxic as DDT if swallowed and forty times 
                                                 
276 McCloskey, In the Thick of It, 106, 108.   
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more toxic when absorbed through the skin.277  Tests conducted by Shell Oil, the 
manufacturer of aldrin and dieldrin, in 1968 showed that the chemicals were 
carcinogenic.  Shell reported the results to the Food and Drug Administration the 
following year, but FDA made no move to remove the chemical and did not share 
the findings with the public or other agencies.  The HEW-appointed Mrak 
Commission nevertheless found aldrin and dieldrin to be carcinogenic in 1969 
and concluded that the chemicals should be banned on that basis.278
EDF first attempted to get the Environmental Protection Agency to cancel 
all uses of aldrin and dieldrin in 1970, but the results of a two-year review process 
left most uses of the chemicals unaffected.  A follow-up lawsuit filed by 
Environmental Defense Fund in 1972 required EPA to detail the risks and benefits 
of aldrin and dieldrin usage.  The ruling culminated in a yearlong cancellation 
hearing for the chemicals beginning in 1973.
   
279
                                                 
277 Carson, Silent Spring, 25-26. 
  Growers’ associations claimed 
 
278 Samuel Epstein attended the Mrak Commission to which HEW Secretary 
Robert Finch delegated the task of determining if DDT should be banned.  Epstein 
reports that O. Garth Fitzhugh, a senior FDA scientist, quipped, “I don’t know 
why you should be so concerned about the carcinogenicity of DDT, you should 
see what we have on dieldrin.”  When probed about the comment, Fitzhugh 
refused to elaborate, maintaining that it was confidential information.   
Publication of the test results waited six years from time of the findings.  Samuel 
S. Epstein, The Politics of Cancer Revisited (Freemont Center, NY: East Ridge 
Press, 1998), 166. 
 
279 Wargo, Our Children’s Toxic Legacy, 88. The EDF worked to ban both 
chemicals simultaneously, because aldrin converted to dieldrin as it broke down 
in the body.  For a description of aldrin and dieldrin’s properties, statistics, and 
the chemicals’ risk to human and environmental health, see Epstein, The Politics 
of Cancer Revisited, 159-166. 
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that their members would suffer devastating losses without the chemicals, arguing 
that available alternatives failed to adequately protect crops or were cost 
prohibitive.280  The associations then warned that the decline in agricultural 
production resulting from the cancellation of aldrin and dieldrin would not only 
lead to domestic and international food shortages, but would adversely affect the 
United States’ international trade standing by reducing available exports.281  EDF 
not only presented scientific evidence on the hazards of aldrin and dieldrin, but 
worked to show that the necessity of use had been overstated by growers.  The 
organization introduced testimony from a Nebraska farm manager who never used 
the pesticides, yet still produced comparable yields to other growers in the area.  
Environmental Defense Fund also called upon a United Farm Workers organizer 
to testify on their behalf.282
                                                 
280 Stuart L. Spradling, “Testimony in Support of the Continued Use of Aldrin as 
a Corn Soil Insecticide,” (testimony, Environmental Protection Agency Aldrin 
Dieldrin Cancellation Hearing,  Kansas City, MO, August 28, 1973) 
Environmental Defense Fund Collection, RG 3, SG II.2, S 1, SS Aldrin & 
Dieldrin Suspension/ Cancellation Hearings, Box 46, Folder 17, Department of 
Special Collections, SUNY Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY. 
   
 
281 Max Bailey, (testimony, Environmental Protection Agency Aldrin Dieldrin 
Cancellation Hearing, Kansas City, MO, August 28, 1973) Environmental 
Defense Fund Collection, RG 3, SG II.2, S 1, SS Aldrin & Dieldrin Suspension/ 
Cancellation Hearings, Box 46, Folder 18, Department of Special Collections, 
SUNY Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY; Stuart L. Spradling, “Testimony in 
Support of the Continued Use of Aldrin as a Corn Soil Insecticide.”  
282 Statement of Diana Lyons, [n.d], Environmental Defense Collection,  RG 3, 
SG II.2, S 1, SS Aldrin & Dieldrin Suspension/ Cancellation Hearings, Box 39, 
Folder 14, Department of Special Collections, SUNY Stony Brook, Stony Brook, 
NY. 
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Whereas United Farm Workers called upon the expertise of Charles 
Wurster and the Environmental Defense Fund prior to signing collective 
bargaining agreements with table grape growers in 1970, EDF called upon UFW 
in 1973 because of the pesticide provisions in their contract.  The uses of aldrin 
and dieldrin that Shell Oil deemed critical for high yield agricultural production 
included applications of the chemicals in orange groves.283  EDF wanted to show 
that usage in orange production was unnecessary.  They contacted UFW, because 
the union had recently signed contracts with Coca Cola, the makers of Minute 
Maid juice, covering 40,000 acres of citrus grove in Florida.284  The contracts 
carried the same pesticide provisions as the agreements signed with table grape 
growers in California.  These provisions banned not only DDT, but aldrin and 
dieldrin as well.285
                                                 
283 William A. Butler to Joseph Segor, February 7, 1973, Environmental Defense 
Fund Collection, RG 3, SG II.2, S 1, SS Aldrin & Dieldrin Suspension/ 
Cancellation Hearings, Box 2, Folder 2, Department of Special Collections, 
SUNY Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY. 
  EDF hoped to show that the contracted fields continued to 
produce good yields without the use of aldrin and dieldrin to undercut arguments 
 
284 The new contracts covered 1,250 farmworkers on 40,000 acres of citrus grove 
in Florida.  Boycott Central to UFWOC Staff, February 24, 1972, UFW Central 
Administration Files Collection, Box 26, Folder 26-26, Archives of Labor and 
Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.  EDF attorney William 
Butler initially contacted the Migrant Services Foundation in Miami, because he 
had heard that “some of the few farm worker unions in Florida” had contracts 
prohibiting the use of aldrin and dieldrin.  Butler wrote: “Your clients are our 
clients in this matter, and it is our firm conviction their health, and even their 
lives, may be at stake.”  William A. Butler to Joseph Segor, February 7, 1973.  It 
is unclear whether Migrant Services Foundation told him that it was UFW that 
held the contracts or if he found out through established contacts with the union.   
 
285 Statement of Diana Lyons, [n.d]. 
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about the chemicals’ benefit.286  UFW organizer Diana Lyon testified that Coca 
Cola readily agreed to stop usage of the chemicals and that it did not suffer a 
decline in product volume.287
After considering all the evidence, the Chief Administrative Law Judge 
sided with EDF and submitted his decision to EPA administrator Russell Train.  
Train confirmed the decision on October 1, 1974, suspending registration because 
the chemicals exposed the public to an “imminent hazard.”  Shell unsuccessfully 
appealed the decision, arguing that the benefits of aldrin and dieldrin outweighed 
the risks and that the EPA lacked data to prove that the chemicals constituted an 
“imminent hazard.”
  Lyon’s testimony joined a host of others as EDF 
built its case for the cancellation.   
288
                                                 
286 William A. Butler to Joseph Segor, February 7, 1973. 
  Though the ruling still allowed minor uses of aldrin and 
dieldrin against termites, Shell announced that it would stop manufacturing the 
chemical in the United States in April 1975, although usage in other nations 
 
287 Statement of Diana Lyons, [n.d].  Diana Lyon’s brief statement numbered one 
among many that filled the 35,000 pages of testimony accumulated over a twelve-
month period, so the weight that it carried in the decision-making process is 
difficult to determine.  Wargo, Our Children’s Toxic Legacy, 88.   
 
288 The appellate court that reviewed the case defined “imminent hazard” as a 
substance or threat where “there is a substantial likelihood that serious harm will 
be experienced during the year or two required in any realistic projection of the 
administrative process.”   Hence, an immediate crisis was not necessary to cancel 
a chemical’s registration; rather, parties trying to ban the usage of a particular 
chemical just had to adequately demonstrate a probability of harm.  The court 
held that tests conducted on rats sufficiently established a probability of risk.  The 
court dismissed Shell’s claim that available alternatives would significantly 
increase the growers’ workload, stating: “When the subject is risk of cancer, 
convenience may be relevant but it does not weigh heavy in the scales.”  
Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 510 F. 2d 
1292 (2d Cir. 1975).   
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continued.289
EDF’s legal strategy worked, but it proved to be a slow approach.  Cases 
took years to reach closure and only addressed one chemical at a time.
  After many years of effort, EDF had succeeded in halting nearly all 
use of aldrin and dieldrin in the United States.  
290  The 
increasing usage of the courts to limit the application of some agricultural 
chemicals coupled with heightened public concern about pesticides helped 
convince Congress to consider new legislation to improve the regulatory 
framework in 1971.291  Bills in the House and Senate sought to strengthen the 
1947 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), which 
functioned primarily as a labeling law that protected growers from dubious claims 
by pesticide manufacturers.292  As Congress debated the FIFRA amendments, the 
Senate Agriculture Committee tried to stall the bills.293
                                                 
289 Epstein, The Politics of Cancer Revisited, 169.  
 When growers, industry, 
 
290 The aldrin and dieldrin case was unique in addressing two chemicals at once; 
an approach necessitated by the fact that aldrin broke down into dieldrin. 
 
291 Senate Subcommittee on the Environment, Committee of Commerce, Federal 
Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1971, 92nd Congress, 2nd sess., 1972,  28, 
42. 
 
292 The 1947 FIFRA did entrust USDA with the responsibility of protecting the 
public from harm by agricultural chemicals, giving the agency the power to 
cancel pesticide registrations.  Yet the Pesticide Regulation Division of USDA 
repeatedly failed to fulfill its responsibility to protect the public.  It did not bring a 
criminal prosecution against a single violator of the law in the twenty-two years 
following passage of the legislation, despite evidence of regular infractions.  It 
also refused to cancel hazardous chemicals, registered some products over 
protests from HEW, and failed to remove canceled products from the market.  
Daniel, Toxic Drift, 157.  
 
293 Victor Cohn, “The ‘Grim Specter’,” Washington Post, August 1, 1972. 
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and their congressional allies came to the realization that changes to FIFRA 
would pass, the focus shifted from trying to stall the bills to trying to weaken 
them.  They asserted that public fears about pesticides had little basis in fact and 
warned that too stringent regulation would unnecessarily burden growers.294
 At the hearing on FIFRA amendments, environmental organizations 
weighed in on the discussion attempting to preserve strong environmental and 
human health protections in the new law.  Sierra Club’s William Futrell lobbied 
for a citizen suit provision, arguing that individuals deserved a hearing for their 
grievances when they felt that pesticides threatened their health and environment.  
He cited the role of the courts in banning DDT as evidence, stating that “without 
environmental lawsuits, it is doubtful if the agencies involved would ever have 




                                                 
294 Dunlap, DDT, 236 
  EDF attorney William Butler seconded the Sierra Club’s 
 
295 Senate Subcommittee on the Environment, Federal Environmental Pesticide 
Control Act of 1971, 107.  The Sierra Club began lobbying for the passage of the 
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) in 1971 as well.  Congress eventually 
passed the TSCA in 1976.  Judith Kunofsky to Mike McCloskey, Brock Evans, 
Paul Swatek, Gene Coan, Phil Berry, Bill Futrell, Ed Wayburn, Richard Cellarius, 
Dick Leonard, Holly Jones, and Richard Lippes, July 9, 1980.  The history of 
pesticide regulation prior to 1970 gave no reason to believe that responsible 
agency would have restricted DDT without substantial public pressure.  Historian 
Pete Daniel states that the Agricultural Research Service’s (ARS) Pesticide 
Regulation Division (PRD) was “tucked into the mammoth USDA bureaucracy 
and shielded by ARS leadership”; he maintains that “despite its crucial public 
health mission, the PRD operated behind closed doors, where a chorus of eager 
corporate registrants drowned out concern for public safety.”  The congressional 
Fountain Committee investigated the agency and concluded that the agency failed 
to fulfill its prescribed duty, failing to prosecute a single criminal violation in the 
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call for a citizen suit provision and added that human safety needed to be better 
protected in the bill, stating that applicators, farmers, farm workers, and other 
persons coming into contact with pesticides or pesticide residues should be 
protected.  In regard to farmworkers, Butler maintained: “There is value in this 
instance of making explicit what probably is already implicit…that hazard to farm 
workers from pesticides is a subject of major concern in classifying and 
registering a pesticide.”296  Friends of the Earth, Environmental Policy Center, 
and Defenders of Wildlife also supported an amendment to protect farmworkers 
and farmers.297
The passage of the Federal Environmental Pesticides Control Act in 1972 
amended FIFRA, shifting the intent of the law from ensuring accurate product 
labeling to protecting public health and the environment.  Manufacturers had to 
present sufficient evidence of a product’s safety and effectiveness to EPA when 
registering a pesticide.  The agency then determined if the chemical could be used 
without significant adverse effects on people and non-target species.  The 
registrations only stayed valid for five years, after which the manufacturer had to 
re-register the chemicals with updated information.  The legislation also granted 
   
                                                                                                                                     
twenty years following the passage of the 1947 FIFRA despite repeated and 
regular violations of the law.  Daniel, Toxic Drift, 130, 156-157, quote on p. 130. 
 
296 Senate Subcommittee on the Environment, Federal Environmental Pesticide 
Control Act of 1971, 112. 
 
297 Senate Subcommittee on the Environment, Federal Environmental Pesticide 
Control Act of 1971, 170; Senate Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and 
General Legislation, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Federal 
Environmental Pesticide Control Act, Part II, 92nd Congress, 2nd sess., 1972, 230. 
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EPA the right to cancel a pesticide registration if evidence of an “imminent 
hazard” surfaced.298  FIFRA amendments included provisions assuring the public 
access to the registration information and a voice in pesticide regulation.  It 
required pesticide data be made available to the public within thirty days of the 
EPA’s registration of the product, so that the validity of claims could be 
evaluated.  The act carried provisions acknowledging the right of citizens to bring 
suit against violators of the law or EPA, if the agency failed to properly enforce it.  
It also included specific protections for farmworkers, as proposed by Senator 
Nelson and supported by both environmental organizations.299
Environmental organizations supported amendments that strengthened the 
regulatory power of the Federal Environmental Pesticides Control Act; still, they 
expressed some dissatisfaction at the final product.
   
300
                                                 
298 Epstein, The Politics of Cancer, 365. 
  Instead of basing chemical 
assessments solely on risk factors, the legislation instructed EPA to employ a 
cost-benefit analysis in its review of pesticides up for registration. In addition to 
calling on EPA to use the poorly defined criteria of cost, risk, and benefit in its 
evaluation of chemicals, the law lacked some of the strong wording that 
 
299 Wargo, Our Children’s Toxic Legacy, 89-93; Cohn, “The ‘Grim Specter’.”  
The citizen suit provisions in FIFRA has proven to be an essential safeguard 
against laxity in regulation.  Samuel Epstein states that the EPA only took action 
against a small number of chemicals, some of which were no longer manufactured 
by the time the agency acted.  He contends that the majority of actions began after 
public interest groups threatened legal action.  Epstein, The Politics of Cancer, 
367. 
 
300 McCloskey, In the Thick of It, 119. 
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environmentalists desired.  The law required the federal government to reimburse 
manufacturers, applicators, and farmers for their stores of suspended or banned 
chemicals, which environmentalists feared would make EPA hesitant to ban a 
chemical.301
 
  Despite these shortcomings, the amendments strengthened the 
framework for regulating pesticides over what had been in place prior to 1972. 
A Tale of Two Unions 
 
While EDF worked to ban dangerous chlorinated hydrocarbons in the 
courts and environmental organizations exerted their influence in Congress in 
effort to pass a stronger regulatory law, Chavez’s union continued to fight for 
contracts in the fields.  The union’s revenue generation increased to such an 
extent by 1972 that the AFL-CIO determined that it was no longer an organizing 
committee and subsequently chartered the organization as the United Farm 
Workers of America, AFL-CIO (UFW).302
                                                 
301 Senate Subcommittee on the Environment, Committee of Commerce, Federal 
Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1971, 92nd Congress, 2nd sess., 1972, 172; 
Senate Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and General Legislation, Federal 
Environmental Pesticide Control Act, 230; Wargo, Our Children’s Toxic Legacy, 
89-93. 
  Since UFW leaders premised 
pesticide reform on the continued signing of new contracts and the growth of an 
industrial democracy in the fields, it had to extend its reach beyond the vineyards 
 
302 Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 231.  When referring to the union from 
1972 onward, the acronym UFW will be used in the text instead of UFWOC.  
UFW will also be used when making a generalized statement that spans both 
periods. 
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of California table grape growers.  Immediately, after signing the grape contracts 
in 1970, UFWOC shifted its focus to the Salinas Valley to begin a campaign 
anew.  While the union planned to expand its reach into other fields, the swift 
shift in focus came more as a result of necessity than choice.   
Lettuce growers witnessed the gains of UFWOC in the grape vineyards, 
and decided to sign “sweetheart” deals with the Teamsters before Chavez’s union 
made inroads into the Salinas Valley.  The Grower-Shipper Vegetable 
Association of Central California appointed a committee to explore the possibility 
of negotiating an agreement with the Teamsters to be the exclusive bargaining 
agent of lettuce workers.303  The Teamsters signed five-year agreements with 
twenty-seven growers within a week of being contacted.304  Farmworkers had no 
advance knowledge of the agreement between lettuce growers and the Teamsters 
and did not consent to be represented by them.  California law did not require that 
the farmworkers be notified of the labor agreement, so neither the Teamsters nor 
the lettuce growers sought farmworkers’ input in drafting the contracts.305
                                                 
303 The Teamsters previously contracted to represent the truck drivers and packing 
house workers employed by Salinas Valley growers.  Englund v.Chavez, 504 P. 
2d 457 (Cal: Supreme Court 1972).  Lettuce grower Daryl Arnold later admitted:  
“The grape boycott scared the heck out of the farmers, all of us…and they thought 
if they could sign a contact with [the Teamsters] it would forestall Cesar trying to 
come in and take over the industry.”  Quoted in Ferriss and Sandoval, The Fight 
in the Fields, 161. 
  The 
 
304 Englund v.Chavez.  The number of growers contracted with the Teamsters 
grew to approximately 200 by 1972.  “Worldwide Lettuce Boycott to Resume,” 
Los Angeles Times, March 16, 1972. 
 
305 Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 228-229; Englund v.Chavez. 
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foremen in the fields then urged the farmworkers to sign up with the union after 
the fact, reportedly threatening them with job loss if they refused.  Still the 
majority of farmworkers refused to sign with the Teamsters with many of them 
expressing a preference for the UFWOC.306
The Teamsters’ agreements with lettuce growers varied dramatically from 
UFWOC contracts in terms of wages, safety provisions, and workers’ ability to 
influence production processes.  The “sweetheart” deal with growers did little to 
improve lettuce workers’ wages, which stagnated five years prior.  The new wage 
provision guaranteed workers a modest 0.5 cent a box increase per year for five 
years.
  Chavez’s union consequently spent 
the next several years competing with the Teamsters for contracts in the fields.   
307 A UFWOC contract in lettuce, in comparison, guaranteed workers eight 
cents a box and a wage that was twenty-five cents more an hour than under the 
Teamster bargain.308
                                                 
306 Farmworkers testified that they were coerced into signing up with the union, 
though growers denied such claims in court.  Englund v.Chavez.  Farmworker 
delegates from the Salinas Valley requested Chavez to organize the lettuce fields 
during the grape strike, but UFWOC did not have the resources to carry on two 
campaigns at once.  When the growers signed the “sweetheart” deals with the 
Teamsters, many workers approached UFWOC, expressed their interest in joining 
and asked UFWOC to intervene.  Miriam J. Wells, Strawberry Fields: Politics, 
Class and Work in California Agriculture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1996), 81. 
 Whereas the UFWOC contract stipulated that workers be 
 
307 Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 229. 
 
308 “Inter-Harvest Pact: ‘Best Yet’,” El Malcriado IV, No. 4 (1 Aug 1970):7.  The 
threat of boycott quickly convinced Inter Harvest to break its contract with the 
Teamsters and sign with the UFWOC.  United Fruit owned Inter Harvest and 
Chavez warned of a consumer boycott on Chiquita bananas if they did not 
negotiate an exit from the Teamster pact.  Ferriss and Sandoval, The Fight in the 
Fields, 163-168. 
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provided protective gear and have a voice in decision-making about pesticides; 
the Teamster contract offered growers lax provisions, requiring only that they 
comply with state and federal pesticide laws.309
Two of the larger lettuce growers, Inter-Harvest and Fresh Pict, decided to 
sign contracts with UFWOC as Chavez prepared to boycott, but the other growers 
readied for a fight.
  This allowed growers to continue 
using pesticides as they had done in the past and denied farmworkers the degree 
of control over the workplace environment provided in the UFW agreements. 
310  With the other growers insisting on keeping their contracts 
with the Teamsters, thousands of lettuce workers went on strike seeking 
representation by UFWOC.  Lettuce growers readily obtained injunctions against 
the union, arguing that Chavez had no right to picket with the Teamster presence 
in the fields.  Growers supplemented the legal decision with action of their own to 
keep UFWOC out of the fields.  Shotgun-wielding security guards patrolled the 
perimeters of the fields.  The Teamsters supplemented the growers’ security with 
men of their own, many of whom armed themselves with baseball bats.  The 
combined show of force aimed to intimidate the Chavistas.311
                                                 
309 Shaw, Beyond the Fields, 133; “Pesticides and the Public,” El Malcriado IV, 
No. 10 (15 Nov 1970): 2. 
  Intimidation, 
 
310 Inter Harvest and Fresh Pict both considered themselves more vulnerable to 
the effects of a boycott than other growers in the valley.  The two companies 
belonged to corporate conglomerates that had easily identifiable consumer goods 
that could be boycotted by consumers. Ferriss and Sandoval, The Fight in the 
Fields, 163, 170.  Inter Harvest actually inked the contract on August 30, 1970, 
but they had been in talks with the UFWOC for weeks prior to the signing of the 
agreement.  “Our Strike in Salinas,” El Malcriado IV, No. 7 (15 Sept 1970): 5. 
 
311 Ferriss and Sandoval, The Fight in the Fields, 170. 
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though, soon transitioned into acts of violence against UFWOC and its 
supporters.312
After a month of increasing tension and interspersed incidents of violence, 
Monterey County Superior Court judge Anthony Brazil weighed in on the labor 
dispute with a permanent injunction, ruling that the UFWOC was conducting an 
illegal strike that violated the Teamsters’ jurisdictional authority.
   
313  Rather than 
cease their efforts, UFWOC chose to escalate the campaign by employing a 
strategy that had proven effective during the grape strike.  Once again, it turned to 
the consumer boycott as a means of pressuring growers into recognizing UFWOC 
as the legitimate union in the lettuce fields.  The Court sentenced Chavez to jail 
for willfully violating the injunction.  As deputies escorted Chavez from his 
sentencing to his cell, he turned to the crowd and said: “Boycott the hell out of 
them!”314
                                                 
312 Attorney Jerry Cohen, two UFWOC organizers, and reporter Jacques Levy 
attempted to check on the welfare of workers engaged in a sit-down strike on 
April 25, 1970.  The group encountered ranch owner Albert Hansen en route to 
the workers.  Cohen identified himself and made the purpose of the group 
transparent to the grower.  Hanson reversed his course, only to return a short time 
later with a number of strong-arms.  After a brief exchange of words with Cohen, 
the grower instructed the men to attack.  Levy, Cesar Chavez, 382, 383; “Salinas 
and Santa Maria: Violence, Greed and Stupidity,” El Malcriado IV, No. 6 (1 Sept 
1970): 2.  Chavez recalled a number of other incidents occurring around the same 
time as the assault on Cohen, including an instance in which a grower drove a 
vehicle into a picket line.  Levy, Cesar Chavez, 385. 
 
 
313 Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 230; “Boycott Scab Lettuce,” El 
Malcriado IV, No. 8 (1 Oct 1970): 3. 
 
314 Bill Carder, “Bill Carder,1970-1974: UFW Attorney,” Farmworker 
Documentation Project,  
http://farmworkermovement.com/essays/essays/076%20Carder_Bill.pdf  
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UFWOC addressed pesticide threats to some degree after the start of the 
lettuce boycott, but the issue did not assume the central position that it had in the 
table grape boycott from 1969 to 1970.  After the call for the boycott, Cohen 
charged that lettuce growers misused pesticides to a greater extent than producers 
of other crops in the state, stating that workers have suffered respiratory problems 
and rashes as a result.315  El Malcriado followed suit, stressing the importance of 
UFWOC’s health and safety provisions.  Growers’ “greatest interest was in the 
crops,” the editorial claimed, “not the people.”316  Chavez’s union also used Bud 
Antle’s connection to Dow Chemical to disparage the lettuce grower, intimating 
that the same disregard for human welfare applied to other growers as well.  El 
Malcriado asserted that “Dow’s napalm game [in Vietnam] doesn’t seem so far 
away when you consider that along with the pesticide manufacturers and growers 
like Antle, they contribute to the yearly pesticide poisoning of over 80,000 
people.  When tallying the profits, they never think of the deaths, rashes and burns 
of the people in the fields caused by these dangerous pesticides.”317
                                                                                                                                     
(accessed July 22, 2010).  The California Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, 
but UFWOC appealed again to the California Supreme Court.  Levy, Cesar 
Chavez, 432-433. 
  Still, despite 
 
315 “Boycott Scab Lettuce,” 3. 
 
316 “Pesticides and the Public,” 2. 
 
317 “Non-Violence v.s. Greed: Who Should Be on Trial?” El Malcriado IV, No. 
11 (December 15, 1970): 2.  Organizers called for a boycott of Dow Chemical 
products as well and worked the slogan “Dow Chemical, which brought you 
napalm, now brings you Antle lettuce!” into the boycott campaign.  “Cesar Jailed; 
Boycott Goes On,” El Malcriado IV, No. 11 (December 15, 1970): 5. 
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the growing unpopularity of the war in Vietnam, UFWOC did not make this 
connection or pesticide-related health issues the main focus of the campaign. 
Boycott organizers employed two lines of reason when trying to build 
consumer support from 1970 to 1972.  First and foremost, UFWOC maintained 
that growers denied farmworkers a union of their choosing, contending that the 
lettuce contracts were the illegitimate product of the collusion between growers 
and Teamsters.318 The jurisdictional dispute storyline did not readily draw people 
to the cause though.319
  The jailing of Chavez for violating the court injunction against 
boycotting provided an opportunity for organizers to grow public support.  At no 
time during the previous grape strike had Chavez spent any time in jail.  Lettuce 
   UFWOC emphasized a secondary message that stressed 
the connection between growers and government, asserting that certain politicians 
and government institutions and agencies consciously worked to undermine the 
farmworker movement.  Government actions after the start of the boycott 
provided ready examples for UFWOC to reference during the boycott campaign.  
                                                 
318 “Lettuce Boycott Shows Signs of Gaining After Lagging for Its First Three 
Months,” New York Times, September 4, 1972. 
 
319 Harry Bernstein, “Jailing of Chavez May Rally Support for Lettuce Boycott,” 
Los Angeles Times, December 6, 1970.  The complexity of the jurisdictional 
dispute also proved difficult to explain quickly to consumers entering a 
supermarket where boycotters conducted their campaigns.  Former boycotter Joel 
Glick recalls that they would try to persuade customers not to shop at stores 
carrying non-union lettuce and sometimes would “engage in lengthier (but not too 
lengthy discussions, especially given the rather complicated nature of the issues 
regarding the Teamsters contracts with the lettuce growers.”  Joel Glick, “Joel 
Glick 1971-1973,” Farmworker Documentation Project, 
http://farmworkermovement.com/essays/essays/096%20Glick_Joel.pdf  (accessed 
July 22, 2010).  
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grower Bud Antle’s attorney recognized that imprisoning Chavez could be a boon 
for the union and unsuccessfully tried to convince the judge to postpone the 
sentencing.320  UFWOC flipped the judge’s ruling from one designed to break the 
union effort to one that rallied people to the cause.  The Court ordered that 
Chavez remain imprisoned until he called off the boycott; organizers, however, 
responded by telling supporters: “The sooner we stop Antle, the sooner that Cesar 
will be freed.”321  UFWOC set up an altar across the street from the jail and held 
constant vigil until Chavez’s release.  The union held a mass that attracted 2,000 
farmworkers.  Ethyl Kennedy and Coretta Scott King also came to voice their 
support for the farmworkers’ cause.322  Organizers across the country 
characterized the incarceration of Chavez as a wrongful violation of first 
amendment rights, which helped heighten public sympathy for the UFWOC 
cause.323
After the California Supreme Court ruled that the injunction violated 
Chavez’s free speech rights and released him from prison, UFWOC shifted its 
   
                                                 
320 Bill Carder, “Bill Carder, 1970-1974: UFW Attorney.”  
 
321 “Boycott to Free Cesar,”  El Malcriado IV, No. 11 (15 Dec 1970): 7. The 
excessive fines levied against Chavez supported the UFWOC argument that the 
Court was trying suppress the farmworker movement.  The judge initially tried to 
impose a fine of $10,000 for each violation before UFWOC attorney Bill Carder 
reminded him that the maximum penalty for the offense was $500 per violation. 
“Cesar Jailed; Boycott Goes On,” 5, 6.  
 
322 Levy, Cesar Chavez, 431-433; “Cesar Jailed; Boycott Goes On,” 5, 6; “Coretta 
King Visits with Cesar in Jail, Asks Blacks to Boycott Lettuce,” El Malcriado IV, 
No 12 (1 Jan 1971): 10. 
 
323 Bill Carder, “Bill Carder,1970-1974: UFW Attorney.”  
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attention to other government actions that they characterized as efforts to weaken 
or break the lettuce boycott and the farmworkers’ movement.324   The union 
publicized the jump in the Department of Defense’s lettuce purchases after the 
start of the strike, emphasizing that their consumption of grapes trended the same 
at the peak of the table grape boycott in 1969 and 1970.  Boycotters called upon 
investigative reporters and congressmen to look into the Pentagon purchases, 
while supporters around the country staged demonstrations at a number of 
different military bases.325  UFW then targeted the Republican Party after Nixon 
appointees to NLRB ruled that the union could no longer lawfully conduct 
secondary boycotts.  The union believed the decision to be a politically-based one, 
contending that NLRB was “the undisguised tool of the Republican Party and 
grower benefactors, enemies of the farmworkers, who will pay to maintain 
servitude in the fields.”326
                                                 
324 The California Supreme Court ordered Chavez released on December 23, 1970 
pending a trial.  After hearing all the evidence in the case, the California Supreme 
Court ruled that the injunction against UFWOC’s lettuce boycott was an 
unconstitutional infringement on free speech.  Philip Hager, “Lettuce Boycott 
Legal, State High Court Decides,” Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1971. 
  Boycotters asked people to send letters to Chairman of 
 
325 Farm Workers Protest at Pentagon: Department of Defense is Breaking Antle 
Lettuce Strike,” El Malcriado IV, No. 12 (1 Jan 1971): 3.  Fort Holabird, Fort 
Lewis, Nellis Air Force Base, Moffett Air Force Base, Fort Ord, Alameda Naval 
Air Station, and Long Beach Naval Station numbered among the bases picketed 
by the UFWOC.“Farm Workers Picket to Protest DoD Use of Boycotted Lettuce” 
El Malcriado IV, No. 12 (1 Jan 1971): 3.  UFWOC also filed a lawsuit against 
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, arguing that the DoD unlawfully interfered in 
the labor conflict. “UFWOC Files Suit Against No. 1 Scab:  The Pentagon,” El 
Malcriado 4, No. 13 (15 Jan 1971): 4. 
 
326 “The Republican Party Needs to be Educated,” El Malcriado V, No. 1 (20 Mar 
1972): 2.  President Nixon changed the composition of NLRB so that it had a 
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the Republican National Committee Robert Dole stating their opposition to the 
NLRB ruling.327   They also distributed bumper stickers that read “Abajo con los 
republicanos” [Down with the Republicans] and “Republicans Hate Farm 
Workers” in attempt to draw support away from the Republican Party in an 
election year.328  The castigation of Republicans won the lettuce boycott an 
endorsement from the Democratic Party, which increased UFW’s number of 
supporters.329
UFW found opportunity to reengage the issue of pesticides in 1973 
without deviating much from the two lines of argumentation that it had used to 
build support for the boycott since its start.  Even as other issues consumed the 
  Still growers refused to break their contracts with the Teamsters 
and negotiate with the UFW. 
                                                                                                                                     
Republican majority.  His appointments included Peter Nash to the position of 
NLRB General Counsel. Nash sought to preclude UFW from engaging in 
secondary boycotts, because the union had acquired contracts covering packing 
shed workers who were not exempt from the provisions of the National Labor 
Relations Act.  Chavez considered the decision a “direct political attack on the 
farmworkers’ movement” that UFW had to confront because the “Boycott is 
breath and life for our Union.” “Message From Cesar Chavez: Help Stop Illegal 
Attack by Republican Party,” El Malcriado V, No. 1 (20 Mar 1972): 3. 
 
327 NLRB ultimately reversed its ruling after Dole received thousands of letters 
objecting to it.  There are widely variant estimates as to how many letters Dole 
received.  Former boycott organizer Joel Glick estimates that tens of thousands of 
letters were mailed when recalling events years later.  Joel Glick, “Joel Glick 
1971-1973.”  El Malcriado, in contrast, stated that over one million letters had 
been received by Dole. “Farmworker Boycott of the Republican Party Spreads,” 
El Malcriado V, No. 2 (28 Aug 1972): 10. 
 
328 Joel Glick, “Joel Glick 1971-1973.”  
 
329 “Democratic Party Supports Lettuce Boycott,” El Malcriado V, No. 5 (21 July 
1972): 8. 
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bulk of the union’s attention from 1970 to 1973, UFW interest in pesticides did 
not disappear.  UFW staffers stayed abreast of developments even when they 
were not central to the current campaign.  UFW attorneys monitored pesticide-
related bills as they worked their way through the state legislature, supporting 
legislation that would provide better protection to farmworkers and opposing bills 
that would put them at greater risk.330
A story about grower negligence, Teamster inattention, and a potential 
government conspiracy developed as 1972 reached a close.  A ground rig operator 
working lettuce in California’s Imperial Valley in December noticed that some of 
the lettuce sprayed with the recently approved organophosphate Monitor 4 
appeared to be burnt around the edges of the leaves.  The California Department 
of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) took samples for testing, the results of which 
showed levels of pesticide residue in excess of established tolerance levels.
  Still when compared to the attention paid 
to pesticides in 1969 and 1970, these effects paled in comparison.  This changed 
temporarily in early 1973.    
331
                                                 
330 Joe Brooks, “Pesticide Poisoning: Senate Will Act to Protect Farmworkers,” 
Assembly Environmental Quality Committee, LP159: 506, California State 
Archives, Sacramento, CA; “Legislative Report From Sacramento,” El Malcriado  
V, 5  (21 Jul 1972): 8; Growers’ associations regularly tried to push through 
legislation that would minimize pesticide oversight and regulation.  The 1972 
grower-sponsored initiative Proposition 22 would have barred farmworkers’ 
unions from negotiating contract provisions related to pesticides. “Editorial,” El 
Malcriado V, No. 8 (1 Sept 1972): 2. 
 In 
 
331 United Farm Workers, press release, February 21, 1973, UFW Work 
Department Collection, Box 5, Folder 5-30, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, 
Wayne State University, Detroit, MI; Environmental Protection Agency to 
Edward R. Roybal, March 16 1973, UFW Work Department Collection, Box 5, 
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response, Imperial Valley Agricultural Commissioner Claude Finnell “suggested” 
that growers stop harvesting lettuce on January 5, 1973.  CDFA followed 
Finnell’s suggestion with a revocation of permits for usage of Monitor 4 on 
lettuce five days later.332  The agency seized 10,000 crates of lettuce, but 
thousands of other crates shipped across the United States and into Canada.333
Growers knew that volumes of lettuce tested over the tolerance level, yet 
continued to harvest their crop.  Chemagro and Chevron Chemical Company, 
manufacturers of Monitor 4, advised that the over-tolerance lettuce could be 
“reconditioned” by peeling off the outer leaves of the head.  Most of the Monitor 
4 residue remained on the exterior leaves, so the removal of that part of the lettuce 
   
                                                                                                                                     
Folder 5-52, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, 
Detroit, MI. 
 
332 Assembly Select Committee on Agriculture, Food, and Nutrition, Hearing on 
Monitor 4 Residues in Imperial County Lettuce Crops, March 9, 1973, 7,  Fong 
(March K.) Collection, LP159: 553, California State Archives, Sacramento, CA.  
The EPA banned the use of Monitor 4 on lettuce in March 1973.  Robert Jones, 
“Monitor 4 Pesticide Banned by U.S. for Use on Head Lettuce,” Los Angeles 
Times, March 7, 1973. 
 
333 Consumer advocate Ida Honoroff verified that CDFA destroyed 2,896 crates of 
contaminated lettuce, but the fate of the other 7,104 seized crates remained 
unknown.   Assembly Select Committee on Agriculture, Food, and Nutrition, 
Hearing on Monitor 4 Residues in Imperial County Lettuce Crops, 6 Belt 16-B 
JK.  UFW attorney Jerry Cohen cited reports that said that lettuce on the Alpha 
Beta dock in La Habra was “Reconditioned and Released” and that lettuce in 
Oxnard was “reconditioned and made into salad.” Assembly Select Committee on 
Agriculture, Food, and Nutrition, Hearing on Monitor 4 Residues in Imperial 
County Lettuce Crops, 7  Belt A5 dsm.  FDA found excessive residues on more 
than 10,000 crates by March.  Jones, “Monitor 4 Pesticide Banned by U.S. for 
Use on Head Lettuce.”  Buyers consumed contaminated lettuce in a number of 
cities including: Buffalo; New York City; Rochester, NY; and Chelsea, MA. 
Assembly Select Committee on Agriculture, Food, and Nutrition, Hearing on 
Monitor 4 Residues in Imperial County Lettuce Crops, Belt 6-B dsm. 
  126 
made it more likely for the head to test within an acceptable range.334  Hence 
while some of the lettuce was destroyed, other heads were stripped of their 
exterior leaves and sent to grocers to be sold.335  The practice raised an issue of 
legality since FDA requirements for pesticide residue sampling stated that a crop 
“shall not be washed, brushed, stripped, or trimmed except to the extent that this 
is a standard commercial practice prior to shipment for that commodity.”336  
CDFA reportedly knew that Imperial Valley lettuce was being “reconditioned” in 
December 1972 and took no action.337
                                                 
334 Assembly Select Committee on Agriculture, Food, and Nutrition, Hearing on 
Monitor 4 Residues in Imperial County Lettuce Crops, 1 Belt 9-A J-K.  Chemargo 
and Chevron later agreed that Monitor labels should be revised to eliminate 
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28, 1973.  Environmental Protection Agency to Edward R. Roybal, March 16 
1973.  There is a time discrepancy in the hearing testimony.  Chevron Chemical 
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  Consumer advocate and environmental 
activist Ida Honoroff testified that Newell Lundy with the Downey Department of 
Agriculture told her that the agency had knowledge of the outer leaves being 
removed, so that the lettuce would meet tolerance standards.  None of the 
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involved agencies informed the public about the lettuce contamination until 
Honoroff broke the story on her radio program in late January, alleging that the 
problem would have gone unreported if she had not brought it to light.338
UFW integrated the story into their ongoing campaign against lettuce 
growers and the Teamsters, arguing that it was another example of grower and 
government collusion to deceive the public by suppressing evidence of the 
contamination.
  
339  UFW held that growers shipped poisoned lettuce, CDFA 
“committed a possible crime” under the Delaney Clause by allowing 
“reconditioned” lettuce to be shipped and sold, and that grocery stores still 
stocked contaminated lettuce on their shelves.340  Chavez announced the scandal 
in St. Louis, held a press conference in Chicago, and sent telegrams to grocery 
chains and public health agencies across the United States and Canada.341
                                                 
338 Ida Honoroff worked as a consumer advocate on the non-commercial radio 
station KPFK, served as the West-Coast Editor of Prevention Magazine, chaired 
the committee organized to get Drugs Out Of Meat (DOOM), and sat on the 
Executive Board of Citizens for Legislative Environmental Action Now 
(CLEAN).  Ibid., 1 Belt 16B JK. 
  UFW 
instructed boycott volunteers that they needed to raise the issue with the public, 
 
339 Jerry Cohen, United Farm Workers, Press Release, February 20, 1973, Fong 
(March K.) Collection, LP159: 553, California State Archives, Sacramento, CA.   
 
340 The State of California Committee on Agriculture, Food, and Nutrition, 
Hearing on Monitor 4 Residues in Imperial County Lettuce Crops, 3 Belt A5 dsm. 
 
341 Legal Department to All Boycott Cities, February 16, 1973, UFW Information 
and Research Department Collection, Box 24, Folder 24-3, Archives of Labor and 
Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI; Telegram to A&P, Safeway, 
and Director of the FDA and Minister of Public Health in Ottawa, February 13, 
1973, Box 24, Folder 24-3, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State 
University, Detroit, MI. 
  128 
emphasizing that consumers bore the cost of the “sweetheart” deal between 
Teamsters and growers, because it prevented UFW from ensuring that growers 
used pesticides safely.  The legal department urged boycotters to stress that “there 
is still a great deal of poisoned lettuce still unaccounted for, and that the American 
public as well as the farmworkers is being poisoned by pesticides like 
Monitor..[and] only a union contract will offer protection against these 
poisons.”342
  Pressure from the UFW helped convince state legislators to conduct a 




                                                 
342 Legal Department to All Boycott Cities, February 16, 1973.  A subsequent 
flyer, for example, warned “Lettuce May Be Hazardous to Your Health” and 
concluded that “Only a UFW Contract Can Protect Farmworkers & Consumers 
From Dangers of Poisonous Pesticides.”  United Farm Workers, “Lettuce May be 
Hazardous for your Health,” pamphlet, 1973, Fong (March K.) Collection, 
LP159: 553, California State Archives, Sacramento, CA.  
  UFW wanted not only to expose the alleged cover-up of the 
contamination incident, but expand the discussion beyond Monitor 4 to other 
organophosphates during the hearing.  The commission made the trek to the 
Imperial Valley the day before the hearing and collected testimonials from a 
number of farmworkers, including one who wished to speak in private for fear of 
losing his job.  The farmworker told how his employer sprayed lettuce with 
phosdrin and then sent workers into the field to “recondition” it before the waiting 
period expired.  Phosdrin, Cohen argued, had the same potential risks as Monitor 
4.  He described how the fingernails of the worker who came forward rotted from 
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exposure to the chemical and noted that hundreds of crates of lettuce had been 
seized in Massachusetts one week prior because of excessive phosdrin residues.344  
Cohen stressed that growers shift from one dangerous chemical to another and 
cautioned that “just because they ban Monitor on lettuce, does not mean that 
poisoned lettuce is not on the retail shelves now.”345
Neither the hearing nor the UFW focus on pesticides in 1973 produced 
lasting effects though.  The hearing failed to assign blame for the contamination 
episode and did not broaden its scope to address other organophosphates such as 
phosdrin.
   
346  Usage of Monitor 4 on lettuce ended with an EPA ban before the 
hearing, but growers continued to use it on other crops.347
                                                 
344 Phosdrin had a two-day waiting period, which the grower violated by sending 
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  The hearing did not 
address the threat posed to farmworker health in great detail, despite the efforts of 
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the UFW and their political allies to introduce the topic into the discussion.  
Organizers tried to expand concern about grower negligence and harmful 
organophospates after the hearing, castigating the Teamsters for denying there 
was a problem.348  Yet within two months of the Monitor 4 hearings, other issues 
arose to once again displace pesticide issues as a central concern of the union.  
Grape growers’ contracts with the UFW expired in April 1973, after which they 
promptly followed the example set by lettuce growers.  A period of violent unrest 
followed the grape growers signing contracts with the Teamsters, during which 
the UFW suffered increased attacks from Teamsters, growers, and local police.349  
These developments placed the union’s survival in jeopardy.350
The boycott expanded to include grapes and Gallo wine, but the UFW did 
not gain enough ground to force growers to negotiate.  Fortunes changed to some 
degree with the election of Democratic allies to the state legislature and Jerry 
Brown to the governor’s office.  Even though the UFW put little faith in 
legislative solutions in the past, it decided that the electoral turn presented an 
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349 Marshall Ganz presents some statistics on the increased violence, stating that 
“two strikers were murdered, while picketers endured 44 shootings, 400 beatings, 
and 3,000 arrests” by August 1973.  Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 232. See 
also, J. Craig Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency: The Farm Worker Movement in 
the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 185-192.  For an 
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page 191. 
 
350 Philip Shabecoff, “Chavez Union Struggling for Survival,” New York Times, 
June 27, 1973. 
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opportunity to ply a new strategy.  The union pushed for a new California farm 
labor law for agricultural workers that would mirror the federal NLRA.  Growers 
did not protest the new Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA), in part because 
they did not think the UFW would emerge victorious from secret ballot 
elections.351  ALRA passed in May 1975, with union elections following in 
February 1976.  Growers’ prognostications proved wrong, with the UFW faring 
much better than the Teamsters in the elections, which ultimately helped convince 
the Teamsters to abandon organizing efforts in the fields.352
.   
 
An Invisible Ally 
 
Cesar Chavez contacted several environmental groups, including the 
Sierra Club, shortly after the Monitor 4 hearings in 1973, hoping to enlist their 
support in the struggle against the Teamsters.  He wrote to the organizations after 
receiving a mailing from Environmental Action regarding the Oil Chemical and 
Atomic Workers (OCAW) strike against Shell Oil.353
                                                 
351 Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 234; Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency, 
195-197. 
  The letter stated that 
 
352 The UFW carried 214 elections and the Teamsters won 115 contests.  High 
legal costs associated with contesting election results convinced the Teamsters to 
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the fields.  Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 236-237. 
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Environmental Action and a number of other environmental organizations 
supported the OCAW because the union had gone on strike over health and safety 
issues in the workplace.  It also pledged that the groups would rally people to the 
OCAW cause and expressed hope that this would be a catalyst for “broadening 
the base of the environmental movement.”354  Chavez sought to foster the same 
sort of alliance, asserting that “the unity which the union movement can have with 
the environmentalists is crucial to our survival - both in a spirit of justice and in a 
literal sense.” 355
Sierra Club President Raymond Sherwin showed a similar desire to build 
bridges between the labor movement and the environmental movement.  Shortly 
before Chavez reached out to environmental groups, Sherwin published an 
editorial in the Sierra Club Bulletin that stated “trade union objectives” related to 
health and safety in the workplace “merit the vocal support of the Sierra Club and 
allied organizations, for the very basic reason that an unhealthy micro-
environment anywhere reduces the overall vitality of our natural world…the two 
   
                                                 
354 The environmental organizations supporting the OCAW strike included the 
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are inseparable.”356  Yet Sherwin wrote somewhat defensively in response to 
some members who had written letters to the national office to express their 
disappointment with the Sierra Club’s expansive new vision, particularly the 
organization’s support of the OCAW strike.  Sherwin countered arguments that 
the Sierra Club was getting involved in too many issues, contending that the 
organization’s “strength and vitality” would be more threatened by “ignoring 
environmental threats to the human condition than from fighting them.”357
Despite grumblings by a portion of the membership, leaders within the 
Sierra Club persisted in promoting an understanding of environmentalism that 
incorporated concerns for social justice, while working to develop amicable 
relations with the labor movement.  Sierra Club Director William Futrell 
continued to suggest that members adopt an expanded view of environmentalism.  
Asserting that “environmental rights and civil rights are closely intertwined,” he 
held: “Our stand should be: love for the land and justice for its people.  The land 
ethic undergirds the social structure of which justice is the crown.”
  These 
internal disagreements about the appropriate scope of interests for the Sierra Club 
may or may not have shaped the response to Chavez’s request.   
358
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  Leaders 
carried the message beyond their membership as well.  Sierra Club Vice President 
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Will Siri spoke before a meeting of the California Labor Federation, telling them 
that the labor movement and the environmental movement were “engaging in an 
unnecessary war.” 359
The labor movement’s past support for environmental initiatives showed 
that not only was peace between the groups possible, but collaboration as well.  A 
number of unions supported the major environmental legislation of the 1960s and 
early 1970s.  The AFL-CIO voiced support for the Clean Air Act in 1963 and 
spoke in favor of legislation that would curb water pollution.  The United Auto 
Workers (UAW), United Steelworkers, International Association of Machinists, 
and OCAW backed amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1970 and Clean Water 
Act in 1972.
  
 360  More progressive unions, like the UAW under the leadership of 
Walter Reuther, advocated for the creation of a National Trails System with 
recreation opportunities in both urban and rural areas.  UAW and OCAW also 
proved willing to defend pollution control measures that had the potential to 
compromise union members’ jobs but promised to improve public health in 
exchange.361
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  Some union members participated in Earth Day events and some 
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No. 1 (January 1998): 48-49, 56; Gordon, “‘Shell No!’” 467. 
 
361 “UAW, Conservationists Ask Stiff Pollution Law,” Los Angeles Times (July 
12, 1970); Dewey, “Working for the Environment, 52-53, 56. 
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labor leaders appeared as featured speakers supporting environmental 
protection.362
Nevertheless, the accord that Will Siri spoke of needed fostering because 
fragility still defined relations between the labor movement and the environmental 
movement.  Not all unions backed environmental legislation.  Whereas the UAW 
showed willingness to sacrifice some industry jobs for the sake of public health, 
the United Mine Workers (UMW) often opposed more restrictive environmental 
regulation out of fear that it would result in job loss.
 
363  Industrialists who had 
fractured union solidarity in the past by stoking interethnic animosities used the 
same strategy to divide workers and environmentalists with the “jobs versus 
environment” argument.364  John F. Henning, the Executive Secretary Treasurer 
of the California AFL-CIO, for instance, blamed environmentalists for reducing 
trade jobs with the “no-growth nonsense.”365
                                                 
362 Rome, “The Genius of Earth Day,” 195, 199; Dewey, “Working for the 
Environment,” 56. 
  Others workers felt that 
environmental organizations failed to sufficiently back important labor 
legislation.  OCAW Public Relations Director Ray Davidson, for instance, 
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Environmental History 5, No. 1 (January 2000): 78. 
 
364 Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial 
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Press, 1995), 138, 149; Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation 
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365 Henning made the charge at a California State Federation conference co-
sponsored by the Sierra Club.  Gordon, “‘Shell No!’” 471. 
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referred to environmentalists as “intellectual snobs” and remained upset that 
environmental groups had only offered passive support for the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act of 1970.366
Still many environmentalists and union leaders saw promise in a labor-
environmental coalition and worked to build the relationship between the groups.  
Environmental Action and the UAW hosted the Black Lake Conference after the 
first Earth Day, a meeting of environmentalists, union representatives, students 
and community organizers to discuss strategy for the future.
  These factors sometimes fostered animosity 
and distrust between the two groups. 
367
                                                 
366 Sierra Club, Wilderness Society, National Wildlife Federation, and 
Environmental Action supported the passage of OSHA, but Davidson remained 
dissatisfied with the organizations for failing to make the legislation a priority.  
Ibid.,  474.  None of the organizations testified in support of the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act at the congressional hearings that took place between 1968 
and 1970.  House Select Subcommittee on Labor, Committee on Education and 
Labor, Occupational Safety and Health, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968; Senate 
Subcommittee on Labor, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1968, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968; Senate Subcommittee 
on Labor, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, 1970, Part 1, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, 1970; House Select 
Subcommittee on Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1969, Part 1, 91st 
Cong., 1st sess., 1969;  House Select Subcommittee on Labor, Committee on 
Education and Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1969, Part 2 and 
Appendix, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969; Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Committee 
on Labor and Public Welfare, Occupational Safety and Health Act, 1970, Part 2, 
91st Cong., 1st sess., 1970. 
  The conference 
included workshops on industrial pollution, workplace health and safety, 
researching pollution problems, the process for initiating legal action, and the 
environmental movement’s relationship to the urban poor.  Many attendees found 
 
367 Dewey, “Working for the Environment,” 57. 
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informal conversations about past experiences, tactics, and technical information 
to be the most rewarding part of the conference.368  When the disparate groups 
mobilized in support of each other, the effect could be powerful.  The 
environmental organizations who supported the OCAW’s Shell strike, for 
instance, distributed thousands of pamphlets urging members to boycott Shell 
products.  Their efforts contributed to a 10 to 25 percent decline in Shell gasoline 
purchases between February and April 1973.369
The Sierra Club engaged in outreach efforts, hoping to strengthen relations 
between the club and labor organizations.  William Futrell pledged that the Sierra 
Club would back bills of mutual concern and work to develop an intra-
organizational “labor advisory council.”
   
370  Executive Director Michael 
McCloskey voiced similar support for collaboration with the labor movement 
when speaking at the OCAW national convention in October 1973.  After citing 
occupational disease statistics that included people injured by pesticides, 
McCloskey reasoned that environmentalists should cooperate with workers 
because “workers and people with limited incomes are the chief victims of 
environmental disorders.”371
                                                 
368 John Kifner, “Earth Day Group Zeros in on Autos,” New York Times (July 20, 
1970). 
  The rhetoric and outreach of Sierra Club leaders 
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demonstrated a willingness to work for common cause with other organizations 
on issues related to environment and health.   
Cesar Chavez requested that environmental organizations publicize the 
UFW struggle in their newsletters, organize members to picket in support, or 
contact Senator Gaylord Nelson of the Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor 
to call a hearing addressing the harm inflicted on farmworkers and consumers by 
pesticides.372  Senator Nelson had been the organizational impetus behind the first 
Earth Day celebration in 1970.  His work on behalf of environmental protection 
and labor justice is but one example of how progressives commonly sympathized 
with both causes in the 1970s.  Several environmental groups responded favorably 
to Chavez’s request.  Center for Science in the Public Interest promised to inform 
their readers about the boycott.373  Environmental Policy Center stated its 
admiration of Chavez, adding that “the Teamsters turn up as the enemy in so 
many of the problems we work on that a lot of the people we work with should 
see the value of keeping the Teamsters from spreading their power to 
agribusiness.”374
                                                 
372 Cesar Chavez to Brook [sic] Evans, May 9 1973. 
  National Parks and Conservation Association (NPCA) held that 
 
373 Albert J. Fritsch to Cesar Chavez, May 19, 1973, UFW Information and 
Research Department Collection, Box 24, Folder 24-3, Archives of Labor and 
Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.   
 
374 The organization requested to meet someone from the UFW to discuss how 
best the Environmental Policy Center contacts could be employed to promote the 
UFW lettuce boycott.  Joe Browder to Cesar Chavez, June 21 1973,   UFW 
Information and Research Department Collection, Box 24, Folder 24-3, Archives 
of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.   
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UFW actions to “prevent the misuse of pesticides” and protect farmworkers and 
consumers from the harmful effects of agricultural chemicals were “designed to 
achieve goals which are shared by the environmental movement as a whole.”375  
NPCA suggested that UFW submit an article addressing the “wider environmental 
context within which UFW efforts are being made,” offering to publish the piece 
in their magazine with a readership of 50,000.376
Chavez sent a letter requesting support to the Sierra Club as well.  Sierra 
Club Director of the Washington D.C. Office Brock Evans expressed personal 
support for the UFW and forwarded Chavez’s request to the Executive Committee 
in San Francisco with a strong recommendation for approval.  Evans lacked the 
authority to officially endorse the UFW or the lettuce boycott, but exuded 
confidence about the possibility for collaboration.  The Sierra Club, he said, had 
to make certain that any endorsements of labor unions’ actions had “a sound and 
strong environmental basis,” but felt the UFW would have little trouble meeting 
the requirement with its “strong stand on pesticide control.”
 
377
                                                 
375 Robert Eisenbud to Cesar E. Chavez, June 14, 1973, UFW Information and 
Research Department Collection, Box 24, Folder 24-3, Archives of Labor and 
Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.   
  Nonetheless, no 
endorsement or article on the UFW appeared in the Sierra Club Bulletin in 1973 
 
376 Ibid.  The article never appeared in the organization’s publication though.  The 
UFW received the letter from the NPCA in mid-June, a time during which the 
UFW was beset by violence.  It is unclear whether the UFW neglected to submit 
an article or if the NPCA failed to print it.   
 
377 Brock Evans to Cesar Chavez, June 5, 1973, UFW Work Department 
Collection, Box 3, Folder 3-21, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne 
State University, Detroit, MI.   
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and there is no evidence in Sierra Club records that the Executive Committee 
weighed the UFW request.378
While the Sierra Club did not publicly endorse the lettuce boycott, it did 
communicate with the UFW and work to strengthen pesticide regulations in an 
effort to protect farmworkers.  Brock Evans forwarded Chavez’s request to Sierra 
Club’s Washington lobbyist Linda Billings who in turn contacted the UFW’s 
Washington representative, Father James Vizzard.  Billings drafted a letter in 
consultation with Bizard that would be signed by a number of “national groups” 
and sent to Senator Nelson in hopes of gaining a hearing on the threat of 
pesticides to farmworkers and consumers.  As she contacted different 
organizations, Billings learned of another lobbying effort underway by the 
Migrant Legal Action Program (MLAP) focused on protecting farmworkers from 
a suite of organophosphate pesticides.
   
379
In anticipation of the DDT ban, MLAP petitioned the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) to issue an emergency temporary standard 
(ETS) on organophosphates in September 1972, maintaining that exposure to 
these chemicals was farmworkers’ most pressing health concern.  If OSHA 
  
                                                 
378 The Sierra Club Executive Committee Minutes and Board of Directors minutes 
from May 1973 through December 1973 make no mention of receipt of a request 
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on supporting the UFW in its campaign.  Sierra Club Records, BANC MSS 
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determined that a substance posed a “grave danger” to people in the workplace, 
the agency could skip formal rulemaking practices and issue an ETS that 
temporarily set standards to protect worker health.380    The agency, however, 
failed to issue any new standards, so MLAP filed suit in the U.S. District Court to 
force action on the issue.  Within a month, OSHA responded by drafting an ETS 
that applied to twenty-one different organophosphates used in treating seven 
different crops: apples, peaches, tobacco, grapes, oranges, lemons, and 
grapefruit.381  The new regulation mandated that workers wait a specified number 
of days before reentering fields after the application of one of the listed 
chemicals.382
Growers’ associations, including the Florida Peach Growers Association 
and the Florida Citrus Production Managers Association, sought to stop the 
regulatory action scheduled to take effect in July.
  The ETS did not meet with universal approval though. 
383
                                                 
380 Benjamin W. Mintz, OSHA: History, Law, and Policy (Washington, D.C.: 
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1984), 96, 97; “Emergency Standard for 
Exposure to Organophosphorous Pesticides,” Federal Register 38, No 83 (May 1, 
1973): 10715.  The standards set by an ETS took effect immediately and held 
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  Under pressure from 
 
381 “Emergency Standards for Exposure to Organophosphorous Pesticides,” 
10715; “U.S. Eases Pesticide Safeguards Under Pressure From Farmers, Hill,” 
Washington Post, June 27, 1973.  MLPA dropped its suit after OSHA 
promulgated the standards.  Mintz, OSHA, 96.   
 
382 The wait times varied depending on the chemical used and the climate within 
which the use occurred.  “Emergency Standard for Exposure to 
Organophosphorous Pesticides,” 10715-10717. 
 
383 Florida Peach Growers Association, Inc. v. United States Department of 
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growers and their congressional allies, OSHA significantly weakened the 
provisions of the ETS, dropping the number of chemicals covered by the ETS 
from twenty-one to twelve and shortening the reentry times for each by two days 
or more.384  The growers’ associations filed suit nonetheless and obtained a 
temporary injunction to keep the ETS from going into effect. Opponents of the 
OSHA regulations also lobbied congressmen to shift responsibilities for 
safeguarding farmworkers’ health and safety from OSHA to the US Department 
of Agriculture, which was more sympathetic to the interests of growers.385  
OSHA, in the meantime, proceeded with efforts to set permanent regulations.  
The agency announced a number of hearings in different cities to discuss reentry 
times for sprayed fields, posted warning notices around field perimeters, 
protective clothing for farmworkers, sanitation, and accessible medical 
facilities.386
Linda Billings, representing the Sierra Club, entered the fray as growers 
and like-minded congressmen attempted to rid OSHA of its regulatory 
responsibilities in the field.  The Sierra Club joined AFL-CIO and United Auto 
Workers to oppose the legislation that would transfer power from OSHA to 
USDA.  Together they succeeded in subtracting the “anti-OSHA farm worker 
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provisions” from the farm bill before it passed.387
                                                 
387 The AFL-CIO advised Billings not to press Senator Nelson for a hearing as 
Chavez requested, because the organizations had spent a good deal of political 
capital in the fight against the “anti-OSHA” provisions.  Billings communicated 
the AFL recommendation to Chavez, assuring him that support for the Nelson 
hearings had not been abandoned.  Linda Billings to Cesar Chavez, August 22, 
1973.  Robert Gordon uses Billings’ letter to argue that the Sierra Club and other 
mainstream environmental organizations showed a lack of concern for the UFW 
and a reluctance to support pesticide reform efforts after the DDT ban.  He states 
that Billings told Chavez that the Sierra Club could not support the UFW effort to 
force a congressional hearing and “offered no concrete support” to the union.  
Robert Gordon, “Poisons in the Fields: The United Farm Workers, Pesticides, and 
Environmental Politics,” Pacific Historical Review 68, No. 1 (Feb 1999): 70.  In 
an otherwise sound analysis, Gordon mischaracterizes the episode by failing to 
note that Billings was ready to push Nelson for a hearing until the AFL-CIO 
dissuaded her from doing so at that time.  He also neglects to discuss Billings’ 
efforts to get an environmental contingent to the OSHA hearings to defend 
farmworkers’ health interests.  On an individual level, Billings’ concern for social 
justice can be tracked to some degree by her employment before and after 
working for the Sierra Club.  Billings coordinated Earth Day affairs for Senator 
Nelson in 1970 before transitioning into her position as a Sierra Club lobbyist.  
Gaylord Nelson with Susan Campbell and Paul Wozniak, Beyond Earth Day: 
Fulfilling the Promise (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002), 8.  After 
working as a lobbyist, she became the Director of the Pesticide Farm Safety Staff 
at the EPA.  Linda M. Billings to Lupe Sanchez, May 29, 1985, MCOP Papers, 
ACC# 1990-00402, Box 5, Folder 28, Department of Archives and Special 
Collections, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 
   Billings also worked to rally 
environmentalists to counter opponents of OSHA regulations who had appeared 
in force at the first two hearings in Phoenix and Boise.  She drafted and mailed an 
information sheet to approximately thirty groups and Sierra Club leaders that 
were based in areas where the OSHA hearings would be held, urging her contacts 
to attend or write letters in support of stringent regulations that would better 
protect farmworkers from harm.  Billings asserted that “since a strong public 
outcry was in part responsible for phasing out the use of persistent pesticides, it 
behoves [sic] us to insist that the shift to short-lived pesticides not result in 
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increased hazards to farm workers through improper regulation of their use.”388  
She suggested that persons attending the public hearings stress that: OSHA had a 
responsibility to protect farmworkers; data from pesticide manufactures needed to 
be interrogated to test its accuracy and protect human health; better data-gathering 
efforts on pesticide-related illnesses were needed; and growers’ overuse of 
agricultural chemicals should be curbed.389
The presence of farmworker organizations and their environmental allies 
at the public hearings did not result in OSHA’s adoption of a permanent set of 
pesticide regulations.  The agency inaction ultimately had little to do with the 
testimony presented at hearings.  Rather OSHA fell into a jurisdictional 
disagreement with EPA over authority to regulate field reentry times after 
pesticide application.  EPA claimed responsibility under FIFRA.
 
390  OSHA 
conceded regulatory powers to EPA, because of a provision in the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act that prohibited a duplication of regulation by different 
federal agencies.391
                                                 
388 Linda Billings to Cesar Chavez, August 22, 1973.  Both environmental groups 
and organizations concerned with farmworker welfare criticized OSHA for caving 
to pressure from growers.  Shabecoff, “U.S. is Blocked From Enforcing 
Safeguards on Farm Pesticides.”  
  Farmworker organizations brought suit in attempt to keep 
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391 Section 4(b)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act precludes OSHA 
from setting rules for working conditions in an industry if another federal agency 
had previously set standards or regulations that affected occupational health and 
safety.  “Interpreting OSHA’s Preemption Clause: Farmworkers as a Case Study,” 
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regulatory authority with OSHA since the agency had a more concentrated focus 
on the welfare of workers and stronger enforcement capabilities than the EPA.  
The Court of Appeals, however, sided against them, affirming that regulatory 
authority rested with EPA.392
After the Court rendered its decision, both farmworker organizations and 
environmental groups worked to preserve FIFRA and the power of EPA from 
being constrained by USDA.  When FIFRA passed in 1972, it carried a sunset 
clause that required the legislation to be reauthorized after three years.  Congress 
began holding hearings to discuss the effectiveness of the legislation in May 1975 
to determine whether the law should be given new life.  Growers, pesticide 
manufacturers and USDA approached the hearings intent on making changes to 
FIFRA that would ease EPA oversight of regulators and give USDA greater 
influence over regulatory decisions.
 
393
One of the proposed amendments would supplant pesticide applicators’ 
written or oral certification programs with a “register-signing system” in which 
applicators would sign a form when purchasing agricultural chemicals stating that 
  A number of environmental groups, UFW, 
and MLAP testified at the hearing to counter the efforts of those bent on 
weakening the law. 
                                                                                                                                     
 
392 “Interpreting OSHA’s Preemption Clause: Farmworkers as a Case Study,” 
1980-1981.  See Organized Migrants in Community Action v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 
1161 (D.C. Cir 1975). 
 
393 Senate Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and General Legislation, 
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they had read the instructions and would apply the pesticides in accordance with 
the rules on the label.  The American Farm Bureau Federation held that a more 
rigorous certification program “ignores the good safety record farmers have 
developed in the handling and use of pesticides” and would “impose an 
unjustifiable burden on the nation’s agriculture.”394  UFW, in contrast, warned 
that the “only applicators to benefit from a self certification system are the very 
ones who need the training the most” and joined MLAP in calling into question 
the Farm Bureau’s claims of an untarnished safety record.395  Environmental 
groups agreed that a state certification program was essential to a good regulatory 
system that would help minimize injuries from improper use.396
Another amendment that aimed to give USDA a greater role in pesticide 
regulation by giving the agency veto power over EPA regulatory actions on 
pesticides also drew fire from farmworker organizations and environmental 
groups.  When that proposal failed to get adequate congressional support, a 
similar but weaker amendment was offered in its place.  This alternative 
  
                                                 
394 Senate Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and General Legislation, 
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amendment, if passed, would require EPA to complete a cost-benefit analysis on 
proposed pesticide suspensions without public involvement.  Furthermore, EPA 
would be required to submit any proposal to suspend the use of specific pesticides 
to USDA for consultation sixty days prior to it being made available to the 
public.397  Both farmworker organizations and environmental groups argued that 
the adoption of this policy was undemocratic and would unfairly favor 
agricultural interests over concerns for environment and health.  The groups 
maintained the formulation of an accurate and just cost-benefit analysis required 
broad public input, not closed-door concessions to an agency that had a history of 
regulatory inaction and opposition to pesticide restrictions.398
Farmworker organizations and environmental groups generally defended 
EPA’s record of regulation and urged Congress to reauthorize FIFRA, but they 
also put forth recommendations to better protect farmworkers and the public from 
suffering harm from pesticide poisoning.  UFW still believed the union contract to 
 
                                                 
397 Senate Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and General Legislation, 
Extension of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, October 28-
29, 1975, 52-54. 
 
398 The Sierra Club, MLAP, Rachel Carson Trust, and EDF echoed similar 
sentiments in opposing the amendment that would give USDA greater influence 
over EPA regulations and actions.  Ibid., 46, 52-55.  Sierra Club lobbyist Linda 
Billings maintained that “to place the economic concerns of agriculture over these 
disastrous effects is unconscionable.”  Ibid., 46.  MLAP attorney Miriam Guido 
contended: “[T]he amendment is contrary to our system of open government 
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EPA was intended to strike in its consideration of the economic, social, and 
environmental costs and benefits of its actions to protect man and the environment 
from the adverse effects of pesticides.  The Congress, however, in increasing the 
role of the USDA is throwing this balance off.”  Ibid., 21. 
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be the best protection for farmworkers, but admitted that it had only unionized a 
small percentage of the total agricultural workforce and would have to rely on 
federal regulations until the situation changed.  Father Vizzard stated that EPA’s 
reentry standards marked a good starting effort to better protect farmworkers, but 
said that “stronger, more comprehensive and more reliable standards with tough, 
effective enforcement mechanisms” were possible and preferable.399  MLAP 
similarly requested that more attention be paid to the welfare of farmworkers, 
urging the agency to initiate better data collection programs so that it could more 
accurately set reentry standards to prevent undue exposure to health hazards.400
                                                 
399 Senate Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and General Legislation, 
Extension of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act , May 12-
16, 1975, 200. 
  
EDF also spoke of the need for a sound accident reporting system from which 
EPA could compile data on pesticide poisonings and misuse, then use the results 
 
400 Senate Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and General Legislation, 
Extension of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act , October 
28-29, 1975, 19. Alabama Senator James Allen questioned MLAP attorney 
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of that information to craft policies that minimized exposure to unnecessary 
risks.401
Congress reauthorized FIFRA in 1975 with minor changes.  Despite the 
recommendations of farmworker organizations and environmental groups, an 
amendment accompanied the reauthorization that gave USDA a greater role in 
regulatory affairs.  EPA subsequently had to provide advance notice to USDA 
when planning to make changes in regulatory policy, initiate the cancellation 
process for a pesticide, or change a chemical’s registration status.  EPA also had 




                                                 
401 EDF made a number of other suggestions to better protect people from the 
hazards of pesticide exposure.  The organization maintained that EPA should 
require an updated literature survey on all pesticide registrations and re-
registrations so that it had the most current information on the effects of exposure; 
analyze the effects of inert as well as active ingredients for toxicity; develop a 
comprehensive pesticide container disposal program to reduce risks to humans 
and pollution of the environment; and implement regulations necessitating that 
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possibility of accidental injury.  Senate Subcommittee on Agricultural Research 
and General Legislation, Extension of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act, May 12-16, 1975, 186-195. 
  Though the reauthorized FIFRA did not represent an 
unqualified victory for environmentalists and farmworker organizations, their 
efforts helped convince Congress to reauthorize FIFRA and leave EPA in charge 
of regulatory responsibilities. EPA Administrator Russell Train recognized the 
role that the Sierra Club and “several respected voices” played in staving off the 
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The Sierra Club, which had been burdened by an organizational inertia in 
the 1960s, entered the 1970s more ready to embrace a role at the fore of the 
environmental movement.  Sierra Club leaders mirrored the spirit of Earth Day 
organizers as they worked to expand the breadth of issues addressed by the group.  
Pesticides numbered among Sierra Club concerns.  Organization leaders spoke of 
the relationship between the microenvironment of the workplace and the larger 
world, and of the intersection between environmental rights and civil rights.   
Sierra Club recognized that pesticide issues embodied their rhetorical connections 
and actively engaged in efforts to reform use practices to better protect worker, 
public, and environmental health.  The club believed that strong regulatory laws 
that allowed public oversight and participation in the process offered the best 
protection for public and environmental health when enforced by agencies not 
                                                 
403 Russell Train sent personal letters to both Linda Billing and Brock Evans, who 
was director of Sierra Club’s Washington Office, thanking them for the Sierra 
Club’s efforts.  Russell E. Train to Brock Evans, December 18, 1975, Sierra Club 
National Legislative Office Records, BANC 71/289 c, Carton 78, Folder 27, The 
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University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA.  Laura Pulido ignores the role 
of environmentalists in passing federal pesticide legislation and defending it from 
attack.  She mistakenly contends that mainstream environmentalists abandoned 
pesticide reform efforts after the DDT ban, thinking that the pesticide problem 
had been resolved.  Pulido, Environmentalism and Economic Justice, 103.   
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beholden to the agricultural industry.  Sierra Club lobbied Congress and testified 
at public hearings in support of better laws regulating the use of agricultural 
chemicals.  In these efforts, the club’s concern extended beyond safeguarding 
wildlife to protecting the health of the public and farmworkers.  It collaborated 
with unions, helped get its members to hearings on pesticide regulation, and 
testified to Congress on the importance of re-authorizing a strong FIFRA and 
keeping authority over pesticide regulation out of USDA and in the hands of 
agencies like EPA and OSHA that were more attentive to farmworker health and 
safety.  
EDF and UFW generally took the same approaches to pesticide reform 
that they had employed prior to the DDT ban.  EDF, pursuing its “Sue the 
Bastards” strategy, used the courts to ban aldrin and dieldrin.  UFW still believed 
that union representation best protected farmworkers, and consequently 
consumers, from the ill effects of pesticides.  The union worked to grow the 
number of labor contracts with pesticide provisions, but success was slow in 
coming because of Teamster incursions into the fields.  The conflict with the 
Teamsters resulted in the UFW spending less time on pesticides between 1970 
and 1976 than it had between 1969 and 1970.  It continued to care about 
pesticide-related issues, but at a lower level of priority.  Though the UFW 
monitored pesticide politics throughout the period, it only made pesticide 
contamination a central component in its boycott campaign for a few short months 
in 1973.  During this period, mainstream environmental organizations and other 
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farmworker advocacy groups, like Migrant Legal Action Program, were most 
responsible for advancing pesticide reform. 
Despite the lack of focus on agricultural chemicals between 1970 and 
1976 in the UFW, some environmental groups corresponded and cooperated with 
the union on issues related to pesticides.  These relationships were strategically 
forged between the respective groups’ leaders and lobbyists so they lacked public 
visibility and permanence.  Labor organizations spoke to their members about 
labor issues while environmental groups spoke to their members about 
environmental issues.  Environmental groups did not have a public presence in 
UFW campaigns and did little to publicize the lettuce boycott; likewise, unions 
did not participate in environmental campaigns except when workers interests 
were directly affected.  However, environmentalists and farmworker 
organizations took similar stances on pesticide legislation, so they worked 
towards common ends when Congress considered bills and heard testimony.  
Cooperation occurred fleetingly around these times as the groups strove to 
counter the power of growers, pesticide manufacturers, and the USDA who 
opposed tougher regulations.  Environmental groups and unions continued to 
defend FIFRA, OSHA, and other federal legislation relating to health and 
environment throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s.404
                                                 
404 Sierra Club urged its members to write their congressmen voicing opposition 
to two OSHA amendments in 1978 which combined would make it more difficult 
for regulators to inspect workplaces and easier for employers to avoid punitive 
action when violations were found.   “Amendments to Weaken OSHA Offered,” 
Sierra Club National News Report 10, No. 23 (September 15, 1978), Grand 
Canyon Chapter Sierra Club Collection, ACC# 94-1420, Box 2, Folder 2-7, 
  As these groups 
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attempted to influence national policy, a major state-level pesticide conflict in 
Arizona that pitted growers and the state’s pesticide regulatory authority against 
farmworkers and suburbanites was coming to a head. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Department of Archives and Special Collections, Arizona State University, 
Tempe, AZ.  Farmworker organizations and environmental groups continued to 
offer congressional testimony at hearings on FIFRA.  They voiced opposition to 
proposed amendments that would restrict public access to pesticide information 
and deny states the right to adopt more stringent pesticide regulation standards.  
See for example: Sierra Club National News Report 13, No. 12 (May 6, 1981), 6, 
Grand Canyon Chapter Sierra Club Collection, ACC# 94-1420, Box 2, Folder 2-
5, Department of Archives and Special Collections, Arizona State University, 
Tempe, AZ; House Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and 
Foreign Agriculture, Committee on Agriculture, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act Part 1, 97th Congress, 1st sess., June 16, July 16, and July 22, 
1981,  623-626; House Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and 
Foreign Agriculture, Committee on Agriculture, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act Part 2, 97th Congress, 1st sess., June 18 and September 4, 
1981, 200-201; House Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and 
Foreign Agriculture, Committee on Agriculture, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act Part 3, 97th Congress, 2nd sess., February 4, 1982, 8-10. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A DIFFERENT KIND OF BORDER WAR: CONFLICTS OVER PESTICIDES 
IN ARIZONA'S AGRICULTURAL/URBAN INTERFACE, 1971-1986 
An “insecticide fog” drifted west from the fields that growers leased on 
the Salt River Pima Maricopa Indian Community (SRPMIC) Reservation into the 
developing city of Scottsdale, Arizona on October 11, 1971.405  People living 
within a mile of the fields reported breathing problems, coughing, and suffering 
from burning eyes, throats, and noses.406  The spread of suburban development 
into other agricultural areas of the Valley of the Sun heightened the number of 
complaints about pesticides.  Residents of southeast Mesa, Avondale, and Peoria 
voiced grievances in 1970 and 1971 as well.407
                                                 
405 Gordon Robbins, “Crop Dust Probe Asked,” Scottsdale Daily Progress, 
November 1, 1971.  Though the leased land belonged to the tribe, growers had to 
comply with state and federal regulation and could be investigated by state 
agencies. Barbara L. Nellor and Patti A. Cleary, Arizona Agricultural Pesticide 
Program Evaluation, August 13-21, 1979 (San Francisco: US Environmental 
Protection Agency, 1981), 30. 
  Scottsdale drew the most 
attention though. The Scottsdale Daily Progress ran a series of articles about the 
problems, which in conjunction with three television editorials raised public 
awareness about a burgeoning conflict at the agricultural/urban interface.  Arizona 
House Representative Hal Runyan responded to the bevy of complaints.  He 
suggested that the Board of Pesticide Control (BPC) take voluntary measures to 
 
406 “Aerial Crop Spraying Halted,” Scottsdale Daily Progress, October 27, 1971. 
 
407 Minutes of the Board of Pesticide Control, May 15, 1970 and September 1, 
1971.  RG 72 Board of Pesticide Control, SG Pesticide Control Board Minutes 
1968-79, Arizona State Library, Archives and Public Records, Phoenix, AZ. 
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resolve the problem and stave off a more restrictive legislative response.408  The 
strength of the agricultural lobby in the state legislature and the failure of 
University of Arizona tests to show evidence of pesticide intoxication in 
Scottsdale helped forestall changes in pesticide policy though.409
Ten days after the October drift incident in Scottsdale, Gustavo Gutierrez 
ventured out to SRPMIC lands to collect data on pesticide use, particularly the 
names of chemicals used and the volume in which they were applied to the fields.  
Gutierrez did not work for BPC or any other state agency.  Rather he numbered 
among a handful of individuals who compiled data on pesticide use in Arizona for 
the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee.
 
410  Gutierrez, a native Arizonan 
who grew up working in the fields, began organizing an independent local of 
UFWOC in 1967.411
                                                 
408 Bob Rayburn to Board of Pesticide Control, December 3, 1971,  RG 72 Board 
of Pesticide Control, SG Pesticide Control Board Minutes 1968-79, Arizona State 
Library, Archives and Public Records, Phoenix, AZ.  
  A formal education that ended after the sixth grade did not 
 
409 Gordon Robbins, “Pesticide Effect Denied: Indians to Undergo Tests,” 
Scottsdale Daily Progress, November 25, 1971.  
 
410 Pesticide monitoring notes, 1971-72, United Farm Workers Arizona State 
Office Collection, Box 4, Folder 4-2, Archives of Labor & Urban Affairs, Wayne 
State University, Detroit, MI. 
 
411 F. Arturo Rosales states that Gutierrez named the union the Arizona Farm 
Workers Organizing Committee.  Gutierrez’s choice of names shows a close 
connection to Cesar Chavez’s United Farm Workers Organizing Committee, but 
also a degree of independence.  Rosales maintains Chavez sanctioned the creation 
of the Arizona organization, but that Gutierrez had to raise the funds to cover 
operational expenses on his own.  Rosales, Chicano!, 150.  Gutierrez’s 
organization is referred to as the Arizona branch of the United Farm Workers 
Organizing Committee, because many of the historical sources fail to make the 
distinction between the Arizona Farm Workers Organizing Committee and the 
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hamper Gutierrez’s ability to lead.  He soon became a central figure in the 
farmworkers’ movement in Arizona.  Under his direction, UFWOC in Arizona 
supported the efforts of California farmworkers and organized strikes for their 
own contracts.412  The Arizona branch adopted the health and safety concerns of 
UFWOC, maintaining that “normal things that people take for granted nowadays” 
such as sanitation and “these pesticides that they spray all over you” were 
important issues for farmworkers.413
                                                                                                                                     
United Farm Workers Organizing Committee in California.  Gutierrez’s 
organizations letterhead actually used the name United Farm Workers Organizing 
Committee instead of Arizona Farm Workers Organizing Committee.  See, for 
example, United Farm Workers Organizing Committee AFL-CIO, 8000 Lettuce 
Workers are on Strike (Tolleson, AZ: United Farmworkers Organizing Committee 
AFL-CIO, [n.d.]), United Farm Workers Arizona State Office Collection, Box 4, 
Folder 4-2, Archives of Labor & Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, 
MI; United Farmworkers Organizing Committee AFL-CIO, The Arizona Grape 
Strike (Tolleson, AZ: United Farmworkers Organizing Committee AFL-CIO, 
[n.d.]), United Farm Workers Arizona State Office Collection, Box 4, Folder 4-5, 
Archives of Labor & Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI. 
  The very first issue of El Paisano, the 
newspaper published by United Farm Workers Organizing Committee of Arizona, 
carried an article proclaiming that farmworkers needed a safety law because they 
 
412Deposition of Gustavo Gutierrez, United Farm Workers Union on Behalf of 
Itself and its Members v. Raul Castro, Governor of the State of Arizona, et. al, 72-
445 PHX CAM (1975), 5-7, 12. Record Group (RG) 9 Department of Agriculture, 
Subgroup (SG) 4 Boards and Commissions, SG 1 Agricultural Employment 
Relations Board, Box unprocessed, Arizona State Library, Archives and Public 
Records, Phoenix, AZ;  United Farmworkers Organizing Committee AFL-CIO, 
The Arizona Grape Strike. 
 
413 Deposition of Gustavo Gutierrez, 112, 113.  See also Letter from UFWOC 
organizer Mel Huey to the Pesticide Control Board, May 19, 1970, RG 72 Board 
of Pesticide Control, SG Pesticide Control Board Minutes 1968-79, Arizona State 
Library, Archives and Public Records, Phoenix, AZ.   
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worked in the third most dangerous occupation.414
Little evidence exists that Arizona farmworkers and Scottsdale 
suburbanites, turned NIMBY (not in my backyard) environmentalists on the 
urban/agricultural fringe, collaborated on pesticide-related issues in 1971, even 
though both groups focused attention on some of the same fields.  The Scottsdale 
residents’ concern about drift does not appear to have influenced Gutierrez or the 
Arizona UFWOC in their decision to monitor the reservation fields in 1971, 
because the field monitoring began a month before the suburbanites uttered their 
first complaints.  Similarly, the concerns of farmworkers went unaddressed in the 
suburbanite discourse on pesticide drift.  The only mention of UFWOC in the 
Scottsdale Daily Progress’s series of articles referred to the Health and Safety 
Clause in the union’s California contracts, but said nothing about the Arizona 
UFWOC’s ongoing pesticide monitoring efforts.
  Since they harbored these 
health concerns, Gutierrez and other UFWOC members monitored pesticide 
applications in the fields around the Phoenix metropolitan area in Maricopa 
County. 
415
                                                 
414 “We Want a Safety Law,” El Paisano, edited by Mel Huey and Gustavo 
Gutierrez (February 1968), UFW Office of the President: Cesar Chavez 
Collection Part II, Box 36, Folder 36-12, Archives of Labor & Urban Affairs, 
Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.  A later issue discussed the dilapidated 
quality of farmworkers’ housing in Yuma, Arizona.  Articles like this demonstrate 
that Arizona farmworkers had a wide range of concerns from the very beginning.  
“Yuma News,” El Paisano, edited by Mel Huey and Gustavo Gutierrez 
(December 1968), UFW Office of the President: Cesar Chavez Collection Part II, 
Box 36, Folder 36-12, Archives of Labor & Urban Affairs, Wayne State 
University, Detroit, MI. 
  For nearly thirteen years 
 
415 Robbins, “Pesticide Effect Denied; Indians to Undergo Tests.” 
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thereafter, in fact, farmworkers organization and suburbanites failed to join forces 
in attempt to shape pesticide politics in the state of Arizona. 
 Part of the reason for the lack of cooperation between farmworkers and 
suburban NIMBYists between 1971 and 1984 had to do with timing.  The groups’ 
interest in the state’s pesticide politics peaked at different times.  Growers’ 
efforts, in part, contributed to this phenomenon.  The suburbanite protest reached 
a fever pitch in 1978, a year in which the reinvigorated farmworkers’ movement 
in Arizona was still gathering steam.  By the time that the farmworkers’ 
organizations immersed themselves in the state’s pesticide politics in the 1980s, 
Scottsdale residents interest in pesticide reform had faded.  A pesticide drift 
incident, however, reengaged Scottsdale suburbanites in the issue and provided an 
opportunity for collaboration with farmworker organizations.  Mutual concern 
about pesticides’ adverse health effects provided a common ground for 
interaction.  Successful collaboration, though, depended upon the bridge-building 
efforts of professionals within activist organizations. 
 
The Ghosts Emerge From the Fields 
 
UFW found it very difficult to make significant gains in the state of 
Arizona during the early 1970s.  In response to the union making inroads into the 
state, agricultural interests drafted H.B. 2134, which became the Agricultural 
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Employment Relations Act when passed in May 1972.416  The new law made it 
unlawful for unions to recruit members in the fields, prohibited secondary 
boycotts, allowed the courts to issue ten-day restraining orders against work 
stoppages during the harvest, and required that workers vote to strike under the 
observance of a governor-appointed board.  This anti-labor law severely restricted 
farmworkers’ options in event of a labor dispute.  It made illegal some of the most 
effective tactics employed in the Delano grape strike.  Growers also began 
importing an increasing number of undocumented workers from Mexico, who 
sometimes interfered with organizing efforts and could be used to undermine a 
strike.  In 1974, for example, growers used two-hundred undocumented workers 
to break a UFW strike at Arrowhead Ranch in the West Valley outside of 
Phoenix.417  In the same year, the antagonism between legal and undocumented 
farmworkers in Yuma deteriorated into violence when some UFW members 
formed a “wet line” to prevent undocumented workers from entering the field.  
Participants in the “wet line” beat several undocumented workers and turned them 
in to the border patrol.  The violence generated negative publicity for UFW and 
alienated Mexican nationals who were becoming increasingly common in the 
fields.  The Yuma strike cost UFW $1.6 million and ended without a contract.418
                                                 
416 José A. Maldonado, “!Sí Se Puede¡  The Farm Worker Movement in Arizona 
1965-1979” (master’s thesis, Arizona State University, 1995), 65.  
  
 
417 Meeks, Border Citizens, 202-203, 205.  
 
418 Richard Griswold del Castillo and Richard A. Garcia, Cesar Chavez: A 
Triumph of Spirit (Norman, OK:  University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 165.  
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These troubles, in part, caused UFW to all but abandon Arizona farmworkers by 
1975.419
A contingent of the organizers in Arizona disagreed with UFW’s stance on 
undocumented workers and established a more inclusive civil rights organization 
to represent the interests of all farmworkers within the state.  Similar to UFW, 
activists within the fledgling Maricopa County Organizing Project (M-COP) 
envisioned their organization as one which strove to advance the civil and human 
rights of farmworkers, but they made no distinction between documented and 
undocumented workers.
      
420  M-COP organizers maintained that any agreement 
that failed to include undocumented workers in contract provisions would “drive a 
wedge between Chicano and Mexican workers by creating a second and third 
citizen status among the worker.”421
                                                 
419 Guadalupe L. Sanchez to Timothy Collins, July 23, 1978, United Farm 
Workers Office of the President: Cesar Chavez Collection Part II, Box 22, Folder 
22-5, Archives of Labor & Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.   
  They believed that this distinction would 
adversely affect all farmworkers regardless of legal status.   
 
420 Maricopa County Organizing Project, Who is MCOP? (El Mirage, AZ: 
Maricopa County Organizing Project, [no date]), Folder MCOP – Maricopa 
County Organizing Project, Department of Archives and Special Collections, 
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 
 
421 “A Formal Invitation to Each Agricultural Worker to the First Historical 
Constitutional Convention of Farm Workers in Arizona,” December 16, 1979, 
2,3, UFW Office of the President: Cesar Chavez Collection Part II, Box 25, 
Folder 25-10, Archives of Labor & Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, 
Detroit, MI.  The 1965 Hart-Celler Act and amendments to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act made it more difficult for Mexicans to legally immigrate to the 
United States.  Subsequently, undocumented migration increased.  This change is 
evidenced by the growth in the number of arrests for illegal immigration between 
1964 and 1986.  Authorities arrested 87,000 undocumented workers in 1964, 
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Conventional wisdom held that undocumented workers could not be 
effectively organized.  Mexican nationals lack citizenship, so state and federal 
politicians often have had little reason to intervene on their behalf in labor 
disputes, especially since many of their political constituents believe that 
undocumented workers constitute a significant threat to American jobs.422  
Furthermore, undocumented workers face the threat of deportation; a 
circumstance that employers may use advantageously to rid themselves of 
employees who voice discontent over wages or working conditions.  M-COP, 
however, speculated that growers’ dependence on foreign labor during the harvest 
would, to some extent, mitigate the factors that made organizing undocumented 
workers difficult.423
Recognizing that the “greatest obstacle in organizing undocumented 
workers was fear,” M-COP organizers Lupe Sánchez and Jesús Romo set an 
     
                                                                                                                                     
whereas in 1986, they recorded 1.8 million arrests.  Marcela Cerrutti and Douglas 
S. Massey, “Trends in Mexican Migration to the United States, 1965-1995,” in 
Crossing the Border: Research From the Mexican Migration Project.  Edited by 
Jorge Durand and Douglas S. Massey (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
2004), 19.  The tremendous growth in the number of undocumented workers in 
the United States and, more particularly, in the agricultural fields meant that 
farmworkers’ unions would have a much more difficult time organizing if they 
excluded that demographic.    
 
422 Kenneth Juan Figueroa, “Immigrants and the Civil Rights Regime: Parens 
Patriae Standing, Foreign Governments and Protection From Private 
Discrimination,” Columbia Law Review, 102, No. 2 (2002): 409, 410, 414.  
 
423 Jeffrey Shavelson, “Bottom-Up Populism:  The Lessons for Citizen and 
Community Empowerment” (Phd diss., University of Maryland, 1989), 36, 37; 
The Plight of the Migrant, VHS, (Tucson: Arizona Center for Occupational 
Safety and Health, 1979). 
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innovative strategy to build trust and strengthen the resolve of farmworkers.424  
M-COP organizers evaded growers’ security teams and entered migrant labor 
camps in Maricopa County in 1976 and found farmworkers to be highly 
dissatisfied with their living and working conditions.425  Many farmworkers lived 
underneath the canopy of citrus trees in the groves, using only black plastic tarps 
or makeshift lean-tos of old crates to shield themselves from the elements.  An 
absence of sanitary facilities forced them to live amidst their own waste and 
excrement, while the lack of a good water supply limited bathing options to the 
chemically-laden canals that bordered fields.426 The dissatisfaction caused by 
these conditions and poor wages provided a base of issues around which to 
organize, if they could gain undocumented farmworkers’ confidence.427
                                                 
424 Guadalupe L. Sánchez and Jesús Romo, “Organizing Mexican Undocumented 
On Both Sides of the Border,” Working Papers in U.S.-Mexican Studies, 27 (La 
Jolla, CA: University of California, San Diego, 1981), 3. 
   
 
425 Organizers Guadalupe Sánchez and Jesús Romo reported that “growers had 
almost total reign in the fields…surveillance was strict, and any outsider caught 
inside the fields faced a severe beating.” Ibid., 3; Maldonado, “!Sí Se Puede¡,” 
101. 
 
426 “Workers Picket Robert Goldwater’s Ranch,” Scottsdale (AZ) Progress, 
October 3, 1977; “Citrus Workers’ Strike Hits Arizona Farm.”; “IRE Reported on 
Aliens in March,” Scottsdale (AZ) Progress, October 4, 1977; Tom Kuhn, 
“Harvest Hands in Citrus Grove Out on Strike,” Arizona Republic, October 4, 
1977; “Unequal Enforcement La Migra in Arizona,” Watch Seers Weekly, 
October 21-28, 1977.  Folder Maricopa County Organizing Project (News 
Clippings), Department of Archives and Special Collections, Arizona State 
University, Tempe, AZ. 
 
427 In attempt to prove their commitment to the farmworkers, M-COP organizers 
identified exploitative coyotes (individuals who engaged themselves in the 
transport of migrants after being paid sometimes exorbitant fees) and brought 
them before a “workers trial” in the fields “where restitution was fixed for 
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In their conversations with farmworkers, M-COP discovered that most of 
the workers came from the same towns within the Mexican states of Querétaro, 
Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, Nayarit, Michoacán, and Guerrero.  Organizers then 
traveled to various points of origin within the six Mexican states to organize 
twenty-six strike committees during the summers of 1976 and 1977.428  In 
contrast to the United States where farmworkers operated from a disadvantaged 
position, villagers and local authorities in Mexico viewed migrants with a sense a 
respect, which in turn made it easier to plan for a strike.429
  After two summers of organizing in Mexico, two-hundred farmworkers 
walked off of their jobs at the 3,000 acre Arrowhead Ranch during the 1977 fall 
  With this strategy, 
Mexican farmworkers and M-COP lessened some of the advantage that growers 
gained from the migrants’ undocumented status in the United States.  
                                                                                                                                     
damages.  Sánchez and Romo, “Organizing Mexican Undocumented On Both 
Sides of the Border,” 3.  Organizers also informed farmworkers that they had 
certain legal rights that were unaffected by their lack of legal immigrant status in 
the country. Shavelson, “Bottom-Up Populism,” 40. 
 
428 José A. Maldonado, “!Sí Se Puede¡,” 101. 
 
429 M-COP organizers did not initially know how the Mexican government would 
react to their activities.  Sánchez and Romo recalled that organizers initially 
feared a negative response from Mexican authorities, but soon realized that “the 
migrant undocumented workers were usually the most prominent citizens of their 
communities and that they enjoyed the full respect of local authorities.”  Sánchez 
and Romo, “Organizing Mexican Undocumented On Both Sides of the Border,” 
5, 6.  Quote on page 6.  Migrant workers’ home communities respected them 
because community members recognized that the workers’ sojourns across the 
border were an economic survival strategy undertaken in effort to support the 
family.  Massey, Durand, and Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors, 12; Margarita 
Mooney, “Migrants’ Social Capital and Investing Remittances in Mexico,” 
Crossing the Border: Research From the Mexican Migration Project, ed. Jorge 
Durand and Douglas S. Massey (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004), 45, 
61. 
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harvest, demanding improvements in their wages and living and working 
conditions. Sánchez and Romo recognized that the public could respond 
negatively to the undocumented workers’ action, so they called on the press to 
paint a sympathetic picture.430  Romo stressed, “We are not interested in getting 
them to sign (union) cards, we want to improve the living conditions of these 
people.”431  As word of the strike spread through the media, some area locals 
began to refer to the farmworkers as “ghosts of the orchards” or “ghostworkers” 
because they had previously been a relatively invisible segment of the state’s 
labor force.432
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents wasted little time in 
organizing a sweep of Arrowhead Ranch to round up undocumented workers after 
the start of the strike.
   
433
                                                 
430 Sánchez and Romo, “Organizing Mexican Undocumented On Both Sides of 
the Border,” 6. 
  The Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office then surrounded 
the fields, preventing the remaining farmworkers from receiving any visitors.  M-
COP, in response, sought and received protection from a federal district court.  
U.S. District Judge Carl Muecke informed the growers’ attorneys that the 
farmworkers held constitutional and statutory rights, including the right to 
 
431 Tom Kuhn, “Harvest Hands in Citrus Grove Out on Strike.” 
 
432 Tom Barry, “Ghosts Strike Goldwater Ranch,” In These Times, October 19-25, 
1977, Folder Arrowhead Ranch Strike, Department of Archives and Special 
Collections,  Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 
 
433 “Unequal Enforcement La Migra in Arizona.” 
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assembly, that were unaffected by legal status.434  The order still did not stop the 
use of force and intimidating tactics on the ranch though, so M-COP decided to 
step up their efforts by calling a strike on the nearby Fletcher Ranch.  After an 
INS raid on the Fletcher Ranch netted another 122 workers, M-COP organizer 
Lupe Sánchez charged that “Border Patrol enforcement is in some serious degree 
being selectively applied where labor disputes are happening…in sufficient force 
to disrupt organizing efforts and to intimidate the work force, but never as a total 
sweep sufficient to threaten the harvest.”435  The repeated migration sweeps 
weakened the strike to some degree, but failed to break it.  The farmworkers’ 
continued effort forced Goldmar, Inc., the owners of Arrowhead Ranch, and 
Fletcher Ranch to come to terms.436
The growers negotiated the contracts with the Arizona Farm Workers 
(AFW), a newly created offshoot of the Maricopa County Organizing Project.
   
437
                                                 
434 Barry, “Ghosts Strike Goldwater Ranch.”  Before taking a position on the 
bench, Charles Muecke worked as a labor organizer.  After becoming a judge, he 
presided over trials in which he was not afraid to render controversial decisions.  
His court, for example, desegregated Arizona schools three years before the 
Brown v. Board of Education decision. Michael Kiefer, “Carl Muecke, Retired 
Judge, Dies in His Sleep at 89,” Arizona Republic, September 24, 2007. 
  
 
435 “Unequal Enforcement La Migra in Arizona.”  
 
436 “Laborers and Ranch Reach Pact,” Phoenix Gazette, November 25, 1977, 
Folder  Maricopa County Organizing Project (News Clippings), Department of 
Archives and Special Collections, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 
 
437 Maricopa County Organizing Project, “Maricopa County Organizing Project 
1977-1988” (El Mirage, AZ: Maricopa County Organizing Project, 1988), 3, 
Folder Maricopa County Organizing Project; 1987, Department of Archives and 
Special Collections, Hayden Library, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ; 
Shavelson, “Bottom-Up Populism,” 57.   
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Farmworkers convinced growers to agree to a mix of concessions at the 
bargaining table.  Wages increased between twenty-five percent and seventy-five 
percent on the citrus ranches depending on the starting rate and nineteen percent 
on the onion farms.  The increase raised farmworker pay rates close to the federal 
minimum wage, though not always above it.438  AFW also inserted a clause into 
the contract that required growers to contribute ten cents for every hour worked to 
a redevelopment fund, the sum of which would be used to foster the growth of 
self-sustaining communities in the farmworkers’ home villages in Mexico.439
The contracts also addressed a number of issues relating to the migrants’ 
daily living quality and work conditions in the fields of Arizona.  Fletcher Ranch, 
 
                                                 
438 “M-COP Helps Farmworkers Win Victories,” MCOP, March 1979, 4. Folder 
MCOP – Maricopa County Organizing Project, Department of Archives and 
Special Collections, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ; Maricopa County 
Organizing Project, Who is MCOP?. 
 
439 Growers could assign fifteen cents worth of farm machinery for every hour 
worked in lieu of the cash deposit.  In the first two years, monies from the 
redevelopment fund supported a number of projects in Mexico, including the: 
drilling of wells in Guanajuato and San Luis Potosí; construction of a tortilla 
factory in Sinaloa; creation of a crafts and textiles workshop in Michoacán; and 
removal of invasive non-native plants from lakes for Guanajuato fisherman.  
Cooperative Sin Fronteras, the organization that M-COP and AFW created to 
manage funds and implement projects, focused the bulk of their attention on 
Querétaro though, the state from which most of the contracted farmworkers 
migrated.  In the small village of Ahuacatlán, for example, the cooperative 
constructed a gravity-fed irrigation system that drew its water from mountain 
springs and fed more than ninety collection basins.  The system provided water 
for traditional agricultural endeavors, as well as for an extensive peach growing 
operation on the terraced hillsides.  Cooperativa Sin Fronteras: El Primer Paso, 
VHS, directed Juan Farre (New York: West Glen Productions, 1987); Maricopa 
County Organizing Project, “Maricopa County Organizing Project 1977-1988,” 3; 
Ted Conover, “A Cooperative Between Borders,” Grassroots Development 9, No. 
2 (1985): 43, 49. 
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for instance, agreed to provide space for camping and blankets, refrigeration 
facilities for food, better sources of drinking water, showers, and toilets.440  
Goldmar Inc. stated that they would notify workers before irrigating and provide 
forty-eight hours notice before an area was sprayed with pesticides.  This advance 
warning allowed workers time enough to move their belongings from underneath 
the citrus trees and prevent them from being ruined.   Goldmar also agreed to 
provide protective clothing to pesticide applicators and have physicians test them 
regularly to monitor the effects of pesticide exposure.441
The newly signed contracts, however, did not resolve farmworkers’ 
problems with pesticides.  Farmworkers rarely received information on the 
hazardousness of the risks of chemical exposure.  Also many pesticide applicators 
and growers still failed to notify farmworkers of spray dates, despite the contract 
clause requiring advance warning.  Crop dusters often sprayed fields with little 
regard for the workers in the camps or in the fields.  Sometimes, the planes would 
dump chemicals on top of laboring migrants, making them ill from the 
exposure.
   
442
                                                 
440 “Laborers and Ranch Reach Pact.”  
 
 
441 “Goldmar Workers Win Contract,” MCOP, March 1979, 3, Folder  MCOP – 
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The problems stretched beyond crop dusters flight schedules and a lack of 
notification though.  A 1979 investigation by the Arizona Department of Health 
Services (ADHS) revealed that more than twenty-eight wells in the greater 
Phoenix area and thirty-three in Yuma County were contaminated with the highly 
toxic pesticide dibromochloropropane (DBCP).443  The ranches under contract 
with the Arizona Farm Workers – namely Arrowhead Ranch, Fletcher Ranch, and 
Bodine Produce Co. – did not escape the contamination.444
                                                 
443 Bruce Babbitt to Douglas Costle, November 23, 1979, Folder Environmental 
Protection Agency, U.S. General Correspondence, RG: Governor’s Office, 1979, 
Series: Federal Files, Box 103, Arizona Department of Library, Archives and 
Public Records, State Archives Division, Phoenix, AZ.  Growers started using 
DBCP in the mid-1950s to control worm problems in citrus, grapes, and cotton.  
Tests initiated by the Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers union in 1977 revealed 
that the DBCP caused male sterility.  U.S Environmental Protection Agency, 
“Notice of Intent to Suspend Registrations of Dibromochloropropane (DBCP): 
Direct Testimony of Mr. Frank L. Davido,” FIFRA Docket No. 485, 1-5, MCOP 
Papers, ACC #1990-00402, Box 36, Folder 2,  Department of Archives and 
Special Collections, Hayden Library, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ.  
Excepting Hawaiian pineapples, the EPA banned DBCP usage in the United 
States in 1979.  Problems of DBCP groundwater contamination persisted after the 
usage of DBCP stopped.  Otto Wong, M. Donald Whorton, Nancy Gordon, and 
Robert W. Morgan, “An Epidemiologic Investigation of the Relationship Between 
DBCP Contamination in Drinking Water and Birth Rates in Fresno County, 
California,” American Journal of Public Health 78, No. 1 (January 1988): 43; 
Kathleen Stanton, “Some Farm Workers Still Rely on Tainted Wells,” Arizona 
Republic, May 21, 1985; Cohen, “Ground Water Contamination by Toxic 
Substances,” 502, 503. 
  Farmworkers 
arguably stood a greater chance of being affected by the chemical, since they 
historically lacked a clean water supply and often bathed in and drank from the 
pesticide-laden canals.  Even though farmworkers used ranch wells for these 
 
444 “Well Water Sampling for DBCP in Maricopa County, Arizona,” MCOP 
Papers, ACC #1990-00402, Box 39, Folder 14, Department of Archives and 
Special Collections, Hayden Library, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 
 
  169 
purposes, the wells were not categorized as residential and not recognized as a 
public drinking source.  Upon discovering the contamination, the state closed 
some residential wells, but ADHS stated that it lacked the authority to close the 
wells on ranches, because they were classified as agricultural rather than 
residential.  Farmworkers subsequently had to continue to use the tainted water.445
Maricopa County Organizing Project and Arizona Farm Workers 
committed to learning more about pesticides after signing contracts and devoted 
greater resources to reform efforts after 1980.
 
446  The efforts in Arizona shared 
some similarities with United Farm Worker’s earlier actions, namely the inclusion 
of pesticide provisions in contracts.  UFW and the Arizona organizations both 
used the courts, but for somewhat different ends.  While similarities existed, M-
COP and AFW employed strategies that varied significantly from those of UFW 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  United Farm Workers emphasized the 
centrality of contracts in protecting farmworkers and consumers and focused 
energies on building boycott support to increase union representation in the fields.  
M-COP and Arizona Farm Workers, in contrast, concentrated more resources on 
improving the regulatory system in Arizona.447
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1980, State Reports,” Arizona Republic, July 25, 1984; Stanton, “Some Farm 
Workers Still Rely on Tainted Wells.”  
  The Arizona organizations also 
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MCOP Papers, ACC #1990-00402, Box 3, Folder 6,  Department of Archives and 
Special Collections, Hayden Library, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ.   
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planned “to act as [a] ‘shadow gov’t’ [government] monitoring the activities” of 
the Board of Pesticide Control and sometimes the Department of Health 
Services.448
Maricopa County Organizing Project stepped up efforts in 1983 when it 
recruited Nadine Wettstein, a Tucson civil rights attorney, to lead the 
organization’s pesticide reform efforts and obtained grant money to create the 
Arizona Farm Workers Committee on Pesticides (AFWCP) and the Pesticide 
Project.
 
449  Karen Kincaid, an M-COP organizer and paralegal, joined Wettstein 
in devising a plan of action.  They decided to seek a seat on the grower-dominated 
Board of Pesticide Control, the state agency responsible for pesticide regulation.  
M-COP also wanted to have a voice in decisions on the application of 
experimental pesticides and stricter oversight of those chemicals when used.   
Kincaid shouldered the responsibility of recruiting pesticide applicators and 
farmworkers to document pesticide usage in the fields, the results of which would 
give the organization a catalog of pesticide information to inform their efforts.  A 
November meeting also identified contaminated agricultural water systems as 
target of concern.450
                                                 
448 L.M. [Laurie Martinelli] to Frieda Christie, [n.d.], MCOP Papers, ACC #1990-
00402, Box 56, Folder 7,  Department of Archives and Special Collections, 
Hayden Library, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 
    
 
449 Ibid.; Don Devereux to Friends of Arizona Farm Labor Movement, January 6, 
1984. 
 
450 M-COP meeting notes, November 3, 1983, MCOP Papers, ACC #1990-00402, 
Box 1, Folder 26,  Department of Archives and Special Collections, Hayden 
Library, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ; Paul Bullis to AFW, MCOP, and 
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Arizona Farm Workers addressed governmental response to DBCP 
contamination in wells soon after ADHS announced its response to the problem.  
The union filed complaint with Department of Health Services over the agency’s 
differentiation between residential and agricultural wells, asserting that 
“harvesters here, in actual fact, are required to live in unsheltered labor camps 
within the orchards after working hours, with virtually no facilities at their 
disposal…they drink, cook with, and wash in whatever water is available, often 
limited to irrigation well and ditch water.”451  It proposed that ADHS should 
consider agricultural labor camps when determining a well’s status, categorizing 
wells that serviced camps of 25 or more farmworkers as residential.452
M-COP also requested that Department of Health Services test well waters 
for ethylene dibromide (EDB) contamination.
 
453  Growers had turned to EDB, a 
chemical that caused cancer in laboratory animals, after the DBCP ban.454
                                                                                                                                     
Farmworker Staff, November 7, 1983, MCOP Papers, ACC #1990-00402, Box 1, 
Folder 26,  Department of Archives and Special Collections, Hayden Library, 
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 
  Public 
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00402, Box 39, Folder 14,  Department of Archives and Special Collections, 
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453 Karen S. Kincaid to Boyd Dover, April 17, 1984, MCOP Papers, ACC #1990-
00402, Box 3, Folder 6,  Department of Archives and Special Collections, Hayden 
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454 Environmental Protection Agency, “EPA Acts to Ban EDB Pesticide,” Press 
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concern about the chemical heightened as traces of EDB began to show in 
groundwater in California and Florida.  Both states suspended use of the chemical 
in 1983 after discovering the contamination.455  The Environmental Protection 
Agency followed suit, issuing an emergency ban on the use of EDB as a soil 
fumigant in September 1983 because of concerns about groundwater quality.456  
Maricopa County Organizing Project wanted ADHS to test Arizona’s 
groundwater for the chemical after the problems in other agricultural states came 
to light.  Department of Health Services, however, responded that it could not test 
the water quality in wells without knowing where EDB had been applied in recent 
years.457 M-COP gathered data on the sale and usage of DBCP and EDB, as well 
as the location of labor camps, and turned their finds over to the health 
department.458
                                                 
455 Ken Klein, “Need to Eat vs. Clean Water: Worries Rise Over EDB 
Contamination,” Los Angeles Times, September 22, 1983. 
     
 
456 The EPA suspension did not apply to the usage of EDB in gasoline, where the 
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cylinders.  Environmental Protection Agency, “EPA Acts to Ban EDB Pesticide.” 
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Devereux to Richard W. Sweet, MCOP Papers, ACC #1990-00402, Box 3, Folder 
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March 1, 1984, MCOP Papers, ACC #1990-00402, Box 3, Folder 6,  Department 
of Archives and Special Collections, Hayden Library, Arizona State University, 
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The persistence and data-gathering efforts of Maricopa County Organizing 
Project and Arizona Farm Workers paid off.  State health officials agreed to 
AFW’s proposed revision to well classifications in late 1984.  It began treating 
agricultural water in the same regard as residential wells, so long as it serviced a 
labor camp of twenty-five or more persons for at least two months of the year.  
The agency also developed “action standards” for DBCP and EDB that allowed 
ADHS to close contaminated wells.459  Yet the department lacked the necessary 
resources to conduct extensive investigations.  M-COP’s Pesticide Project and 
Centro Adelante Campesino subsequently negotiated a cooperative agreement 
with the health department in 1986, in which the farmworker groups conducted 
preliminary tests on water supplies.  ADHS then tested the samples for 
contamination.  If the results showed chemicals above tolerance levels, then the 
agency sent its own personnel to the field to take an official sample for testing 
before closing the well.460
                                                                                                                                     
Tempe, AZ; Karen S. Kincaid to Boyd Dover, April 17, 1984.  The partial 
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 While the Pesticide Project and Centro Adelante Campesino collaborated 
with Arizona Department of Health Services, Arizona Farm Workers Committee 
on Pesticides encouraged farmworkers to directly participate in policing growers’ 
pesticide usage practices by initiating a watchdog program that awarded 
whistleblowers twenty-five dollars for reporting major violations.461  One such 
report led to the location of an illegal dump that had empty containers of 
carcinogenic and teratogenic pesticides lying about haphazardly in close 
proximity to food crops, irrigation ditches, and a labor camp.462  Farmworker tips 
identified violations on the part of both pesticide applicators and chemical 
companies, which on occasion spurred the Environmental Protection Agency to 
investigate and lobby fines in excess of $150,000.463
                                                                                                                                     
advice, help with food stamp applications, and a daycare.  “M-COP Helps 
Farmworkers Win Victories.”; Karen Kincaid to María Transito Sánchez, July 23, 
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Archives and Special Collections, Hayden Library, Arizona State University, 
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  Considering budgetary and 
personnel constraints within government agencies, such extensive policing of the 
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fields and wells would not have been possible without the volunteered assistance 
of M-COP, its affiliated charters, and migrant farmworkers.   
The efforts of farmworkers and professionals within the Pesticide Project 
and Arizona Farm Workers Committee on Pesticides helped protect farmworkers 
in the field and, arguably, the public at large.  The grower-controlled Board of 
Pesticide Control remained the primary regulatory authority for pesticide 
application and use though.  BPC had increased its pesticide monitoring efforts in 
the years since 1971, but still remained ineffective as the regulatory agency 
charged with protecting the public health.  The farmworkers needed to find allies 
who were similarly concerned about BPC inadequacies if they hoped to 
significantly reform or abolish the board.  Instances of pesticide poisoning and 
environmental contamination in the early 1980s provided the necessary catalyst 
for coalition-building from 1984 to 1986.  
 
Trouble in Suburbia 
  
 Arizona growers felt threatened by both pests and people during the 
1970s.  A 1979 study commissioned by the Agri-Business Council of Arizona 
stated that while persons with negative attitudes about agriculture in Arizona 
remained low in number, they represented a latent force that could “become very 
powerful and could easily translate into increased public tolerance for public 
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policies detrimental to the industry.”464  The agricultural lobby had historically 
been a powerful force in state politics.  Agriculture boomed with the development 
of large scale water projects in the state during the late 19th and early 20th century.  
Phoenix developed as an agricultural city, surrounded by large-scale farming 
operations.  Since it was the capital, state agricultural associations located their 
headquarters in the city and exerted their influence on the state’s economic, 
political, and social matters.  In the post-World War II era, however, rapid urban 
and suburban growth, based on a less and less agriculturally based economy, 
encroached on arable lands.  By 1977, residential growth in Maricopa County 
alone forced ten thousand acres a year out of production.465  Growers feared that 
the urban newcomers, whom they identified as liberal, would alter the balance of 
power in Arizona.  Growers deferred action when possible, made minor 
concessions to disgruntled suburbanites when necessary, and continually stressed 
the importance and value of agriculture to Arizona.466
 The Board of Pesticide Control believed that suburbanites’ concerns about 
pesticide drift were unfounded.  The Board maintained that most complaints arose 
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because of odor associated with some pesticides.  The odors, they argued, posed 
no health threat to the public.  Acting on this assumption, the BPC often did not 
undertake serious investigations; rather, they followed up on complaints “for 
public relations sake” and used the instance as an opportunity to explain the 
position of the growers and pesticide applicators.467  The Board considered a 
follow-up to a complaint be an “educational meeting” more than an 
investigation.468
every segment of agriculture is going to be adversely effected by 
legislation that already has reared it’s [sic] ugly head, and it 
doesn’t take much imagination on anyones [sic] part to see what is 
going to take place if some of the unbridled efforts of those 
opposed to pesticides in any form are allowed to continue to 
discriminate against agriculture and this means discrimination 
against the human race.
  It believed that the public knew nothing about pesticides and 
that their unchecked ignorance would prove devastating to growers.  The grower-
controlled Board generally viewed the public with antipathy even though it was 




Operating from this mindset, the Board would take minor ameliorative steps when 
suburban protest became too noisome in order to appease the group and keep the 
discontent from spreading to other sectors of the city.  For instance, when the 
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1971 drift incidents in Scottsdale started to draw national attention, the Board 
disallowed the use of the odoriferous liquid Di-Syston in hopes that suburbanites 
would not resume their “cease and desist chant” through the mouthpiece of the 
media and “begin all over their harassment of the farmers, the Applicators [sic] 
and this Board.”470
The suburbanite protest against pesticide drift in the greater Phoenix 
metropolitan area rose to a fever pitch in 1978.  Over 1,000 letters of complaint 
flooded state agencies that year with concerns ranging from the odor of the sprays 
and the noise of crop dusters to the effects of the sprays on human health.  Once 
again people living in fringe communities along the urban/rural border expressed 
the greatest concern about the health effects of pesticide exposure.  As their 
concerns continued to go unaddressed, they grew increasingly antagonistic 
towards BPC and attempted to appeal to a higher authority.  Reasoning that it was 
the state’s responsibility to protect the health of its residents, the Sun City Town 
Meeting Association passed a motion that Governor Bruce Babbitt should force 
growers to reform their chemical use practices, particularly in regard to Aflotoxin 
and other carcinogenic sprays that crop dusters used on the neighboring fields.
  Such actions quieted suburban complaints over drift and 
forestalled the development of a grassroots NIMBY environmental campaign, but 
failed to resolve the conflict in the agricultural/urban interface. 
471
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471 Sun City Town Meeting Association to Bruce Babbitt, March 22, 1979, RG 1 
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Similarly, residents of Ellsworth Mini-Farms subdivision, a new community in 
the agricultural area of Queen Creek, circulated a petition among residents 
demanding that Babbitt take action to eliminate the aerial application of 
pesticides. Ninety-four disgruntled homeowners complained that the effects of the 
drift “severely violated” their “right to live as free Americans.”472
Other parts of the Phoenix metropolitan area had shifting geographies of 
pesticide drift complaints that followed the path of suburban sprawl.  However, 
Scottsdale residents living along the Pima Road corridor that separates the city 
from the Salt River Pima Maricopa Indian Community continued to be exposed to 
drift, because the reservation boundary kept suburban sprawl from moving further 
outward.  Their complaints peaked three times over a fifteen year period: 1971; 
1978 and 1979; and 1984 through 1986.  This repeated exposure to drift reduced 
Scottsdale residents’ patience for the BPC’s foot-dragging and inadequate 
responses.  In fact, the Pima Road corridor separating city from reservation came 
to be referred to as the “Gaza Strip of the pesticide war,” because of both the 
  While 
residents along the suburban fringes of both the East and West Valleys clamored 
for change, Scottsdale residents living adjacent to the SRPMIC raised the most 
virulent protests about pesticide drift.   
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persistence and intensity of conflict along Pima Road’s agricultural/urban 
interface.473
Scottsdale residents living along the Pima Road corridor expressed a sense 
of helplessness during heavy spray seasons, because fear of the adverse effects of 
pesticide exposure made them feel like prisoners in their own homes.  Numerous 
letters to the governor detailed the maladies suffered during the 1978 summer 
spray season:  headaches, dizziness, breathing difficulties, diarrhea, stomach 
cramps, fatigue, and bloody noses.  Most of those who experienced health 
problems during the season lived within a mile of the fields.  Concerned citizens 
reported on how the sickness from the pesticide drifts would linger for the entire 
crop-spraying season, sometimes as long as six weeks, forcing children and adults 
to respectively take sick days from school and work.
 
 474
You’re working at your desk.  You have the sniffles so you reach 
for your handkerchief.  You use it and lo and behold it [sic] 
covered with blood.  And the bleeding goes on and on and on.  
   A particularly powerful 
letter addressed to Babbitt from a Scottsdale woman vividly described a 
nightmarish scene in suburbia: 
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You find yourself repeating this scene five or six times a day for 
several days.  What’s happening?  You come home to find your 
little girl in tears.  She can’t control her bowels and has soiled 
herself.  And your son awakens terrified he’s dying because his 
pillow is soaked in blood.  Another nose bleed.475
 
 
The woman closed the letter by informing the governor that such experiences 
were commonplace for many people in the area. 
Public pressure from residents in Scottsdale and other outlaying areas of 
the Valley forced BPC to call two meetings to address citizen concerns in October 
and November 1978, though residents were less than satisfied with the results of 
the sessions.  A distressed Scottsdale woman wrote Babbitt after one of the 
meetings, complaining that the Board “jeered and hooted,” “laughed at 
questions,” and “ridiculed” citizens who spoke out.476
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 Another Scottsdale woman 
complained of her voice being drowned out by the chemical companies, pesticide 
applicators, farmers, and others with a vested interest in maintaining the status 
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quo.477  Growers and the grower-controlled BPC found the scientific results of 
pesticide studies inclusive and maintained that the residents suffered less from the 
toxic effects of pesticide exposure than they did from an “emotional problem of 
[pesticide] odor.”478  After hearing the public complaints, the Board proposed 
talking with suppliers about reducing the levels of mercaptans in DEF, Folex, and 
Bolstar in order to reduce the chemicals’ offensive odors.  They blamed these 
three chemicals’ odors for most of the conflict in the agricultural-urban interface 
and left larger issues of human health unaddressed.479
  Suzanne Prosnier, a Scottsdale mother whose family suffered through the 
spray seasons since moving within a mile of the Pima Road corridor remained 
unsatisfied with BPC’s conclusions and unconvinced by the Board’s contention 
that the pesticides used on the neighboring reservation were no more dangerous 
than table salt or aspirin.  She belonged to the fledgling NIMBY organization 
People’s Environmental Organization for Pesticide Legislation and Enforcement 
(PEOPLE), which formed in Scottsdale when the problems with drift reemerged 
in 1978.  PEOPLE represented over four-hundred families, many of whom 
actively engaged in pesticide politics by collecting data, writing letters, generating 
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publicity, and providing testimony at public hearings.  Prosnier assumed the 
position of research director for the organization traveled to Washington D.C. 
with a contingent of other members to testify before the House Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee.  
She maintained that residents had sought protection from the ill effects of 
pesticide drift for years and met with frustration every time because of the 
inadequate response from state agencies, particularly the Board of Pesticide 
Control.480  The testimony drew the interest of EPA, which recognized that the 
problems relating to pesticide drift in Arizona’s agricultural/urban interface had 
national significance because aerial spraying was commonplace throughout the 
country.481
EPA called a three-day public hearing in September 1979 to hear 
testimony from the conflicting interests in Arizona.  Specifically, it wanted to 
determine if residents living along the agricultural/urban interface suffered 
adverse health effects from pesticide drift.  If such a problem did exist, it would 
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investigate to see if the problem resulted from the misuse of pesticides or if the 
problem occurred despite the strict adherence to pesticide application directions.  
They then planned to weigh possible remedies under state and federal law.  If the 
State lacked the power or will to sufficiently address the issue, EPA would 
determine if a resolution to the problem required federal intervention.482
Growers, citizens, scientists, and pesticide applicators testified at the 
hearing, offering widely variant interpretations of problems relating to pesticide 
drift.  Growers and individuals with connections to the pesticide industry 
outnumbered other attendees by approximately four to one.  They used the lack of 
conclusive scientific evidence to argue that the aerially-applied pesticides did not 
cause adverse health effects, stating that the pilots applied chemicals in such 
diluted concentrations that they would not harm humans.
   
483  Arizona Farm 
Bureau Federation representative Ralph Baskett, Jr. complained of the “hysteria 
about the effects of chemicals on the environment and upon health” and stated 
that the Farm Bureau “opposed legislation or regulation based upon emotional, 
nondocumented [sic] complaints.”484
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  Yet opponents of increased regulations 
 
483 Minutes of the Board of Directors Meeting Arizona Cotton Growers 
Association, September 25, 1979, Arizona Cotton Growers Association 
Collection, Box 33, Folder 3, Arizona Historical Foundation, Hayden Library, 
Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona.   
 
484 Environmental Protection Agency Region IX, “Testimony of Arizona Farm 
Bureau Federation representative Ralph Baskett, Jr.,” Public Hearing on the Use 
of Agricultural Pesticides in Arizona: September 6-8, 1979 Adam’s Hotel, Navajo 
Room, Central and Adams Streets, Phoenix, Arizona/ United States, 
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failed to offer a good answer for the suffering in suburbia.  Residents from 
affected areas countered the charge of irrational hysteria with evidence from a 
door-to-door survey that showed their illnesses coinciding with the aerial 
application of pesticides in the area.  The results also revealed that the maladies 
disappeared when the spraying stopped or afflicted individuals traveled out of the 
area.485
Arizona government officials offered their assessment of the conflict at the 
hearings as well.  ADHS Director Dr. Suzanne Dandoy acknowledged the lack of 
conclusive scientific evidence that growers referenced, but maintained that very 
few studies had been done to confirm or deny the “unmistakable association in 
time and place between the application of agricultural pesticides and the reporting 
of symptoms and illnesses in nearby residents.”  Dandoy also testified that the 
Board of Pesticide Control lacked the staff and experience necessary to 
sufficiently address the problem, while warning that “putting the maintenance of 
these regulatory programs in government agencies dominated by the industries 
they regulated” jeopardized the “ultimate goal” of protecting the public from 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Environmental Protection Agency, Region IX, Volume I (San Francisco: Smythe 
& Wilson, 1979), 59, 60. 
 
485 Environmental Protection Agency Region IX, “Testimony of People’s 
Environmental Organization for Pesticide Legislation and Enforcement members 
Suzanne Prosnier and Dennis Stadel,” Hearing on the Use of Agricultural 
Pesticides in Arizona: September 6-8, 1979 Adam’s Hotel, Navajo Room, Central 
and Adams Streets, Phoenix, Arizona/ United States, Environmental Protection 
Agency, Region IX, Volume III (San Francisco: Smythe & Wilson, 1979), 103, 
104, 786-796. 
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illnesses caused by toxic exposure.486  Babbitt also took aim at BPC, charging that 
it was dominated by agricultural interests and had proven “tame” and 
“ineffective,” as made clear by its “history of no regulation.”487  A review of BPC 
action, in fact, revealed that the Board had failed to investigate 156 of 180 
randomly selected complaints.488  BPC Administrator Bill Blackledge tried to 
defend the agency, stating it did not need more stringent regulations, because they 
had “enough trouble keeping up with what we’ve got.”489
After weighing the merits of the variant testimony heard over the course of 
the three-day hearing, EPA released a draft of its advisory opinion on July 23, 
1980.  EPA recognized that regulatory agencies and scientists act differently in 
the face of uncertain evidence and considered this difference when drafting the 
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report.  Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances Steven D. 
Jellinek stated that scientists act cautious and avoid drawing conclusions when 
confronted with uncertainty; whereas regulators do not have the luxury of 
withholding decisions until concrete links were established because regulators are 
charged with protecting the public from harm.  He reasoned:  “Given this 
circumstance, the regulator must step into a murky world of imprecision where 
scientists are loathe to tread.”490
                                                 
490 Steven D. Jellinek, “On the Inevitability of Being Wrong,” speech delivered to 
the New York Academy of Sciences Workshop on Management of Assessed Risk 
for Carcinogens, New York, NY (March 17, 1980), 1-3, quote on page 3, Arizona 
Cotton Growers Association Collection, Box 11, Folder 3, Arizona Historical 
Foundation, Hayden Library, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona. 
  The federal agency maintained that even in the 
face of uncertain evidence, certain actions could and should be taken to reduce 
drift exposure.  While recognizing that some states may have to alter certain 
aspects of the advisory opinion, the EPA stated that no pesticides should be 
applied aerially when wind speeds exceeded ten miles per hour or within three-
hundred feet of areas designated as “sensitive.”  Sensitive areas included places in 
which “unprotected people” resided, substantial commercial business operations 
existed, locations where school or church would convene within twenty-four 
hours, and/or there were public parks and highways.  The advisory opinion 
additionally held that individuals located within sensitive areas should be notified 
about pesticide applications in advance so that they might take whatever 
precautionary measures they deem necessary to avoid any unintentional 
 
  188 
exposure.491
Growers viewed the EPA advisory opinion as a significant threat to their 
economic livelihood and reacted with hostility to the draft, marshalling their 
organizational forces in an effort to stop the proposed regulations from being 
adopted.  They quibbled over buffer zone distances and argued that the advance 
notification clause would create an undue burden for pesticide applicators who 
would have great trouble identifying and contacting all of the property owners in 
sensitive areas.
  The Advisory Opinion remained silent on whether or not the 
grower-controlled BPC had an inherent conflict of interest in its regulatory 
responsibilities. 
492  The growers’ associations contacted their Congressmen who in 
turn exerted pressure on EPA in attempt to force them to scrap their advisory 
opinion.  Congressional letters to EPA generally asserted that the agency 
overreacted in issuing the advisory opinion and failed to balance the responsibility 
of protecting the public health with the necessity of preserving cost-effective 
agricultural production.493
                                                 
491 Environmental Protection Agency, “Advisory Opinion Concerning the 
Application of Cotton Insecticides and Defoliants [Draft]” (July 23, 1980), 12-13, 
18-19, Arizona Cotton Growers Association Collection, Box 4, Folder 1, Arizona 
Historical Foundation, Hayden Library, Arizona State University, Tempe, 
Arizona. 
  The Congressional pressure swayed EPA, which 
 
492 William T. Keane to Bill Blackledge, August 4, 1980, Arizona Cotton Growers 
Association Collection, Box 12, Folder 1, Arizona Historical Foundation, Hayden 
Library, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona. 
 
493 Bob Stump to Douglas M. Costle, September 5, 1980, See also letters from 
Eldon Rudd, Thomas J. Foley, and Morris K. Udall to the EPA on behalf of 
growers associations.  Arizona Cotton Growers Association Collection, Box 20, 
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decided to suspend work on the advisory opinion.  EPA reasoned that the 
agricultural/urban interface’s “emotional and polarized climate” would prevent 
the advisory opinion from functioning as an effective “mechanism for giving 
guidance to applicators.”  Though the agency abandoned work on the advisory 
opinion, it predicted the conflict between agricultural chemical users and new 
suburbanites would not diminish as long as suburban development continued to 
intrude on agricultural land.494
Growers also did not think that their defeat of the advisory opinion would 
end the conflict with suburbanites affected by pesticide drift.  A 1979 survey of 
urban Arizonans revealed that less than a quarter of respondents believed that 
Arizona growers were “very careful” when using pesticides, while approximately 
half of all respondents viewed pesticides as a “potential hazard” to themselves and 
their children.
   
495
                                                                                                                                     
Folder 2, Arizona Historical Foundation, Hayden Library, Arizona State 
University, Tempe, Arizona.   
  Agribusiness interests subsequently took a multi-pronged 
approach to address their conflict with suburbanites.  Growers along the Pima 
Road corridor bordering Scottsdale reached a “gentlemen’s agreement” with 
residents.  In effort to avoid rigid state or federal regulation, growers engaged in a 
program of voluntary self-monitoring.  They restricted the use of odoriferous 
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chemicals in sensitive areas and adopted many of the proposed tenets of the 
EPA’s draft advisory opinion.496  BPC tried to quash a proposed public education 
program focused on environmental problems in the agricultural/urban interface, 
because it believed that the series of workshops would create problems for 
agricultural interests.497  The Arizona Cotton Growers Association then employed 
a public relations firm to remind urban Arizonans of the importance of agriculture 
within the state and warn them that pesticide bans would result in lower crop 
yields and higher prices. It assured the public that they had little reason to fear 
pesticide drift, comparing the skill of applicators to legendary mule skinners “who 
could flick a fly off the ear of the lead mule in a 20-mule hitch with his whip, 
without even bothering the animal.”498
                                                 
496 Minutes of the Committee on Law and Rules Board of Pesticide Control, 
October 26, 1984, 3, 4,  RG 72 Board of Pesticide Control, SG Pesticide Control 
Board Minutes 1984/86, Arizona State Library, Archives and Public Records, 
Phoenix, AZ;  Kathleen Stanton and Christia Johnson, “Ills Blamed on Spraying, 
Babbitt Urges Control,” Arizona Republic, October 12, 1984. 
  The multi-pronged approach proved 
effective until a careless application in 1984 reignited suburban fears about 
pesticide drift. 
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New Allies and Old Enmities 
 
Peace along the Pima Road corridor came to an end on October 11, 1984.  
Between five and eight o’clock in the morning, licensed pesticide applicators Gila 
River Industries, Inc. used a helicopter to apply ethyl-methyl parathion, a 
chemical with high acute toxicity, to 2,200 acres of fields bordering Pima Road 
and the Scottsdale Community College campus.499  The parathion spray drifted 
over the roadway coating cars with chemicals and onto the college campus where 
dozens of students and faculty became ill.  Phone calls from individuals suffering 
from nausea, headaches, and other illnesses flooded state health and 
environmental offices.500
                                                 
499 Gila River Industries, Inc. Custom Applicator License No. 68 and Samuel D. 
Radoman Agricultural Aircraft Pilot License No. 2052 and Samuel D. Radoman 
Certified Commercial Applicator Credential No. 9738C Before the State of 
Arizona Board of Pesticide Control, Order No. 8410-11-1 (Arizona State Board of 
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  The incident awakened anger over pesticide drift in 
Scottsdale that had remained latent for over two years.  Scottsdale Mayor Herb 
Drinkwater charged that the applicator displayed an “arrogant disregard” for 
people’s lives and pledged that the City of Scottsdale would not tolerate any 
 
500 Minutes of the Board of Pesticide Control Emergency Meeting and Hearing, 
October 13, 1984, 6, RG 72 Board of Pesticide Control, SG Pesticide Control 
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Phoenix, AZ; Stanton and Johnson, “Ills Blamed on Spraying, Babbitt Urges 
Control.”  
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threat to the health of its residents.501 The governor expressed a similar degree of 
frustration over the “long standing problem” and asserted that “citizens must not 
be expected to suffer illness or anxiety over health risks due to pesticide 
applications.”502  BPC responded by placing Gila River Industries, Inc. and pilot 
Samuel Radoman on probation for one year.503
BPC’s weak disciplinary action in the Gila River Industries case was 
emblematic of the Board’s inadequate response to most pesticide violations.  
While the Board’s responsiveness to complaints improved after the EPA hearings 
in 1979, it still took relatively few disciplinary actions on pesticide violations.
 
504
                                                 
501 Herb Drinkwater to State Pesticide Control Board, [n.d.], RG 72 Board of 
Pesticide Control, SG Pesticide Control Board Minutes 1984/86, Arizona State 
Library, Archives and Public Records, Phoenix, AZ. 
  
The agency rarely pursued potentially serious violations that inspectors reported 
to them, often failing to even review the details of the investigation.  BPC staff 
members investigated an estimated three-hundred complaints annually and 
conducted approximately 1,000 routine inspections every year.  Though 
thousands of investigations took place between May 1979 and March 1983, the 
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Board held only thirty-three hearings on reported infractions.  In those thirty-three 
cases, BPC took disciplinary action eleven times.  The Arizona Office of the 
Auditor General reported that the “Board has been perceived as a weak 
enforcement agency” and that the “criticism comes from many sources, including 
the Federal government, the industry and to some extent Board members 
themselves.”505
Representatives from Arizona Farm Workers and Arizona Farm Workers 
Committee on Pesticides began appearing at Board of Pest Control meetings six 
months prior to the Gila River Industries drift incident.  AFW press secretary Don 
Devereux, AFW organizer Lupe Sánchez, and AFWCP paralegal Karen Kincaid 
urged the Board to support farmworkers in their effort to gain representation on 
the BPC.
  Since threats from elected officials did little to improve the 
Board’s enforcement of pesticide violations, the public shouldered the 
responsibility of improving pesticide regulation in Arizona. 
506  The farmworkers’ organizations felt that the Board of Pesticide 
Control did not properly enforce the law nor sufficiently protect farmworkers’ 
health, because they had regularly been rebuffed.507
                                                 
505 State of Arizona Office of the Auditor General, A Performance Audit of the 
Board of Pesticide Control,  i-ii, 19, 29, 31, quote on page 31. 
  They believed that having a 
representative on the Board would better agency response.  After making little 
 
506 Minutes of the Board of Pesticide Control, April 3, 1984, 1, 2,  RG 72 Board 
of Pesticide Control, SG Pesticide Control Board Minutes 1984/86, Arizona State 
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507 Minutes of the Board of Pesticide Control, April 3, 1984, May 3, 1984, March 
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headway with their requests, AFWCP brought suit against BPC in 1985.  They 
alleged that the Board’s composition denied farmworkers equal protection under 
the law, because farmworkers were the only demographic deemed ineligible for a 
seat on the board.508  BPC allocated ten of its fifteen seats to the various sectors of 
Arizona agribusiness including:  cotton, produce, dairy, alfalfa and feed grains, 
citrus, cattle, agricultural chemical industry, entomologists, pesticide applicators, 
and the Arizona Commission of Agriculture and Horticulture.  An occupational 
health specialist and a representative of Arizona Department of Health Services 
claimed two other spaces.509   Three members of the public filled Board, but a 
clause in the law stated that participating citizens could have no direct or indirect 
connection to agriculture other than as consumers.  This precluded a farmworker 
representative from serving on the Board of Pesticide Control.510
Arizona Farm Workers Committee on Pesticides also alleged that BPC 
failed to fulfill its obligatory duties to protect public health and property.  To 
strengthen their case on this charge, AFWCP enlisted a diverse contingent of 
secondary plaintiffs who had been adversely affected by pesticides. Plaintiff 
Eloisa Lopez’s family became ill after a crop duster violated regulation and 
applied sprays within one hundred feet of her residence.  Connie Selby, an owner 
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and operator of a Montessori school, joined the suit because a crop duster dropped 
chemicals within one hundred feet of the school when it was not supposed to 
come within a quarter mile of the premises.511  The other plaintiffs had all worked 
in the fields applying pesticides to crops.  J.D. Moore and Manuel Gonzales could 
not read English. The men claimed that they had not been warned about the 
chemicals’ dangers or provided protective clothing to reduce exposure to the 
pesticides during application.  Both Moore and Gonzales experienced the 
cumulative debilitating effects of the sprays and could no longer work.  A third 
farmworker Rafael Fernandez also held that he had not received safety 
instructions or protective gear from his employer prior to spraying fields with 
pesticides either.  Because of the lack of training, protective equipment, and 
sanitation facilities in the fields, Fernandez suffered severe injury when a hose on 
the pesticide holding tank broke.512  All of plaintiffs reported their incidents to the 
BPC and in all instances the Board failed to take any disciplinary action.513
AFWCP attorney Nadine Wettstein also tried to recruit a victim of the 
October drift incident in Scottsdale as a plaintiff in the suit.  Arizona Farm 
Workers Committee on Pesticides initially took affront to the degree of attention 
generated by the Scottsdale drift incident, stating: “It is interesting and sad to 
discover that our Gov. [governor] thinks that pesticides can only injure white 
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children in Scottsdale and not brown children in El Mirage and the outlying towns 
in [the] west [valley].”514  The organization’s consternation over the 
disproportionate attention to the affluent suburb, however, did not stop AFWCP 
from working with individuals from the affected areas of Scottsdale.  M-COP 
Chairperson Gustavo Gutierrez recognized the potential strength of coalitions, 
including collaborative efforts between workers and environmentalists.  He 
maintained that “the Rank and Filers [workers] are faced by the same adversaries 
that the Enviormentlist [sic] are facing in this state capital…the same adversaries 
who’s [sic] only concern is big business and the profit system, with no 
consideration for human suffering.”515  Guiteirrez concluded:  “There is only one 
way that we can change the course in which we are going [sic] there has to be a 
strong alliance between the Environmentalist and the Labor movement of this 
state…we have to pull our forces together.”516
  AFWCP did not have the option of forming an alliance with the 
Scottsdale-based grassroots environmental organization PEOPLE though.  The 
  
                                                 
514 Draft letter to editor, October 13, 1984, MCOP Papers, ACC #1990-00402, 
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growers’ “gentlemen’s agreement” to adjust pesticide application practices a few 
years prior served its purpose in alleviating much of the drift problem along the 
Pima Road corridor.  Consequently, PEOPLE disbanded before the October 1984 
spray incident.  Since PEOPLE no longer existed, AFWCP began contacting 
individuals within the community.517  Scottsdale Community College professor 
Pat Brock who suffered headaches, runny nose, and skin irritation when parathion 
seeped through the college’s ventilation system represented the Scottsdale victims 
in the AFWCP lawsuit. Together, the farmworker and suburban plaintiffs pushed 
for the immediate reform of the Board of Pesticide Control or its abolition if 
corrective action could not be taken. 518
The attempt to use the court to force BPC to fulfill its duty to the public 
ended on September 10, 1986 when Judge Thomas O’Toole ruled in favor of the 
defendant, but that was not the end of AFWCP efforts to reform or abolish the 
agency.
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36, Folder 10, Department of Archives and Special Collections, Hayden Library, 
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Papers, ACC #1990-00402, Box 36, Folder 10, Department of Archives and 
Special Collections, Hayden Library, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 
  At the same time AFWCP prepped its lawsuit in 1984, it strategized to 
introduce a pesticide reform bill to the state legislature.  AFWCP coordinator 
Laurie Martinelli recognized that “with all the publicity on pesticides and the 
 
518 “Introduction,” Arizona Farmworkers Committee on Pesticides (AFCP) v. 
Arizona Board of Pesticide Control (ABPC), 15, 16. 
 
519 “Judgment,” Arizona Farmworkers Committee on Pesticides (AFCP) v. 
Arizona Board of Pesticide Control (ABCP), Case No. C535639, Maricopa 
County Superior Court, Phoenix, AZ.  
 
  198 
Governor’s recent response over the Scottsdale spraying, it is time to introduce 
legislation.”520  If legislation failed to pass in 1985, the group planned to 
introduce an initiative in 1986. 521
Winton Dahlstrom, a transplanted Michigander retiree with a history of 
environmental activism, moved to Sun City in 1982.  Dahlstrom soon became 
concerned that Arizona’s drinking water would become as fouled as that in the 
industrialized Rust Belt.
   For the initiative to be successful, AFWCP 
would need to foster partnerships with other organizations, combining resources 
to build public support before the November elections.  Widespread public 
concern about pesticides and groundwater quality made the AFWCP’s task of 
identifying allies easier. 
522  His concerns had merit.  State health officials 
reported that over one hundred wells suffered contamination from the pesticide 
DBCP in 1979, a series of other tests in 1984 revealed that eighteen out of forty-
four sampled wells in the state had high levels of the pesticide EDB, and the 
industrial solvent trichloroethylene (TCE) appeared at dangerous levels in 
Tucson’s water supply.523
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  Dahlstrom also learned the extent to which agricultural 
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and mining interests had successfully blocked environmental legislation in the 
state.524  He shared his fears about diminishing groundwater quality with Arizona 
Common Cause’s board of directors and soon headed up the organization’s water 
quality task force.  Common Cause organizer John Anderson began talking with 
different organizations and members of the public about the need for action in 
1984, communicating developments to Winton Dahlstrom.525
Anderson organized meetings in Tucson and Phoenix to discuss the 
possibility of circumventing the agricultural and mining industry lobbies by 
drafting an initiative which would bring the issue of groundwater protection 
directly before the voters.  In Tucson, he spoke with Sierra Club representatives 
and drafted an outline of the proposed initiative.  A much more diverse group of 
interests showed up at the Phoenix meeting, including representatives from the 
Sierra Club and Audubon Society; Pamela Swift, the founder of the grassroots 
organization Toxic Waste Investigative Group (TWIG); members of the League 
of Women Voters; and Don Devereux and Nadine Wettstein from the Arizona 
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Farm Workers.526  Meeting attendees agreed on several key components to 
include in the initiative in order to better protect the public from the adverse 
effects of industrial and agricultural toxins.  First, they agreed that the emphasis 
would be on Arizona’s groundwater supply, because they figured that “safe 
drinking water” would be a “dynamite rallying cry.”  They also believed that the 
initiative should begin with a “very, very strong statement” of public policy, so 
that the courts would have a clear indicator of intent.  The initiative would ban 
unregulated dumping, encourage source reduction, establish a clear regulatory 
authority within an agency free of industry influence, and put the burden of cost 
on the regulated industries. 527
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  Lastly, the attendees believed that citizens “have 
an inherent right to know the full range of risks they face from exposure to 
hazardous substances so that they can make reasoned decisions and take informed 
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actions to protect their own health and safety.”528  To address this concern, 
attendees agreed to include a “right to know” clause relating to toxic exposure, 
while making it easier for private citizens to bring suits against polluting 
industries for damages suffered. 529
Nadine Wettstein and John Anderson collaborated with David Barron of 
the Center for Law in the Public Interest and Tucson Assistant City Attorney T.J. 
Harrision to draft the initiative over the course of the next year.
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Maricopa County Organizing Project, and others criticized that:  “because of 
legislative inaction this session, the Board of Pesticide Control will continue to 
operate as it has consistently operated in the past -- i.e., with little or no regard for 
the health and safety of either the public at large or those farm workers whose 
 
529 Ibid., 3; John Anderson to Winton Dahlstrom, June 14, 1984.  
 
530 Nadine Wettstein to David Yetman, August 15, 1985, Arizona Common Cause 
Collection, Box 51, Folder 1C, Department of Archives and Special Collections, 
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 
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health is, perhaps, most at risk.”531
The coalition held simultaneous press conferences on September 17, 1985 
to announce the formation of Arizona Clean Water Advocates (ACWA 
pronounced “aqua”) whose singular purpose was to collect 72,637 valid 
signatures before July 3, 1986 in order to get the Water Quality and Pesticide 
Control Initiative on the November ballot.
  The final draft of the initiative transferred the 
regulatory powers of BPC to ADHS, a change that AFW and suburbanites had 
tried to initiate in the past. 
532  This ambitious task required strong 
commitments from all of the participating organizations.  Common Cause, Sierra 
Club, and Arizona Farm Workers arguably made the greatest contribution of 
resources to the project.  Sierra Club representative Alma Williams and Nadine 
Wettstein split coordination duties for the Phoenix press conference, leaving the 
planning of the Tucson conference to John Anderson.  Williams then accepted the 
position of chairperson, while Wettstein assumed the role of budget officer.533
                                                 
531 Arizona Common Cause, Press Release, March 26 1985, Arizona Common 
Cause Collection, Box 51, Folder 3, Department of Archives and Special 
Collections, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 
  
ACWA estimated that they would need $33,800 to fund the campaign.  Common 
 
532 “Water Quality Initiative Coalition Information Sheet”, [n.d.], Arizona 
Common Cause Collection, Box 51, Folder 1B, Department of Archives and 
Special Collections, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ; Nadine Wettstein to 
Arizona Daily Star (draft), December 6, 1985, Arizona Common Cause 
Collection, Box 51, Folder 1, Department of Archives and Special Collections, 
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 
 
533 Minutes of Arizona Clean Water Advocates, August 22, 1985, Arizona 
Common Cause Collection, Box 51, Folder 1B, Department of Archives and 
Special Collections, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 
 
  203 
Cause planned to contribute $10,000 in donation, while the Sierra Club and 
Arizona Farm Workers pledged $4000 and $2000 respectively.534
ACWA continued to discuss pesticide-related issues throughout the 
petition drive, using the inadequacies of the Board of Pesticide Control as a 
primary example of how current regulatory mechanisms failed to properly protect 
the public from the adverse effects of toxins.  ACWA targeted Tucson, Litchfield 
Park, Sun City, and Scottsdale at the start of its campaign.
  ACWA truly 
represented a merging of diverse interests into an effective grassroots coalition.   
535
                                                 
534 “Arizona Clean Water Advocates Budget Proposal,” [n.d.],  Arizona Common 
Cause Collection, Box 51, Folder 1B, Department of Archives and Special 
Collections, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ.  ACWA conducted its 
initiative on a minimal budget, relying heavily on volunteer efforts to accomplish 
the coalition’s goal.  John R. Owens and Larry L. Wade compiled statistics on 
initiative campaign spending in California from 1924 to 1984, converting the 
dollar amount spent to 1972 levels to establish a base equivalency.  An analysis of 
data after the conversion revealed that 116 out of 153 initiative campaigns in the 
state cost more than $100,000.  Thirty-seven cost less than $100,000, a total that 
included twenty initiatives on which no money was spent. 681.  John R. Owens 
and Larry L. Wade, “Campaign Spending on California Ballot Propositions, 
1924-1984: Trends and Voting Effects,” Political Research Quarterly 39, No. 4 
(December 1986): 681. 
  Tucson differed 
slightly from the other cities because its contamination concerns centered on TCE.  
Residents in the other three cities experienced problems related to pesticides.  
Litchfield Park had a high number of agricultural workers; whereas Sun City and 
Scottsdale residents suffered health ailments caused by pesticide drift.  ACWA 
maintained that “the adverse effects [of pesticides] are no longer limited to farm 
workers, but now are spreading to the public at large through drift and, more 
 
535 Minutes of the Arizona Clean Water Advocates, August 12, 1985, Arizona 
Common Cause Collection, Box 51, Folder 1B, Department of Archives and 
Special Collections, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 
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importantly, ground water contamination.”536  This statement inferred that the 
concerns of farmworkers and the public were intimately linked and that the 
maladies suffered by farmworkers were symptomatic of risks to the public at 
large.  It also directly connected the farmworkers’ and suburbanites’ health 
concerns into much broader concerns about safe drinking water, which expanded 
the support base for pesticide reform well beyond the labor camps in the fields 
and the suburban developments along the agricultural/urban interface.537
The growing support for the strongly worded initiative convinced the 
governor to appoint a committee of legislators and interested parties to engage in 
negotiations, in hopes that compromise would yield a mutually acceptable 
legislative bill.  The legislators initially believed that agricultural chemicals were 




                                                 
536 “The Arizona Clean Water and Pesticide Control Act A Citizens’ Initiative: A 
Brief Analysis Prepared by Members of ACWA,” 3, Arizona Common Cause 
Collection, Box 51, Folder 1, Department of Archives and Special Collections, 
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 
  Common Cause, however, insisted that pesticides be addressed in the 
 
537 In 1986, Ninety percent of 565 surveyed persons in Phoenix and Tucson stated 
that they would “sign a voter petition requiring the legislature to pass a strong 
clean water act.” “Clean Water Issue: Special Survey for Central Arizona Labor 
Council,” (Phoenix: Behavior Research Center, Inc., 1986), Arizona Common 
Cause Collection, Box 51, Folder 1B, Department of Archives and Special 
Collections, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ.  
 
538 Meeks, Jr, Arizona Groundwater, 18, 24; David S. Baron, “Arizona’s New 
Environmental Quality Act -- An Overview,” Arizona’s New Environmental 
Quality Act (Phoenix: State Bar of Arizona, 1986), 21. 
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bill, because pesticides and water quality issues were inseparable.539  The 
legislators relented and kept the pesticide component in the draft of the bill with 
both sides making compromises in process.  The bill contained strict pesticide 
regulation clauses and would abolish the Board of Pesticide Control, but it 
divided enforcement responsibility among several different agencies, including 
the Arizona Commission of Agriculture and Horticulture (ACAH).540  ACWA 
found the final bill satisfactory and opted to discontinue work on the initiative in 
May 1986.541
Arizona voters approved the bill by referendum in November 1986, 
passing the Arizona Environmental Quality Act into law.  The sweeping new 
legislation established the Department of Environmental Quality and abolished 
the industry-dominated Water Quality Control Council and Board of Pesticide 
Control.  It distributed BPC’s responsibilities to three different agencies.  ACAH 
took over the licensing of pesticide applicators, the Industrial Commission 
assumed responsibility for overseeing farmworker safety, and the new 
Department of Environmental Quality undertook the task of preventing water 
 
                                                 
539 Nelson Beeman to Governor’s Water Quality Group, January 22, 1986, 
Arizona Common Cause Collection, Box 51, Folder 1B, Department of Archives 
and Special Collections, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 
 
540 Meeks, Jr, Arizona Groundwater, 24; Baron, “Arizona’s New Environmental 
Quality Act -- An Overview,” 19; Nadine K. Wettstein, “Pesticide Control and 
Worker Safety Provisions of the Environmental Quality Act,” Arizona’s New 
Environmental Quality Act (Phoenix: State Bar of Arizona, 1986), 231. 
 
541 Arizona Clean Water Advocates to supporters, [n.d], Arizona Common Cause 
Collection, Box 51, Folder 1, Department of Archives and Special Collections, 
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 
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pollution.542  The act addressed many of the concerns harbored by farmworkers 
and suburbanites.  The law expanded buffer zones and made pesticide drift into 
non-target areas illegal even if the applicator sprayed the chemicals outside of the 
established buffer zone.  It safeguarded whistleblowers and provided farmworkers 
the same health and safety protections as workers in other industries.  
Additionally, the Act required that growers and applicator keep records of 
pesticide use and created avenues for public participation and education.543  It 
also made it easier for citizens to bring suits against polluting industries and the 
state if the state failed to fulfill its regulatory responsibilities.544  This citizen 
oversight provision would theoretically minimize the government inaction that 
had been so endemic to pesticide regulation in the past.  Lastly, the 
Environmental Quality Act directed the ACAH to create an Integrated Pest 
Management program with the intent that such a program would reduce the use of 






                                                 
542 Baron, “Arizona’s New Environmental Quality Act -- An Overview,” 19, 25. 
 
543 Wettstein, “Pesticide Control and Worker Safety Provisions of the 
Environmental Quality Act,” 252-253, 268, 272. 
 
544 Baron, “Arizona’s New Environmental Quality Act -- An Overview,” 23, 25. 
 
545 Wettstein, “Pesticide Control and Worker Safety Provisions of the 
Environmental Quality Act,” 269. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Arizona Environmental Quality Act abolished the grower-controlled 
Board of Pesticide Control and marked the end of fifteen years of intermittent 
conflict over issues related to the application and use of poisonous agricultural 
chemicals.  Its passage into law came as the result of a number of factors.  First 
and foremost, it may be attributed to the hard work of individuals within the 
Arizona Clean Water Advocates and the cooperation of the diverse supporting 
organizations.  Several grassroots organizations attempted to alter the state’s 
pesticide politics in the years between 1971 and 1986, but they found little 
success on their own.  The Board of Pesticide Control stalled when asked to adopt 
new policies, sometimes made minimal concessions to quiet clamor for more 
stringent legislation, and undertook public relations campaigns to win public 
support and counter critics.  The agricultural lobby within the state also exerted 
strong pressure on legislators to protect growers against proposed changes to the 
state’s regulatory structure and law.  Pesticide reform proponents overcame the 
power of the agricultural lobby by identifying likeminded organizations and 
linking their concerns into larger issues of groundwater quality. 
The success of the coalition had much to do with the timing of the 
collaborative efforts.  The influence of Arizona’s agricultural lobby over state 
politics proved to be weaker in 1984 than it was in 1978 or 1971.  During this 
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time, the urban population doubled.546  Most of the growth came as a result of 
migration from other states, which helped diminish the political power of growers 
and their representative organizations.547
To take advantage of the favorable timing, organizations depended upon 
the active work of bridge-builders who built bonds between diverse groups of 
people to form a successful coalition.  The separate engagement of farmworkers 
and suburbanites in pesticide reform efforts in 1971 demonstrates that cooperation 
between the two groups did not occur naturally, despite mutual concern about the 
  Growers recognized the threat posed by 
the shift in political power and actively worked to persuade urban residents of the 
value of agriculture to Arizona.  They also made concessions in a “gentlemen’s 
agreement” to quell suburban discontent in Scottsdale, the most organized of the 
suburban areas in the city.  A drift incident in 1984, though, awakened anger over 
pesticide drift in suburbia and reengaged suburbanites in pesticide politics.  Prior 
to this time, the engagement of suburbanites and farmworkers in pesticide reform 
efforts seldom overlapped. The 1984 drift incident presented AFWCP an 
opportunity to capitalize off the increased public and political interest in 
pesticides and establish new cooperative relationships with other groups 
disaffected by BPC’s lax regulation.  
                                                 
546 Arizona’s urban population grew from 1,408,864 persons in 1970 to 2,278,728 
persons in 1980.  The urban population continued to increase during the 1980s, 
reaching 3,206,973 persons in 1990.  Arizona rural population grew as well, 
though its population increase was far more moderate than that in urban areas.  
U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Population and 
Housing Unit Counts PHC-3-4, Arizona Washington, DC, 2003, 1. 
 
547 Meeks, Jr, Arizona Groundwater, 16. 
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effects of pesticides on human health.  These networks formed as a result of the 
active outreach of organization members, who were often organizers or 
participating professionals.  Attorney Nadine Wettstein first recruited 
suburbanites to serve as secondary plaintiffs in the AFWCP lawsuit against the 
Board of Pesticide Control in 1985.  Later, she helped connect the concerns of 
farmworkers and suburbanites to a growing public concern about groundwater 
quality.  The work of bridge-builders like Wettstein linked the concerns of 
farmworkers, environmentalists, suburbanites, and other members of the public.  
These networks enlarged the base of support for a comprehensive environmental 
law, which resulted in the passage of the Arizona Environmental Quality Act in 
1986.  Similar efforts to pass a comprehensive environmental law took place 
simultaneously and met with fierce resistance from recalcitrant growers and the 
state’s industry-friendly Republican governor. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESISTING ROLLBACKS: PESTICIDE ACTIVISM IN CALIFORNIA,  
1982-1990 
As the cameras cut and lights dimmed at the Convention Center Music 
Hall in Cleveland on October 28, 1980, televisions across the country returned to 
their normally scheduled programming.  Voters, however, continued to mull the 
closing remarks made by Republican challenger Ronald Reagan in the hours and 
days that followed the presidential debate with Jimmy Carter.  Reagan suggested 
that voters ask themselves if they and the nation were better off than four years 
prior and make their decision at the polls based on that answer.  He closed the 
evening with a promise to lead a “crusade…to take government off the backs of 
the great people of this country, and turn you loose” to make America great 
again.548  The remarks resonated with voters and helped break open a race that 
had been close on the eve of the debate.549
                                                 
548 “The Second 1980 Debate:  Part IV,” Debating Our Destiny:  They Second 
1980 Presidential Debate October 28, 1980, 
  Voters turned out in low numbers on 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/debatingourdestiny/80debates/cart4.html (accessed 
October 19, 2010); David S. Broder, “Carter Yields Early in Night,” Washington 
Post, November 5, 1980.  Ronald Reagan did not say the phrase “Let’s Make 
America Great Again” during the televised debate.  That slogan appeared in 
campaign ads leading up to the election.  Ronald Reagan for President 
Committee, “Let’s Make America Great Again,” (1980), 
http://www.hulu.com/watch/40622/historic-campaign-ads-lets-make-america-
great-again-reagan-1980 (accessed October 19, 2010).  Reagan’s closing 
statement in the debate shared the campaign slogan’s tone and message though. 
 
549 Carter entered the convention center with a three point lead over Reagan, but 
polls showed Reagan surging in the final days before the election.  The Gallup 
Poll that reported Carter’s lead before the election had a 4 percent margin of error.  
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November 4, 1980, but the overwhelming majority of those who went to the polls 
cast their ballot for Ronald Reagan.550
Reagan campaigned, in part, on a promise to unfetter business from a 
tangle of federal regulations that he claimed was hampering economic growth.  
He questioned the necessity of the Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration, for instance, holding that the administration served only to harass 
employers and did little to actually reduce injuries in the workplace.
 
551  Reagan 
backtracked a little on his condemnation of OSHA when trying to woo workers in 
economically-depressed areas of Ohio, but contended that the United States must 
“get rid of those thousands of regulations that make it impossible for us to 
compete with” foreign companies.552
                                                                                                                                     
Martin Schram, “Carter Goes Into Debate With Lead in New Poll,” Washington 
Post (October 28, 1980); Broder, “Carter Yields Early in Night.”  
  He also targeted the EPA.  Confusing sulfur 
dioxide with carbon monoxide, Reagan claimed that Mount St. Helens spewed 
more sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere in a single blast than ten years of exhaust 
 
550 Voter apathy in the 1980 election led to the lowest turnout since 1948.  Reagan 
carried the election with 489 of the 538 Electoral College votes, making the 1980 
contest the third largest landslide in the history of presidential elections.  Sean 
Wilentz, The Age of Reagan:  A History 1974-2008 (New York:  Harper 
Perennial, 2008), 124. 
 
551 David S. Broder, “Reagan Makes Pitch to Labor, But First He Changes the 
Key,” Washington Post, October 9, 1980.; Adam Clymer, “Anderson to Conduct 
Poll on Impact of Third Party,” New York Times, April 9, 1980.; Colman 
McCarthy, “Reagan: an Old Political Dog Learns No New Tricks,” Los Angeles 
Times, January 17, 1980.   
 
552 Broder, “Reagan Makes Pitch to Labor, But First He Changes the Key.” 
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from automobiles.553
Reagan proved that his calls for deregulation were not empty campaign 
rhetoric after taking office in January 1981.  Within nine days of being sworn in, 
he ordered a 60-day freeze on hiring and rule-making by federal agencies.
  While his understanding of chemical compounds appeared 
fuddled, Reagan’s message did not.  His campaign rhetoric put proponents of 
protective environmental and labor law on notice that their past gains may be 
rolled back if he assumed office. 
554  
Reagan then appointed advocates of deregulation to lead positions within 
regulatory agencies, slashed agency budgets, and ordered the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission, OSHA, and EPA to reduce their staffs.555
                                                 
553 Joanne Omang, “Reagan Criticizes Clean Air Laws and EPA as Obstacles to 
Growth,” Washington Post, October 9, 1980; “Mr. Reagan v. Nature,” 
Washington Post, October 10, 1980. 
  OSHA, for 
example, had to cut 160 of its 2,786 positions in 1981 alone, which resulted in a 
 
554 Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 140; Peter Behr and Joanne Omang, “Impact of 
Regulation Freeze is Unclear,” Washington Post, January 30, 1981.  A subsequent 
executive order necessitated that regulatory agencies perform a cost-benefit 
analysis of future regulations before implementing them.  Donald T. Critchlow, 
The Conservative Ascendancy:  How the GOP Right Made Political History 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 189. 
 
555 Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendancy, 190; John M. Berry, “Regulatory 
Agencies Targeted,” Washington Post, February 14, 1981;  Peter Behr and Joanne 
Omang, “DOE, FTC, Other Agency Payrolls Slashed,” Washington Post, March 
11, 1981.  Reagan, for example, appointed Anne Gorsuch to head the EPA.  On a 
100-point scale, Gorsuch earned a 33 and an 8 in 1976 and 1977 respectively on a 
Colorado Open Space Council analysis that ranked the environmental 
consciousness of state legislators.  As chair of a state legislative committee, 
Gorsuch helped defeat a proposal in the Colorado legislature that would have 
better regulated toxic wastes within the state.  Joanne Omang, “Denver Lawyer 
Reagan’s Choice to Head EPA,” Washington Post, February 21, 1981.  
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17% decline in workplace inspections.556  The administration also targeted 
existing regulation for review and change in its efforts to create a more favorable 
business climate.557
The actions put environmentalists and unionists alike on the defensive.  
The two movements sometimes looked towards one another for support in their 
efforts to withstand the attack on their past gains.  Speaking before the Industrial 
Union Department of the AFL-CIO in Detroit, former Sierra Club President Joe 
Fontaine sought to “set the record straight” stating:  “Environmentalists often are 
characterized as elitists who care more about birds and animals than 




                                                 
556 Warren Brown, “Administration Takes Muscle Out of Labor,” Washington 
Post, October 28, 1981. 
  After chronicling some of the organization’s past support for 
labor-related issues, Fontaine discussed a new labor-environmental coalition, the 
OSHA/Environmental Network, that produced a report in 1982 titled “Poisons on 
 
557 Peter Behr and Joanne Omang, “White House Targets 27 More Regulations for 
Review,” Washington Post, March 26, 1981.  Historian Sean Wilentz contends 
that Reagan’s deregulation efforts “became an all-out pro-business crusade that 
drew no distinctions between regulations restraining business competition and 
those designed to enforce laws protecting the public’s health and safety.” Wilentz,  
The Age of Reagan, 140. 
 
558 Joe Fontaine, “Speech to Industrial Union Department of the AFL/CIO” 
(speech, Detroit, Michigan, October 26, 1982), 1, Sierra Club Members Papers 
Collection, Carton 80, Folder 1, The Bancroft Library, University of California, 
Berkeley, Berkeley, CA. 
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the Job:  The Reagan Administration and American Workers.”559  The report 
charged that the Reagan Administration jeopardized the health of millions of 
workers by weakening protections for workers, refusing to set new standards or 
strengthen existing ones, and restricting public access to information.560  Fontaine 
noted that the political candidates supported by the Sierra Club were the same as 
those supported by unions in 90% of elections, asserting that “it is up to groups 
like ours to put humanity and compassion back into government.”561
The conservative turn that confronted unions and environmental groups in 
American political life stretched beyond Ronald Reagan.  Republicans picked up 
 
                                                 
559 Fontaine co-chaired the coalition with Howard Samuel of the AFL-CIO 
Industrial Union Department.  Ibid.  
 
560 Sierra Club, “Poisons on the Job:  The Reagan Administration and American 
Workers,” press release, Sierra Club Members Papers Collection, Carton 80, 
Folder 1, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA. 
 
561 Fontaine, “Speech to Industrial Union Department of the AFL/CIO,” 2, 4.  
Quote on page 4.  While many unions disapproved of Reagan and agenda, the 
Teamsters, National Maritime Union of America, and  Professional Air Traffic 
Controllers Organization endorsed Reagan before the election.  “Teamsters 
Leaders Endorse Reagan,” Washington Post, October 9, 1980; Bill Prochnau, 
“Reagan Endorsement Flouts Union Chief,” Washington Post, October 11, 1980; 
Mike Causey, “The Federal Diary: Unions Expect Reagan to Make Life Tough,” 
Washington Post, Novermber 9, 1980.  Reagan also made inroads with the blue-
collar ethnic vote, who sought a change in leadership in the midst of an economic 
downtown.  Broder, “Carter Yields Early in Night.”  Nevertheless many unions 
recognized the threat that Reagan’s presidency posed to their wellbeing before the 
administration started its deregulation efforts and warned members against voting 
for him.  “AFL-CIO Chief Says Labor Won’t Hide From Republicans,” 
Washington Post, November 9, 1980; Causey, “The Federal Diary.”; Wilentz, The 
Age of Reagan, 143. 
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twelve Senate seats, claiming a majority for the first time in a quarter century.562  
A significant number of seats in the House of Representatives went to 
Republicans as well, though Democrats managed to hold their numerical 
advantage.563  Conservatives also rose to power in some state-level contests in the 
years immediately following the Reagan victory.  In California, Republican 
gubernatorial candidate George Deukmejian defeated Democrat Tom Bradley 
with a campaign in 1982 that reprised the rhetoric of Reagan on regulatory and 
economic issues.564
Governor Deukmejian committed himself to weakening California’s 
regulatory structure in similar fashion to Reagan on the national level and 
encountered like opposition from unions and environmental organizations.  Both 
farmworker organizations and environmentalists opposed Deukmejian’s 
deregulation efforts.  The groups defended existing regulatory agencies and law 
from attack by the Deukmejian administration and supported initiatives to better 
protect public health with stronger regulatory law.  The groups worked towards 
common ends, supported like legislative initiatives, and showed support for one 
another’s efforts.  Environmentalists and United Farm Workers, however, 
typically conducted campaigns separately from one another, because their 
strategies to effect change and focus of their efforts varied to some degree.   
 
                                                 
562 David S. Broder, “A Sharp Right Turn:  Republicans and Democrats Alike See 
New Era in ’80 Returns,” Washington Post, November 6, 1980. 
 
563 Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 124, 125. 
 
564 Pincetl, Transforming California, 240. 
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Fault Lines 
 
 George Deukmejian maintained that the state could not “build prosperity 
by shackling those who create it.” 565  He promised to “start with a thorough 
housecleaning of state government” and pledged to eliminate those regulations, 
agencies, commissions, and boards that his administration judged to have costs 
outweighing benefits.566  He also spoke directly to issues of agriculture and 
pesticide regulation, stating:  “When you get right down to it, the biggest pests in 
agriculture today aren’t the bugs that eat crops, but the bureaucrats who smother 
productivity beneath a blanket of cumbersome regulations.”567
 Growers thought that both candidates, Tom Bradley and George 
Deukmejian, would represent their interests better than the outgoing governor 
  Growers, hence, 
had reason to be hopeful that the 1982 gubernatorial election would provide a 
relief to regulatory oversight. 
                                                 
565 George Deukmejian,[no title] (speech, United Way Center of Santa Clara 
County, CA, September 8, 1982), Environmental Affairs Agency Collection 
R284, Box 5, Folder 16, California State Archives, Sacramento, CA. 
 
566 George Deukmejian,[no title] (speech, California Republican Party 
Convention, San Diego, CA, September 18, 1982), Environmental Affairs Agency 
Collection R284, Box 5, Folder 16, California State Archives, Sacramento, CA; 
George Deukmejian,[no title] (speech, United Way Center of Santa Clara County, 
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California Cities, [no place info], September 8, 1982), “Environmental Affairs 
Discussion,” January 24, 1983, Environmental Affairs Agency Collection R284, 
Box 5, Folder 16, California State Archives, Sacramento, CA. 
 
567 George Deukmejian, [no title] (speech, Annual Convention of Agricultural 
Leadership Associates, Sacramento, CA, February 10, 1982), Environmental 
Affairs Agency Collection R284, Box 5, Folder 16, California State Archives, 
Sacramento, CA. 
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Edmund Brown, Jr., but they favored Deukmejian more.  Governor Brown had 
presided over the appointment of a pro-labor majority to the Agricultural Labor 
Relations Board (ALRB), vetoed bills that would have restricted the tactics 
employed by farmworkers’ unions, and passed more restrictive pesticide 
legislation into law.568  Bradley promised to make the ALRB fair and balanced.569  
Deukmejian clearly leaned towards growers’ interests, characterizing Chavez and 
the UFW as agitators who “harassed and threatened” farmworkers into joining the 
union and “vandalized” growers’ properties.570  Deukmejian stressed that growers 
would have a “friend in the Governor’s office--not an adversary” if he won the 
election.571
                                                 
568 Keith Love, “Agriculture Ranks as No. 1 Industry:  State Farmers Cultivate 
Clout at Capitol,” Los Angeles Times, May 5, 1982. 
  Growers and their representative associations responded to 
Deukmejian’s assurances, enriching his campaign coffers with contributions that 
 
569 The UFW viewed the statement with trepidation and withheld their 
endorsement in the election, yet few expected Bradley to appoint board members 
who were anti-union.  Harry Bernstein, “Growers Eager for New Face in 
Sacramento,” Los Angeles Times, September 20, 1982. 
 
570 Nancy Skelton, “George Deukmejian as Candidate:  A Cautious Man Counters 
a Dull Image,” Los Angeles Times, October 18, 1982. 
 
571 George Deukmejian, [no title] (speech, Annual Convention of Agricultural 
Leadership Associates, Sacramento, CA, February 10, 1982). 
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totaled between $750,000 and $1,000,000.572  This accounted for approximately 
20 percent of the total funds that Deukmejian spent on his 1982 campaign.573
 After winning a close election, Deukmejian kept his campaign promise to 
growers by changing the character of the state’s Agricultural Labor Relations 
Board.  He appointed David Stirling, who had supported a number of grower-
backed bills as a legislator, as the ALRB’s general counsel.  The general counsel 
played the role of gatekeeper, deciding which cases would be heard by the 
Board.
 
574  Accusations from ALRB executive staff members Luis Lopez and John 
Moore claimed Stirling tried to wield even greater control over the agency’s 
actions by forcing them to alter judgments and sign documents falsely stating that 
they supported the decisions.575
                                                 
572 “California Farmworkers:  Back to the Barricades?” Businessweek, September 
26, 1983, 86. 
  Several Board members complained of “being 
punished for our efforts to carry out the law since such efforts are seen as signs of 
‘philosophical differences’,” adding that they expected to face “punitive action for 
 
573 Deukmejian spent a total of 4,972,389 dollars on his gubernatorial campaign in 
1982.  Mark Baldassare, Bruce E. Cain, D.E. Apollonio, and Jonathan Cohen, The 
Season of Our Discontent: Voters’ Views on California Elections (San Francisco: 
Public Policy Institute of California, 2004), 8, 
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_1004MBR.pdf (accessed March 27, 
2011). 
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Angeles Times, January 26, 1983; Harry Bernstein, “Dispute Grows in Farm 
Labor Board Ranks,” Los Angeles Times, February 22, 1983.  
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Angeles Times, March 28, 1983. 
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disloyalty” if they continued to perform their jobs in the way proscribed by the 
Agricultural Labor Relations Act.576  When ALRB members moved to curb 
Stirling’s power, Deukmejian forced the Board to back down with a threat to 
eliminate the agency’s budget.577  Deukmejian still slashed the Board’s funding 
by 27 percent in the month following, reducing its budget $2.6 million.  He 
reasoned that the financial constraints could be overcome by developing “new 
efficiencies” and modifying policies and procedures.578  Deukmejian later 
appointed John P. McCarthy, a former agribusiness executive, to ALRB and 
named Jyrl Ann James-Massengale, an attorney who represented growers when 
she worked for one of largest labor law firms in the United States, as the new 
chairwoman of the ALRB in July 1984.579
                                                 
576 Internal letter to the members of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board 
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 The appointment of Stirling and the ALRB budget reduction greatly 
reduced the speed with which farmworkers’ grievances were heard, leading to an 
immense backlog of cases.  The Board suffered the loss of fifty positions in 1983, 
which contributed to a rise in the number of uninvestigated cases from 496 in 
December 1982 to 1,091 in the following year. 580  Stirling failed to match his 
predecessor’s speed in handling cases, increasing the average time for processing 
cases from 31 to 51 days.581  Consequently, ALRB heard less than half the cases 
in the first six months of the 1983-84 fiscal year than it did the year prior.582  
Several ALRB staff members concluded that “every day that law [ALRA] is 
being chipped away by an insensitive administration that has proven its 
unwillingness to enforce the law.”583
 The attacks on the Agricultural Labor Relations Board raised challenges 
for the United Farm Workers, which emerged from the 1970s as a lesser 
organization than it was in the decade prior.  After the passage of the Agricultural 
Labor Relations Act in 1975, the union went through an intense period of internal 
conflict that cost it most of its veteran staffers.  The growth of the union with new 
members and contracts in the mid-1970s expanded the UFW’s responsibilities and 
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raised unanticipated organizational problems.  Chavez wanted to institute a 
rational and efficient method of operation that would maximize the use of 
available resources and keep the union focused on prioritized objectives.584  He 
stressed that the development of managerial structures would not favor the 
“suppression of different and dissenting points of view” over choice and open 
discussion, but that is precisely what happened.585
In addition to centralizing control, he required staffers to play the Synanon 
Game, an activity in which participants vented their personal frustrations in a 
supposedly neutral forum.  Advocates of the game maintained that the public 
airing of grievances ultimately improved group communication by the forestalling 
the growth of latent hostilities within the organization that would poison 
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relationships between staffers if left unaddressed.586  The exercise did not work so 
well in practice though.  After the game was incorporated into union affairs, 
Marshall Ganz claims that “Chavez transformed UFW deliberations into a 
controlled, exclusive, and judgmental process in which one’s loyalty was 
constantly on the line.”587  Chavez drove several staffers out of the organization, 
feeling that disagreement with his planning or union practices equated to 
conspiracy against the organization.  Other veteran organizers and attorneys quit 
on their own accord, disheartened with the organizational turn that Chavez and 
the union had taken.  Hence, UFW entered the 1980s as a more autocratic 
organization, lacking many of the creative minds that were critical to the union’s 
early success.588
 Though the character and structure of the union varied from its previous 
form, Chavez still believed in the power of the boycott.  When he determined that 
Deukmejian’s depredatory actions against ALRB rendered the agency ineffective, 
he turned again to the strategy that yielded gains in the past.  The union could not 
  
                                                 
586 Charles Dederich, a recovering alcoholic, founded the drug rehabilitation 
facility Synanon and developed the Game as part of the treatment strategy for 
participants.  David Rosenzweig, “Union Leader Uses Synanon ‘Game’ Regularly 
at Headquarters,” Los Angeles Times, December 29, 1978.; Miriam Pawal, The 
Union of Their Dreams:  Power, Hope, and Struggle in Cesar Chavez’s Farm 
Worker Movement (New York:  Bloomsbury Press, 2009), 203. 
 
587 Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 245.  For more on the game and the 
deterioration of internal relations within the UFW, see Pawal, The Union of Their 
Dreams. 
 
588 Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 245-247; Robert Lindsey, “Glory Days are 
Fading for Chavez and U.F.W.,” New York Times, December 23, 1984. 
 
  223 
call a consumer boycott on the Agricultural Labor Relations Board though, so he 
chose to target grapes once again in July 1984.  Chavez chose to focus the boycott 
on grapes for symbolism, in hopes that the memory of the storied UFW campaign 
would spark public participation in the current one.589  It framed the action as an 
effort to “guarantee free election and good faith bargaining.”590  The union held 
that consumer participation in the campaign would put economic pressure on 
growers until they were forced to ask their political ally Deukmejian to reverse his 
course on the ALRB.591
The loss of so many veteran organizers likely contributed to Chavez’s 
decision to ply a different tact to build support for the new boycott.  Rather than 
rely on the footwork of organizers centered in select cities in the United States 
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He believed that at least eight million people would support the UFW effort if the 
union could “find them” and estimated that three million would be sufficient for 
the boycott to be a success.593  The UFW targeted other labor unions, religious 
organizations, African-Americans, and Hispanics in their mail campaign.  It also 
identified progressives as potential supporters of the boycott.  It grouped peace 
activists, gays and lesbians, students, welfare rights proponents, animal rights 
supporters, and environmentalists under the umbrella term.594  The UFW then 
crafted different solicitations to appeal to the divergent interests of the targeted 
groups.595
Public support for the new grape boycott, however, did not develop as 
predicted.  Some traditional allies, such as the Catholic Church and National 
Council of Churches, proved slow to endorse the boycott and grape sales figures 
showed little sign of decline months after the start of the campaign.
 
596
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critics dismissed the boycott, charging that Chavez primarily initiated the effort to 
attack a conservative governor and maintained that it would do little to help 
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farmworkers in the field.597  Others felt that UFW lacked the public appeal of 
earlier years, because it had lost its sympathetic underdog character when the 
Agricultural Labor Relations Act put the union on more equal footing with 
growers.598  Former UFW attorney Jerry Cohen questioned Chavez’s reliance on 
direct marketing, asserting that “junk mail does not organize people, people 
organize people.”599 Ex-organizer Marshall Ganz similarly blamed the change in 
tactics for the boycott’s lack of success, arguing that mass mailings lacked the 
persuasive appeal of committed activists on the streets.600  Whether it was one of 
these reasons or a combination of factors, Chavez still lacked widespread support 
for the UFW cause as the boycott entered its twelfth month.601
UFW did not address the issue of pesticides in the early phase of the 
boycott, though Chavez recognized that the union would likely need to reengage 
the issue at a future date.  He kept abreast of developing pesticide issues and other 
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organizations’ reform efforts.602  When contemplating UFW slogans in 1983, 
Chavez considered adopting “Our mission is safe food” and “Our mission is to be 
a watchdog for clean food and good working conditions” before opting for the 
simple generalized statement, “Our mission is food.”603  He also believed that the 
UFW should “set up a single issue political action committee on water [and] 
pesticides.”604 National Farm Worker Health Group Medical Director Marion 
Moses, formerly of the UFW, remained closely allied with the union and handled 
the task of organizing a pesticide advisory committee for Chavez.  By October 
1985, Moses had enlisted the support of four experts, including the former chief 
of the California Department of Health Services’ Epidemiology Studies Section, 
to advise the union.605
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issues into the new boycott during the first year of the campaign.606
 
  Incidents in 
1985, though, heightened public fears about pesticide risks and presented an 
opportunity for the union to reengage the issue, revive a boycott whose public 
support was flagging, and forge bridges again to the environmental community. 
Varied Responses to Common Concerns 
 
Dozens of people complaining of tremors, cramps, and intense vomiting 
checked into hospital emergency rooms across California, Oregon, and 
Washington on July 4, 1985.  The number of afflicted individuals who sought 
treatment for the symptoms climbed to more than 1,100, stretching across five 
states and into Canada.607
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stores.608  California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) destroyed 
thousands of tons of harvested watermelons, making no distinction between the 
contaminated and uncontaminated fruit.609  A CDFA investigation traced the 
contamination to forty growers who willfully violated state pesticide law by 
illegally applying the restricted pesticide aldicarb to their crop.610   In an attempt 
to control the incident and restore buyers’ confidence, the agency required 
growers to test their fields for illegal pesticide residues before harvesting any 
more of their crop.611  Still, consumer wariness about pesticide residues 
remained.612
Concerns about the long-term health effects of pesticide exposure also 
grew.  A 1982 study by the state health department showed increases of stomach 
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cancer and leukemia in Fresno County communities with detectable amounts of 
DBCP in their water supply, though no follow-up studies were done to establish a 
causal relationship between the chemical and the cancers.613  The California State 
Water Resources Control Board (CSWRCB) then released a report in 1984 that 
summarized five years of tests conducted on the state’s water resources.  It stated 
that California water showed increasing evidence of contamination from the direct 
discharge of pesticides, runoff from irrigation, over-spraying, and drift from the 
aerial application of chemicals.614  Groundwater contamination affected twenty-
eight of the fifty-eight counties in California.  Kern County, for example, had 153 
wells that showed evidence of pesticide contamination.  Following release of the 
report, the State Water Resources Control Board responded by closing more than 
100 wells in the Central Valley.  A number of others remained open with the 
understanding that water would only be drawn from them on an emergency 
basis.615
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CSWRCB report author David B. Cohen maintained that the ability of 
scientists “to detect and quantify a growing list of organic chemicals in 
groundwater outstrips our ability to interpret the toxicological significance of 
these findings,” which prolonged scientific uncertainty about the long-term effects 
of contamination.616  He asserted that the difficulty of establishing a causal link 
between pesticides and chronic diseases, like cancer, did not mean that no link 
existed.617  Cohen’s intimations that water contamination from pesticides may 
have unforeseen health consequences coincided with the discovery of abnormally 
high incidents of childhood cancer in the agricultural town of McFarland.  The 
rise in the number of pediatric cancers in McFarland raised concerns among some 
people that pesticides were putting human health at risk.618
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McFarland mother Connie Rosales thought something afoul when six 
neighborhood children, her son included, living within six blocks of each other 
contracted cancer within a relatively short timeframe.619  More cancers followed.  
Doctors diagnosed eleven children with different forms of cancer in the small 
town of 6,400 between 1981 and 1984.620  Statistically, communities the size of 
McFarland should average three childhood cancers per ten-year period.  
McFarland’s cancer incidence rate, therefore, was nearly quadruple this national 
average in a third of the time.621  The Kern County Health Department undertook 
an investigation under increasing pressure from parents, but controversy swirled 
around the department’s efforts with critics charging that the studies were 
underfunded, understaffed, and negligent in their failure to explore potentially 
fruitful sources of information.622
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concluded its investigation without checking the records of the water company 
that serviced McFarland during the period of suspected contamination.  It did not 
look over pesticide records to try to ascertain crop-dusting practices near the town 
nor did it examine past conditions in the vicinity of a chemical warehouse near 
several of the victims’ homes.623
As these incidents sparked renewed public concern about pesticides and 
health, Deukmejian moved to limit the public’s ability to affect pesticide policy 
and blocked attempts to strengthen the state’s pesticide regulations.  Deukmejian 
worked with Republican and rural Democratic legislators to pass a grower-backed 
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McFarland, 8, 27. Quote on page 27.  
  The legislation relieved the state of its responsibility for completing 
an environmental impact report before beginning a pesticide spray campaign.  It 
also precluded public health concerns from being considered by the courts if a 
lawsuit was filed to stop a state-sponsored spray program, even if the spraying 
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was planned near a densely populated area.625  Deukmejian then vetoed 
legislation, backed by California Rural Legal Assistance and sponsored by 
Democratic Senator Nicholas Petris, offering greater protection to farmworkers.  
The vetoed law required growers to post warning signs around fields within 
twenty-four hours of spraying Class 1 pesticides, the most toxic agricultural 
chemicals, or within forty-eight hours of using pesticides of lesser toxicity.626
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The governor also twice vetoed bills that would have expanded the collection of 
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of the state’s population.  Less populated agricultural counties lacked the 
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resources necessary to establish cancer registries, which arguably would have 
proved valuable in the investigation of cancer clusters in agricultural areas.627
Environmental organizations joined groups representing farmworkers to 
oppose attacks on state law governing pesticide use, push for better monitoring 
and enforcement of pesticide law, and lobby for stiffer penalties for parties who 
broke the law.  The Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 
and California Rural Legal Assistance partnered with eight other organizations in 
1983 to counter bills that “threatened to severely weaken existing pesticide 
protection standards for public health and environment.”
 
628  These groups tried to 
defeat the bill that limited the public’s ability to use the courts as a means of 
halting a planned or ongoing spray campaign, arguing that it would impinge upon 
citizens’ right to challenge pesticide use that had the potential to adversely affect 
their health and neighborhoods.629
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Garland criticized Deukmejian’s decision to veto the legislation requiring growers 
to promptly place warning signs along field perimeters after applying pesticides.  
He maintained that the veto effectively “tied the hands of epidemiologists” 
seeking to understand the effects of pesticides on human health, stating that “you 
can’t do studies unless you know what workers were exposed to and workers 
cannot know what they’re exposed to unless there are signs.”630  Sierra Club, 
NRDC, Environmental Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth, Citizens for a Better 
Environment, CRLA, California Agrarian Action Project, and the Coalition for 
Occupational and Environmental Health Hazards also pushed Deukmejian to 
investigate the watermelon poisoning incident in 1985, test groundwater for purity 
in Kern County where McFarland sat, investigate the pesticide regulatory 
program in Kern County, and impose stiffer penalties on people who misused 
agricultural chemicals.631
Environmental groups, California Labor Federation, and Agricultural 
Workers Health Center also supported Democratic Assemblyman Lloyd 
Connolly’s successful attempt to pass a bill to address the contamination of 
groundwater by pesticides in California.
 
632
                                                                                                                                     
as promised.  Opponents then lacked enough votes to rescind the legislation.  
Wolinsky, “Plan to Curb Pesticide Challenges Revived.”  
 Connelly believed that the state 
 
630 Petrillo, “County Farm Workers to Get Funds to Improve Housing.” 
 
631 “Duke Urged to Seek Poison-Melon Probe,” Sacramento Bee, July 25, 1985. 
 
632 California Assembly Committee on Agriculture, AB 2021 (Connelly) Hearing, 
May 14, 1985, 5, Assembly Agriculture Committee Collection, LP254:208, 
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needed to address data gaps on the ability of certain pesticides to move through 
soil and into groundwater reservoirs, so that it could come up with a regulatory 
solution to protect groundwater reserves.  He also took issue with the lack of 
available information on the health effects of many of the pesticides used by 
growers in the state.  A report released by the California Assembly of Research 
entitled “The Leaching Fields: A Nonpoint Threat to Groundwater” held that only 
eight of the forty top priority pesticides identified by the Department of Health 
Services had a complete set of health and safety studies, and only two of those 
had the information necessary to calculate a pesticide’s ability to percolate 
through soil to groundwater basins.633  His bill, the Pesticide Contamination 
Prevention Act, required pesticide registrants to provide information on the 
environmental fate of chemicals and charged the Department of Food and 
Agriculture with the task of establishing a soil and groundwater monitoring 
program.634
                                                                                                                                     
Folder Bill Files, AB1890-2047, 1985-86, California State Archives, Sacramento, 
CA. 
  Natural Resources Defense Council lodged its support, stating that 
the bill would make the important shift to preventative action from response that 
 
633 Connelly, “‘Leaching Fields’ Report Reveals Pesticide Threat to State’s 
Groundwater.” 
 
634 Registrants had to submit data on a chemical’s solubility, vapor pressure, soil 
absorption, and susceptibility to breakdown by water, sunlight and 
microorganisms.  California State Assembly, “Concurrence in Senate 
Amendments: AB 1511 (Connelly),” (September 10, 1985),  2, Assembly 
Agriculture Committee Collection, LP254:208, Folder Bill Files, AB1890-2047, 
1985-86, California State Archives, Sacramento, CA.  
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is “remedial and reactive.”635  The Sierra Club similarly urged the California 
Senate to pass the Pesticide Contamination Prevention Act and encouraged club 
members to write letters of support as private citizens.636
UFW also readdressed pesticide issues in 1985 by incorporating pesticide-
related demands into the ongoing grape boycott.  At a news conference with 
Marion Moses in September 1985, Chavez stated that watermelons with excessive 
aldicarb residues were only “the tip of the iceberg,” adding that no one knew the 
effects that pesticides would have on human health after ten to twenty years of 
exposure.
 
637 He held that five chemicals used on grapes--Parathion, Phosdrin, 
Methyl Bromide, Dinoseb, and Captan--were more dangerous than the aldicarb 
and should be banned.638
                                                 
635 Lawrie Mott to Assemblyman Norman Waters, May 10, 1985, Assembly 
Agriculture Committee Collection, LP254:208, Folder Bill Files, AB1890-2047, 
1985-86, California State Archives, Sacramento, CA.   
  In an effort to draw a link to the ongoing campaign, 
Chavez reasoned that growers interpreted “the Deukmejian Adminstration’s 
 
636 Michael Paparian to Norman Waters, May 13, 1985, Assembly Agriculture 
Committee Collection, LP254:208, Folder Bill Files, AB1890-2047, 1985-86, 
California State Archives, Sacramento, CA; Sierra Club Legislative Office, 
“Pesticides Threaten Groundwater:  Your Help Needed,” , Sierra Club California 
Legislative Office Records Collection, Box 7, Folder 5, The Bancroft Library, 
University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA.  Some of the other 
organizations supporting the Pesticide Contamination Prevention Act included:  
Environmental Defense Fund, California Agrarian Action Project, California 
Food Policy Coalition, California League of Conservation Voters, Citizens for a 
Better Environment, and the American Cancer Society.  California Assembly 
Committee on Agriculture, AB 2021 (Connelly) Hearing, 5. 
 
637 “Grape Pesticides Worse Than Watermelons,” Food and Justice 2, No. 4 
(September 1985): 7. 
 
638 Ibid., 6. 
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cavalier attitude toward the Agricultural Labor Relations Act as a signal to ignore 
other laws, particularly those governing the regulation of the thousands of 
pesticides sprayed each year on California fields.”639
Marches from the towns of Earlimart, McFarland, and Richgrove to 
Delano in September commemorated the twentieth anniversary of the beginning 
of the Delano grape strike, though the union’s focus was as much on pesticides as 
it was on remembrance of the catalyst of the farmworkers’ movement. 
Participants carried small black flags bearing a single skull, while a banner in the 
front of the procession bore three skulls with the bilingual slogan “La Desgracia 
de los Pesticidas/The Scourge of Pesticides.”
   
 640
                                                 
639 Cesar Chavez, “Deterioration of Farm Law Led UFW Back to Boycott,” Los 
Angeles Times, January 10, 1986.  At the September 1985 press conference, 
Chavez asserted that grape growers illegally applied restricted pesticides to their 
crops in a manner similar to the watermelon growers who unlawfully applied 
aldicarb to their fields.  To back his claim, he referenced a June 1985 incident 
involving A. Caratan, Inc. in which the vineyard had to be quarantined after 
residues of the unregistered pesticide Orthene were found.  “Grape Pesticides 
Worse Than Watermelons,” 6.  
 At the rally following the march, 
Chavez referenced pesticide-related injuries and illness suffered by farmworkers, 
chastising growers for the “decades of abuse and damage they have brought upon 
 
640 Local police estimated that 300 marchers participated, while UFW figured the 
crowd to number in the thousands.  “Farm Workers March Against Pesticides on 
Boycott Anniversary,” San Jose Mercury News, September 8, 1985; “’65 Delano 
Strike Observed: Farm Workers Protest Pesticide Peril,” Food and Justice 2, No. 
5 (October 1985): 3, cover.  The actual number of participants probably fell 
somewhere between the two estimations, since photos of the rally appear to show 
crowd densities that exceed the low number put forth by local police.  
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the land.”641  He then returned to a theme that resonated with the public in 1969, 
stating that the union was committed to “protecting farm workers--and 
consumers--from systematic poisoning” by growers’ “reckless use” of 
pesticides.642  He warned consumers that “corporate growers…glory in their 
[consumer] complacency,” holding that people had been conditioned “to accept 
the idea that something is wrong with the food they buy.”643  Chavez maintained 
that consumer participation in the boycott would help protect both farmworkers 
and consumers from the adverse effects of pesticides.  He concluded with the 
assertion that “there is nothing more important that we [UFW] share in common 
with the consumers of America than the safety of the nation’s food supply which 
we both depend upon.”644
UFW recognized the opportunity for increasing public support for the 
boycott with the switch in emphasis to pesticides.  The union suspected that recent 
incidents of pesticide poisoning, coupled with the increased number of childhood 
  With that, the UFW switched the focus of the grape 
boycott to pesticides, announcing a new campaign shortly thereafter to bring 
attention to the health hazards that pesticides and pesticide residues posed to 
consumers and farmworkers alike. 
                                                 
641 Cesar Chavez, “Delano Speech-Pesticide March,” (speech, Delano, California, 
September 8, 1985), 5, UFW New York Boycott (unprocessed, 06/01), Box 1, 
Folder [no title, blue 3-ring binder], Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne 
State University, Detroit, MI. 
 
642 Ibid., 6. 
 
643 Ibid., 7,8. 
 
644 Ibid., 9.  
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cancers and birth defects in the heart of California’s agricultural region would 
raise public concern about pesticides.  Recent revelations about the extensiveness 
of water contamination similarly promised to make the public more receptive to 
UFW calls for constraints on some pesticide use.  These developments occurred 
in the midst of a growing “political debate on toxics [that] has raised the 
consciousness of the consumer” and convinced an increasing number of people 
that some form of corrective action was needed.645
Making obvious reference to the Steinbeck classic, UFW introduced its 
“Wrath of Grapes” campaign in January 1986.
 
646  As he had in his September 
speech, Chavez attempted to connect the concerns of farmworkers to consumers.  
He said:  “The Wrath of Grapes’ symbolizes the killing, maiming and poisoning 
of thousands of farmworkers--and their children--through the reckless use of 
deadly poisons in agriculture…[and] also represents the threats posed to 
consumers by pesticide residues contained on fresh grapes and other produce.”647
                                                 
645 United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Mid-Atlantic Grape Boycott, 
“Wrath of Grapes Video and Film Marketing Plan,” January 10, 1987, UFW New 
York Boycott (unprocessed, Acc. Date 06/01), Box 5, Folder Wrath of Grapes 
Mktg Plan (1987), Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, 
Detroit, MI. 
  
UFW reiterated that the boycott had the power to protect farmworkers and the 
 
646 “Wrath of Grapes Campaign to Counter Grape Growers’ Natural Snack 
Theme,” Food and Justice 3, No. 2 (February/March 1986): 3; “‘The Wrath of 
Grapes’--The Tragedy of Pesticide Poisoning,” Food and Justice 3, No. 2 
(February/ March 1986): 4; Chavez, “Deterioration of Farm Law Led UFW Back 
to Boycott.”  
 
647 “‘The Wrath of Grapes’--The Tragedy of Pesticide Poisoning,” 6. 
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public from pesticides by forcing growers to alter practices and curb pesticide use.  
The union held that growers should begin by banning Parathion, Phosdrin, Methyl 
Bromide, Dinoseb, and Captan.648
 UFW then released a sixteen-minute video in the first half of 1986, which 
like the larger campaign, bore the name The Wrath of Grapes.  The film opened 
with ominous music, the whirring of helicopter blades, and the silhouette of a 
helicopter dropping pesticides on the fields.  The scene is cut with clips of 
distraught mothers whose children suffered health problems suspected of being 
caused by pesticides.  Chavez then charged:  “We’re declaring war, war on the 
pesticides that are poisoning and killing our people.”
 
649
I’m very angry.  I’m angry that something like this 
could go on around you in your environment and 
when you think you’re safe.  What we’re dealing 
  The film focused heavily 
on the town of McFarland and the spate of cancers and birth defects that afflicted 
some of the town’s children.  Connie Rosales, whose son Randy suffered from 
lymphatic cancer, numbered among the McFarland mothers who spoke on camera 
about the town’s cancer cluster.  She said: 
                                                 
648 “‘The Wrath of Grapes’--The Tragedy of Pesticide Poisoning,” 4. 
 
649 The Wrath of Grapes, VHS, narrated by Mike Farrell, produced by Lorena 
Parlee and Lenny Bourin, United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 
production of Volunteer Staff of UFWofA, 1986; Tompkins, “Cancer Valley, 
California,” 283.  UFW reported that it had distributed over 60,000 copies of the 
film by December 1987 and that more than a million people in the United States, 
Canada, and Western Europe had watched it.  United Farm Workers, “There Will 
Be No ‘Silent Spring’ as Farm Workers’ Attack on Pesticides Intensifies,” March 
1988, UFW New York Boycott (unprocessed, Acc. Date 06/01), Box 2, Folder 
Press Releases 1988, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State 
University, Detroit, MI.    
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with here is invisible.  The only problem is that our 
children are our flags.  They’re dying and that is 
showing us that there is something wrong here.650
 
 
After introducing another cancer cluster in the nearby town of Fowler, Chavez 
offered summary judgment of the health crisis, declaring pesticides that were 
“once considered a miracle of science” had become a “chemical time bomb 
threatening to contaminate our food supply and environment.”651
The film connected the suffering of McFarland mothers to consumers in 
its narration, emphasizing that risks posed by pesticides stretched beyond the 
bounds of the towns bordering agricultural fields.  Ramona Franco, who worked 
in the fields until the eighth month of her pregnancy and gave birth to a child with 
no arms and no legs, reported being exposed to Captan, one of the pesticides 
targeted in the UFW boycott.  She charged that growers “never tell you when they 
spray pesticides, because they don’t care about people’s health.”
 
652
Workers are kind of canaries, if you will, for the 
consumer out there because the workers are being 
harmed.  These are the same [pesticide] residues that 
are ending up on the food that is being bought in the 
 The narrator 
then said that the California Department of Agriculture found Captan residues on 
grape samples and claimed that those residues posed a possible threat to 
consumers.  Marion Moses added an additional warning, stating: 
                                                 




652 The film also introduced Salvadore DeAnda who was diagnosed with 
inoperable cancer on his ninth birthday and Amalia Larios who was born with a 
piece of her spine missing.  Both children had mothers who had worked in the 
fields while pregnant.  Ibid. 
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market and being fed to people…some of the 
chemicals that we’re concerned about that do end up 
as residues are these carcinogenic and teratogenic or 
birth-defect causing pesticides that we don’t think 
should be in the American diet.653
 
 
The film concluded with the contention that there was a “danger hiding in our 
food” that the growers would only address after feeling the economic pinch of the 
UFW boycott.  Chavez promised that once UFW achieved results in grapes that it 
would move on to address pesticide problems in other crops.654
 The release of the Wrath of Grapes film coincided with a campaign 
supported in part by the Sierra Club, NRDC, and EDF to pass a sweeping toxics 
initiative within the state of California that promised to restrict the usage of 
certain pesticides.  Senior EDF attorney David Roe teamed with Sierra Club 
Political Director Carl Pope, Assemblyman Connelly, Democratic Assemblyman 
Gray Davis, and Democratic Senator Art Torres, a former UFW and California 
Rural Legal Assistance lobbyist and current Chairman of the Senate Toxics 
Committee, to co-author the initiative that became Proposition 65, the Safe 
 
                                                 
653 The Wrath of Grapes. 
 
654 Ibid.  A 1987 marketing analysis estimated that 90 percent of individuals 
within targeted groups pledged to support the boycott after viewing the Wrath of 
Grapes film.  United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Mid-Atlantic Grape 
Boycott, “Wrath of Grapes Video and Film Marketing Plan.”  UFW also ran print 
ads that pictured a bunch of green grapes with barrels of toxic chemicals 
interspersed with the fruit and carried the slogan “It Won’t Wash.”  “It Won’t 
Wash,” advertisement, UFW New York Boycott (unprocessed, Acc. Date 06/01), 
Box 2, Folder  [no title, blue folder “It Won’t Wash” print ad on front], Archives 
of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.   
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Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act.655  If passed, the initiative would 
prohibit the release of cancer-causing chemicals into drinking water, require that 
employees and the public be warned if carcinogens were to be used in their 
vicinity, and subject violators to a possible three years in prison and $100,000 in 
fines.656
                                                 
655 David Roe was the principle author of Prop 65.  Carl Pope contributed greatly 
as well.  Journalists tended to quote Pope more than Roe in the weeks preceding 
the election.  David Roe, “An Incentive-Conscious Approach to Toxic Chemical 
Controls,” Economic Development Quarterly 3, No. 3 (August 1989): 179; David 
Roe, “Prop. 65 Kit:  A Quick Reference Guide to California’s Proposition 65,” 
  The legislation would apply to both industrial toxins and hazardous 
agricultural chemicals.  Yes on Proposition 65 campaign manager Tom Epstein 
estimated that only 2 percent of the roughly 13,000 pesticides used in California 
http://www.edf.org/article.cfm?ContentID=3376 (accessed December 2, 2010); 
Robert P. Studer, “Prop. 65 Safe Water Fight is ‘How,’ not ‘If’,” San Diego 
Union, October 19, 1986; Dirk Werkman, “Big Five Might Steal Election Show,” 
Daily News of Los Angeles, July 27, 1986; Elliot Diringer, “Safe Tap Water-Risk 
vs. Cost-Issues Behind the Toxics Initiative,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 
28, 1986.  Before running for California State Assembly in 1972, Art Torres 
worked for two years as a lobbyist for CRLA.  “Art Torres Wants to Make 
Government Work For People!,” El Malcriado 5, No. 2 (June 6, 1972): 2.  He 
also worked with UFW to defeat anti-farmworker legislation in California and 
countered the National Labor Relations Board’s attacks on the grape boycott.  
“Why do Farmworkers Support Art Torres?,” El Malcriado 5, No. 2 (June 6, 
1972): 2.; Cesar Chavez, “Cesar Chavez:  ‘Farmworkers Support Art Torres for 
Assemblyman!,” El Malcriado  5, No. 2 (June 6, 1972): 2.  As a California State 
Senator and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Toxics and Public Safety 
Management, Torres called a hearing in July 1985 to investigate the lack of 
progress in identifying a causal factor for the rash of childhood cancers in 
McFarland.  California Legislature, Senate Committee on Toxics and Public 
Safety Management, Childhood Cancer Incidences--McFarland.; Tompkins, 
“Cancer Valley, California,” 280. 
 
656 Werkman, “Big Five Might Steal Election Show.”; Tompkins, “Cancer Valley, 
California,” 282.  The initiative resonated with voters.  Supporters gathered 
686,625 signatures--253,000 more than necessary--to put the issue before the 
voters.  Studer, “Prop. 65 Safe Water is ‘How,’ not ‘If”.” 
 
  245 
agriculture would be affected if voters approved the initiative.  The Sierra Club 
invested nearly $125,000 in the effort to pass Prop 65, the second largest donor to 
a campaign that promised to better protect the health of workers and the public 
alike.  NRDC and Environmental Defense Fund ranked among the ten largest 
financial contributors.657  UFW did not contribute significantly to the effort to 
pass the Safe Drinking Water and Toxics Enforcement Act.658
In drafting Prop 65, David Roe and Carl Pope reasoned that the regulatory 
framework had to be fundamentally altered to better protect workers and 
consumers from the adverse effects of industrial toxins and agricultural 
chemicals.  Pope held that the “chemical industry does not accept the legitimacy 
of the public’s desire for safer chemicals” and had a “very limited concept of 
responsibility toward public health and environment,” as did industries that used 
the chemicals in their production practices.
   
659
                                                 
657 “Top Contributors in Prop. 65 Toxics Race,” Fresno Bee, October, 19, 1986. 
  The government only regulated a 
 
658 UFW did not rank among the top ten contributors to the campaign.  “Top 
Contributors in Prop. 65 Toxics Race.”  A review of articles in several California 
newspapers--including Los Angeles Times, Fresno Bee, San Francisco Chronicle, 
San Diego Union, and Sacramento Bee--did not show the UFW as an endorser of 
Prop 65.  The union’s Food and Justice magazine did not mention Prop 65 in 
1986 either.  It kept a closer focus on pesticides and the McFarland cancer cluster.  
The August and October issues, for instance, featured cancer-afflicted children of 
McFarland and Fowler on the cover and carried articles on the health risks posed 
by pesticides, but said  nothing of the effort to pass the toxics initiative.  See Food 
and Justice 3, No. 7 (August 1986) and Food and Justice 3, No. 11 (November 
1986). 
 
659 Pope, “An Immodest Proposal,” Sierra 70, No. 5 (September/October 1985): 
45. 
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small fraction of chemicals and industries fiercely resisted greater regulatory 
constraints on the chemicals that they produced and used.660
If enforcement cannot occur until after the ‘how 
much is too much’ [chemical exposure] decision is 
made, then those to whom the law applies have 
every incentive to extend the ‘how much is too 
much’ debate for as long as possible.  The burden is 
on the regulatory bureaucracy to go forward.  
Meanwhile, public frustration about the 
ineffectiveness of the laws is vented on government, 
not on industry.
  Roe asserted: 
661
Prop 65 put forth an innovative solution to the problem.  If passed, it would shift 
the burden of proof from the public and government to industry. 
 
 Prop 65 held that all companies using a substance known to cause cancer 
or birth defects in the production process or as a product ingredient had to warn 
workers and consumers about the potential exposure risks. The governor bore the 
responsibility of publishing a list of known carcinogens and reproductive toxins 
by March 1987 that was to be updated annually to include any substances proven 
                                                 
660 Fifteen years after its passage, Roe noted that only nine chemicals had 
enforceable limits under the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974.  The Toxic 
Substance Control Act and Clean Air Act had comparable low numbers of 
effected chemicals.  By 1989, regulators had only established tolerances on 17 
chemicals using the Toxic Substance Control Act and only set limits on eight 
substances under the Clean Air Act. Roe, “An Incentive-Conscious Approach to 
Toxic Chemical Controls,” 181. 
 
661 Ibid., 181.  Pope explained the problem with an illustrative analogy, likening 
past efforts to regulate chemicals to building a dam at the base of a waterfall.  He 
stated:  “It is not surprising that efforts to dam the waterfall at the bottom have not 
worked.  We may pile the stones up endlessly, but the water simply flows over, 
around, or through the barrier.  To be effective, the dam must be at the 
headwaters--within the chemical industry itself.  We need to apply controls at the 
point where individual companies decide to manufacture and market a particular 
substance for a particular use.”  Pope, “An Immodest Proposal,” 45. 
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to be harmful by new scientific data.  No set threshold exempted companies from 
issuing warnings if their product included a listed substance.  Companies using a 
listed substance had the option of putting a warning label on their product stating 
that it included a chemical known to cancer, birth defects, or other reproductive 
harm.  If the company did not want to include a warning label on its product, it 
could either alter production practices to remove the toxic substance or seek an 
exemption from the labeling requirement.  To get a labeling exemption, the 
company had to prove that the listed chemical posed no “significant risk” in the 
volume used.662  Companies, in other words, had to show that their product was 
safe; rather than burdening the consumer and government with the time- and 
labor-intensive task of proving that a product threatened public health.663
                                                 
662 Mitchel Benson, “87% in County Favor Prop. 65, Supporters Say,” San Jose 
Mercury News, September 10, 1986.; Jay Matthews, “California Uses ‘Legal 
Judo’ on Toxics,” Washington Post, July 30, 1991; Safe Drinking Water and 
Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, Chapter 6.6, 
 
http://www.edf.org/documents/3379_65original.pdf (accessed December 2, 
2010). 
 
663 Roe, “An Incentive-Conscious Approach to Toxic Chemical Controls,” 181.  
Establishing a link between a public health problem and a particular chemical or 
product often proves an arduous task laden with difficulties, particularly when 
there was a lag between exposure to a substance and the development of a health 
problem.  Long periods of latency expand the range of possible locations of 
exposure and causal agents.  These complicating factors often make it difficult for 
scientists to conclusively link a health problem with a culpable chemical.  
Consequently, scientists employ the uncertain language of probability to explain 
their investigative findings.  Industry representatives may then use the uncertain 
language of scientists to create doubt about a chemical’s health risks and stall 
regulatory efforts.  Sylvia Nobel Tesh, Uncertain Hazards:  Environmental 
Activists and Scientific Proof (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 2000), 5; 
Tompkins, “Cancer Valley, California,” 277.   
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 Roe and Pope aimed to make the cost of using toxics high when drafting 
Prop 65, believing that companies’ valuation of low production costs and high 
profits would encourage self-policing.  The right-to-know component of the law 
had the potential to raise costs and lower profits of the companies who refused to 
voluntarily curtail the use toxic substances in production.  Pope reasoned that 
workers informed about health risks of toxins in the workplace would be more 
likely to organize against their employer, using strikes or the threat of labor 
stoppage to force a change in production practices.664  Similarly, they suspected 
that a label warning consumers of a product’s potential health risks would have an 
immediate effect on a company’s profit margins, because buyers would likely opt 
for comparable goods that posed no threat to one’s wellbeing.665
                                                 
664 Pope held:  “When manufacturers are forced scrupulously to inform their work 
force about dangerous chemicals, the costs of production will rise.  In contrast, 
when these costs are passed on to workers in the form of illness and death, the 
production costs of toxic chemicals appear artificially low to corporate decision 
makers.” Pope, “An Immodest Proposal,” 46.  
  Prop 65 also had 
a citizen suit provision that threatened to raise the costs of using toxic chemicals, 
particularly because the shift in the burden of proof from consumer to business 
made it easier for the public to win lawsuits.  Roe maintained that “citizen 
plaintiff can win without having to mount a complex toxicological case…the 
defendant is also inclined not to pursue a numbing battle of experts, since 
confusion in the courtroom is not sufficient to guarantee success in establishing 
 
665 Pope, “An Immodest Proposal,” 46; Roe, “An Incentive-Conscious Approach 
to Toxic Chemical Controls,” 183. 
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the ‘no significant risk’ defense.”666  Prop 65 supporters concluded that these 
factors would convince companies “to police themselves in advance.”667
 Support for Prop 65 split along predictable lines in the build-up to the 
1986 election.  Environmentalists, labor unions, and Democrats supported the 
initiative.  The petro-chemical industry, the California Farm Bureau, and 
Republicans opposed it.
 
668  Hundreds of growers marched on Los Angeles City 
Hall protesting Prop 65, complaining that it would make it more difficult to use 
pesticides on crops.  Growers and industry representatives also forecast that the 
citizen suit provision of the initiative would spur a rash of “bounty hunter” suits 
that would be detrimental to business since the alleged polluter would bear 
unnecessary costs in proving a product’s safety and defending themselves.669
                                                 
666 Roe, “An Incentive-Conscious Approach to Toxic Chemical Controls,” 181, 
182. 
   
Deukmejian vocally opposed the proposition as well, echoing growers with the 
contention that the initiative would put an “unbearable burden on farmers and 
small businesses” and would effectively drive jobs away from the state of 
 
667 Ibid., 182. 
 
668 John Marelius, “Toxic Issue Draws Much Heat--Proposition 65 is Central 
Topic in California Campaigns,” San Diego Union, November 2, 1986; Robert 
Knowles, “Prop. 65 Supporters Challenge Chevron to debates--Memo Urges 
Workers Not to Discuss Waste Measure,” Daily Breeze (Torrance, CA), August 
13, 1986; Tompkins, “Cancer Valley, California,” 282. 
 
669 The growers chose to march on Los Angeles City Hall because Democratic 
gubernatorial candidate and Los Angeles mayor Tom Bradley voiced support for 
Prop 65.  Donna Prokop, “Farmers Take Prop. 65 Protest to Los Angeles City 
Hall,” Daily Breeze (Torrance, CA), October 23, 1986. 
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California.670  Voters, however, overwhelming ignored prognostications of 
agriculture suffering unnecessarily from Prop 65.  Two-thirds of California voters 
cast their ballots in support of the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement 
Act.  The legislation’s promise did not take form immediately though, in part 
because the Deukmejian administration fought to minimize the applicability of the 
new law.671
 
  In the years following, environmentalists and the United Farm 
Workers continued to struggle against the administration, growers, and some 
scientists to implement protective measures safeguarding farmworkers and the 
public. 
Wrangling Over Risk and Regulation 
 
 The two-thirds of voters who cast ballots in favor of Prop 65 showed that 
many Californians harbored concerns about the adverse effects of toxics and 
pesticides.  Deukmejian, nevertheless, tried to stay the course on freeing business 
from the constraints of regulation after the 1986 election.  The UFW persisted in 
                                                 
670 William Endicott, “Duke Opposes AIDS Initiative Pay Limit, Clean Water 
Proposals Also Criticized,” Sacramento Bee, September 3, 1986; Tompkins, 
“Cancer Valley, California,” 282.  The “Rebuttal to Argument in Favor 
Proposition 65” in the ballot arguments pamphlet for California voters held that 
“Proposition 65 will take environmental regulation out of the hands of lawmakers 
and prosecutors and create a system of vigilante justice with bounty hunters 
seeking rewards.” “Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 65,” 
http://www.edf.org/documents/3386_ArgueFor.pdf (accessed December 2, 2010). 
 
671 Marc Lifsher, “Panel Disagrees on List of What to Ban in Water--Scientific 
Testimony Conflicts on Which Chemicals are Most Harmful,” Orange County 
Register, April 1, 1987; Tompkins, “Cancer Valley, California,” 282.   
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its efforts to ban the five chemicals--Parathion, Phosdrin, Methyl Bromide, 
Dinoseb, and Captan-- that it had given priority in the Wrath of Grapes campaign, 
while environmentalists maintained focus on the state’s regulatory framework.  
Though the tactical strategies of UFW and environmentalists varied significantly, 
the groups found opportunity to extend support to one another in the face of a 
heated battle with the governor, growers, and a handful of scientists over 
pesticides, health, and acceptable risk. 
 After the passage of Prop 65, Governor Deukmejian had the responsibility 
of appointing a twelve-person scientific panel to determine which toxins should 
be banned.  Deukmejian selected two of the scientists recommended by 
environmental organizations.  However, his choice of Bruce Ames for the panel, 
an outspoken and controversial scientist in the biochemistry department at 
University of California, Berkeley, helped offset the two appointments.672  Ames 
publicly opposed Prop 65 before its passage, maintaining that fears about 
environmental toxins were overblown.  He contended that “the simple scientific 
fact of the matter is that manmade carcinogens represent only a tiny fraction of 
the total carcinogens we are exposed to” in the course of a lifetime.673
                                                 
672 Ann Cony, “Duke’s Toxic List Called Too Short,” Sacramento Bee, February 
28, 1987; Tompkins, “Cancer Valley, California,” 285. 
  Ames 
often tried to shift public attention on carcinogens from the toxins of industrial 
polluters to ones that could be linked to poor personal choices, warning that 
 
673 “Argument Against Proposition 65,” 
http://www.edf.org/documents/3385_ArgueAgainst.pdf (accessed December 2, 
2010). 
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people needed to be more concerned about the cancer-causing effects of sunlight, 
poor dietary choices, and cigarettes.  Ames’ subtle change in focus emphasized 
instances in which the cancer-stricken individual could be blamed for the disease 
that they contracted.  Even after being appointed to the governor’s advisory panel, 
Ames continued to refer to Prop 65 as a “thoroughly silly law.”674
 Prop-65 co-author Carl Pope to characterize the action an act of “sabotage” by 
the governor.
  The selection 
of Ames to the governor’s committee raised the ire of environmentalists, leading  
675
 When the advisory panel completed its study, Deukmejian announced that 
only twenty-nine chemicals, twenty-six carcinogens and three reproductive toxins, 
would be included on the governor’s list.
  
676
                                                 
674 Leslie Roberts, “A Corrosive Fight Over California’s Toxic Law,” Science 230 
(January 20, 1989): 306-307.; Tompkins, “Cancer Valley, California,” 285. 
  The governor and his scientific panel 
selected the toxins using the strictest interpretation of scientific classifications.  
For carcinogens, for example, the EPA groups chemicals in one of five different 
categories:  Group A chemicals (known human carcinogens) represent those 
substances that have been the subject of epidemiological tests done on humans 
yielding conclusive evidence proving them carcinogenic; Group B (probable 
human carcinogens) have strong evidence from animal-based studies to conclude 
 
675 Elliot Diringer, “‘It’s an Act of Sabotage’--Prop.65 Foe on Toxics Panel,” San 
Francisco Chronicle, February 27, 1987.; Robert N. Proctor, Cancer Wars:  How 
Politics Shapes What We Know and Don’t Know About Cancer (New York: Basic 
Books, 1995), 150.; Tompkins, “Cancer Valley, California,” 285. 
 
676 AFL-CIO v. George Deukmejian, 212 Cal.App.3d 425, 260 Cal.Rptr. 479 (Cal. 
1989); Ann Cony, “Duke’s Toxics List Called Too Short,” Sacramento Bee, 
February 28, 1987; Tompkins, “Cancer Valley, California,” 285. 
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that a chemical is a carcinogen and more limited results from human-based 
studies; Group C (possible human carcinogens) includes chemicals for which 
there is some positive evidence from animal-based studies though evidence from 
human-based tests is either lacking or has yet to be completed; Group D lacks 
sufficient data or tests to determine if a substance is carcinogenic; and Group E 
(non-carcinogens) shows no evidence of causing cancer in any species.677  
Deukmejian’s office reasoned that only those chemicals in Group A should be 
included. The governor and his advisory panel discounted animal-based studies, 
premising their decision to not consider the chemicals in Group B or C on the fact 
that they had not been sufficiently tested on human subjects.678  DDT and EDB 
numbered among the pesticides that did not make the list, though the EPA had 
previously determined that the chemicals were probable carcinogens and 
restricted their use.679
                                                 
677 Sandra Steingraber, Living Downstream:  An Ecologist Looks at Cancer and 
the Environment (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 125; Tompkins, 
“Cancer Valley, California,” 285. 
  Then, after being lobbied heavily by food industry groups, 
Deukmejian exempted food, drugs, and cosmetics from the provisions of Prop 65, 
 
678 AFL-CIO v. George Deukmejian, 212 Cal.App.3d 425, 260 Cal.Rptr. 479; 
Mitchel Benson, “Governor Releases Toxics List But Coalition Says Roster is 
Incomplete,” San Jose Mercury News (CA), February 28, 1987; Tompkins, 
“Cancer Valley, California,” 285. 
 
679 “Toxic List,” Daily News of Los Angeles, February 28, 1987; “Prop 65 Backers 
Sue Deukmejian Over Toxic-Chemicals List, Orange County Register, February 
28, 1987; Paul Pringle, “Deukmejian Defends Toxins List,” Daily Breeze 
(Torrence, CA), March 4, 1987;  Environmental Protection Agency, “DDT Ban 
Takes Effect,” press release, December 31, 1972, 
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/ddt/01.htm (accessed December 24, 2010); 
Environmental Protection Agency, “EPA Acts to Ban EDB Pesticide.” 
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clearly ignoring the law’s intent with the argument that federal standards were 
sufficient to protect the public.680
A coalition of environmentalists and labor unions argued that the advisory 
panel’s selection criteria did not meet the requirements of the law and called for 
nearly 200 more chemicals to be added to the list.  Prop 65 mandated that the 
governor’s list, at a minimum, include the carcinogens and reproductive toxins 
identified in California Labor Code Section 6382(b)(1) and 6382(d).
  
681  The 
sections of the Labor Code included both human and animal carcinogens as 
identified by the World Health Organization’s International Agency for Research 
on Cancer.  The Labor Code, hence, recognized both Group A (known) and 
Group B (probable) human carcinogens as a threat.  The State Department of 
Health Services also advised Deukmejian that “animal-derived data is 
scientifically and ethically required to be included” in the determination of 
chemicals that posed a health threat.682
                                                 
680 Elliot Diringer, “State’s Own Experts Ignored on Prop. 65,” San Francisco 
Chronicle, March 25, 1988;  Mathews, “California Uses ‘Legal Judo’ on Toxics”; 
David Roe, “An Incentive-Conscious Approach to Toxic Chemical Controls,” 
183-184. 
  Nonetheless Deukmejian contended that 
 
681 Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, Chapter 6.6. 
 
682 The Department of Health reasoned that “since Proposition 65 is in essence a 
public right-to-know issue, the public is entitled to know that a number of 
chemicals exist that have been designated as animal carcinogens by panels of 
international and national experts who, by their own definitions, therefore 
consider those chemicals to be potential carcinogens for humans.” William Kahrl, 
“Will Deukmejian Be Poison for Prop. 65? (An Update),” Sacramento Bee, April 
19, 1987. 
 
  255 
the law only applied to known human carcinogens with conclusive evidence from 
tests on human subjects when defending of the abbreviated list.683
The labor-environmental coalition consisting of AFL-CIO, California 
Rural Legal Assistance, EDF, Sierra Club, and NRDC brought suit against the 
governor to resolve the issue.  The Court held that the Labor Code to which Prop 
65 made reference included animal-based studies; which, consequently, meant 
that the governor’s list should include both known and probable human 
carcinogens and reproductive toxins.  To further justify the inclusion of animal-
based testing in the consideration of toxins, the judge cited the California 
Department of Health Services’ Guidelines for Chemical Carcinogen Risk 
Assessments and Their Scientific Rationale.  The Guidelines maintained that 
drawing conclusions from animal-based experiments was necessary because of 
the ethical problems of conducting tests on human subjects and the long periods 




Sufficient evidence presently exists for the 
carcinogenicity in animals of about 200 
chemicals…For most of the 200 animal carcinogens 
for which there is ‘sufficient evidence,’ it is 
  Furthermore, it held that: 
                                                 
683 AFL-CIO v. George Deukmejian, 212 Cal.App.3d 425, 260 Cal.Rptr. 479.  
California Attorney General John Van de Kamp did not agree with Deukmejian’s 
interpretation of the toxics law and declined to represent the governor when a 
labor-environmental coalition filed suit against the governor to force the addition 
of probable human carcinogens and reproductive toxins to the governor’s list.  
Benson, “Governor Releases Toxics List But Coalition Says Roster is 
Incomplete.” 
 
684 AFL-CIO v. George Deukmejian, 212 Cal.App.3d 425, 260 Cal.Rptr. 479. 
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unlikely that we will ever know with certainty 
whether they cause cancer in humans because of the 
difficulty in obtaining appropriate populations 
suitable for epidemiological studies.  Since it is 
unlikely we will ever confirm or deny the apparent 
carcinogenic potential of these 200 chemicals, it 
appears prudent in the interim to control exposure to 




The Court ultimately sided with the plaintiffs, mandating that nearly 200 
additional chemicals be include on the list of the toxins.686  Continued pressure 
from environmental groups also succeeded in getting the exemptions to the food, 
drug, and cosmetic industries repealed, although it took several years to do so.687
                                                 
685 Department of Health Services published the guidelines prior to the Prop 65 
controversy, so the agency’s contentions were not influenced by any of the 
debates on implementation of the new law.  California Health and Welfare 
Agency, Department of Health Services, Guidelines for Chemical Carcinogen 
Risk Assessments and their Scientific Rationale (November 1985), C-20, quoted 
in AFL-CIO v. George Deukmejian, 212 Cal.App.3d 425, 260 Cal.Rptr. 479.  
 
 
686 AFL-CIO v. George Deukmejian, 212 Cal.App.3d 425, 260 Cal.Rptr. 479.  The 
coalition of Prop 65 supporters initially filed suit against Deukmejian in 
Sacramento County Superior Court in February 1987.  Benson, “Governor 
Releases Toxics List but Coalition Says Roster is Incomplete.” Superior Court 
Roger Warren ordered Deukmejian to add over 200 chemicals to the toxics list 
when it rendered its verdict in April 1987.  Deukmejian, however, appealed the 
decision before it could go into effect.   Jon Matthews, “Toxics List is Extended 
237 Chemicals Ordered for State Enforcement,” Fresno Bee, April 25, 1987.  The 
Court of Appeals rendered its decision on July 20, 1989, affirming the Superior 
Court judgment.  AFL-CIO v. George Deukmejian, 212 Cal.App.3d 425, 260 
Cal.Rptr. 479.   
 
687 The agreement between environmentalists and Governor Pete Wilson in 1992 
required food, drug, and cosmetic manufacturers to be compliant with the law by 
July 1, 1993.  Richard C. Paddock, “Toxics Law Exemption to Be Lifted,” Los 
Angeles Times, December 29, 1992. 
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While the governor stymied the implementation of Prop 65, scientists 
investigating the McFarland cancer cluster failed to identify the cause of the 
town’s health crisis.  The Kern County Health Department ended its study without 
reaching a conclusive result in October 1986.688  Citizens continued to demand 
answers though.  Under increasing pressure, Deukmejian agreed to allocate 
$200,000 to the Department of Health Service in December 1987 to hire a 
contingent of university scientists to review the previously collected data.  Critics, 
including Senator Torres, complained that the allocated funds fell far short of the 
amount necessary to complete a sound investigation.689  In comparison, EPA 
spent $5.3 million to collect and analyze air, water, and soil samples from Love 
Canal over a six-month period in 1980.690  Senator Torres also characterized the 
new investigation as wrongheaded, since it was simply going to review records 
from the incomplete and problematic county investigation.691
                                                 
688 Clemings, “Cancer Cluster Still Not Solved.” 
  Torres’ protests did 
 
689 Amy Pyle, “State Will Expand McFarland Probe:  Duke Requests Further 
Study of Cancer Cluster,” Fresno Bee, December 17, 1987; Tompkins, “Cancer 
Valley, California,” 284. 
 
690 New York State Department of Health, “Love Canal:  A Special Report to the 
Governor & Legislature: April 1981,” revised October 2005, 
www.nyhealth.gov/environmental/investigations/love_canal/lcreport.htm 
(accessed December 9, 2010); Tompkins, “Cancer Valley, California,” 284. 
 
691 Dr. Raymond Neutra, chief of the California health department, maintained , 
for instance, that county investigators lacked the capability to accurately test soil 
and groundwater.  Yet, the county used the results of soil and groundwater tests in 
concluding that there was no evidence of environmental contamination in 
McFarland.   Pyle, “State Will Expand McFarland Probe”; Tompkins, “Cancer 
Valley, California,” 284. Dr. Beverly Paigan, an Oakland Children’s Hospital 
consultant, also asserted that the Kern County Health Department lacked the 
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not alter the state’s plan though.  A month later, a spokeswoman for the state 
Health Department announced the results of the investigation, stating that the 
agency had found “no smoking gun” in their investigation, though four chemicals-
-dimethoate, fenbutatin oxide, dinitrophenol, and dinoseb--warranted further 
study.692
UFW continued to draw attention to McFarland, arguing that pesticides 
were responsible for the spate of childhood disease.  Unlike the 1973 Monitor-4 
scare, the McFarland cancer cluster remained a public concern for an extended 
period of time.  Thirteen McFarland children had been diagnosed with cancer 
since 1975.  Six had died by early 1988.
 
693  The discovery of other cancer clusters 
in the nearby agricultural towns of Fowler and Earlimart further heightened public 
concern about the adverse health effects of pesticides.694
                                                                                                                                     
expertise to perform the epidemiological studies correctly.  Russell Clemings, 
“McFarland Parents Demand New Childhood-Cancer Study,” Fresno Bee, 
October 17, 1987. 
  The lack of resolution 
and the governor’s seeming callousness towards the problem presented an 
opportunity for the UFW to develop a campaign against pesticides and articulate 
the need for reform better than it had at any time since the initial Delano grape 
strike.  
 
692 “Pesticides Studied in Town’s Cancers:  Large Quantities of Four Chemicals 
Used in Kern Community’s Fields,” Sacramento Bee, January 30, 1988; 
Tompkins, “Cancer Valley, California,” 286. 
 
693 “McFarland Cancer Panel Will Look at Other Towns,” Fresno Bee, April 9, 
1988. 
 
694 Elliot Diringer, “5 Children of Farm Workers:  New Cancer Cluster in Farm 
Town,” San Francisco Chronicle, September 14, 1989. 
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As the UFW advanced its Wrath of Grapes campaign, it recruited a 
diverse array of activists to serve on its Environmentalists Committee.  As a 
longtime union supporter and friend of Chavez, Marion Moses naturally agreed to 
contribute to the group.  The union also enlisted the services of the two 
individuals largely responsible for Prop 65, Sierra Club’s Carl Pope and EDF’s 
David Roe.  Lawrie Mott, an NRDC staff scientist and co-author of Pesticide 
Alert: A Guide to Pesticides in Fruits and Vegetables, also served on the 
committee.  In Pesticide Alert, Mott wrote “I believe consumers have the power 
to force change…we’ve used the power of the purse to change the way that 
American industries made and sell their products.”695
                                                 
695 United Farm Workers, “Boycott Grapes For Your Sake…and Ours,” [n.d., 
1988?], UFW New York Boycott (unprocessed, Acc. Date 06/01), Box 4, Folder 
Boycott Grapes for Your Sake…and Ours, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, 
Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.  Mott urged consumers to demand safer 
food, asserting that “consumers can accelerate this transition in agriculture 
through their power in the marketplace.” Lawrie Mott and Karen Snyder, 
Pesticide Alert:  A Guide to Pesticides in Fruits and Vegetables (San Francisco: 
Sierra Club Books, 1987), in text quote on page vii-viii, footnote quote on page 
20.  Mott echoed her point about consumer engagement in an article she authored 
for the UFW’s Food and Justice magazine, stating “consumers must play an 
active role” in the “inevitable transition away from pesticides” and should “make 
the government do a better job of protecting the public--consumers and workers 
alike--from the hazards of pesticides.” Lawrie Mott, “Pesticides: No Protection,” 
Food and Justice 4, No. 3 (March 1987): 14. 
  Such sentiment meshed 
will with the UFW strategy for pesticide reform.  Greenpeace Regional Director 
David Chatfield and California League of Conservation Voters Executive 
Director Lucy Blake participated in the group, as did two activists from newer 
grassroots environmental organizations.  Diane Takvorian worked with the poor 
before founding Environmental Health Coalition in 1980 to address issues of 
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pollution in poor communities.696  Another committee member, Penny Newman, 
co-founded Concerned Neighbors in Action after millions of gallons of toxic 
waste leaked from the Stringfellow Acid Pits and flooded the streets of Glen 
Avon, a Riverside suburb, in 1978.697  Walter Hooke rounded out the committee.  
Hooke, who had roots in labor and social justice issues, worked as an advocate for 
National Association of Radiation Survivors after serving in World War II.698  
Following his father’s support of the UFW, NRDC attorney Robert Kennedy, Jr. 
also advised Chavez on pesticide issues.  Kennedy, however, was not listed as 
part of the Environmentalists Committee in 1988.699
Chavez touted the strength of the labor-consumer-environmental coalition 
to change pesticide use practices, maintaining that the public could use its 
“collective power in the marketplace to protect human health.”
   
700
                                                 
696 United Farm Workers, “Boycott Grapes For Your Sake…and Ours”; Lily 
Leung, “Three Decades of Environmental Activism,” San Diego Union Tribune, 
October 17, 2010.   
  Environmental 
 
697 United Farm Workers, “Boycott Grapes For Your Sake…and Ours”; Jennifer 
Bowles, “Environmental Crusaders Celebrate 30 Years Strong,” Press-Enterprise 
(Riverside, CA), December 7, 2007; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring,  221. 
 
698  United Farm Workers, “Boycott Grapes For Your Sake…and Ours”; “Walter 
G. Hooke (obituary),” Post Star (Glen Falls, NY), May 24, 2010.   
 
699 Ethel Kennedy, interview by Paradigm Productions, 1995/1996.  
http://www.farmworkermovement.us/media/oral_history/ParadigmTranscripts/Ke
nnedyEthel.pdf (accessed March 13, 2011).  Paradigm Productions conducted this 
interview when making the documentary The Fight in the Fields:  Chavez and the 
Farmworkers’ Struggle, VHS, Directed by Ray Telles and Rick Tejada-Flores 
(Sparks, NV:  Paradigm Productions, 1996). 
 
700 “Nader and Friends Dump Grapes,” Food and Justice 5, No. 2 (February 
1988): 4. 
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groups assumed a more visible presence in the union effort in 1987 as a number 
of organizations pledged their support for the boycott.  Representatives from 
several environmental groups appeared at a UFW press conference in December 
to join Ralph Nader in endorsing the grape boycott.  Represented groups included:  
Center for Science in the Public Interest, Clean Water Action Project, 
Environmental Action, Farm Animal Reform Movement, Friends of the Earth, 
National Campaign Against Toxic Hazards, and the National Coalition Against 
the Misuse of Pesticides.701  The names of national environmental groups 
subsequently appeared in some UFW pamphlets to show the breadth of boycott 
support.702  Environmentalists also joined union members, community activists, 
and religious leaders in some public rallies, such as the human billboard at the 
Baltimore Convention Center, to bring attention to the threats that pesticides 
posed to the health of farmworkers and consumers.703
                                                 
701 “Nader and Friends Dump Grapes,” 4.  
  Natural Resources Defense 
Council also funded a project called Mothers and Others Against Pesticides that 
was co-chaired by Meryll Streep and worked closely with UFW. The project 
 
702 See, for example, Western New York Grape Boycott Coalition, “Boycott 
Grapes,” pamphlet, October 1988, UFW New York Boycott (unprocessed, Acc. 
Date 06/01), Box 5, Folder Grape Boycott Leaflets, Archives of Labor and Urban 
Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.  This pamphlet included Center for 
Science in the Public Interest, Environmental Action, and Friends of the Earth in 
its partial list of supporters.  It also listed several unions, religious organizations, 
other non-profit groups, and politicians among the boycott supporters. 
 
703 “Join Actor Ed Asner in the Human Billboard,” pamphlet, October 20, 1988, 
UFW New York Boycott (unprocessed, Acc. Date 06/01), Box 3, Folder Fast for 
Life/Grape Boycott Celebrity Support, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, 
Wayne State University, Detroit, MI. 
 
  262 
intended to educate the public about pesticide risks and inspire consumer-based 
change and political action.704
Chavez increased the attention to the boycott further when he began a 
liquid-only fast on July 16, 1988 that lasted thirty-six days.  Chavez stated that the 
“Fast for Life” was a “fervent prayer that, together, farmworkers and the public 
would “confront and resist…the scourge of poisons that threatens our people and 
our land and our food.”
 
705  He said that his literature review, conversations with 
pesticide victims and their families, and discussions with experts convinced him 
that the pesticide problem “threatens to choke out the life of our people and also 
the life systems that support us all.”706  Chavez warned that people could not rely 
on the political system to solve the problem; rather, he held that “our combined 
energy and influence in the market place” would be required to break the “cycle 
of poisons and destruction and death that threatens our people and our world.” 707
                                                 
704 Wendy Gordon Rockefeller to Artie Rodriguez, June 6, 1989, UFW New York 
Boycott (unprocessed, Acc. Date 06/01), Box 2, Folder Mothers and Others 
Against Pesticides, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State 
University, Detroit, MI.; Mothers and Others Against Pesticides meeting notes, 
May 25, 1989, UFW New York Boycott (unprocessed, Acc. Date 06/01), Box 2, 
Folder Mothers and Others Against Pesticides, Archives of Labor and Urban 
Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI. 
  
When Chavez finally broke his fast at a liturgy attended by approximately 8,000 
farmworkers and supporters, he could not speak or stand without assistance.  He 
 
705 “Chavez Begins Fast,” Food and Justice 5, No. 5 (July 1988): 8. 
 
706 Ibid., 8. 
 
707 Ibid., 8. 
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had risked kidney failure and shed thirty-three pounds, approximately 20 percent 
of his body weight.708
Chavez intended the “Fast for Life” to continue even as he gave it up to 
avoid permanent damage to his health.  In a statement read by his son Fernando, 
Chavez asserted that the fast should be carried on in hundreds of different places 
and passed from one person to next every three days until “every poisoned grape 
is off supermarket shelves.”
 
709  He urged that the fasts continue “until the fields 
are safe for the farm workers, the environment is preserved for future generations, 
and our food is once again a source of nourishment and life.”710  Jesse Jackson, 
who stood by Chavez’s side, took up the fast first, passing it to Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference President Reverend Joseph Lowery three days later.711  
Sierra Club Executive Director Michael Fischer continued the “Fast for Life,” 
receiving the “chain” from Cesar’s son Fernando on September 19 and passing it 
on to Robert F. Kennedy’s daughter Rory on September 23, 1988.712
                                                 
708 “…and on the 36th, Bread,” Food and Justice 5, No. 6 (September 1988): 11, 
12; Louis Sahagun, “After 36 Days Chavez Halts Protest Fast,” Los Angeles 
Times, August 22, 1988.; Louis Sahagun, “Chavez Ailing as He Completes 17th 
Day of Fast,” Los Angeles Times, August 4, 1988. 
  Other 
 
709 ‘“Today I Pass On the Fast for Life…’,” Food and Justice, 5, No. 6 
(September 1988): 14. 
 
710 Ibid., 14. 
 
711 Ibid., 14. 
 
712 “National Fast for Life,” Food and Justice 5, No. 7 (October 1988): 6; United 
Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO, “Impact of Boycott Activity,” [n.d., 
1988?], UFW New York Boycott (unprocessed, Acc. Date 06/01), Box 2, Folder 
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“chains” of fasts developed apart from the initial thread that began with Chavez, 
enlarging the web of participants.713  Grape sales to New York City fell 22 
percent, while Philadelphia witnessed a 6 percent decline between Chavez’s fast 
and the end of 1988.  UFW figured that per capita consumption of California table 
grapes dropped 13 percent between the start of the boycott and the beginning of 
1989.714
Growers responded to the actions of UFW, environmentalists, and 
concerned consumers with a carefully-crafted rebuttal that aimed to cast doubt on 
activists’ contentions and weaken the boycott.  The California Table Grape 
Commission initiated a print ad campaign that carried a picture of a group 
assumed to be fieldworkers who questioned who would protect them from 
boycotts.  The ad, written in the voice of farmworkers, feigned shock at the UFW 
claim that grapes carried dangerous pesticide residues and reassured the reader 
that grapes were safe.  It maintained that the UFW effort threatened the livelihood 




                                                                                                                                     
Press Releases 1988, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State 
University, Detroit, MI. 
  Grape growers also hired the Dolphin Group, a right-wing public 
 
713 “‘A Multitude of Simple Deeds’,” Food and Justice 5, No. 7 (October 1988): 
5. 
 
714 United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO, “Impact of Boycott Activity.” 
 
715 California Table Grape Commission, “Boycotts Are Supposed to Protect Us.  
But Who Will Protect Us From Boycotts?” [n.d], UFW New York Boycott 
(unprocessed, Acc. Date 06/01), Box 3, Folder Grower Boycott Propaganda, 
Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI. 
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relations firm, to establish the Grape Workers and Farmers Coalition (GWFC).  
GWFC monitored the UFW boycott and countered charges made by the union.  
Though the group purported to represent the interests of both growers and 
farmworkers, the Dolphin Group employees who managed GWFC affairs testified 
under oath that they could not identify any farmworkers who belonged to the 
organization and did not know of any member list that would provide such 
evidence.716
                                                                                                                                     
 
  Hence, it is probable that the organization’s name purposely 
misrepresented its membership composition to mislead the public into believing 
that statements from the organization represented the opinions of farmworkers as 
well as growers.   
716 The Dolphin Group account managers purported to be from the Grape Workers 
and Farmers Coalition in public, even though they were employees of the public 
relations firm.  GWFC was headquartered in the Dolphin Group building.  Yet the 
Dolphin Group employees who handled the account could not identify any 
GWFC members or recall if there had ever been a GWFC meeting.  The account 
manager testified that he had never corresponded with GWFC to report on any 
actions that he had taken.  Senior account executive Avan Ortega, who was 
charged with the task of setting up the organization, stated that there were no 
organizational members of the Coalition when he began working on the account, 
but would not say that it was created by the Dolphin Group. “Testimony of Avan 
Ortega,” California Table Grape Commission v. United Farm Workers of 
America, AFL-CIO, Agricultural Labor Relations Board Case No: 91-CL-5-ED 
(SD), 91-CL-5-1-ED(SD), and 91-CL-1-VI (April 6, 1992), 54, 64-68, 71, 104, 
UFW New York Boycott (unprocessed, Acc. Date 06/01), Box 5, Folder Rees 
Lloyd Letter and Trial Transcript, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne 
State University, Detroit, MI; “Testimony of Carlos Arambula,” California Table 
Grape Commission v. United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Agricultural 
Labor Relations Board Case No: 91-CL-5-ED (SD), 91-CL-5-1-ED(SD), and 91-
CL-1-VI (April 7, 1992), 142-145, 150, 158, UFW New York Boycott 
(unprocessed, Acc. Date 06/01), Box 5, Folder Rees Lloyd Letter and Trial 
Transcript, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, 
Detroit, MI. 
 
  266 
The California Table Grape Association also widely distributed the video 
Big Fears, Little Risks: A Report on Chemicals in the Environment produced by 
the American Council on Science and Health (ACSH), a group that consistently 
defended food producers and industries from charges that their products posed a 
public health threat.717  ACSH paid Walter Cronkite, the newscaster often referred 
to as “the most trusted man in America,” to narrate the film in which a handful of 
scientists, including Bruce Ames, assured the public that their fears about 
chemical carcinogens were overblown.718  According to their logic, the presence 
and volume of chemicals in the environment remained nearly constant, while 
science and definitions of “safe” were in a state of constant flux.  The video then 
asserted that these miniscule amounts of chemicals posed no greater threat to the 
human body than the natural carcinogens found in foods such as peanut butter or 
mushrooms.  Last, it maintained that the body had an amazing defense system that 
was “designed to live in a world of carcinogens.”719
                                                 
717 Proctor, Cancer Wars, 90-91, 150. 
  Growers undoubtedly hoped 
that the conflicting assertions of industry-friendly scientists in Big Fears, Little 
Risks would temper consumer fears about pesticide threats, making them less 
likely to support the UFW boycott or environmentalists’ attempts to pass more 
stringent regulations. 
 
718 Ibid., 150; Tompkins, “Cancer Valley, California,” 283. 
 
719 Big Fears, Little Risk:  A Report of Chemicals in the Environment, VHS, 
narrated by Walter Cronkite, produced by Film Counselors Associates, Inc., 
American Council on Science and Health, 1989; Tompkins, “Cancer Valley, 
California,” 283. 
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Despite the efforts of growers and industry scientists to create doubt, 
environmentalists felt the time was right to pass far-reaching legislation 
addressing a host of problems.  Public interest in a variety of environmental issues 
seemed to favor passage of environmental legislation.  Continuing problems of 
groundwater contamination and inconclusive results in the Central Valley cancer 
cluster investigations continued to concern the public. A report released by NRDC 
in 1989 entitled Intolerable Risks:  Pesticides in Our Children’s Food and a 
follow-up 60-Minutes’ segment, “A is for Apple,” brought further attention to the 
threat that pesticides residues posed to children.720  The California Department of 
Food and Agriculture’s attempts to control the Mediterranean fruit fly with the 
aerial spraying of malathion over some neighborhoods in Los Angeles and 
Orange Counties similarly raised protests from affected individuals and other 
concerned citizens.721
                                                 
720 John Tweedy, Jr., “Coalition Building and the Defeat of California’s 
Proposition 128,” Stanford Environmental Law Journal, 11(1992): 126-127.  
Intolerable Risk and “A is for Apple” addressed the health hazards of Alar 
(daminozide).  60 Minutes’ Ed Bradley reported that a number of scientific 
experts concluded that “the most potent cancer-causing agent in our food supply 
is a substance sprayed on apples to keep them on the trees longer and make them 
look better,” adding that “children may someday develop cancer from this one 
chemical called daminozide.”   Apple growers subsequently lost millions of 
dollars as consumer demand fell off.  Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes,” 67 F.3d 816 (3rd 
Cir. 1995). 
  Environmentalists also expected that the twentieth 
 
721Tweedy, Jr., “Coalition Building and the Defeat of California’s Proposition 
128,” 126-127.  Terry B. Friedman, “Fiscal Issues Relating to Medfly Spraying in 
Los Angeles and Orange Counties” (Assembly Ways and Means Subcommittee 
on Health and Welfare, State Office Building, Van Nuys, CA, February 28, 1990),  
Senator Tom Hayden Collection, LP322:384, Folder Subject Files: Pesticide, 
Malathion (part 1), California State Archives, Sacramento, CA.  Some concerned 
citizens formed the grassroots organization Citizens Against Urban Aerial 
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anniversary of Earth Day would make voters more amenable to proposed 
environmental legislation.722
Carl Pope, NRDC senior attorney Al Meyerhoff, Assemblyman Tom 
Hayden, and California Attorney General John Van de Camp partnered to draft 
the measure that became Proposition 128, the “Big Green” initiative.
 
723  
California League of Conservation Voters, National Toxics Campaign, Citizens 
for a Better Environment, Greenpeace, Campaign California, California Public 
Interest Research Group, AFL-CIO, and UFW joined in supporting the initiative 
after it was drafted.724
                                                                                                                                     
Spraying in attempt to halt the use of malathion in urban neighborhoods in the 
campaign against the Mediterranean fruit fly.  Victor J. Kimm to Gordon Bruce 
McKeller, April 26, 1994, Senator Tom Hayden Collection, LP322:387, Folder 
Subject Files: Pesticide, Malathion (part 4), California State Archives, 
Sacramento, CA.   
  The sweeping initiative addressed issues ranging from 
 
722 Randy Shaw, The Activist’s Handbook: A Primer for the 1990s and Beyond 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 121. 
 
723 Tweedy, Jr., “Coalition Building and the Defeat of California’s Proposition 
128,” 117; John Balzar, “Environmental Groups Offer Their Dream List 
California: Advocates and Politicians Propose a Sweeping Initiative Enforced by 
a Conservation Cop,” Los Angeles Times, October 11, 1989; Marla Cone, “Prop 
128 Might Double Most Sewer Bills in O.C.,” Los Angeles Times, October 31, 
1990; Maura Dolan and Richard C. Paddock, “Proposition 128: ‘Big Green’ 
Reached Too Far, Backers Say,” Los Angeles Times, November 8, 1990; Scott 
Reeves, “Initiative Called ‘Scare Tactics’,” Fresno Bee, October 26, 1900. 
 
724 Tweedy, Jr., “Coalition Building and the Defeat of California’s Proposition 
128,” 117; Al Meyerhoff, “Perspectives on Proposition 128: Is it Practical and 
Forward-Looking, or is it the Big Green Con Job?” Los Angeles Times, October 
27, 1990; Cesar Chavez, “Farm Workers at Risk,” in Toxic Struggles: The Theory 
and Practice of Environmental Justice, edited by Richard Hofrichter 
(Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1993), 167; Ferriss and Sandoval, The 
Fight in the Fields, 250; Dan Morain and Mark Arax, “Once-Powerful Union 
Declines in Influence,” Los Angeles Times, April 24, 1993. 
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pesticides to pollutants in coastal waters to ozone depletion and global warming.  
The initiative, in part, would set a five to eight year cancellation period for 
pesticides that were carcinogenic or reproductive toxins, specifically stating that 
those chemicals in both Group A and Group B would be targeted for phase out.  
The California Senate Committee on Toxics and Public Safety Management 
estimated that sixty-nine pesticides would be subject to increased regulation and 
possible cancellation under the law in the long-term.725  Prop 128 would have also 
transferred the authority to establish and regulate pesticide-related health 
standards from the Department of Food and Agriculture to the Department of 
Health Services.  Additionally, it would have removed the agricultural exception 
from state right-to-know laws in effort to better protect farmworkers.726
                                                 
725 Art Torres asserted that the legislation would help solve McFarland’s health 
crisis, which he maintained was caused by pesticides, by eliminating four of the 
chemicals viewed with “high levels of suspicion” in the cancer cluster 
investigation.  Art Torres, Proposition 128: Analysis of Pesticide Use and 
Regulation (Sacramento: Senate Committee on Toxics and Public Safety 
Management, 1990), 2-4, 10; Tompkins, “Cancer Valley, California,” 290. 
  Carl 
Pope held that the initiative’s breadth could be credited in part to Deukmejian’s 
continued hostility towards environmental regulation, stating: “George 
Deukmejian is more responsible for Big Green than anyone else.  It has been his 
 
726 Senate Toxics and Public Safety Management Committee, Proposition 128: 
Environmental Protection Act of 1990 (Sacramento: Senate Office of Research, 
1990), 1, 6, 7; Tompkins, “Cancer Valley, California,” 290. 
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lack of leadership, his veto of good environmental legislation and his refusal to 
implement environmental laws that forced us to put Big Green on the ballot.”727
The sweeping nature of “Big Green,” however, also made it easier for 
growers, other industries, and Deukmejian to attack it.  Growers forecasted that 
the measure would cripple the state’s agricultural industry.
 
728  Deukmejian 
characterized supporting environmental groups as deceptive organizations 
engaged in a “big lie campaign” and warned that Prop 128 would cause “tornado-
like changes” in the California economy.729  Growers, the chemical industry, and 
other opponents spent an estimated $10 million to convince Californians to vote 
against the initiative.730  Opponents contended that “Big Green” was too complex 
to be administered effectively and would financially burden Californians by 
raising taxes, the price of food, and energy costs.731
                                                 
727 Richard C. Paddock, “California elections Proposition 128: Deukmejian Says 
‘Big Green’ Will Jeopardize Jobs,” Los Angeles Times, September 9, 1990.  Al 
Meyerhoff echoed Pope, contending:  “Opinion polls consistently indicate 
unparalleled support for true environmental reform.  Yet, because of the dearth of 
leadership from the governor and the power of special interests, the Legislature 
remains unresponsive.” Al Meyerhoff, “Greening California, by Initiative,” Los 
Angeles Times, January 22, 1990. 
 
 
728 Rudy Abramson, “Growers Fear Pesticide Controls in ‘Big Green’,” Los 
Angeles Times, July 11, 1990. 
 
729 Paddock, “California elections Proposition 128: Deukmejian Says ‘Big Green’ 
Will Jeopardize Jobs.” 
 
730 Nancy Rivera Brooks, “Expensive Victory for Businesses,” Los Angeles 
Times, November 8, 1990. 
 
731 Richard C. Paddock, “3Environment Issues Lose; Prop. 140 Ahead,” Los 
Angeles Times, November 7, 1990. 
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Growers also succeeded in putting a competing initiative, the Consumer 
Pesticide Enforcement Act, on the ballot. Supporters of “Big Green” referred to 
the growers’ initiative as “Big Brown,” because it placed fewer restrictions on 
pesticides than Prop 128 even as it promised to expand monitoring efforts.732  
“Big Brown” also invalidated the pesticide provisions of “Big Green,” meaning 
that growers would be generally unaffected if both initiatives managed to pass in 
November.733  In at least one instance, “Big Brown” backers at a “Big Green” 
rally wrongfully told attendees that Prop 135 was the initiative supported by 
environmentalists and was the only ballot measure that would stop the spraying of 
malathion.  The “Big Brown" campaign also used slogans like “Protect Children 
From Pesticides” and “Stop Malathion” in an effort to confuse the public and 
draw votes away from “Big Green.”734  Growers committed time to building 
support for the industry initiative as well.  An estimated 600 growers campaigned 
door-to-door, bearing gifts of flowers and chocolate covered raisins, in greater 
Los Angeles neighborhoods urging people to vote against “Big Green” and for 
Prop 135.735
                                                 
732 Al Meyerhoff, “Greening California, by Initiative”; Daniel P. Puzo, “A 
Growing Lack of Credibility,” Los Angeles Times, May 24, 1990. 
  An October Field Institute poll revealed that counter-initiative 
 
733 Paddock, “3 Environment Issues Lose; Prop. 140 Ahead.” 
 
734 Clifford E. Gladstein, “Affidavit of the Events at the March 4, 1990 Focus 
Rally Buena Vista Park, Burbank,”1-3, Senator Tom Hayden Collection, 
LP322:384, Folder Subject Files: Pesticide, Malathion (part 1), California State 
Archives, Sacramento, CA.   
 
735 Jack Cheevers, “California Elections Propositions 128 and 135: Farmers Try to 
Harvest Votes for ‘Big Green’ Rival,” Los Angeles Times, October 28, 1990. 
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strategy had the potential to derail “Big Green.”  The poll showed voter support 
divided so that both “Big Green” and “Big Brown” had a chance of being 
passed.736
 Voting results on “Big Green” turned out to be far more lopsided than the 
Field Institute poll suggested, as the warnings of growers, business groups, and 
Deukmejian turned Californians against the Prop 128.  The initiative that 
supporters thought was a sure winner garnered only 36 percent of the vote in the 
end.
 
737  The initiative failed to pass despite the fact that it had the support of 
environmentalists, the AFL-CIO, and UFW.  Opponents’ arguments that “Big 
Green” was too complex and would financially burden Californians factored into 
the initiative’s defeat.  Supporters also blamed voter confusion with the 
competing “Big Brown” initiative.738
                                                                                                                                     
 
   
736 When considering the financial impact of “Big Green,” 52 percent of voters 
favored Prop 128, 37 percent disapproved, and 11 percent remained undecided.  
“Big Brown” numbers varied slightly with 40 percent of polled voters supporting 
the initiative, 40 percent opposing it, and 18 percent undecided.  Mervin Field and 
Mark DiCamillo, “Voter Preferences on Prop. 128 (Big Green), Prop 134 (Nickel 
a Drink) and Prop. 130 (Forests Forever) Vary Considerably Depending on 
Awareness of Fiscal Impact of Each Initiative,” California Poll, No. 1563 
(October 16, 1990): 2, http://ucdata.berkeley.edu/pubs/CalPolls/1563.pdf  
(accessed December 17, 2010). 
 
737 Voters defeated “Big Brown” by an even larger margin than “Big Green.”  
Paddock, “3 Environment Issues Lose.” 
 
738 Dolan and Paddock, “Proposition 128.” 
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 The loss at the polls strengthened Chavez’s resolve that “electoral politics 
isn’t the only median of change.”739  Opponents to progressive measures could 
influence votes with multi-million dollar campaigns; but Chavez maintained that 
the same was not necessarily true of boycotts.  He asserted that “money and clout 
are impotent in the face of such simple challenges as boycotts,” because boycotts 
do not need majority support to achieve victory.740  While UFW supported the 
“Big Green” initiative, it maintained its focus on building support for the Wrath of 
Grapes campaign.  Chavez claimed that time was an ally in boycott campaigns 
and remained optimistic that the effort begun in 1984 would ultimately be 
successful.741  The Wrath of Grape boycotts, however, also failed to achieve its 
objective, despite support from some environmentalists, concerned consumers, 





                                                 
739 Cesar Chavez, “Effective Protest Doesn’t Require a Majority,” Los Angeles 






742 The UFW finally called off the boycott in 2000, sixteen years after it started.  
The boycott, especially in later years, lacked the impact of earlier boycotts.  Three 
of the targeted pesticides--dinoseb, parathion, and phosdrin--had been banned.  
The use of Captan had been restricted and methyl bromide was scheduled to be 
phased out.  The UFW had also shifted its focus away from grapes to roses, 
strawberries, mushrooms.  Dan Levy, “UFW Abandons ’84 Boycott Against 
California Grapes,” San Francisco Gate, November 22, 2000. 
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Conclusion 
 
 While the defeat of “Big Green” represented a significant and unexpected 
loss at the polls for regulation proponents, cooperative efforts among 
environmentalists, labor unions, and farmworker advocates posed a challenge to 
supporters of deregulation earlier in the decade.  Deukmejian took office in 1982 
with a plan to free business from the constraints of regulation.  Throughout his 
term in office, he worked to diminish the regulatory framework by underfunding 
agencies, working to limit the public’s ability to affect pesticide programs, and 
vetoing new laws that would result in more stringent regulations.  Yet these plans 
were resisted and sometimes fouled by a labor-environmental coalition that 
recognized a shared common ground between the groups.  Together unions and 
environmentalists filed lawsuits to force enforcement of existent law, pushed for 
legislative measures that would better protect the health of workers and the 
public, and tried to apply economic pressure to businesses in attempt to effect 
voluntary change within the industry.  Environmentalists and worker groups 
collaborated and showed support for the efforts of the other on multiple 
occasions, yet differences in the strategies and tactics of environmentalists and 
UFW also resulted in campaigns that were largely carried out separately from one 
another. 
 Environmentalists generally preferred the legislative track to pass more 
stringent regulations and use of the courts to force adherence to the law.  They 
also grouped pesticides in with other toxics in the 1980s, which in turn affected 
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the scope of their reform efforts.  Rather than try to restrict usage of one or two 
chemicals at a time, environmentalists in California tried to pass sweeping 
initiatives at the state-level that would curtail the use of both agricultural and 
industrial chemicals.  Prop 65, for example, looked to fundamentally reshape the 
regulatory landscape by shifting the burden of proof from the public and 
government to business.  The broad-based initiative faced vigorous challenges by 
the governor and industry groups after it passed into law, but withstood them to 
affect approximately 470 toxic chemicals in 1990.  The number grew after the 
repeal of the food, drug, and cosmetic industry exemption in 1993.  The overall 
impact of such broad-based legislative efforts, hence, was greater than it would 
have been had the groups chose to address one toxic substance at a time.743
 UFW, however, remained skeptical of the utility of law-making as a 
strategy for effecting change.  After passage of the best agricultural labor relation 
laws in the nation, UFW still had problems with enforcement, particularly after 
the election of Deukmejian to the governor’s office.  It returned its focus to the 
boycott as it had prior to the passage of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act.  The 
successful boycott, it believed, would result in union contracts that would be 
better than law, because union representatives would play a direct role in pesticide 
decision-making and monitoring of use practices.  Unlike the legislative efforts of 
environmentalists, the union chose to focus on a much smaller group of 
chemicals, promising to address other chemicals after Parathion, Phosdrin, Methyl 
 
                                                 
743 Randolph B. Smith, “California Spurs Reformulated Products,” Wall Street 
Journal, November 1, 1990. 
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Bromide, Dinoseb, and Captan were banned.  The geographical scope of the UFW 
effort also differed from the environmentalists’ campaigns.  Whereas 
environmentalists campaigned hard within the state of California to build voter 
support for Prop 65 and “Big Green,” UFW looked outside the state to the 
national and international community in effort to increase consumer participation 
in the boycott. 
 Despite the significant difference in campaign scope and strategy, UFW 
and environmentalists still found opportunity for cooperation.  A small contingent 
of environmental activists from mainstream and grassroots organizations advised 
the UFW on pesticides.  Some environmental groups endorsed the boycott and 
participated in the Fast for Life and other public rallies.  UFW did not contribute 
significant resources to the effort to pass Prop 65 in 1986, but the initiative 
campaign occurred at the same time that UFW was trying to revive a flagging 
boycott with the launch of the Wrath of Grapes campaign.  The new campaign 
undoubtedly consumed much of the union’s resources.  It did, however, support 
“Big Green” in 1990.  Continued collaboration between farmworker groups and 
environmentalists occurred in the 1990s and beyond as the organizations worked 
to keep the United States on its phase-out schedule for methyl bromide. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FROM THE GROUND UP: FUMIGANTS, OZONE, AND HEALTH 
Cesar Chavez stayed up late to review court documents on the night of 
April 22, 1993 in the home of a former farmworker in San Luis, a small border 
town in Arizona not far from where Chavez had grown up.  After spending the 
day in Yuma County Superior Court giving testimony to defend the union in a suit 
brought by grower Bruce Church, Inc., he drove past familiar places from his 
youth in the poorer sections of Yuma.  At the house in San Luis, Chavez broke a 
three-day fast, sharing a vegetarian dinner with a few union staffers and their host 
before retiring to a small spare bedroom to read. He showed signs of tiredness, but 
nothing to raise concern with those familiar with him.  Chavez, however, never 
woke from his sleep.744
 Six days later, a three-mile-long procession of 35,000 mourners followed 
Chavez and his pallbearers on the funeral march from Delano to the UFW’s Forty 
Acres compound.  UFW flags, banners, chants, and union songs filled the streets.  
Farmworkers alternated with celebrities and political allies to carry the simple 
white pine casket hewn by Chavez’s brother Richard along the route.  A single 
small red UFW flag adorned the inner lid of the otherwise plain coffin.
 
 745
                                                 
744 Tony Perry, “Chavez Died Near Birthplace, Site of Property Lost in 
Depression,” Los Angeles Times, April 24, 1993. 
  Luis 
 
745 Patt Morrison, “For the Final Time, They March for Chavez Memorial: From 
the Famous to the Field Workers, 35,000 Turn Out to Pay Tribute to the Late 
Labor Leader,” Los Angeles Times, April 30, 1993; “Cesar Chavez Funeral” 
(photo album) , Farmworker Documentation Project, 
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Valdez, founder of El Teatro Campesino, closed the ceremony with a promise to 
Chavez.  He said:  “We have come to plant your heart like a seed…the seed of 
your heart will keep on singing, keep on flowering, for the cause.”746
In the wake of his passing, Natural Resources Defense Council 
commended Chavez’s work on pesticides and expressed hope that cooperative 
efforts with the UFW to safeguard the health of farmworkers and protect the 
environment would continue to grow.  NRDC co-founder and executive director 
John Adams and attorney Al Meyerhoff characterized Chavez as a 
“visionary…[who] far before the concepts of ‘environmental justice’ became 
popular…understood that preserving human dignity and protecting the earth’s 
resources are necessarily intertwined.”
   
747
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.farmworkermovement.us/gallery/thumbnails.php?album=445
  The organization dedicated a 1993 
 
(accessed January 21, 2011). 
 
746 Morrison, “For the Final Time, They March for Chavez Memorial,” April 30, 
1993.   The future of the farmworkers’ movement remained uncertain following 
Chavez’s death, particularly since recurrent legal fees pushed the union to the 
brink of bankruptcy and anemic membership rolls paled in comparison to the 
number of dues-paying members in the 1970s.  Richard Steven Street, “Richard 
Steven Street 1988, 1993,” Farmworker Documentation Project 
http://farmworkermovement.com/essays/essays/194%20Street_Richard%20Steve
n.pdf (accessed January 25, 2011); Frank Bardacke, “Cesar’s Ghost,” Nation (July 
26, 1993): 130-135. 
 
747 Adams and Meyerhoff wrote that the death of Chavez “refocused the nation’s 
attention on the plight of our more than two million farmworkers” who labor for 
substandard wages and rank among the highest for occupational illness and death 
as a result of “intolerable working conditions and daily exposure to the range of 
toxic chemicals that now characterize much of American agriculture.”  John 
Adams and Al Meyerhoff, “Recalling Cesar Chavez,” UFW PR Dept: Jocelyn 
Sherman (unprocessed, Acc. No. 779, Acc. Date 10/28/97), Box 3, Folder NRDC, 
Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.  
Meyerhoff had an intimate familiarity with migrant farmworkers’ working and 
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report entitled After Silent Spring: The Unsolved Problems of Pesticide Use in the 
United States to the memory of Chavez for his commitment “to protecting 
farmworkers and the rural poor--those most exposed to the hazards of 
pesticides.”748
                                                                                                                                     
living conditions, since he began his career as an attorney working for California 
Rural Legal Assistance in 1972. He joined NRDC in 1981.  Steven Greenhouse, 
“Al Meyerhoff, Legal Voice for the Poor, Dies at 61,” New York Times, 
December 24, 2008. 
  The report noted that the volume of pesticides used in the United 
States had nearly doubled in the thirty years since publication of Silent Spring, 
climbing from an estimated annual use of 540 million pounds to more than one 
billion pounds per year in 1991. It then summarized the continuing health and 
environmental threats associated with pesticide use, arguing that the shortcomings 
 
748 Jennifer Curtis, Tim Profeta, and Lawrie Mott, After Silent Spring:  The 
Unsolved Problems of Pesticide Use in the United States (New York:  Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 1993), dedication page.  NRDC sent an advance draft 
of this report to new UFW president Arturo Rodriguez which bore the title Thirty 
Years Since Silent Spring: A Record of Inaction and Neglect.  Tim Profeta, 
Jennifer Curtis, and Lawrie Mott, Thirty Years Since Silent Spring: A Record of 
Inaction and Neglect [draft] (June 1993), UFW PR Dept: Jocelyn Sherman 
(unprocessed, Acc. No. 779, Acc. Date 10/28/97), Box 3, Folder NRDC, Archives 
of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.  Sierra Club 
similarly dedicated a bilingual 2004 report entitled Latino Communities at Risk: 
How Bush Administration Policies Harm Our Community to the memory of Cesar 
Chavez, stating: “Chavez’s movement linked people and the environment and 
taught us that we all have a right to live in a healthy and safe environment--no 
matter who we are or where we are from.  The work of Chavez and members of 
the environmental movement resulted in passage of landmark laws that protected 
our air, water, land and--most importantly--people.” Sierra Club, Latino 
Communities at Risk: How Bush Administration Policies Harm Our Community 
(Washington, D.C.: Sierra Club, 2004), 4, 
http://www.sierraclub.org/ecocentro/downloads/comunidades.pdf (accessed 
March 4, 2011). 
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of existent regulatory law failed to keep dangerous pesticides off the market. 749   
The report maintained that regulations to “protect farmworkers are wholly 
inadequate and should be dramatically overhauled.”750  NRDC asked Arturo 
Rodriguez, the successor to Chavez, to speak at the press conference announcing 
the release of the report.751
To illustrate its point about the inadequacies of pesticide regulation, 
NRDC used the example of methyl bromide, a pesticide that the UFW targeted in 
its Wrath of Grapes campaign.  UFW tried to force California grape growers away 
from methyl bromide with the boycott, but that effort proved unsuccessful.  
Methyl bromide, in fact, remained widely used in the production of a variety of 
crops across California, United States, and the world.  Global usage of methyl 
bromide climbed from 92 million pounds in 1984 to 139 million pounds in 1990 
with the United States accounting for more than 42 percent of the volume applied 
in that year. The pesticide, however, posed a serious threat to human and 
environmental health.  Between 1982 and 1990, poisoning from methyl bromide 
 
                                                 
749 Curtis, Profeta, and Mott, After Silent Spring, 3-5. 
 
750 The organization recommended that the provisions of the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act be extended to farmworkers, just as environmental and 
farmworker organizations had requested in the early 1970s.  It called upon states 
to “determine dislodgable pesticide residues in labor-intensive crops under local 
conditions,” lengthening reentry intervals beyond federal requirements if 
necessary.  NRDC also urged EPA to devote resources to investigating the 
occupational health hazards of pesticides in labor-intensive crops, while stressing 
that the most acutely toxic pesticides (Category 1) should be phased out to better 
safeguard the health of farmworkers.  Ibid., 39, 43, 49. Quote on page 39. 
751 Judy E. Martinez to Arturo Rodriguez, May 12, 1993, UFW PR Dept: Jocelyn 
Sherman (unprocessed, Acc. No. 779, Acc. Date 10/28/97), Box 3, Folder NRDC, 
Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.   
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caused the death of fifteen people and over 250 injuries in California alone.752  
Chronic overexposure could cause nerve damage, kidney problems, and impaired 
vision.753 Animal-based studies showed methyl bromide to be a mutagen and 
reproductive toxin.  Upon breaking down in the atmosphere, methyl bromide, in 
combination with CFCs, also deteriorates the ozone layer.754
After the death of Chavez, environmental groups and farmworker 
organizations continued to push growers and government to halt the usage of 
methyl bromide. The discovery of a hole in the ozone layer in 1985 and 
subsequent signing of the Montreal Protocol in 1987 committed the United States 
to ending usage of ozone-depleting substances.  An amendment to the 
international agreement in 1993 set a phase-out date for methyl bromide after the 
pesticide was found to contribute to the deterioration of the ozone layer.  
Growers’ associations and industry groups fiercely resisted the ban on methyl 
bromide with some success.  Through the 1990s and first decade of the new 
millennium, environmentalists and farmworker organizations worked separately 
and in coalitions to counter agricultural industry lobbying and to keep the United 
States on target for replacing methyl bromide with suitable less toxic alternatives. 
   
                                                 
752 Curtis, Profeta, and Mott, After Silent Spring, 43. 
 
753 California Department of Health Services, “Methyl Bromide,” Fact Sheet  
(May 1990), http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/hesis/Documents/mebr.pdf 
(accessed February 8, 2011). 
 
754 R.F. Hertel, T. Kielhorn, World Health Organization, International Labour 
Organisation, United Nations Environmental Programme, Methyl Bromide: First 
Draft Prepared by R.F. Hertel and T. Kielhorn (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 1995), 23, 81-84, 206-211. 
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The Development of International Agreement 
 
Scientists first became concerned that human actions could damage the 
ozone layer in 1970, but did not discover the developing hole over Antarctica 
until fifteen years thereafter.  Following the discovery of large sinks of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in the atmosphere in 1970, scientists F. Sherwood 
Roland and Mario Molina developed a theory that these common industrial 
chemicals had the potential to denigrate Earth’s protective ozone layer.  They 
argued that the CFCs would break down into chlorine monoxide, a compound 
which would then attack ozone particles.  The British Antarctic Survey 
documented a hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica eleven years later, a finding 
that was reaffirmed by NASA satellite photos.755  The hole spanned an area as 
large as the United States, extending over some parts of Argentina and New 
Zealand.756
                                                 
755 Scientists, in 1970, initially speculated that the development of supersonic 
transport (SST) could pose a threat to the ozone layer.  SST turned out not to be a 
substantial threat.  Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt: 
How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to 
Global Warming (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010), 107, 112, 118-120. 
  Subsequent studies concluded that high concentrations of chlorine 
from CFC breakdowns were responsible for the low stratospheric ozone levels 
over Antarctica.  The Airborne Arctic Stratospheric Expedition detected a similar 
 
756 Mostafa K. Tolba and Iwona Rummel-Bulska, “The Story of the Ozone 
Layer,” The Montreal Protocol: Celebrating 20 Years of Environmental Progress, 
ed. Donald Kaniaru (London: Cameron May and United Nations Environment 
Programme, 2007), 28. 
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deterioration of ozone particles in the Arctic in 1989, though the ozone layer at 
the northern pole had not thinned as much as in the Antarctic region.757
The destruction of the ozone layer posed a significant threat to human 
health and environment, since ozone helps shield the Earth from the sun’s harmful 
ultraviolet rays.  EPA predicted that the United States would witness 40 million 
additional cases of skin cancer and 12 million more eye cataracts as a result of the 
increased ultraviolet radiation (UV-B) exposure in the next hundred years if the 
volume of CFC emissions remained unchanged. 
 
758  Increased exposure to UV-B 
could also weaken the body’s immune system and hasten the spread of infectious 
disease.759  The discovery of stratospheric ozone deterioration in the Arctic 
further raised the possibility that health problems would be more widespread.  
NASA estimated that a 3 percent increase in global CFC emissions could result in 
a 10 percent loss of ozone annually by 2050.760
                                                 
757 Oreskes and Conway, Merchants of Doubt, 118-124. 
  Evidence suggested that 
increased UV-B radiation could also adversely affect ocean ecology by reducing 
phytoplankton, a vital source of food for marine life.  Subsequent declines in fish 
stocks had the potential to impact human life, since approximately half of the 
protein consumed by humans worldwide is drawn from the ocean.  Scientists 
knew little about the effects of increased UV-B on agricultural production, though 
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Technology, and Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 59-63. 
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a few early tests showed a decline in yields and greater susceptibility to weeds, 
insects, and disease.761
The threats associated with more UV-B rays reaching the Earth’s surface 
convinced several nations that the problem of ozone deterioration needed to be 
promptly addressed.  The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
Governing Council hosted a conference of industrialized and developing nations 
in April 1987.
 
762  The meeting ended with twenty-four nations signing the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.  Taking effect in 
1989, the Montreal Protocol froze production of CFCs at 1986 levels, gradually 
reducing the manufacture of the ozone-depleting chemicals over the next ten 
years.  By 1998, CFC-producing nations agreed to scale back manufacturing and 
consumption of CFCs to 50 percent of 1986 levels.763
                                                 
761 Makhijani and Gurney, Mending the Ozone Hole, 77, 79-82. 
  The protocol took a 
precautionary approach based on available scientific data.  Recognizing that new 
scientific evidence could necessitate an alteration in the nations’ response to the 
ozone hole, the agreement included a clause that required participating countries 
 
762 Tolba and Rummel-Bulska, “The Story of the Ozone Layer,” 29. 
 
763 By 1995, 145 nations ratified the protocol.  Makhijani and Gurney, Mending 
the Ozone Hole, 219-220.  The protocol forbid participating nations from moving 
production facilities to non-participating nations and similarly prohibited the 
importation of CFCs into signatory nations. Reiner Grundmann, Transnational 
Environmental Policy: Reconstructing Ozone (New York: Routledge, 2001), 165. 
 
  285 
to meet every few years to consider whether any changes needed to be made to 
the restrictions on ozone-depleting chemicals.764
 The 1992 Copenhagen Amendment added methyl bromide to the cast of 
ozone-depleting chemicals restricted by the Montreal Protocol.  Participating 
nations reconvened once previously in 1990 in London to strengthen the 
provisions of the international agreement, during which a date was set to 




                                                 
764 Oreskes and Conway, Merchants of Doubt, 122. 
  Copenhagen hosted the next meeting, during which participants 
addressed the deleterious effects of methyl bromide on the ozone layer.  Methyl 
bromide broke down into bromine in the atmosphere, a compound that destroyed 
stratospheric ozone particles with fifty times greater efficiency than chlorine.  
Scientists estimated that bromine was responsible for approximately 25 percent of 
the ozone depletion in 1992.  Dr. Robert Watson, Associate Director for the 
Environment for the Office of Science and Technology Policy, estimated that if 
usage of methyl bromide ceased by 2001 that the rate of ozone loss would fall by 
13 percent in the fifty years following.  Consequently, attendees of the 
Copenhagen meeting resolved that a global ban on methyl bromide would help 
 
765 Under the London Amendment of 1990, industrialized nations agreed to phase-
out CFCs by 2000.  Developing countries had an additional ten years to complete 
the transition.  The phase-out date for CFCs was shortened by four years with the 
subsequent Copenhagen Amendment of 1992.  Makhijani and Gurney, Mending 
the Ozone Hole, 222-225. 
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slow the destruction of the ozone layer.766  The Copenhagen Amendment of 1992 
froze production and consumption of methyl bromide in 1995 at the chemical’s 
1991 levels of manufacture and use.767
Subsequent amendments to the Montreal Protocol set a schedule for 
phasing out methyl bromide for industrialized and developing countries, though 
the United States planned to follow a self-imposed timeline that was even more 
abbreviated.  The Vienna Amendment of 1995 restricted industrialized countries’ 
usage of methyl bromide further, setting a goal of 50 percent reduction by 2005 
and phase-out by 2010.  Representatives of participating nations met again in 
Montreal two years later to revise the schedule on methyl bromide.  Thereafter, 
industrialized countries agreed to achieve a 50 percent reduction in use by 2001 
and phase the chemical out in the four years following.  “Critical use exemptions” 
could still be granted for agricultural use when no available alternative would 
effectively do the job of methyl bromide.
   
768
                                                 
766 House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on 
Commerce, Clean Air Act Amendments, 104th Cong., 1st sess., August 1, 1995, 37, 
108.  The Copenhagen Amendment also restricted hydrochlorofluorocarbons and 
hydrobromofluorocarbons.  Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Environmental Treaties, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., October 26, 1993, 11. 
  The United States’ Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 hastened the nation’s schedule for phasing out methyl 
bromide even further.  Intended to complement the Montreal Protocol, the Clean 
Air Act Amendments established a seven-year phase-out schedule for chemicals 
 
767 Makhijani and Gurney, Mending the Ozone Hole, 226. 
 
768 Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Air Pollution Control Law: Compliance and 
Enforcement (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Law Institute, 2001), 400. 
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classified as Class 1 Ozone-Depleting Substances.  In the case of a rule 
discrepancy, the stricter standard took precedence.  Hence, when EPA listed 
methyl bromide as a Class 1 chemical in December 1993, growers within the 
United States had only until 2001 to adopt alternatives to the chemical.  The 
Clean Air Act Amendments had no “critical use” exemption.769
As 2001 approached, growers in the United States became more vocal in 
their calls to prolong the phase-out of methyl bromide.  They argued that the 
effectiveness of methyl bromide could not be matched by any other means of 
control.  Executive manager of the California Cherry Export Association Jim 
Culbertson held that methyl bromide had been unfairly “placed in the position of 
public enemy No. 1 by the radical environmental community” and stressed that 
“methyl bromide has remained as a silver bullet in the economic control of many 
pests and diseases, weathering the tide of pest evolution.”
 
770
                                                 
769 House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Clean Air Act 
Amendments, 2; House Subcommittee on Health and Environment, Committee on 
Commerce, Implementation of Title VI of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
and Plans for the Upcoming Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol in 
Montreal in September 1997, 105th Cong., 1st sess., July 30, 1997, 34, 41. 
  The American Farm 
Bureau Federation similarly reiterated methyl bromide’s uniqueness, stating that 
its ability to combat a wide variety of pests in a multitude of crops differentiated it 
from other agricultural chemicals.  It countered arguments that the pending phase-
out date would spark a period of new innovations, suggesting that “while 
government can ban certain technologies…it can’t require scientists to invent 
 
770 House Subcommittee on Livestock and Horticulture, Committee on 
Agriculture, The Implications of Banning Methyl Bromide for Fruit and Vegetable 
Production, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13, 2000, 14. 
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something.”  AFBF asserted that potential alternatives were not as effective as 
methyl bromide, cost too much, had questions relating to environmental impact, 
or would not be able to be registered prior to the 2001 phase-out date.771
American growers argued that they would be put at a competitive 
disadvantage if the 2001 phase-out date remained unchanged.  This schedule 
would force growers within the United States to stop using methyl bromide four 
years before other industrialized nations.  Countries like Mexico, which were 
classified as developing nations by the Montreal Protocol, could continue to use 
the ozone-depleting pesticide until 2015.  AFBF warned that this discrepancy 
threatened the vitality of American agriculture.  The organization estimated that 
strawberry production in Florida and California, for example, would see a 
production decline of 30 to 50 percent and predicted that the costs of berries 
produced in the United States would consequently rise.  AFBF asserted that 
Mexican growers, meanwhile, could undersell their American competitors 
because their unrestricted access to methyl bromide allowed for the continued 
production of strong yields at low cost.
 
772
                                                 
771 House Subcommittee on Forestry, Resource Conservation, and Research, 
Committee on Agriculture, Review of the Phaseout of Methyl Bromide 105th 
Congress, 2nd sess., June 10, 1998, 86-88, quote on p. 88. 
  The Florida Farm Bureau Federation 
forecast that holding American growers to more stringent standards would have 
“no net environmental gain” because Mexican growers would expand acreage and 
 
772 Ibid., 86. 
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increase use of methyl bromide to fill the niche left by Florida growers who were 
no longer able to compete in the global marketplace.773
Proponents of continued methyl bromide use also questioned the rationale 
behind the planned phase-out.  Jim Culbertson suggested that “we long ago lost 
sight of the forest for the trees” in researching methyl bromide releases in the 
atmosphere.  He argued that natural occurrences like biomass burning injected a 
far greater share of methyl bromide emissions into the atmosphere than 
agricultural use.  He complained that the international community nonetheless 
continued “to concentrate our regulatory efforts on a minute portion of the methyl 
bromide equation that carries with it a great loss for agriculture.”
 
774
                                                 
773 House Subcommittee on Livestock and Horticulture, The Implications of 
Banning Methyl Bromide for Fruit and Vegetable Production, 53. 
  Culbertson’s 
complaint implied that there was consensus on the percentage of methyl bromide 
emissions in the atmosphere that could be traced to agricultural production and 
that the figure was negligible.  Others chose to attack the science supporting the 
methyl bromide ban.  In 1998, AFBF complained that “methyl bromide’s role as 
an ozone depleter is still uncertain” and that restrictive action was premature.  It 
referenced the results from recent tests, funded in part by the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), showing that the oceans broke down 
atmospheric methyl bromide more quickly than scientists previously thought, 
which meant that the atmospheric lifetime of methyl bromide was also less than 
earlier estimates.  AFBF suggested that this finding should forestall action on the 
 
774 Ibid., 56. 
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regulation of methyl bromide, because the discovery proved that methyl bromide 
constituted less of a threat than originally thought.775
All of the arguments for prolonging the use of methyl bromide had 
weaknesses.  NOAA estimated that 20 to 30 percent of the methyl bromide in the 
atmosphere came from crop fumigation emissions.  Even as scientists revised the 
atmospheric lifetime of methyl bromide in 1997, NOAA still maintained that 
“man-made methyl bromide is responsible for 3-10% of global stratospheric 
ozone destruction.”
   
776
                                                 
775 House Subcommittee on Forestry, Resource Conservation, and Research, 
Review of the Phaseout of Methyl Bromide, 87.  Scientists reduced estimates on 
the lifespan of atmospheric methyl bromide to .7 years after processing the data 
from the NOAA-funded research.  This represented a notable change from the 
1992, when scientists believed that methyl bromide remained in the atmosphere 
for two years.  NOAA did not conclude that the use of methyl bromide as an 
agricultural fumigant posed no threat to the ozone layer.  Shari A. Yvon-Lewis 
and James Butler, “The Potential Effect of Oceanic Biological Degradation on the 
Lifetime of Atmospheric CH3Br,” Geophysical Research Letters 24, No. 10 (May 
15, 1997): 1227-1230; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, press 
release, “Oceans Remove More Ozone-Depleting Methyl Bromide From 
Atmosphere Than Previously Estimated, Research Shows,” May 22, 1997, 
  The fumigant, furthermore, was the most easily regulated 
source of the compound, so the elimination of its production and use remained the 
best option for reducing ozone deterioration by atmospheric methyl bromide.  Soil 
fumigation accounted for approximately 75 percent of the global man-made 
methyl bromide use in 1998, so phasing it out in agriculture would greatly reduce 
release of the dangerous compound into the air.  Though growers applied it to 
http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/pr97/may97/noaa97-31.html (accessed 
February 20, 2011).  
 
776 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Oceans Remove More 
Ozone-Depleting Methyl Bromide From Atmosphere Than Previously Estimated, 
Research Shows.”  
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over a hundred varieties of fruits and vegetables, UNEP’s Methyl Bromide 
Technical Options Committee maintained that every crop that currently used the 
fumigant could be successfully produced without it using Integrated Pest 
Management.777  Field experiments in Florida, for instance, concluded that some 
growers might suffer a slight loss in yield, but could still produce a good crop 
without methyl bromide.  Some trials with Integrated Pest Management, however, 
actually had higher net returns because the costs of production fell when growers 
did not have to pay for fumigation.778
 
  This evidence discounted growers’ 
assertions that lack of viable alternatives to methyl bromide and increased foreign 
competition would cause the decline of United States agriculture in the wake of a 
methyl bromide ban. 
                                                 
777 United Nations Environment Programme Ozone Secretariat, Synthesis of the 
Reports of the Scientific, Environmental Effects, and Technology and Economic 
Assessment Panels of the Montreal Protocol: A Decade of Assessments for 
Decision Makers Regarding the Protection of the Ozone Layer: 1988-1999, ed. 
Daniel L. Albritton and Lambert Kuijpers (Nairobi: UNON Printshop, 1999), 17; 
House Subcommittee on Forestry, Review of the Phaseout of Methyl Bromide, 66, 
93, 104. 
 
778 Alternatives lacked the universal applicability of methyl bromide and required 
the growers to make more complex choices in adopting pest control strategies. 
Tests on Florida tomatoes comparing Integrated Pest Management strategies with 
usage of methyl bromide in production showed a decline in harvest yield from 
42.5 tons of tomatoes per hectare to thirty-six tons.  The return to growers, 
however, increased from 2,320 dollars per hectare to 2,888 dollars when using an 
alternative pest management strategy.  D.O. Chellemi, “Field Validation of 
Methyl Bromide Alternatives in Florida Fresh Market Vegetable Production 
Systems,” in Global Report on Validated Alternatives to the Use of Methyl 
Bromide for Soil Fumigation, FAO Plant Production and Protection Paper 166, 
ed. R. Labrada and L. Fornasari (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations and United Nations Environment Programme, 2001), 27-29. 
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Linking Local to Global 
 
 As growers lobbied for continued use of methyl bromide, Farmworker 
Association of Florida (FWAF) partnered with Friends of the Earth (FoE), 
Farmworker Self-Help, Inc., Florida Consumer Action Network, and Legal 
Environmental Assistance Foundation (LEAF) to initiate a campaign supporting 
the methyl bromide ban.  The organizations opted to take a largely localized 
approach to an international problem, focusing their efforts primarily on Florida 
and its tomato industry.779  Soil fumigation in tomato production accounted for 
approximately 30 percent of the 35 million pounds of methyl bromide used in the 
United States agriculture in 1996.780  Florida growers led production of fresh 
market tomatoes, growing nearly half of the nation’s crop.  They used methyl 
bromide on 93 percent of the tomato crop.781
                                                 
779 Corinna Gilfillan, Reaping Havoc: The True Cost of Methyl Bromide on 
Florida’s Tomatoes (Washington, D.C.: Friends of the Earth, 1998). 
  The Sustainable Tomatoes/Safer 
Communities campaign launched by the coalition of farmworker groups and 
environmental organizations clearly targeted a segment of the industry that was 
one of the primary users of methyl bromide in the United States. 
 
780 Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Facing the 
Phaseout of Methyl Bromide” Agricultural Outlook (August 1999): 24, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/agoutlook/aug1999/ao263h.pdf (accessed 
February 20, 2011).  
 
781 Chellemi, “Field Validation of Methyl Bromide Alternatives in Florida Fresh 
Market Vegetable Production Systems,” 27; House Subcommittee on Livestock 
and Horticulture, The Implications of Banning Methyl Bromide for Fruit and 
Vegetable Production, 5. 
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 Both Friends of Earth and Farmworker Association of Florida had a 
history of engagement in pesticide issues prior to forming the Sustainable 
Tomatoes/Safer Communities Coalition.  Friends of the Earth partnered with 
Natural Resources Defense Council and Environmental Defense Fund to petition 
EPA in December 1991 to phase-out usage of methyl bromide by 1993.782  FoE 
also worked to find replacement options for methyl bromide, funding studies and 
coordinating projects to identify alternatives to methyl bromide and ease the 
transition away from the ozone-depleting chemical.783  Since former farmworker 
Tirso Moreno became director of FWAF in 1986, the organization engaged in 
efforts to better protect farmworkers from pesticide-related injuries and 
diseases.784
                                                 
782 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Pollution Control Law: Compliance & Enforcement, 
395; Speaking before the 1991 International Conference on CFC and Halon 
Alternatives, NRDC Senior Attorney David D. Doniger presented the petition and 
urged EPA to take immediate steps to restrict methyl bromide.  He contended:  
“the situation is far too grave to wait, hold back U.S. action and play a global 
game of ‘chicken’ with the health and welfare of tens of millions.  The Clean Air 
Act--and any measure of good sense--require industry and government to act now 
in this country.” David D. Doniger, “An Emergency Phase-Out Schedule” 
(lecture, Hyatt Regency, Baltimore, MD, December 3, 1991), 1, quote on 3-4. 
  Moreno previously served as a worker representative for UFW in 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2028475237-5240.html (accessed February 23, 
2011). 
 
783 Friends of the Earth, for instance, helped fund and coordinate research in 
developing countries that investigated the technical and economic feasibility of 
replacing methyl bromide. The Technical and Economic Feasibility of Replacing 
Methyl Bromide in Developing Countries: Case Studies in Zimbabwe, Thailand 
and Chile, ed. Melanie Miller (Washington, D.C.: Friends of the Earth, 1996). 
 
784 FWAF actually came into existence three years earlier.  It shortened its name 
from Farmworker Association of Central Florida when it was incorporated in 
1986. “Becoming a Standout in the Field: Farmworker Association Co-Founder 
Aids Laborers With Migrant Headaches,” Orlando Sentinel (February 4, 1991); 
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Florida and considered Chavez an environmental hero.785  Moreno, like Chavez, 
similarly expressed concern about the effects of pesticides on farmworkers and 
pushed for more a stringent “right to know” law in Florida.786  FWAF also 
engaged in educational outreach in attempt to make farmworkers more aware of 
the pesticide threat and to teach doctors how to better identify cases of pesticide 
poisoning.787  The groups found opportunity for collaboration in the campaign 
against methyl bromide in 1998.  FoE Health and Environment Director Larry 
Bohlen and Atmosphere Campaign Director Jessica Vallette Revere, along with 
FWAF Pesticide Safety and Environmental Health Project Coordinator Jeannie 
Economos and Administrator Sister Gail Grimes served as the primary points of 
contact in the collaborative effort.788
                                                                                                                                     
“FWAF History,” 
   
http://www.floridafarmworkers.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=50&limitstart=3 (accessed February 26, 2011). 
 
785 Grist Magazine asked Moreno who was his “environmental hero” and Moreno 
responded Cesar Chavez.  Moreno did not actually use the words “environmental 
hero” in his response. “The Not-So-Funny Farm: Tirso Moreno, Farmworker 
Organizer, Answers Questions,” Grist (March 20, 2006), 
http://www.grist.org/article/moreno (accessed February 26, 2011). 
 
786 Jerry Jackson, “Farm Workers Seek More,” Orlando Sentinel (August 23, 
1993). 
 
787 Tom Moore, “Farm Workers Will Learn Work Hazard,” Orlando Sentinel 
(May 28, 1992); Farmworker Association of Florida, “¡La Amenaza de los 
Pesticidas!,” [n.d], Folder MBA and Sustainable Tomato Campaign, Farmworker 
Association of Florida private collection, Apopka, FL.   
 
788 Friends of the Earth, “Congress Poised to Weaken Clean Air Act and Ozone 
Protection: Rep. Fazio’s Amendment Would Delay Ban of Toxic Pesticide 
Methyl Bromide,” press release, September 29, 1998, Folder Methyl Bromide, 
Farmworker Association of Florida private collection, Apopka, FL; Friends of the 
  295 
 The Sustainable Tomatoes/Safer Communities campaign introduced its 
broad-based agenda with the release of a report, entitled Reaping Havoc: The 
True Cost of Using Methyl Bromide on Florida’s Tomatoes, published jointly by 
the participating organizations.  The coalition called on the Clinton 
administration, Congress, and the State of Florida to resist growers’ appeals for an 
extension on methyl bromide and recommended the adoption of a graduated 
timeline for use reduction leading up to ultimate phasing-out of the pesticide in 
2001. It additionally urged EPA and USDA to develop an educational program 
that eased growers’ transition to safer alternatives.  The report then narrowed its 
focus from the national level to Florida.  To global concern about ozone 
deterioration, the coalition added complaints that methyl bromide threatened the 
health of farmworkers and people living close to agricultural fields where the 
pesticide was used in production.  The groups further held that Florida’s 
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (DACS) failed to enforce EPA 
Worker Protection Standards and requested EPA to review Florida’s regulatory 
program and take corrective action.  The organizations also called upon the State 
                                                                                                                                     
Earth, “Methyl Bromide Red Alert!!,” press release, September 2, 1998, Folder 
Methyl Bromide, Farmworker Association of Florida private collection, Apopka, 
FL; Mark Johnson to Farmworker Association of Florida, November 17, 2000, 
Folder Methyl Bromide Test Results, Farmworker Association of Florida private 
collection, Apopka, FL; “How to Conduct Air Test,” [n.d.], Folder MB Originals, 
Farmworker Association of Florida private collection, Apopka, FL. 
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of Florida to expand public right-to-know laws and promote sustainable pest 
management practices in an effort to reduce the overall use of pesticides.789
 The Sustainable Tomatoes/Safer Communities Campaign, in part, 
continued the FWAF’s work of educating farmworkers and their families about 
the health risks of exposure to methyl bromide and other chemicals.  Reaping 
Havoc and educational pamphlets outlined the chronic effects and short-term 
symptoms of methyl bromide poisoning.  The acute effects of exposure included:  
eye and lung irritation, shortness of breath, difficulty talking, convulsions, 
fainting, and vomiting.  More severe cases of exposure, it reported, could result in 
damage to the brain and other vital organs, heart attack, and death.
 
790  A 
children’s coloring book entitled “Sunny’s Niños Juegan Con Cuidado” (Sunny’s 
Kids Play With Care) taught the children of farmworkers how to identify 
hazardous containers of pesticides, instructed them to stay away from freshly 
sprayed fields and agricultural chemicals, and informed them about the 
preventative steps that their working family members should take in the field to 
protect themselves from pesticide poisoning.791
                                                 
789 Gifillan, Reaping Havoc, 2, 35-36; “Reaping Havoc Released,” (Friends of the 
Earth) Atmosphere , (September 1999): 5, Folder Methyl Bromide Alternatives, 
Farmworker Association of Florida private collection, Apopka, FL.   
 
 
790 Ibid., 11-13; Farmworker Association of Florida,“Your Informational Booklet 
on Methyl Bromide,” (February 2001), Folder Methyl Bromide, Farmworker 
Association of Florida private collection, Apopka, FL.   
 
791 Publication of the coloring book was funded in part by grants to the 
Sustainable Tomatoes campaign.  Acorn Foundation, Ben and Jerry’s, and 
Patagonia Environmental Grants Program numbered among the donors who 
supported the costs of publication.  Children could also punch out a card at the 
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 The coalition similarly devoted resources to an education campaign that 
would educate the public about the hazards of methyl bromide in an attempt to 
build support for the 2001 phase-out.  It appealed to the public on multiple levels 
ranging from global to local, addressing both environmental and human health 
concerns.792  FoE President Brent Blackwelder asserted:  “We’re talking attack of 
the killer tomatoes.  Not only is it depleting the ozone; but if it drifts into the air, it 
could kill someone.  It’s a lethal toxic.”793   The coalition warned that Congress 
and the Clinton administration might cave to growers lobbying for a revised 
schedule that would extend the phase-out date to 2005.  The groups urged people 
to write their congressional representatives and the president to counter the 
intensive lobbying of grower associations and industry-related groups.  The 
Sustainable Tomatoes/Safer Communities campaign also recommended that the 
public use their purchasing power to effect change, demanding that grocers carry 
“ozone friendly” tomatoes and buy produce grown without the use of methyl 
bromide.794
                                                                                                                                     
back of the book that identified them as junior members of the Farmworker 
Association of Florida.  Alisa Roberson and La Asociación Campesina de Florida, 
Inc. (Farmworker Association of Florida), Sunny’s Niños Juegan Con Cuidado 
(Apopka, FL: Farmworker Association of Florida, 2002).  Copy in possession of 
the author courtesy of Farmworker Association of Florida, Apopka, FL. 
   
 
792 Friends of the Earth, “I Say Tomáto, You Say Tomäto,” pamphlet, [n.d.], 
Folder Methyl Bromide, Farmworker Association of Florida private collection, 
Apopka, FL.   
 
793 “Some Say Time Ripe for Tomato Changes,” Orlando Sentinel, March 8, 
1998. 
 
794 Friends of the Earth, “I Say Tomáto, You Say Tomäto.” 
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The campaign had little chance to gain momentum before Victor Fazio, a 
Democratic U.S. Representative from a rural California district, introduced an 
amendment to extend the timeline for phasing-out methyl bromide.  Florida’s 
Republican Representative Dan Miller previously introduced a House Bill in June 
1998 that would amend the Clean Air Act and set the United States on the same 
methyl bromide reduction schedule as other industrialized nations under the 
Montreal Protocol.  The bill also included a provision absent from the Clean Air 
Act that allowed growers to continue using methyl bromide after the ban if they 
got an emergency use exemption.795 Congress passed the legislation on October 6, 
1998, but it did not go into effect because President Clinton vetoed Miller’s 
bill.796  Fazio, however, attached a similarly-worded rider to the 1999 omnibus 
spending bill.  The rider received little notice in the package legislation and 
passed into law with Clinton’s signature on October 21.797
                                                                                                                                     
 
  Jessica Vallette voiced 
795 “Methyl Bromide Phase-Out Focus of Agriculture Subcommittee,” California 
Capitol Hill Bulletin 5, No. 20 (June 11, 1998): 6, 
http://www.calinst.org/bulletins/bull520.pdf (accessed February 26, 2011); House 
Subcommittee on Forestry, Review of the Phaseout of Methyl Bromide, 13-14. 
 
796 Pesticide Action Network North America, press release, “Action Alert: Stop 
Delay of U.S. Methyl Bromide Ban,” October 7, 1998, http://www.sare.org/sanet-
mg/archives/html-home/28-html/0260.html (accessed February 26, 2011); 
“Methyl Bromide Ban Delayed,” Grain News (October 21, 1998), 
http://www.grainnet.com/articles/methyl_bromide_ban_delayed-2408.html 
(accessed February 26, 2011). 
 
797 Martha Groves, “Gas Ban Creates a Cloud of Discontent: Both Growers, 
Environmentalists Unhappy,” Los AngelesTimes, November 12, 1998; “Easy 
Riders: Attempting to Push an Anti-Environmental Agenda, Congress Goes Into 
Stealth Mode,” E: The Environmental Magazine (December 31, 1998), 
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the sentiments of environmentalists and other supporters of the methyl bromide 
ban, stating that Fazio “sneaking in an anti-environmental amendment without 
hearing” was contemptible.798  Vice President Al Gore characterized the tactic as 
a “sneak attack” that buried “special-interest riders deep in budget bills where 
they hope no one will find them.”799  Fazio’s strategy proved successful 
nonetheless, allowing growers to continue using methyl bromide until 2005.800
After the passage of the Fazio Amendment, the Sustainable 
Tomatoes/Safer Communities coalition tightened its focus on state-level policies.  
Florida’s pesticide regulations provided far less protection to farmworkers and 
residents in surrounding communities than did the laws in California.  Whereas 
the EPA set the methyl bromide exposure limit at 5,000 ppb (parts per billion) for 
farmworkers, the California Department of Pesticide Regulation reduced the 
exposure threshold for farmworkers and the general public to 210 ppb in a 
twenty-four hour period.  The Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer 
Services (FDACS) required only that growers adhere to the federal standards on 
product labels.  Additionally, California regulation mandated that a sixty-foot 
buffer zone separate spray areas from residential developments.  Some counties 
 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.emagazine.com/archive/57 (accessed February 26, 2011); “Methyl 
Bromide Ban Delayed.” 
 
798 Friends of the Earth, “Congress Poised to Weaken Clean Air Act and Ozone 
Protection.” 
 
799 “Easy Riders.”; “A Stealth Assault on the Environment,” San Francisco 
Chronicle (October 2, 1998). 
 
800 Ibid. 
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within California further required that growers notify people living within 360 
feet of an application site prior to the use of methyl bromide.  FDACS had no 
buffer zone requirements and did not call for growers to provide advance 
notification to people living adjacent to fields scheduled for fumigation.801 
Florida’s Department of Agriculture did not have data banks comparable to 
California that charted the volume of pesticides used, location of application, or 
duration of use either.  In addition, FWAF charged that the agency showed laxity 
in its enforcement of existing regulations, asserting that FDACS failed to properly 
monitor growers to make sure that they posted warning signs around recently 
fumigated fields.802
The coalition drew inspiration from the efforts of activist groups in 
California to show that Florida’s regulatory laws did an inadequate job of 
protecting the public from exposure to pesticides.  California planned to ban the 
use of methyl bromide within the state in March 1996 because the pesticide 
manufacturers had failed to submit scientific data required under the 1984 
California Birth Defects Prevention Act.  After being intensely lobbied to rescind 
the ban and reportedly receiving nearly 100,000 dollars from the agricultural 
industry, Governor Pete Wilson called the legislature into special session in 
 
                                                 
801 Friends of the Earth, “Methyl Bromide Health Effects and Exposure Level 
Standards,” [n.d.], Folder Packet of Info from FOE, Farmworker Association of 
Florida private collection, Apopka, FL. 
 
802 Tirso Moreno to Jeb Bush, April 16, 2001, Folder Methyl Bromide Sustainable 
Tomatoes, Farmworker Association of Florida private collection, Apopka, FL. 
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January 1996 with virtually no notice to the public.803    The legislature lifted the 
proposed ban less than three weeks before it was to take effect.804  Environmental 
Working Group (EWG) subsequently collaborated with a number of local 
community groups to conduct air monitoring tests to show that methyl bromide 
posed a risk to residents in neighborhoods adjoining fields where it was used.805  
EWG responded to complaints from Castroville residents in 1997, who had 
suffered the symptoms of pesticide poisoning on several occasions after growers 
applied methyl bromide to their crop.  Silicon-lined canisters that the organization 
set out after a local grower fumigated his fields showed methyl bromide 
concentrations peaking at 3,700 ppb, more than seventeen times higher than the 
allowable exposure level, at an elementary school outside the buffer zone.806
                                                 
803 Michael G. Wagner, “Activists Urge Ban on Methyl Bromide Use,” Los 
Angeles Times, July 29, 1996; Methyl Bromide Alternatives Network, “After 
Taking Almost $100,000 from the Methyl Bromide Lobby: Gov. Pete Wilson Just 
Called a Special Session of the Legislature to Unleash a Deadly Pesticide,” 
advertisement, New York Times, January 19, 1996; United Farm Workers, 
“Saturday, News Conference in Oakland: UFW’s Dolores Huerta Joined by Local 
CA. Democrats to Denounce Possible Methyl Bromide Use Extension as 
Lawmakers Debate Extending the Use of This Birth Defect-Causing Toxic 
Pesticide,” press release, January 20, 1996, UFW PR Dept: Jocelyn Sherman 
(unprocessed, Acc. No. 779, Acc. Date 10/28/97), Box 3, Folder Methyl Bromide 




804 “Wilson OKs Methyl Bromide Extension,” Los Angeles Times, March 13, 
1996. 
 
805 Bill Walker, “California Study Admits Methyl Bromide Safety Standard 
Inadequate,” Environmental Working Group, June 1997, 
http://www.ewg.org/reports/dprweb (accessed March 1, 2011). 
 
806 The concentration of methyl bromide in the air fluctuated over a period of 
days.  The peak occurred when school was out of session, but measurements still 
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Environmental Working Group, Friends of the Earth, Pesticide Action Network, 
and Pesticide Watch used the data from two years of air monitoring tests to bring 
suit against the California Department of Pesticide Regulation, ultimately forcing 
the agency to revise its regulations on methyl bromide.807
The Sustainable Tomatoes/Safer Communities coalition initiated its own 
air monitoring campaign to demonstrate that the state’s anemic regulatory 
structure put the members of some communities at risk.  Friends of the Earth 
rented equipment from the same company used by the organizations in California.  
In Fall 2000, FWAF volunteers and Florida Consumer Action Network staffers 
watched for growers to apply methyl bromide to the fields around the town of 
Homestead.  Then they set out a total of twelve test canisters for eight to twelve 
hours to collect air samples.  They put canisters in the parking lot of the First 
  
                                                                                                                                     
exceeded permissible levels when school convened on Monday.  Environmental 
Working Group, “High Levels of Methyl Bromide Discovered Near Elementary 
School,” Environmental Working Group, http://www.ewg.org/node/8675 
(accessed March 1, 2011).  EWG analyzed state figures on school enrollment and 
reported that 68,238 children attended schools within 1.5 miles of fields 
fumigated with methyl bromide in 1998.  Zev Ross and Bill Walker, An Ill Wind: 
Methyl Bromide Use Near California Schools (Washington, D.C.: Environmental 
Working Group, 1998), 1, 21-29, http://www.ewg.org/files/anillwind_illwind.pdf 
(accessed March 1, 2011). 
 
807 Environmental Working Group, Friends of the Earth, Pesticide Action 
Network, Pesticide Watch, and Western Environmental Law Center, “California 
Court Ruling: State’s Lax Guidelines for Pesticide Violate Law,” press release, 
March 19, 1999, Folder MBA and Sustainable Tomato Campaign, Farmworker 
Association of Florida private collection, Apopka, FL; Environmental Working 
Group, “California Ordered to Adopt Methyl Bromide Regulations,” San Diego 
Earth Times, May 1999, http://www.sdearthtimes.com/et0599/et0599s2.html 
(accessed March 1, 2011); Environmental Working Group, “High Levels of 
Methyl Bromide Discovered Near Elementary School.”   
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Baptist Church, which was fifty feet away from a fumigated field, and at two 
other churches in the vicinity. 808  Test results revealed that methyl bromide drift 
exited the fields in surrounding areas, sometimes in concentrations reaching 625 
ppb.809  That amount was within allowable limits according to Florida regulations, 
but nearly three times as high as the legal limit in California.  The growers 
provided no advance warning to people in adjacent areas, since they were not 
required to do so by law.  The coalition also reported that area farmworkers did 
not receive proper instruction or protective equipment for using and working 
around methyl bromide.810
The Sustainable Tomatoes/Safer Communities coalition used the test 
results to support their argument for stricter regulation. It concluded that the 
results showed the necessity of restricting where methyl bromide could be applied 
and recommended that the state require the establishment buffer zones around 
field perimeters to better protect people in surrounding residential and commercial 
    
                                                 
808 “Methyl Bromide Drift in Homestead, Florida,” Folder Methyl Bromide, 
Farmworker Association of Florida private collection, Apopka, FL; Friends of the 
Earth, Florida Consumer Action Network, and Farmworker Association of 
Florida, press release, “Toxic Pesticide Drifts onto Church Properties in 
Homestead,”  [n.d., 2000], Folder Methyl Bromide, Farmworker Association of 
Florida private collection, Apopka, FL. 
 
809 Mark Johnson to Florida Consumer Action Network, October 13, 2000, Folder 
Methyl Bromide Test Results, Farmworker Association of Florida private 
collection, Apopka, FL; Mark Johnson to Farm Worker Association of Florida, 
November 17, 2000, Folder Methyl Bromide Test Results, Farmworker 
Association of Florida private collection, Apopka, FL. 
 
810 “Methyl Bromide Drift in Homestead, Florida.”; Friends of the Earth, Florida 
Consumer Action Network, and Farmworker Association of Florida, “Toxic 
Pesticide Drifts onto Church Properties in Homestead.”  
 
  304 
areas.  Growers, the groups maintained, should also be required to warn people in 
neighboring communities before using the fumigant.  The coalition then urged 
FDACS to help growers transition to non-toxic alternative forms of pest 
control.811  Tirso Moreno maintained focus on farmworkers who both worked in 
and lived around fumigated fields, contending that “the work we do does not have 
to be a cause of illness to our family, neither should we have to lose our lives to 
feed ourselves.”812
News accounts of a church congregation near Homestead suffering 
pesticide poisoning from methyl bromide fumigation combined with pressure 
from the Sustainable Tomatoes/Safer Communities campaign put pressure on the 
state government to respond.  Reverend Gladys Herrera of Iglesia El Calvario 
Fuente de Vida, a church located just north of Homestead in the small town on 
Naranja, told reporters covering the incident that “the kids started coughing, to 
vomit, all the people in my church started to feel dizzy, bad, and the people felt 
like tickling in their throats…and the kids said to me, ‘Grandmother, I feel 
 
                                                 
811 Friends of the Earth, Florida Consumer Action Network, and Farmworker 
Association of Florida, “Toxic Pesticide Drifts onto Church Properties in 
Homestead.” 
 
812 Moreno actually spoke in Spanish on a Univision interview, stating: “No tiene 
que ser el trabajo que hacemos causa de enfermedades para nuestra familia y a 
veces hasta tener que perder la vida para ganarse el pan.”  The coalition provided 
the translation in its summation of soundbytes from the press conference 
announcing the results of the test. Friends of the Earth, “Quotes from Five TV 
News Stories on the Pesticide Drift News Conference Convened by Friends of the 
Earth, Farmworker Association of Florida and Florida Consumer Action 
Network,” press release, February 22, 2001, Folder Methyl Bromide, Farmworker 
Association of Florida private collection, Apopka, FL. 
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something in my throat, my ears and eyes itch.’”813  The coalition urged people to 
sign a resolution of support and to write letters to Governor Jeb Bush demanding 
action on methyl bromide to protect farmworkers and public alike.814  A sample 
letter drafted by the coalition outlined health hazards and claimed that “simple 
measures can go a long way toward reducing risk.”815  Jeb Bush promised, in 
response, to investigate problems of pesticide drift in Florida.816
The Sustainable Tomatoes/Safer Communities Campaign ultimately 
heralded no change in Florida’s regulation of methyl bromide.  Though Governor 
Bush promised to investigate methyl bromide drift after the coalition’s air 
monitoring tests drew media attention, the administration quietly dismissed the 
issue and did nothing to strengthen the regulation of pesticides within the state.
 
817
                                                 
813 Friends of the Earth, Annual Report 2001 (Washington, D.C.: Friends of the 
Earth, 2001), 7, 
  
http://www.foe.org/about/PDF_Annual_Reports/ar2001.pdf 
(accessed March 2, 2011); “Methyl Bromide Drift in Homestead, Florida.”  Sara 
Olkon, “Pesticide Drift to Be Investigated: Churches Fear Effect of Toxin,” 
Miami Herald, February 22, 2001;  NBC, Telemundo, and Univision broadcast 
the Herrera statement.  She spoke in both Spanish and English. Friends of the 
Earth, “Quotes from Five TV News Stories on the Pesticide Drift News 
Conference Convened by Friends of the Earth, Farmworker Association of 
Florida and Florida Consumer Action Network.”  The quote can be found in 
Friends of Earth’s Annual Report 2001 and “Quotes from Five TV News Stories 
on the Pesticide Drift News Conference.” 
 
814 Tirso Moreno to Colleagues, June 19, 2001, Folder MB Originals, Farmworker 
Association of Florida private collection, Apopka, FL. 
 
815 “Sample Letter,” Folder MB Originals, Farmworker Association of Florida 
private collection, Apopka, FL. 
 
816 Friends of the Earth, Annual Report 2001, 7. 
 
817 “The Not-So-Funny Farm.”  A review of Jeb Bush’s records at the State 
Archives of Florida failed to turn up any information on an investigation of 
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The Sustainable Tomatoes/Safer Communities campaign did raise awareness 
among farmworkers and the public about health risks associated with methyl 
bromide exposure by giving presentations, publicizing the results of air 
monitoring tests, and distributing pamphlets and coloring books.  The actions, 
however, did not generate the sustained public pressure necessary to convince 
Governor Bush or the Florida Legislature to champion additional restrictions on 
the use of methyl bromide within the state.  The coalition eventually fractured 
when the goal was not achieved. Farmworker Association of Florida stayed 
engaged in issues relating to methyl bromide, while Friends of the Earth devoted 
more of their resources to genetically-modified food issues.   
 
The Persistent Fight for Less Toxic Alternatives 
 
The passage of the Fazio Amendment as a rider on the 1999 omnibus 
spending bill extended the life of methyl bromide in the United States to the 
chagrin of pesticide reform advocates.  The amendment to the Clean Air Act put 
the nation’s growers on the same timeline for phasing-out methyl bromide as 
growers in other industrialized countries.  The addition of four years intended to 
eliminate any competitive disadvantage that growers within the United States 
might face if held to an accelerated schedule.  The Fazio Amendment did 
something else as well.  The inclusion of the “critical use exemption” clause 
                                                                                                                                     
methyl bromide drift after the Homestead incident in 2001.  Governor (1999-
2007: Bush) Collection, State Archives of Florida, Tallahassee, FL. 
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provided a means for growers to extend their usage of methyl bromide beyond the 
2005 phase-out date.  In years following, opponents of methyl bromide struggled 
to limit “critical use exemptions,” wean the nation off methyl bromide, and force 
growers to use less toxic alternatives. 
Users of methyl bromide continued to ply their case in the early years of 
George W. Bush’s presidency, rehashing old arguments that the scarcity of 
effective alternatives required the availability of the favored fumigant.  EPA had 
the responsibility of filtering the applications for exemption and forwarding the 
approved ones to the Bush administration for submission to the United Nations 
Environment Program’s Ozone Secretariat.  Senior officials, though, showed little 
enthusiasm for restricting the number of applications it forwarded and said that it 
would submit every request so long as it was justified.818  The United States 
ultimately submitted sixteen requests for exemption covering a range of uses from 
strawberries and tomatoes to golf course greens.  Some applications, such as the 
ones for orchard seedlings and orchard replants, applied to a variety of crops.819
                                                 
818 United Nations Environment Programme, “Ozone: Bush Administration Seeks 
Exemption for Pesticide Banned in Treaty,” Environment in the News, January 31, 
2003, 
  
www.unep.org/cpi/briefs/Brief31Jan.doc (accessed March 4, 2011), 4; 
Andrew C. Revkin, “Bush Administration to Seek Exemptions to 2005 Ban of a 
Pesticide,” New York Times, January 30, 2003. 
 
819 The United States sought “critical use exemptions” for food processing, 
commodity storage, forest seedlings, orchard seedlings, orchard replant, turf and 
sod, tomatoes, peppers, eggplant, strawberry, strawberry nurseries, cucurbits, 
ornamentals, ginger, sweet potatoes, and transplant trays used in certain 
greenhouse production systems.  Environmental Protection Agency, press release, 
“U.S. Government Nominates Critical Use Exemptions for Methyl Bromide--
Materials Submitted to Ozone Secretariat of the United Nations,” February 7, 
2003, 
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The volume requested totaled more than 12,500 tons of this pesticide.820  The end 
result was that, rather than end the use of the fumigant as set forth in the 1997 
amendment to the Montreal Protocol, the Bush administration proposed that the 
United States cut methyl bromide consumption to approximately 40 percent of the 
volume used in 1991.821  Other nations sought “critical use exemptions” as well, 
but the amount requested by the United States exceeded that of all other nations 
combined.822
Many of the Montreal Protocol’s participating nations doubted the 
legitimacy of the United States’ claims, suspecting that viable alternatives existed 
in some circumstances and that not all of the requested uses were essential. 
European Union Environment Commissioner Margot Wallström reacted with 
skepticism, stating that “many farmers worldwide successfully grow crops 




                                                                                                                                     
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/7ebdf4d0b217978b852573590040443a/
f555074ef18e1f3085256cc9005aeb17!OpenDocument
  Dutch consultant Marten Barel intimated that the fears of American 
  (accessed March 4, 2011). 
 
820 Wayne A. Morrissey, “Methyl Bromide and Stratospheric Ozone Depletion,” 
CRS Report for Congress (December 11, 2006), 4.  
 
821 House Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, The Status of Methyl Bromide Under the Clean Air Act and the 
Montreal Protocol, 108 Cong., 1st sess., June 3, 2003, 13.  
 
822 Andrew C. Revkin, “At Meetings, U.S. to Seek Support for Broad Ozone 
Exemptions,” New York Times, November 10, 2003; Joan Lowy, “U.S. Seeks to 
Boost Production of Toxic Pesticide,” Environment in the News, March 25, 2004, 
www.unep.org/cpi/briefs/Brief25March04.doc (accessed March 5, 2011). 
 
823 Revkin, “At Meetings, U.S. to Seek Support for Broad Ozone Exemptions.”  
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growers were largely unfounded, relating that farmers in the Netherlands had the 
same reaction to a methyl bromide ban, bitterly complaining that “it would be the 
end of the world for farming” before they adopted alternatives that subsequently 
produced good agricultural yields.  Critics from the European Union warned that 
the United States’ resistance to ending methyl bromide use threatened to 
undermine efforts to repair the ozone layer.824  Executive Director of UNEP 
Klaus Toepfer held that “maintaining the integrity of the Protocol is paramount; 
otherwise, the world community is left with only a partial success toward a 
declining level of this ozone depleting substance.”825  President Bush and some 
members of Congress, in response, raised the possibility of vacating the 
international agreement if the United States was not granted the “critical use 
exemptions”826
                                                 
824 Revkin, “At Meetings, U.S. to Seek Support for Broad Ozone Exemptions.”  
The Netherlands stopped using methyl bromide much earlier than other nations.  
Between 1981 and 1991, the Netherlands implemented chemical and non-
chemical pest control strategies that allowed growers to grow crops without the 
assistance of methyl bromide.  Alternative pest control methods included steam 
sterilization, using artificial and natural growth substrates, developing resistant 
plant species, rotating crops, and employing chemical substitutes. Open-Ended 
Working Group of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, “The 1994 Science, 
Environmental Effects, and Technology and Economic Assessments,” (Nairobi, 
Kenya, May 8-12, 1995), 17, 
   
ozone.unep.org/Meeting_Documents/oewg/11oewg/11oewg-3.e.doc  (accessed 
March 6, 2011). 
 
825 Alan Crosby, “Rich States’ Demands Threaten Environment Policy” 
Environment in the News, November 26, 2004,  
www.unep.org/cpi/briefs/Brief26Nov04.doc (accessed March 6, 2011). 
 
826 Morrissey, “Methyl Bromide and Stratospheric Ozone Depletion,” 5;  Revkin, 
“At Meetings, U.S. to Seek Support for Broad Ozone Exemptions.”  House 
Republicans debated a bill in 2004 that would permit growers within the United 
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Activists within the United States similarly opposed the Bush’s overuse of 
“critical use exemptions” to avoid of the methyl bromide ban, viewing it as a 
threat to what had previously been a successful effort to reduce deterioration of 
the ozone layer.827  The Montreal Protocol had benefitted from bipartisan support 
in the United States and cooperation from nations around the globe.  Bush and the 
House Republicans threatened to bring a halt to those gains by backing out of the 
international agreement.  David Doniger, Director of Natural Resources Defense 
Council’s Climate Center and former director of climate change policy for the 
Clinton administration, testified before Congress that it was in the nation’s best 
interest to stay committed to the Montreal Protocol.828
                                                                                                                                     
States to continue using methyl bromide without the approval of the ozone 
secretariat or member nations of the Montreal Protocol. John Heilprin, “House 
GOPs Want Out of Pesticide Treaty,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 21, 2004. 
  While admitting that the 
exemption was an acceptable relief to include in the international agreement when 
used appropriately, Doniger charged that “the Bush administration has abused the 
critical use exemption process by submitting a bloated application…padded 
against the possibility that absolutely every use stalls out where it is now and no 
 
827 Revkin, “At Meetings, U.S. to Seek Support for Broad Ozone Exemptions”; 
Carl Pope, “Alone in the World: Bush Ends an Era of Environmental Treaties,” 
Sierra (January/February 2003), 
http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200301/ways.asp (accessed March 5, 2011). 
 
828 House Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, The Status of Methyl 
Bromide Under the Clean Air Act and the Montreal Protocol, 73; Crosby, “Rich 
States’ Demands Threaten Environmental Treaty.” 
 
  311 
further progress in reducing” the use of the substance is achieved.829  He warned 
that “if the Bush administration pushes too hard on this, it is going to stick its 
finger in the eye of yet another international treaty and risk a backlash that will 
imperil the health of Americans.”830
Negotiations among parties to the Montreal Protocol broke down in 
November 2003 over the exemptions sought by the United States and other 
industrialized countries, though UNEP ultimately approved almost all of the 
applications for “critical use exemption” submitted by the Bush administration. 
Developing nations in attendance at the 15th Meeting of the Parties to the 
Montreal Protocol in Nairobi threatened to halt efforts to reduce methyl bromide 




                                                 
829 House Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, The Status of Methyl 
Bromide Under the Clean Air Act and the Montreal Protocol, 73. 
  Doniger also attended the 2003 conference in Nairobi 
 
830 Ibid., 74.  Doniger, in mentioning “another international treaty,” was most 
likely referring to the Kyoto Protocol.  Intended to reduce global warming, the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol called on more than 100 nations to cut carbon-dioxide 
emissions.  In 2001, Bush announced that the United States would not adhere to 
the provisions of the protocol.  Saudi Arabia’s energy advisor, Mohammed Al-
Sabban, commented: “This announcement by President Bush is the announcement 
of the death of the Kyoto Protocol.” Andrew C. Revkin, “Bush’s Shift Could 
Doom Air Pact, Some Say,” New York Times, March 17, 2001.  
831 Margot Wallstrom, “Global Efforts to Repair Ozone Layer are in Jeopardy,” 
Environment in the News, March 25, 2004, 
www.unep.org/cpi/briefs/Brief25March04.doc (accessed March 5, 2011); Lowy, 
“U.S. Seeks to Boost Production of Toxic Pesticide.”  Twelve industrialized 
countries, including the United States sought “critical use exemptions” for methyl 
bromide use in 2005.  The other eleven nations included:  Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands.  Many of the “critical use exemption” requests sought to use a low 
volume of methyl bromide.  The United States wanted to use four times as much 
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and, as the only non-governmental environmental spokesperson to take the floor, 
opposed the United States’ request.  He maintained that the Bush administration’s 
exemption request was so large that the United States, which had substantially 
reduced the amount of methyl bromide manufactured in the years preceding, 
would actually increase production of the fumigant if the exemption was 
granted.832  The Nairobi meeting ended without resolution for the first time in the 
history of the Montreal Protocol meetings.833
An “extraordinary” meeting had to be called in Montreal in March 2004 to 
resolve the exemption issue before the start of the 2005.  At the meeting, Klaus 
Toepfer commented that “the high demand for exemptions to the methyl bromide 
phase out shows that governments and the private sector will have to work much 
harder to speed up the development and spread of ozone-friendly replacements,” 
adding that “the best way for governments to protect the integrity of the Montreal 
Protocol…is to send a powerful signal to both producers and users that methyl 
    
                                                                                                                                     
methyl bromide as Italy, the nation seeking the second largest exemption. “Global 
Methyl Bromide Exemptions Over 13,000 Tons,” Environment News Service, 
March 29, 2004, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/mar2004/2004-03-29-04.asp 
(accessed March 22, 2011). 
 
832 David Doniger, “Hole-y Ozone, Batman,” Switchboard: Natural Resources 
Defense Council Staff Blog: David Doniger’s Blog, September 14, 2007, 
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/ddoniger/yesterday_i_told_the_story.html 
(accessed March 4, 2011). 
 
833 Margot Wallstrom, “Global Efforts to Repair Ozone Layer are in Jeopardy,” 
Environment in the News, March 25, 2004, 
www.unep.org/cpi/briefs/Brief25March04.doc (accessed March 5, 2011). 
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bromide does not have a future.”834  The parties to the Montreal Protocol then 
authorized the United States to use 37.5 percent of the volume of methyl bromide 
used by growers in 1991.835  The total exemptions granted by the Ozone 
Secretariat in 2005 totaled 14,713 tons, of which 9,857 tons were allocated for use 
in the United States.  UNEP cut the United States’ allowable usage to 26.3 percent 
of the 1991 total for the following year.836
After the manufacturing of new stocks of methyl bromide began, NRDC 
filed suit against EPA.  To meet the United States’ demand for the year, the 
participating nations at the 2004 meeting in Montreal authorized the manufacture 
of 8,443 tons of methyl bromide to supplement 1,414 tons of existing stocks.  
Doniger, however, found evidence in a letter from EPA to Congress that the 
United States had not been forthcoming with the amount of methyl bromide that it 
had stockpiled.  The letter revealed that Chemtura and other pesticide suppliers 
had stocks of methyl bromide that exceeded the volume granted in the 
   
                                                 
834 United Nations Environment Programme, press release, “Methyl Bromide 
Approved for Temporary Uses After Montreal Protocol Phase-Out Deadline,” 
March 26, 2004, http://www.unep.org/ozone/Press_Releases/26March_2004.pdf 
(accessed March 6, 2011). 
 
835 Wayne A. Morrissey, “Methyl Bromide and Stratospheric Ozone Depletion,” 
5. 
 
836 Terra Daily, “World Bickers Over Use of Ozone-Harming Methyl Bromide 
After 2005,” The Environment in the News, November 29, 2004, 
www.unep.org/cpi/briefs/Brief29Nov04.doc (accessed March 4, 2011); Andrew 
Olson, “Methyl Bromide Loophole for U.S. Prolongs Ozone Hole,” Pesticide 
Action Network, http://panna.org/print/1131 (accessed March 4, 2011); Natural 
Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 440 F.3d 476, 
370 U.S.App.D.C.154 (3rd Cir. 2006). 
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exemption.837  EPA would not disclose the exact amount of suppliers’ holdings 
when requested to do so however, claiming that the information was “confidential 
business information, the disclosure of which would result in a competitive 
disadvantage to the respective companies.”838  NRDC filed suit to gain access to 
the information.  After winning the case, NRDC learned that methyl bromide 
holdings within the United States roughly totaled 18,500 tons, an amount well in 
excess of the 2005 exemption.839
The organization filed another suit against EPA in 2006, arguing that the 
ongoing production of methyl bromide violated the conditions of the UNEP 
exemption.  NRDC held that the exemption required the United States to exhaust 
existing supplies of methyl bromide before manufacturing any additional stocks.  
NRDC cited the clause of the UNEP decision stating that new production of 
methyl bromide should occur only if the fumigant “is not available in sufficient 
quantity and quality from existing stocks.”
   
840
                                                 
837 Doniger, “Hole-y Ozone, Batman.”  
   EPA interpreted the resolution 
 
838 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Michael Leavitt, 2006 WL 667327 
(D.D.C.) (2nd Cir. 2006). 
 
839 Doniger, “Hole-y Ozone, Batman”; Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
Michael Leavitt, 2006 WL 667327. 
 
840 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 464 
F.3d 1, 373 U.S.App.D.C. 223 (3rd Cir. 2006). 
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differently, maintaining that methyl bromide could be produced even if suppliers 
had stores of the fumigant.841
The Appellate Court offered no judgment on whether the UNEP 
exemption was violated.  On first hearing of the case, the Court ruled that NRDC 
lacked standing to sue because it found the increased health risks posed by EPA 
action to be trivial.  It, therefore, did not weigh the substance of the arguments.
   
842  
At a Rehearing En Banc, the Appellate Court reversed judgment on NRDC’s 
standing to sue, deciding that one could reasonably argue that two to four of 
NRDC’s 500,000 members would develop cancer over the course of a lifetime as 
a result of the EPA rule.843
                                                 
841 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 464 
F.3d 1, 373 U.S.App.D.C. 223; Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 440 F.3d 476, 370 U.S.App.D.C. 154. 
  The Court, however, still ruled against NRDC after 
rehearing the case, holding that the stipulations in the UNEP exemption were not 
enforceable in a federal court because the “critical use” decision was not ratified 
by Congress.  Since the clause was unenforceable, the Court made no ruling 
whether or not the EPA action was allowable under the UNEP “critical use 
 
842 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 440 
F.3d 476, 370 U.S.App.D.C. 154.  NRDC argued that any “scientifically 
demonstrable increase in the threat of death or serious illness” was not trivial.  
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 464 
F.3d 1, 373 U.S.App.D.C. 223. 
 
843 NRDC argued that the EPA decision to allow new production of methyl 
bromide would result in a greater volume of emissions.  This would further 
deteriorate the ozone layer, exposing NRDC members to greater risk of cancer 
and other health threats.  Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 464 F.3d 1, 373 U.S.App.D.C. 223. 
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exemption”844
Use of methyl bromide in the United States continued, but has declined 
every year since 2005.  “Critical use exemptions” in 2005 equaled 37.5 percent of 
the volume used in 1991.  Growers’ usage of the fumigant fell to roughly 3,307 
tons in 2010, approximately 12 percent of the 1991 baseline.  The authorized 
volume for 2012 totals less than 1,323 tons.  The United States plans to phase-out 
usage in 2015, the deadline set for developing countries.
  The decision, hence, did not interfere with the manufacture of 
methyl bromide. 
 845  The elimination of 
methyl bromide from growers’ arsenal of chemical controls finally appears to be 
on the horizon.  Yet, the United States remains one of five industrialized countries 
that continue to seek “critical use exemptions,” driven by growers’ insistence of 
its necessity in agricultural production.846
                                                 
844 The “critical use exemption” was an adjustment to the Montreal Protocol 
rather than an amendment.  Congress only heard and consented to new 
amendments, so it did not consider the “critical use exemption.”  Because of this, 
the Court reasoned that the exemption could not be considered law in a U.S. court 
without raising serious constitutional problems.  Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 464 F.3d 1, 373 U.S.App.D.C. 223.; 
John H. Knox, “Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection 




845 Environmental Protection Agency, “Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: 
Request for Methyl Bromide Critical Use Exemption Applications for 2013,” 
Federal Register 75, no. 135 (July 15, 2010): 41177-41179, 
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846 The four other industrialized countries still seeking exemptions are Australia, 
Canada, Israel, and Japan.  Israel plans to end use of methyl bromide in 2011, 
with Japan following two years later.  The United States will then be one of three 
remaining industrialized nations still using the harmful fumigant. Ibid., 41177-
41179. 
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Environmental organizations and farmworker groups continued to draw 
attention to the problems of methyl bromide in this period of “critical use 
exemptions” and take steps to further limit the fumigant’s use within the United 
States.  In Latino Communities at Risk, Sierra Club chronicled the suffering of 
two disabled farmworkers, Jorge Fernández and Guillermo Ruiz, who labored in 
California strawberry fields without being warned about the dangers of methyl 
bromide exposure and without being equipped with appropriate protective 
clothing.  Reporting that sound alternatives existed for 95 percent of methyl 
bromide uses, it concluded that farmworkers would continue to face unnecessary 
health risks as a result of the extensions.847  The farmworkers, Jorge Fernández 
and Guillermo Ruiz, partnered with a coalition of environmental and farmworker 
groups to bring suit against California Department of Pesticide Regulation 
(DPR).848
                                                 
847 Sierra Club, Latino Communities at Risk, 8. 
  They argued that DPR failed to properly protect farmworkers and the 
 
848 California Rural Legal Assistance, Environmental Defense Center, and 
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, “State Appeals Court Affirms Trial 
Court Ruling: State Pesticide Agency Failed to Adequately Protect Public and 
Farmworkers from Dangerous Pesticide,” press release, July 16, 2008, 
http://www.edcnet.org/news/PressReleases/08-07-16.pdf (accessed March 8, 
2011).  The organizations that brought suit belonged to a coalition of more than 
180 labor, environmental, and citizen groups called Californians for Pesticide 
Reform. The organizations participating in the coalition included: Aububon 
Society of California, California League of Conservation Voters, California Rural 
Legal Assistance, Earth Island Institute, Environmental Defense Fund, 
Environmental Working Group, International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local  
287, Pesticide Action Network, Sierra Club, and United Farm Workers. 
Californians for Pesticide Reform, “Californians for Pesticide Reform Member 
Organizations,” CPR Resource, No. 16 (March 2006): 5, 
http://www.pesticidereform.org/downloads/CPRnewsletterMar06.pdf  (accessed 
March 7, 2011). 
  318 
public from harm when promulgating exposure standards for methyl bromide, 
because the agency failed to consult California Office of Environmental Health 
Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) as required by law.  The Court found DPR at fault 
for not jointly developing the regulation with OEHHA, an agency better able to 
evaluate the health risks of chemicals.849  Linda Krop, Chief Counsel for the 
Environmental Defense Center, responded to the verdict, stating: “Hopefully, this 
ruling will not only result in lower exposure to this highly toxic pesticide, but will 
also encourage farmers to use safer alternatives.”850
The pesticide manufacturing industry came up with an alternative to 
methyl bromide called methyl iodide.  Unfortunately, this new chemical was 
hardly an improvement in regard to its toxicity, so the same battles over its use 
erupted.  Used as a fumigant prior to planting, methyl iodide controlled 
 
                                                 
849 California Rural Legal Assistance, Environmental Defense Center, and 
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, “State Appeals Court Affirms Trial 
Court Ruling.”  The California Office of Environmental Health Hazard 
Assessment (OEHHA) advised DPR that the exposure standard was set too high 
on multiple occasions after it was drafted.  DPR chose not to heed the 
recommendation to lower the target levels of exposure.  The Court held that DPR 
could not “develop regulations on its own, inform OEHHA of them and then 
choose whether or not to adopt any of the recommendations made by OEHHA.”  
It ruled that the DPR regulation on methyl bromide was invalid, because it failed 
to consult the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment when making 
the rule.  Jorge Fernandez v. California Department of Pesticide Regulation, 164 
Cal.App.4th 1214, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 418 (Cal.App. 4th 2008). 
 
850 California Rural Legal Assistance attorney Jonathan Gettleman commented: 
“Methyl bromide should be phased out of use permanently, and hopefully we are 
headed in that direction.  In the meantime, we are encouraged by the Court’s 
decision that the worker safety risks posed by methyl bromide should be assessed 
by OEHHA, an office whose focus is on health risk assessment.”  California 
Rural Legal Assistance, Environmental Defense Center, and California Rural 
Legal Assistance Foundation, “State Appeals Court Affirms Trial Court Ruling.” 
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nematodes, insects, weeds, and plant pathogens.  The chemical proved an 
effective form of pest control in strawberries, tomatoes, and peppers, which were 
some of the biggest consumers of methyl bromide.851  Growers’ usage of methyl 
iodide, however, raised other concerns.  A contingent of fifty-four scientists and 
chemists, including five nobel laureates, signed a letter urging EPA to block the 
registration of methyl iodide.  They warned that the fumigant was a highly 
volatile mutagenic chemical that raised the risk of cancer in humans.  EPA tests 
showed laboratory animals developing permanent neurological damage, fetal 
losses, and increased thyroid toxicity when exposed to methyl iodide.  The fifty-
four scientists stated that “as chemists and physicians familiar with the effects of 
this chemical, we are concerned that pregnant women and the fetus, children, the 
elderly, farm workers, and other people living near application sites would be at 
serious risk if methyl iodide is permitted for use in agriculture.”852 They added 
that if the agency ignored its own data or characterized the results as an 
acceptable risk, then it willingly accepted that 5 percent of persons exposed to the 
fumigant at the application site would develop these health problems.853
                                                 
851 Environmental Protection Agency, “Extension of Conditional Registration of 
Iodomethane (Methyl Iodide), 
  The 
urging of the fifty-four scientists to deny the registration request for methyl iodide 
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/factsheets/iodomethane_fs.htm (accessed March 8, 
2011). 
 
852 Robert G. Bergman, et. al. to Stephen Johnson, September 24, 2007, Folder 
Methyl Iodide, Farmworker Association of Florida private collection, Apopka, 
FL.   
 
853 Ibid.   
 
  320 
failed to sway the Bush administration’s EPA.  The agency approved use of 
fumigant in October 2007.854
Environmentalists and farmworker groups ultimately wanted growers to 
switch to non-toxic alternatives and opposed methyl iodide because of the health 
risks associated with its use and the threat of groundwater contamination.  
Farmworker Association of Florida, Pesticide Action Network North America, 
Sierra Club and other organizations pressed EPA to reject the registration request 
for methyl iodide.
 
855  FWAF initiated a letter writing campaign in 2008 to oppose 
registration of the fumigant for use in Florida.  While unsuccessful in blocking 
approval of the chemical, FWAF helped convince the State of Florida to enact 
tougher regulations for methyl iodide than propagated by EPA.856
                                                 
854 Environmental Protection Agency, “Extension of Conditional Registration of 
Iodomethane (Methyl Iodide), 
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http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/factsheets/iodomethane_fs.htm (accessed March 8, 
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855 Jeanne Economos to Bill Nelson, October 2, 2007, Folder Methyl Iodide, 
Farmworker Association of Florida private collection, Apopka, FL; “The Not-So-
Funny Farm.”; Pesticide Action Network North America, press release, “PAN 
Alert: Help Stop Carcinogenic Methyl Iodide!: EPA Considers Legalizing Methyl 
Iodide for Food Production,” [n.d., February 2006?], Folder Methyl Iodide, 
Farmworker Association of Florida private collection, Apopka, FL; Sierra Club, 
“Keep Methyl Iodide Out of California,” Sierra Club, 
https://secure2.convio.net/sierra/site/Advocacy?alertId=3387&pg=makeACall 
(accessed March 9, 2011).   
 
856 Farmworker Association of Florida, press release, “Cancer and Birth Defects 
Could Threaten Floridians if New Pesticide is Approved,” January 10, 2008, 
Folder Methyl Iodide, Farmworker Association of Florida private collection, 
Apopka, FL; Farmworker Association of Florida,“Fumigant Pesticide Bad for 
Florida and for Farmworkers,” Farmworker Association of Florida, 
http://www.floridafarmworkers.org/index.php?limitstart=16 (accessed March 9, 
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Department of Pesticide Regulation approved use of methyl iodide in December 
2010.  In January, a coalition of environmental organizations and farmworker 
groups submitted comments from 52,000 concerned citizens to Governor Jerry 
Brown, requesting that he intervene to prevent the fumigant from being used 
within the state.  The legal arm of Sierra Club, Earthjustice, and California Rural 
Legal Assistance then filed suit against DPR in an attempt to block use of methyl 
iodide.  They represented Pesticide Action Network North America, United Farm 
Workers, Californians for Pesticide Reform, Pesticide Watch Education Fund, 
Worksafe, Communities and Children, Advocates Against Pesticide Poisoning, 
and farmworkers Jose Hildalgo Ramon and Zeferino Estrada in the suit.  The 
groups argued that registration of methyl iodide violated the California 
Environmental Quality Act, California Birth Defects Protection Act, and the 
Pesticide Contamination Act.857
 
  As of March 2011, a decision is still pending. 
                                                 
857 Peter Fimrite, “Methyl Iodide’s Use in State Challenged by Suit: 
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iodide for DPR prior to the registration of the fumigant.  The panel concluded: 
“use of this agent would result in exposures to a large number of the public and 
thus would have a significant adverse impact on public health.  Due to the potent 
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Relief,” Pesticide Action Network North America v. California Department of 
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(Alameda Sup. Court 2011), http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/mei-final-
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Conclusion 
 
Twenty-five years after UFW first targeted methyl bromide in its Wrath of 
Grapes campaign, and eighteen years after the Parties to the Montreal Protocol 
first recognized it as an ozone-depleting substance, usage of the fumigant 
continues in the United States.  Growers, aided by USDA, have vigorously fought 
to extend usage of the chemical long after it was recognized as a threat to the 
environment and human health.  Efforts to maintain access to methyl bromide 
came from other quarters of government as well.  Congress slipped a rider into an 
omnibus budget bill extending the chemical’s lifeline four years beyond the 
original 2001 phase-out date.  Actions of the Bush administration then helped 
ensure that 2005 would not herald the chemical’s end.  Instead the date passed 
with the United States holding a “critical use exemption” that allowed the nation’s 
growers to use more methyl bromide than all other growers in the world 
combined.  Even EPA under Bush, an agency charged with the task of protecting 
environmental and human health, squirreled away information on existing stocks 
of methyl bromide, thus permitting more to be manufactured in 2005.  From the 
enactment of the 1990 Clean Air Amendment until present, the United States 
moved from being one of the most aggressive supporters of phasing-out ozone-
depleting substances to one of the most resistant.  
Uncertainty in science, in part, enabled methyl bromide supporters to 
create doubt that the fumigant was a critical threat, and they used that doubt to 
delay the phase-out of its use.  The Montreal Protocol recognized that the 
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scientific understanding of ozone depletion and ozone-depleting particles was 
incomplete and adopted a strategy that allowed participating nations to consider 
new scientific information and make adjustments to the international agreement as 
necessary.  Participating nations generally held to the precautionary principle, 
using the best available science to craft proactive policy to protect human and 
environmental health while expecting that some revision might be necessary as 
new scientific studies increased understanding of ozone depletion.  Methyl 
bromide supporters, in contrast, argued that the strategy showed a careless 
hastiness that unnecessarily handicapped growers.  They capitalized on some of 
the scientific uncertainty relating to ozone-depleting sources and sinks to cast 
doubt on the need for immediate action, while stressing the centrality of methyl 
bromide to the production of a wide variety of agricultural crops. 
Environmental organizations and farmworker groups acted as an important 
counterbalance to the aggressive lobbying of growers’ associations and the 
agricultural industry.  Historians Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway note that 
“scientists commitment to expertise and objectivity…places them in a delicate 
position when it comes to refuting false claims [and] if a scientist jumps into the 
fray on a politically contested issue, he may be accused of ‘politicizing’ the 
science and compromising his objectivity.”858
                                                 
858 Oreskes and Conway, Merchants of Doubt, 264. 
  Environmentalists and farmworker 
advocates concerned about human and environmental health, hence, served as 
valuable conduits of scientific information about adverse effects of methyl 
bromide to the public.  When they disseminated information, it was couched in an 
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argument that showed preference for precautionary action rather than the “wait-
and-see” approach favored by growers and the agricultural industry.  The 
organizations educated the public about the hazards of methyl bromide and helped 
build support for regulation and phase-out of the fumigant.  Environmental and 
farmworker organizations also contributed to the bank of knowledge with air 
monitoring tests and the chronicling of the pesticide poisoning among 
farmworkers and people in communities adjacent to fumigated fields.  While 
unable to keep the United States on schedule for phasing out methyl bromide, the 
groups undoubtedly helped hasten the switch to alternatives by generating public 
interest in the issue, scrutinizing the transition, drawing attention to questionable 
delays, and threatening suit when necessary. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
Chemical dependence is a phrase most often employed in the discussion of 
persons addicted to drugs or alcohol, yet it is an equally fitting descriptor to use 
when explaining growers’ resistance to pesticide reform efforts from 1962 
onwards.  Pesticides came to greater use with the accession of Leland Howard, an 
entomologist who touted the supremacy of agricultural chemicals over other 
methods of pest control, to the head of the USDA’s Bureau of Entomology.  The 
volume of pesticides applied to fields steadily increased in the first half of the 
twentieth century before skyrocketing in the post-World War II era with the 
introduction of DDT to commercial markets.  DDT and other new brands of 
synthetic chemicals promised fast action, greater efficiency, and universal 
applicability.  Growers, captivated by the promise of total control and possible 
eradication of pests, applied pesticides in volumes that increased greatly year to 
year.  Insect pests, however, showed a remarkably proclivity for developing 
resistance to the chemicals designed to kill them.  Researchers, pesticide 
manufacturers, and growers continued to invest heavily in chemical controls even 
as pests developed immunities to some chemicals.  Growers saturated their fields 
with higher concentrations of more powerful chemical combinations, believing 
that pesticides still provided the best protection from crop damage.  The 
remarkable ability of insects to continually develop new resistance to potent 
pesticides, hence, helped entrench chemical controls further in the industrial 
agriculture production system.   
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The chemical dependency in agriculture bears comparison to path 
dependency in other technological systems.  Historians David Nye and Thomas 
Hughes introduce the concept of path dependency into their discussions on energy 
systems.  They contend that when systems are in the process of being developed, 
decision-makers have a wide range of options and flexibility in the design and 
function of the system.  As the system matures, however, it becomes path 
dependent.  Earlier choices narrow the range of options that decision-makers have 
for changing the system.859  This model of path dependency applies just as aptly 
to the system of pest control used by growers in the United States.  As chemical 
controls became entrenched in agricultural production, biological and cultural 
control methods seemed less viable.  Historian James McWilliams recognizes a 
path dependency in agricultural pest control, asserting that the investment of 
growers, government, and manufacturers in chemical solutions “limited the way 
in which scientists and farmers framed the pest situation and contemplated their 
options.”860
Prior to the passage of the Federal Environmental Pesticides Control Act, 
which amended the 1947 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 
  The investment and faith in chemicals as the best means of crop 
protection in agricultural production made the switch to other forms of pest 
control an improbable prospect. 
                                                 
859 David Nye, Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 3.; Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: 
Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1983), 14-15, 465.   
 
860 McWilliams, American Pests, 170. 
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pesticide laws did little to regulate growers’ usage of agricultural chemicals.  The 
laws, rather, intended to protect growers from suffering losses from fraudulent 
claims made by unscrupulous pesticide manufacturers.  The Insecticide Act of 
1910 required that agricultural chemicals carry accurate product labeling, while 
the FIFRA (1947) made it necessary that manufacturers attest to the efficacy of a 
pesticide and register it with USDA before introducing it to the commercial 
marketplace.  FIFRA also mandated that warning labels inform growers about 
potential risks to health, plants, or vertebrate animals.  It did not, however, keep 
dangerous chemicals from being sold.  Regulations to protect public health and 
the environment proved severely lacking and pesticide use rose unabated.  Neither 
growers nor the USDA pushed for more stringent regulations to limit use of 
chemicals that posed a threat to human or environmental health.  The public 
similarly raised little protest over the increased use of pesticides in the immediate 
postwar era and did not campaign for better regulations. 
Rachel Carson awoke the nation to the dangers of pesticides in 1962 with 
the publication of Silent Spring.  She numbered among a group of scientists who 
harbored concern about some of the unintended consequences of the proliferation 
of pest control poisons. They believed complex scientific data needed to be 
communicated to the public in an understandable non-partisan manner, 
democratizing the information so that people would be better able to make 
informed personal and political decisions about the use of a broad range of 
potentially hazardous chemicals and new technologies in society.  In his 
biography of concerned scientist Barry Commoner, historian Michael Egan argues 
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that informed debate and dissent are fundamental to the maintenance of a 
functioning democracy.861  Carson held to this philosophy as well and intended 
Silent Spring to be a call for citizen engagement in pesticide regulation. She 
believed that citizens had a right to participate in decisions on how and to what 
extent pesticides would be used on farms, forests, and suburban neighborhoods.  
Historian Karl Brooks asserts that Carson tapped into a public concern about the 
environment that had been building prior to 1962, stating that “Americans’ shared 
personal and civic experiences--what they had done, seen, and thought before 
1963--laid a cultural powder trail that Silent Spring’s bright flame ignited.”862
Several scholars recognize the fundamental importance of public 
engagement in issues related to industrial toxins, environment, and health.  
Historian Robert Gottlieb locates the first campaigns for environmental reform in 
the Progressive Era, with citizens like Alice Hamilton initiating efforts to control 
pollution in the urban environment.
  
Carson’s communication of scientific information to the public empowered 
individuals and groups with knowledge, giving them a degree of expertise which 
could be used to influence public policy and private practices. 
863
                                                 
861 ‘Egan, Barry Commoner and the Science of Survival, 6. 
 Examining the roots of environmental 
health science, historian Christopher Sellers, contends that “an energized labor 
movement unsettled employers’ assumptions about whether they were treating 
their workers fairly and catalyzed new legislative and judicial foundations for 
 
862 Brooks, Before Earth Day, 94. 
 
863 Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 48-50, 58-59. 
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tending to worker health” between 1910 and 1930.864  Historian Alan Derickson 
argues that the state and public health officials knew about the deleterious effects 
of coal dust for over fifty years, yet proved reluctant to address the issue of black 
lung until the “confrontational collective action” of a worker-based social 
movement necessitated change.865  Historians David Rosner and Gerald 
Markowitz assert that response to silocisis, an occupational lung disease caused 
by the inhalation of silica dust, paralleled the rise of labor activism in the 1930s, 
while the subsequent wane in government attention to the problem followed a 
decline in union influence.866  In their next collaboration, Deceit and Denial, 
Rosner and Markowitiz show that the lead and vinyl industries hid information 
about occupational risks and used soft money and donations to political action 
committees to placate certain elected officials and forestall the enactment of new 
regulations.  The industries’ actions, they state, became known as a result of 
lawsuits brought by poisoned workers.867
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  Cancer expert and doctor of 
environmental and occupational medicine Samuel Epstein concludes that nearly 
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every legislative regulation or reform to protect workers and consumers against 
cancer had its roots in a public interest group or labor movement.868
Public engagement in pesticide issues similarly proved a necessary 
predicate to reforming pest control practices in agriculture, since both growers 
and the USDA, the primary regulatory agency prior to 1972, presumed that 
chemicals were the single best pest control option in agriculture.  In an attempt to 
make agricultural pest control less harmful to the environment and human health, 
non-governmental organizations employed variety of strategies to curb pesticide 
usage that ranged from focusing on a single chemical to passing laws that 
reshaped the regulatory landscape.  Growers’ associations and USDA consistently 
opposed efforts to restrict the use of pesticides or remove them from the 
marketplace.  Similar to the tactics employed by industrial manufacturers, they 
tried to delay reform by downplaying risk, fostering doubt about existent 
scientific data, calling for more scientific studies, and leaning on sympathetic 
politicians and government officials for support.  Pesticide reform advocates 
generated publicity and contested industry claims.  Their efforts helped restrict or 
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Ghostworkers and Greens 
 
Scientists concerned about the unintended consequences of technological 
innovations sometimes struggled over the degree to which they should be visibly 
involved in political discourse.  Historians Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway state 
that “scientists consider their ‘real’ work to be the production of knowledge, not 
its dissemination, and they view these two activities as mutually exclusive,” 
noting that scientists who try to bridge the gap between academic and popular 
audiences risk being unfavorably labeled as “popularizers.”869  Hence, while 
Silent Spring reached millions of readers, subsequent scientific findings revealing 
the human health and environmental risks of pesticides did not get translated in 
the same fashion.  Some scientists also feared that political engagement would 
jeopardize the objectivity upon which scientific work is premised.870  
Environmental and health policy, however, grows from an amalgam of scientific 
knowledge, ethical premises, and public opinion.  Hence it is necessarily 
important that scientific knowledge is effectively communicated to the public.871
Political scientist Karen Litfin argues that “knowledge brokers” serve as 
“intermediaries between the original researchers, or producers of knowledge, and 
the policy makers who consume that knowledge but lack the time and training 
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necessary to absorb the original research.”872  These knowledge brokers play the 
same role in shaping public opinion.  The information presented by knowledge 
brokers often bears the imprint of the brokers’ values.  Different knowledge 
brokers interpret scientific results in variant ways, choosing which results to 
emphasize and how to address the issue of scientific uncertainty.  Consequently, 
Litfin holds that science alone will “not likely to save us from environmental ruin, 
persistent political action informed by carefully chosen discursive strategies 
might.”873
Indiscriminate use of pesticides concerned environmentalists and 
farmworkers alike and their representative organizations have acted as important 
knowledge brokers advocating for pesticide reform.  An interest in the 
preservation of environmental and human health committed a number of 
environmental organizations to campaigns for pesticide reform in the nearly fifty 
year history of activism since the publication of Silent Spring.  Organizations of 
farmworkers or groups representing them shared a similar interest in making 
agricultural pest control safer, since farmworkers risked injury to their personal 
and family health when exposed to pesticides in the fields.  While both 
environmental organizations and farmworker groups acted as knowledge brokers 
and engaged in separate efforts to reform pesticide use practices, their mutual 
interest in protecting human health facilitated the development of episodic 
collaborative campaigns. 
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Farmworker groups, in particular, recognized the value of building bridges 
to outside organizations and groups of people.  Farmworkers represent a more 
marginal segment of the populace who wield less power than workers in other 
industries as a result of poverty, migratory work patterns, exemption from 
protective labor laws like the National Labor Relations Act, and sometimes illegal 
immigrant status.  Decades of effort at organizing farmworkers, particularly in the 
1910s and 1930s, failed to come anywhere close to the gains of unions in the 
industrial sector.  Historian Jacquelyn Jones argues that agricultural migrants in 
the East were “systematically alienated from every level of the body politic” in 
the 1930s and 1940s.874  Cindy Hahamovitch similarly characterizes migrant 
farmworkers as “stateless” persons lacking political power.875  Years of frustrated 
organizing efforts made clear that farmworkers needed allies if they were to win 
gains from growers or government.  This fits sociologist Melvin Hall’s argument 
that people are the primary source of power in poor people’s organizations and 
that forming relationships with other organizations may be used as a means of 
building organizational strength in a campaign.876
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 Sociologists Guy Burgess and 
Heidi Burgess similarly contend that one way for “low-power” groups to 
compensate for the absence of political and economic strength “is to enlist the 
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help of external or more powerful groups.”877
Farmworker groups often drew connections to the larger public in their 
pesticide reform efforts in order to increase the number of people supporting their 
campaigns and compensate for their lack of political and economic power.  While 
a number of pesticides carried the risk of poisoning farmworkers, the UFW 
focused its initial pesticide campaign on the most infamous pesticide in use during 
the 1960s that posed a threat to farmworkers and the public alike: DDT.  The 
launch of subsequent campaigns followed incidents of widespread poisoning of 
the public by pesticide residue.  UFW argued that grower misuse of pesticides 
threatened the public and farmworkers alike and that the problem could be 
resolved with a strong union presence in the fields.  When a childhood cancer 
cluster developed in the agricultural community of McFarland, the UFW drew 
comparison to canaries in coal mines, asserting that farmworkers were the 
nation’s canaries whose illness and disease foretold of future troubles for all 
Americans.  It called on the public to join farmworkers in putting enough 
economic pressure on growers to force change.  Maricopa County Organizing 
Project, Arizona Farm Workers, and the Farm Worker Association of Florida 
focused their attempts to elicit public concern on issues of pesticide drift and 
connected farmworkers’ health to consumer health and environmental concerns 
  Since farmworkers lacked political 
and economic capitol, it behooved them to build bridges to other organizations 
and the public to enlarge their base of support.  
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like groundwater quality and ozone depletion.  Additionally, farmworker groups 
devoted resources to educational efforts among farmworkers, teaching workers 
and their families how to take steps to better protect their health around dangerous 
agricultural chemicals.  The organizations also used lawsuits to gain leverage.  
The public face of campaigns, though, typically sought to establish a bond with 
people and groups having little direct connection to the fields. 
Environmental organizations similarly espoused a rhetoric of cooperation, 
suggesting that environmentalists and workers should work together on issues 
where there was an overlap of interests.  Organizers of the first Earth Day stressed 
the value of building alliances with organizations associated with other causes, 
stating that the potential for cooperative campaigns was innumerable because 
pollution affected everyone regardless of race or social standing.  Recently 
formed environmental organizations like Environmental Defense Fund, Natural 
Resources Defense Council, and Friends of Earth embraced the expanded vision 
of environmentalism readily.  Of the older conservation groups, the Sierra Club 
showed the greatest enthusiasm for tackling new challenges.  Editorials in the 
Sierra Club Bulletin from the early 1970s spoke of the compatibility of 
environmentalism and social justice.  Environmental organizations knew that 
workers and environmentalists would not agree on every issue, but recognized the 
value of finding common ground and cooperating on issues of mutual interest.  
Many environmental groups continued to voice support for partnerships with 
labor organizations in the 1980s and beyond. 
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Several scholars have downplayed the common ground between the labor 
and environmental movements, choosing instead to emphasize divisions between 
the groups.  While much of his work looks at the intersections of the labor and 
environmental movement, historian Robert Gordon argues that “the battle to 
restrict the use of DDT is in many ways indicative of the gulf between the UFW 
and the environmental mainstream,” contending that the Sierra Club and other 
mainstream environmental groups cared about the effect of persistent pesticides 
on “natural wildlife, not on Latino farmworkers.”878  Laura Pulido maintains that 
environmentalists chose to “focus on quality-of-life issues in which the social 
actors are fairly removed from the actual threat,” incorrectly asserting that “once 
DDT was banned, mainstream environmental groups retreated from the issue of 
pesticides for a number of years, thinking the problem was solved.”879  In a 
subsequent co-authored article, Pulido and anthropologist Devon Peña hold that 
“mainstream environmentalists focused on protecting wilderness areas and 
consumers from pesticides, while ignoring the plight of farmworkers.”880
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  Pulido 
and Peña conclude that environmentalists’ “narrow articulation of the 
environment” rendered them “incapable of an oppositional politics that would 
allow them to make connections between agribusiness, the state, environmental 
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Early Pesticide Campaign of the United Farm Workers’ Organizing Committee, 
1965-1971,” Race, Gender and Class 6, No. 1 (October 31, 1998). 
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degradation, and [the] highly exploited.”881  They suggest that environmentalists’ 
constrained view of pesticide problems was attributable to their “positionality” as 
college-educated, white persons (often male), “privileged in their socioeconomic 
status,” who lived far from the fields and had a “limited political 
consciousness.”882
The work histories of leaders and organizers in these case studies 
sometimes overlapped the social justice and environmental movements.  EDF co-
founder Victor Yannecone previously represented NAACP for nine years before 
shifting his attention to environmental issues.  Chicano activist Arturo Sandoval 
also organized activities for the first Earth Day in the Southwest.  Earth Day 
organizer and Sierra Club lobbyist Linda Billings later translated her concern 
about farmworkers and pesticides into a new position as the Director of Pesticide 
Farm Safety Staff at EPA.  Al Meyerhoff began his career with California Rural 
Legal Assistance before becoming an attorney for Natural Resources Defense 
Council.  Historian Adam Rome argues that “the rise of the environmental 
movement owed much to the events of the 1960s” and suggests that scholars 
should consider the underexplored connections between environmentalism and 
  A close examination of the rhetoric and actions of 
environmental organizations shows that such sweeping generalizations of 
mainstream environmentalists are problematic. 
                                                 
881 Pulido and Peña, “Environmentalism and Positionality: The Early Pesticide 
Campaign of the United Farm Workers’ Organizing Committee, 1965-1971.” 
 
882 Ibid. 
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other social movements.883
Environmental groups did not assume that pesticide issues were resolved 
after the DDT ban nor did they ignore the effect of pesticides on farmworker 
health as suggested by Pulido, Peña, and Gordon.  EDF continued efforts to ban 
aldrin and dieldrin until the resolution of a lawsuit forced EPA to ban most uses 
of the chemical in 1974, two years after the DDT ban.  Sierra Club and other 
organizations supported more stringent occupational health standards for 
farmworkers, first contending that OSHA had a responsibility to protect 
farmworkers in 1973 and then recommending that Congress add new provisions 
to FIFRA that would better protect the workers in the fields.  These efforts 
continued at the state-level in Arizona and California in the 1980s.  State chapters 
of the Sierra Club played a critical role in the passage of the Arizona 
Environmental Quality Act of 1986, which abolished the ineffective Board of 
Pesticide Control, expanded buffer zones around fields, and provided better 
protection to farmworkers.  Environmental groups in California defended 
pesticide regulation from the attacks of Governor George Deukmejian and helped 
pass the sweeping Prop 65 toxics initiative.   Sierra Club and   environmental 
organizations, in fact, argue the necessity of protecting human and environmental 
  Undoubtedly, the examples of overlap in this study 
and those mentioned by Rome represent only a sample of persons who 
transitioned from an environmental group to an organization focused more 
specifically on social justice and vice versa. 
                                                 
883 Rome, “Give Earth a Chance,” 525; See also Rome, “The Genius of Earth 
Day,” 194-205. 
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health in pesticide reform efforts that continue to the present day.  Since 1972, 
environmental organizations repeatedly engaged in efforts to improve right-to-
know laws, preserve public access to decision-making on pesticide use, pass 
legislation to protect farmworkers and the public, and ban pesticides that 
threatened human health. 
Environmental organizations and farmworker groups recognized their 
common interests on multiple occasions and collaborated in a number of efforts 
both before and after 1972.  Cooperation had benefits for both environmentalists 
and farmworkers.  Sociologist Brian Mayer contends that blue/green coalitions 
provided workers an important ally, while environmentalists had better 
opportunity to learn about worker grievances first-hand and gain an insider’s 
perspective on employer practices from workers.  Collaboration granted 
organizations from both movements “a certain political legitimacy because the 
coalition stretches across class lines.”884
                                                 
884 Brian Mayer, Blue-Green Coalitions: Fighting for Safe Workplaces and 
Healthy Communities (Ithaca: ILR Press of Cornell University Press, 2009), 11. 
 Partnerships between farmworker groups 
and environmental organizations often took the form of jointly-filed lawsuits.  
California Rural Legal Assistance first partnered with EDF in 1969 in attempt to 
use the courts to set a zero tolerance for DDT residue.  More recently, 
representing the United Farm Workers and other organizations in 2011, 
Earthjustice and CRLA brought a suit to block the usage of methyl iodide.   
Farmworkers brought experiential knowledge about pesticides to cases.  EDF 
called upon a UFW representative in 1973 to counter claims from grower 
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associations that aldrin and dieldrin were critically important for sustained 
agricultural production.  The union representative testified that contracted fields 
in Florida produced healthy yields without use of the two chemicals.  
Farmworkers also constituted a group that could be easily identified as an injured 
party in pesticide lawsuits.   
Sometimes organizations within the different movements cooperated in 
campaigns; though, at other times, the groups voiced similar support for reform 
but did not coordinate a joint response.  Chapters of the Sierra Club worked in 
close association with Arizona Common Cause and the farmworker advocacy 
group Maricopa County Organizing Project to build public support for the 
Arizona Environmental Quality Act of 1986.  Natural Resources Defense Council 
and Sierra Club joined a coalition with CRLA in the early 1980s to defend state 
regulations from a barrage of assaults by Governor Deukmejian.  Some 
environmental groups supported the UFW “Wrath of Grapes” boycott that began 
in 1986.  A handful of activists also served on the UFW’s Environmentalists 
Committee.  Friends of the Earth and Farm Worker Association of Florida 
collaborated on the Sustainable Tomatoes/Safer Communities campaign that 
stretched from 1998 to 2002.  In 1990, both the UFW and California 
environmental organizations supported the passage of the “Big Green,” though it 
appears that the groups worked separately, in large part, to generate support for 
the initiative.  The merging of environmental and social justice arguments allowed 
an issue to be addressed on multiple fronts.  The expansion of arguments also 
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promised to increase the number of supporters who backed a particular agenda, 
strengthening the possibility that a reform effort would be successful.   
Cooperative efforts between farmworker groups and environmentalists 
often depended upon the work of bridge-builders within one or more of the 
organizations.  Bridge-builders transcend differences between organizations and 
ably negotiate the cultural terrain of diverse movements to foster working 
relationships.885
                                                 
885 Brian Mayer refers to these individuals as bridge brokers.  Mayer, Blue-Green 
Coalitions, 20, 32.  
  Staff professionals played the critical role in farmworker 
organizations.  Nurse Practitioner and boycott coordinator Marion Moses, for 
example, initiated contacts with scientists and the Environmental Defense Fund 
for Cesar Chavez in the 1960s.  Maricopa County Organizing Project attorney 
Nadine Wettstein similarly established working relationships with the local 
chapter of the Sierra Club and Arizona Common Cause to establish Arizona Clean 
Water Advocates.  FWAF Pesticide Safety and Environmental Health Project 
Coordinator Jeannie Economos and Administrator Sister Gail Grimes served as 
the primary contacts for Friends of the Earth in the Sustainable Tomatoes/Safer 
Communities campaign.  Sierra Club leaders--Raymond Sherwin, William 
Futrell, Will Siri, Michael McCloskey--cast invitations for partnerships with labor 
unions on issues of mutual interest, while some lobbyists like Linda Billings 
networked with different farmworker groups.  NRDC attorney Al Meyerhoff 
undertook efforts to maintain a working relationship between his organization and 
the UFW in the wake of Cesar Chavez’s passing.  These individuals facilitated the 
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growth of collaborative efforts between the farmworker movement and the 
environmental movement.   
Sociologists Sherry Cable, Tamara Mix, and Donald Hastings suggest that 
the most effective working relationships between environmentalists and 
environmental justice activists occur when the environmental justice organization 
has a professional staffer who shares a common background (well-educated and 
middle class) with environmentalists and functions as a bridge between the 
groups.886
Differences in strategy and timing limited opportunities for collaboration 
between farmworker groups and environmental organizations to some extent.  
UFW harbored a distrust of government and believed that a union contract offered 
the best protection to farmworkers by fostering an industrial democracy in the 
fields.  Contract provisions enabled farmworkers to participate in decision-making 
processes relating to the application of chemicals on union-contracted fields.  
  These case studies appear to affirm this contention.  Often the 
individuals within the farmworker organizations who communicated with 
environmental groups had not previously worked in the fields.  Rather they were 
professionals committed to principles of social justice.  Their level of education 
and professional background likely facilitated communication between the 
organizations.  The histories and significance of inter-organizational bridge-
builders still call for further scholarly examination though. 
                                                 
886 Sherry Cable, Tamara Mix, and Donald Hastings, “Mission Impossible? 
Environmental Justice Activists’ Collaborations with Professional 
Environmentalists and with Academics,” Power, Justice, and the Environment: A 
Critical Appraisal of the Environmental Justice Movement, ed. David Naguib 
Pellow and Robert J. Brulle (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 66.  
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UFW reasoned that if farmworkers acted as watchdogs against the misuse of 
agricultural chemicals, then both farmworkers and consumers would be better 
protected from the adverse effects of exposure to pesticides.  The union used 
lawsuits and supported passage of new pesticide regulation as well, but it was 
most committed to the strategy of using the boycott to win a union contract.  
Environmental groups, conversely, invested heavily in lawsuits and campaigns to 
pass more stringent regulatory law.  The associated farmworker organizations 
Maricopa County Organizing Project and Arizona Farm Workers used the courts 
and initiative process effectively, but the timing of their efforts did not coincide 
with NIMBY environmental activism until 1984 when pesticides drifted once 
again into suburban Scottsdale neighborhoods and awoke a latent discontent with 
the Board of Pesticide Control.  Such variations limited, but did not eliminate 
opportunities for collaboration between farmworker groups and environmental 
organizations. 
Collaborative efforts between farmworker groups and environmentalists 
often proved temporary, but the impermanent nature of cooperative work does not 
weaken its significance.  Political scientist David Meyer maintains that 
cooperative endeavors and coalitions lack permanence and that “the peak of 
mobilization is always limited.”887
                                                 
887 David S. Meyer, The Politics of Protest: Social Movements in America (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 76. 
  He argues that “changes in policy, political 
alignments, or even rhetoric alter the constellation of political opportunities for 
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each organization.”888
 
  Organizations often drift apart at the conclusion of a trial 
or when efforts to enact new regulatory laws end in success or failure.  
Environmentalists and farmworker groups then refocused on other objectives, but 
channels of communication remained open and left the possibility of future 
collaborations.  Farmworker groups and environmentalists remained keenly 
interested in pesticide issues in the nearly fifty years since the release of Silent 
Spring, but the different organizations also addressed a host of different issues 
and shifted resources to address other concerns during that time as well.  The 
possibility of reestablishing cooperative arrangements arose when the different 
organizations returned their focus to pesticides at the same time and when 
strategies and goals aligned. 
A Single Movement for Reform 
 
Farmworker groups and environmental organizations are typically 
characterized as belonging to distinct social movements.  From one perspective 
this is true.  Yet, their efforts to reform pesticide use practices place them together 
in a broad social movement to reform industrialized agriculture into a system with 
more just labor relations, less impact on the environment, sustainable crop 
production, and safe food.  David Meyer defines social movements within the 
United States as “coalition affairs” with “sometimes loosely negotiated alliances 
                                                 
888 Meyer, The Politics of Protest, 76. 
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among groups and individuals with different agendas.”889  Meyer adds that the 
combination of “different constituencies, analysis, tactical capabilities, and 
resources” strengthens a social movement.  A diverse collection of organizations 
working simultaneously toward complementary goals increases the visibility of 
issues, improves the opportunity to involve a wider range of people in the reform 
effort, and enhances a movement’s chance of success.890  Viewing the 
organizations as part of a single social movement makes it easier to view the 
groups in less dichotomous terms and understand that even when the 
organizations are working on separate efforts, they are often working towards a 
common end.891
                                                 
889 Meyer, The Politics of Protest, 73. 
     
 
890 Ibid., 75. 
 
891 Sociologist Robert Brulle and environmental engineer Jonathan Essoka 
maintain that “arbitrary and constructed dichotomies, such as between the ‘Group 
of Ten’ and the environmental justice movement obscure the real variation within 
the environmental movement, and fail to advance our understanding of the 
dynamics of this movement.”  Robert J. Brulle and Jonathan Essoka, “Whose 
Environmental Justice? An Analysis of the Governance Structure of 
Environmental Organizations in the United States,” in Power, Justice, and the 
Environment: A Critical Appraisal of the Environmental Justice Movement, ed. 
David Naguib Pellow and Robert J. Brulle (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 
215.  Thinking of farmworker groups and environmental organizations as part of a 
single social movement to reform the industrial agriculture production system 
may spark a new analyses of the groups.  New understanding could, as Robert 
Brulle and sociologist David Pellow suggest, overcome “obstacles to the 
construction of a powerful mass movement that could potentially produce the sort 
of structural changes associated with the goals of environmental justice.”  Robert 
J. Brulle and David Naguib Pellow, “The Future of Environmental Justice 
Movements,” in Power, Justice, and the Environment: A Critical Appraisal of the 
Environmental Justice Movement, ed. David Naguib Pellow and Robert J. Brulle 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 299. 
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The approaches employed by farmworker groups and environmental 
organizations to restrict pesticide use and foster the growth of a more just and 
sustainable agricultural production system produced a variety of gains.  Union 
contracts prohibited growers from using a handful of hazardous pesticides and 
gave farmworkers a say in decision-making processes for the duration of the 
contract.  Lawsuits resulted in the ban of a number of dangerous pesticides, 
beginning with DDT, aldrin, and dieldrin.  Bills supported, and sometimes 
written, by environmental organizations and farmworker groups created a body of 
laws that together changed the intent of regulation from protecting growers’ 
investments to safeguarding the health of workers, the public, and environment.  
Growers, faced with numerous restrictions, need to be much more careful in their 
use of pesticides today than they were in the 1960s. 
During the nearly fifty years of pesticide activism, environmental 
organizations and farmworker groups added to the catalog of information on 
pesticides by conducting studies and using the data to support arguments for 
stronger pesticide regulations.  UFW conducted tests on grocery store grapes to 
prove the presence of DDT residues on produce and show consumers that they 
were not free of pesticide risk.  Air monitoring tests conducted by the Farm 
Worker Association of Florida, Friends of the Earth, and Environmental Working 
Group showed that the fumigant methyl bromide drifted into neighborhoods 
surrounding fields in the process of dissipating into the atmosphere.  The evidence 
from the tests done in California led to the creation of buffer zones around fields 
where the fumigant was used.  Friends of the Earth also helped fund research that 
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investigated the feasibility of phasing out methyl bromide in developing 
countries.  In Arizona, Maricopa County Organizing Project collected data to 
chart the sale and usage of DBCP and EDB and the location of labor camps in 
order to get the state health department to treat agricultural wells in the same 
regard as residential wells, a change that promised to better protect farmworker 
health.  When the beleaguered health department claimed to lack the resources 
necessary to conduct extensive testing of water supplies, M-COP coordinated a 
series of groundwater tests and submitted the data showing contaminated well 
sites  to the Arizona Department of Health Services.  The information gathering 
efforts of environmental organizations and farmworker groups often helped 
advance pesticide reform efforts. 
Environmental organizations and farmworker groups also acted as 
watchdogs of regulatory law.  After the passage of new regulations, general public 
interest in the function of the regulatory agency wanes.  The regulated industry, 
however, remains deeply interested, sometimes aggressively opposing agency 
action.  With public interest in the regulatory agency relaxed, the regulated 
industry has greater opportunity to exert its influence on the agency, tempering 
regulation and, as much as possible, preserving the status quo.892
                                                 
892 Paul Sabatier, “Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies: Toward a More 
Adequate—and Less Pessimistic—Theory of ‘Clientele Capture,’” Policy 
Sciences 6, No. 3 (September 1975): 303. 
  An example of 
this phenomenon occurred when growers’ associations and their congressional 
allies pressured the Occupational Health and Safety Administration to revise its 
standards on organophosphates, which were intended to protect farmworkers, in 
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1974.  Political scientist Paul Sabatier consequently argues that “the presence of 
an organized constituency (supportive of aggressive regulation) capable of 
monitoring the [regulatory] agency and mobilizing in its defense is a necessary 
and, within certain broad limits, even a sufficient condition for forestalling” 
regulatory decay.893
Yet, dangerous pesticides still remain in use after decades of engagement 
in pesticide politics.  The problem, in part, can be traced to the way in which 
pesticides are conceptualized, registered, and regulated.  To remove a pesticide 
from the market or to restrict its usage, proponents of reform must first establish 
that the chemical poses a significant risk to human health or the environment.  
The process to restrict a chemical often requires a great investment of time and 
resources.  Hence, despite the significant achievements of environmental 
organizations and farmworker groups in past pesticide reform efforts, many 
challenges remain ahead.  Prop 65 introduced another alternative for regulation to 
California voters.  When passed Prop 65 fundamentally reshaped the regulatory 
landscape in the state by shifting the burden of proof from government and the 
public to industry.  Premised on the precautionary principle, it required industry to 
prove that a product was safe before selling it, rather than necessitating that 
  In their role as watchdogs, environmental organizations and 
farmworker groups have regularly filed suit when state and federal agencies have 
proven slack in their regulation of pesticides.  The resulting court rulings have 
often forced the targeted agency to fulfill its responsibility to the public and 
change its regulatory behavior.  
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proponents of reform prove the existence of a health threat after a toxin had 
caused harm.  Since products using a listed carcinogen or mutagen in their 
manufacture had to carry a warning label until the company proved that its usage 
in the product did not constitute a health threat, the law gave industry reason to 
favor expediency more than delay.  Replicas of the California initiative or other 
variations of the precautionary principle have not been widely adopted though.  
Environmental organizations and farmworker groups will have to remain ever 
vigilant: staying abreast of new scientific studies on the adverse effects of 
pesticides, considering the experiential knowledge of communities and persons 
who encounter pesticides in their daily life, educating the public and government 
officials about pesticide threats, and monitoring regulatory agencies to ensure that 
they fulfill their responsibility to the public.  Together and separately, 
environmental organizations and farmworker groups will undoubtedly continue to 
take action as part of a diverse social movement to reform the chemically-
intensive industrial agriculture system that developed in the post-WWII era and 
reduce the threat that dangerous pesticides pose to human health and the 
environment. 
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